Museums in China: Power, Politics and Identities (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia) Hardcover – November 13, 2013 Oxford and New York: Routledge. by Tracey L-D Lu (Author) Introduction---- From the earliest museums established by Western missionaries in order to implement religious and political power, to the role they have played in the formation of the modern Chinese state, the origin and development of museums in mainland China differ significantly from those in the West. The occurrence of museums in mainland China in the late nineteenth century was primarily a result of internal and external conflicts, Westernization and colonialism, and as such they were never established solely for enjoyment and leisure. Using a historical and anthropological framework, this book provides a holistic and critical review on the establishment and development of museums in mainland China from 1840 to the present day, and shows how museums in China have been used by a wide range of social, political, and state actors for a number of economic, religious, political and ideological purposes. Indeed, Tracey L-D Lu examines the key role played by museums in reinforcing social segmentation,influencing the economy, protecting cultural heritage and the construction and enhancement of ethnic identities and nationalism, and how they have throughout their history helped the powerful to govern the less powerful or the powerless. More broadly, this book provides important comparative insights on museology and heritage management, and questions who the key stakeholders are, how museums reflect broader social and cultural changes, and the relationship between museum and heritage management. Drawing on extensive archival research and anthropological fieldwork, as well as the author’s experience working as a museum curator in mainland China in the late 1980s, Museums in China such will be of great interest to students and scholars working across museology, heritage studies, tourism studies, Chinese culture and Chinese history. ------------------------------- Contents--- 1. China between 1840 and 1949 2. Missionaries and Early Museums 3. Social Elites and Early Museums 4. Museums for Modern State Formation 5. Museums in the Communist State 6. Ecomuseum, Ethnicity and the Management of Intangible Cultural Heritage 7. Tourism, Museum and Local Cultural Changes 8. Museums in a Changing China Series: Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia (Book 89) Hardcover: 256pages Publisher: Routledge (November 13, 2013) Language: English ISBN-10: 0415828554 ISBN-13: 978-0415828550 Product Dimensions: 9.4 x6.7 x 0.8 inches Shipping Weight: 1.2pounds ---------------------------------------- About the Author Tracey L-D Lu is Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong 呂烈丹 http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ant/tracey/ Educations : 08/1994-02/1998: Dept. of Archaeology and Anthropology, Australian National University.Australia. Ph.D. 1985-1987: Dept.of Archaeology, Beijing University, China. M.Phil. 1979-1983: Dept.of Anthropology, Zhongshan University, China. BA. --------------------------
你觉得现实生活中有诸多不满意吗？你觉得日常交往中被忽视、歧视想改变现状吗。不妨看一下英国Telegraph报社记者Louisa Peacock的经历。对不端行为的不满，可以进行公开指责。这有助于让你得到满意的结果。 Louisa Peacock http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/louisa-peacock/ Louisa Peacock is The Telegraph's Deputy Women's Editor on Wonder Women , a daily section covering politics, business, life, family and sex. She commissions and writes news, comment and features across the site, including her weekly blog Skirting the Issue . Previously the paper's award-winning Jobs Editor, Louisa continues to comment on employment, careers and business, penning a Work column for The Sunday Telegraph . She is a regular commentator on stories, reviewing the papers on radio and TV. Follow her on Twitter @louisapeacock I was refused entry to swanky restaurant for not being sexy enough When Louisa Peacock was refused entry to a restaurant for not wearing high heels or clubbing gear - as if she wasn't sexy enough -she complained to company HQ. They dealt with the 'sexist' incident so swiftly that she has new-found belief in calling out bad behaviour
130105 background FISCAL “CRISIS”: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS Dancing to the music of time ***** TAGS: ***** usa only. policy politics. economy , Fiscal Crisis. national. shortrun, midrun, longrun. commentary, analysis. background. FISCAL “CRISIS” 1 Scenarios 1.1 Accomplishments 1.2 Failures 1.3 POLITICS 2 Shortrun partisan strategy 2.1 Midrun “regime shift” 2.2 Longrun Constitution 2.3 ECONOMICS 3 Shortrun recovery 3.1 Midrun change 3.2 Longrun growth 3.3 SE I National GREETING HAPPY NEW YEAR to all readers.I will strive to achieve the MISSION of this Blog: First, call the attention of Chinese readers to the best COMMENTARY on American politics in the American media. Second, relate that Commentary to the best ANALYSIS in academic research on American politics, particularly explanations. Third, relate both of those to relevant EVALUATION, whether through elite frameworks or mass sentiments. THIS POST This week we focus on America’s turn-of-the-year fiscal crisis, relating much media Commentary to a little academic Analysis. The first section on FISCAL CRISIS summarizes the basic fiscal and political problems involved and how they were or were not solved. The second section unravels some of the POLITICS involved, at varying time scales. The third section provides some of the ECONOMIC background of America’s fiscal difficulties, again at varying time scales. America’s fiscal crisis is a complex subject, so this is a long Post. It provides BACKGROUND, not only for the partisan battle over how to avoid the recent “Fiscal Cliff,” but also for more battles over the same issues in coming months and years. The many media comments on this episode add up to a detailed account, but are difficult to assemble and are subject to partisan simplification. Accordingly, this Post begins by summarizing that journalistic Commentary and only gradually shifts toward more academic Analysis. Readers are welcome to proceed only as far as their interest carries them. (For further BACKGROUND, readers may wish to consult a previous Post on this Blog: 121201 “The politics of “fiscal crisis.”) A first theme of this Post is that partisan POLITICS drives policy-making more than does the substance of policy. In economic policy-making, political logic often overwhelms economic logic. A second theme is that the particular current configuration of American politics tends to turn problems into CRISES. In American policy politics, “crisis” is becoming the new “normal”. A third theme is explicit attention to TIME as a dimension of policy politics. Time is intrinsic both to the substance of policies and to the strategies of politics through which policies are formed. Both policy and politics involve interactions between shortrun, midrun, and longrun (“inter-temporality”). Overall, the main temporal contradiction is between shortrun political advantage and longrun economic benefit. However, we also note temporal contradictions within politics and economics. (The New York Times collects its articles on the Fiscal Cliff – along with links to relevant resources – under Federal Budget in its Times Topics at topics.nytimes.com. For general literature on American fiscal politics, an expert and accessible introduction is David Wessel 2012 Red ink : inside the high-stakes politics of the federal budget. New York : Crown Business, 204 pages (using 2011 as example). A competent textbook is the similarly titled Gary Evans 1997 Red ink : the budget, deficit, and debt of the U.S. government. San Diego CA: Academic Press, 297 pages. An incisive analysis is Simon Johnson and James Kwak 2012 White House burning : the Founding Fathers, our national debt, and why it matters to you . New York NY: Random House, 268 pages. An history is Dennis S. Ippolito 2003 Why budgets matter : budget policy and American politics. University Park PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 329 pages. On a formative period, see Jonathan Kahn 1997. Budgeting democracy : state building and citizenship in America, 1890-1928. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 222 pages. On recent decades see Iwan Morgan 2009 The age of deficits : presidents and unbalanced budgets from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush. Lawrence KN: University Press of Kansas, 375 pages.) FISCAL “CRISIS” 1 As readers know, approaching the end of 2012, America was approaching a “Fiscal Cliff”: an already scheduled combination of sharp rise in taxes and sharp fall in spending. Those drastic changes did not result from a crisis in the real economy. They were an artificial punishment that in 2011 American political leaders had scheduled to force themselves to compromise on fiscal policy in 2012. Nevertheless, failure to meet this artificial challenge would put the real economy back into recession. (For an acerbic critique of this episode, see Paul Krugman 121230 “Brewing up confusion” at nytimes.com. Also Clive Crook 130102 “When governing means lurching between phony crises” at bloomberg.com.) Most liberal commentators deplore both the political process and its policy outcome. Some very liberal commentators say the policy outcome is not too bad but that strategic situation in which the negotiating process leaves Obama is disastrous. Most conservative commentators deplore the policy outcome (higher taxes but not lower spending) and defend the confrontational political process as necessary – in the face of potential future fiscal catastrophe – for pursuing any and all possible means to cut spending. A rare positive view of the legislative process that produced the Cliff Deal sees democracy prevailing over usually anti-democratic conduct of congressional business (Steven Pearlstein 130102 “Congress tries democracy for a change!” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.) Before plunging into details, let’s OVERVIEW both policy and politics. On the POLICY side, the main argument is between radical conservatives and moderate liberals over how to manage America’s longrun TOTAL DEBT. Conservatives call for drastic action in the shortrun, liberals for gradual adjustment over the midrun. The radical-conservative analysis views America’s longrun total debt with deservedly great alarm. Debt is currently about 23% of GDP and currently growing faster than GDP. So the DEBT/GDP RATIO is rising. If debt continues to grow at the current rate, within a few decades it could reach 40% of GDP. That will make us into “Greece,” the current exemplar of an unsustainable situation from which there is no easy escape. Any current strategies to avoid such a future national catastrophe are justified. These include using any and every issue in the current fiscal crisis as leverage to force reduction in spending. Conservatives should demand spending cuts in exchange for again raising the Debt Limit and, if it does not get such cuts, should threaten to allow the country to DEFAULT on its debt obligations. Obama and the Democrats have already raised taxes, so all further debt reduction should come from decreasing spending. As quickly as possible, the USA should totally restructure existing social programs to remove them from the national government budget. (Such arguments, much data, and other specifics are available at a website of the very conservative Cato Institute, downsizinggovernment.org.) The moderate liberal response is that what the USA needs to do is, over the next ten years, achieve a sustainable relationship of total debt to GDP. Getting there requires that debt grow slower than GDP, so that debt gradually falls as a proportion of GDP. That requires a total of about $3.3 trillion in debt reduction over the next ten years, during which total GDP will be about $200 trillion. Of the $3.3 trillion needed reduction, $2.1 trillion have already been achieved: $1.5 trillion in spending cuts during the August 2011 negotiations over raising the Debt Limit and $0.6 trillion in tax increases in the Cliff Deal just passed. So we need only another $1.2 trillion in debt reduction, notionally half from spending cuts and half from tax increases. Although that will be painful and difficult, a rational congress should be able to do it. If so, of the $3.3 trillion in debt reduction, $2.1 trillion will have come from spending cuts, and $1.2 trillion from tax increases. If, as the Republicans now demand, all further debt reduction comes from spending cuts, then $2.7 trillion will have come from spending cuts and only $0.6 trillion from tax increases. (See Jared Bernstein 130106 “A little table (or two) showing why we’re neither Greece nor in need of default” at jaredbernsteinblog.com. That Post contains links to longer analysis supporting that argument and that Blog contains earlier Posts on the Fiscal Cliff crisis. Jared Bernstein formerly was economic advisor to Vice President Joe Biden and is now at the liberal Center for Budget and Policy Priorities.) On the POLITICS side, a main disappointment is that it took American politicians so long and such effort to arrive at a policy outcome on which they all agreed from the beginning: taxes should not rise on the American middle class. Commentators expect policy outcomes to be even harder to reach about issues on which the parties actually disagree, such as whether to cut spending on defense or on social programs. To understand why political conflict over the Fiscal Cliff exceeded the actual extent of policy disagreement, commentators use a variety of explanations. Most commentary involves an IDEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: That Republicans have become increasingly radical in their conservatism and are not interested in compromise. Politicians in both parties have become more uncompromising because, through redistricting, their constituencies have become safer and more homogenous. Some commentary also involves a GENERATIONAL EXPLANATION. When formerly the views of the two parties overlapped, older politicians experienced the advantages of compromise. Now that the views of the two parties do not overlap, younger politicians have not had experience at compromise and perhaps never will. Most commentary relies also on an INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION: to prevent rash action, American institutions deliberately fragment and delay decision-making. Most observers think the Fiscal Cliff takes that too far. A more STRATEGIC EXPLANATION is that the various sides were exploring all possibilities for taking apart or putting together the various policy elements involved. Of course they were doing that for their own partisan purposes, but the effect was to consider a lot of alternatives. The strategic explanation may be paralleled by an ANALYTICAL EXPLANATION. The most advanced formulations in American political science argue that, under certain analytical conditions, decision processes are inherently chaotic. Under those conditions, the main things that makes any decisions possible at all are institutional rules. With that overview in hand, we continue by noting the range of possible scenarios that the recent Cliff Crisis involved. The same range will apply to the several more fiscal crises that will erupt in coming months and years. Indeed, that range of scenarios could apply to any policy crises that American politics creates. That includes crises that result from linking resolution of fiscal crises to solving other problems – such as the upcoming issues of gun control, energy, and immigration. In other policy domains, the specific policy items will be different, but the range of policy packages and political processes will be similar. A classic academic formulation of this range of scenarios contrasted “synoptic” policy-making – which overviews all aspects of a matter at one time – with “incremental” policy-making – which addresses problems piecemeal over time. That author thought incremental policy-making more feasible and effective. (See Charles Lindblom 1959 “The science of 'muddling through'. Public Administration Review 19, 2 (Spring) 79–88.) Scenarios 1.1 In late 2012, the range of SCENARIOS for avoiding the Fiscal Cliff included the following. (See Carrie Budoff Brown and Jake Sherman 121112 “5 fiscal cliff scenarios” at politico.com.) At one end was a comprehensive agreement in late 2012 on all the main fiscal issues for early 2013: increasing TAX, cutting SPENDING, raising the DEBT LIMIT, authorizing the annual BUDGET and, in the long run, reducing America’s cumulative TOTAL DEBT. A comprehensive agreement would have been an exemplary policy process, hopefully leading to wise policy. At the other end of the spectrum of possibilities was simply “going over the cliff” of the arbitrary 31 December deadline, without resolving ANY of these issues in 2012 or establishing ANY common FRAMEWORK for solving them in 2013. That would have revealed a completely DYSFUNCTIONAL policy process that produced no policy at all. In between were various possible combinations of (1) resolving some issues but not others and (2) for the unresolved issues, creating or not creating a framework for addressing them. There was also the possibility of aggregating issues into packages and treating them together, versus the possibility of disaggregating packages into single issues and treating those sequentially. Most observers of the current congress predicted a relatively dysfunctional policy process that would, nevertheless, produce some policy result in the end. Congress would do what it usually does: as little as possible until as late as possible, then do the minimum necessary to avoid crisis. Expecting congress to try to do just that, a few canny observers added that the only way the USA would actually “go over the cliff” was through one side or the other making a tactical miscalculation in the final stages of bargaining. Nevertheless, as it became clear that the “cliff” was only a “slope,”an increasing number of observers predicted that the deadlocked sides would simply “go over” it. Those observations correctly anticipated the PROCESS that actually occurred. Policymaking remained deadlocked even until shortly AFTER the deadline had already passed. The process was made even more messy and uncertain because key actors DID made tactical miscalculations, For example, approaching negotiations with Obama, House Speaker Boehner miscalculated the firmness of Obama’s determination to raise taxes on the rich – in Obama’s plan, all income over $250,000. Attempting to adjust for that miscalculation, Boehner proposed an alternative plan, but miscalculated his ability to obtain House Republican support for it. Breaking recent Republican principles, Boehner’s plan allowing taxes to rise, but only on income over $600,000.) The final compromise in the Cliff Deal was to allow the Bush tax cuts to expire on all income over $400,000 ($450,000 for couples) – effectively the USA’s new definition of “the rich.” (On the overall process, see Jennifer Steinhauer 121231 “Grand deals give way to legislative quick fixes” at nytimes.com) Accomplishments 1.2 Despite the messiness of the process, the resulting POLICY was a solid accomplishment on TAX matters. It avoided tax increases of more than $200 billion a year that might have driven the economy back into recession. It replaced “temporary” Bush policies with notionally permanent ones. That somewhat reduced economic uncertainty and thereby should promote economic growth. Taken as a whole, the Cliff Deal probably reduced government taxation of the economy by about 1-1.5% of GDP, most of the contraction in the first half of the year. So on balance, despite continuing tax cuts for the middle class, the Deal probably had some “austerity” effect. (A good short summary of the fiscal details and their likely economic effects is 130105 “Nothing to be proud of” at economist.com. A particularly positive view of the policy substance of the deal is E.J. Dionne Jr. 130102. “The cliff deal is better than it looks” at washingtonpost.com. A particularly negative view is Dylan Matthews 130102 “Everything is terrible” on Wonkblog at wasingtonpost.com.) To understand why this tax accomplishment was a “big deal” in American politics we must briefly review the tax policies of recent administrations. The Republican Reagan administration significantly lowered tax rates in 1981 but, when that produced deficits, endorsed tax increases that took back about half of the cut. Under Reagan, nominal marginal rates on the highest incomes began at about 50% and ended at about 28%. Famously breaking a campaign pledge, the Republican first Bush administration raised top marginal rates to 31%. The Democratic Clinton administration raised the top marginal rate to 39.6%, which helped balance the budget and evidently did not harm economic prosperity. The Republican Bush administration repeatedly LOWERED taxes, including top marginal rates to 35%, until 2012. This was accompanied by budget deficits and, in the end, the Great Recession. One expected the Democratic Obama administration, once past the Great Recession, to RAISE taxes to prevent cuts to social programs while reducing deficits. Obama had long promised to raise taxes on very high incomes from their Bush 35% back to their previous Clinton 39.6%. With the Cliff Deal, he has succeeded in doing that. (Throughout all this, effective rates differed from nominal rates.) Nevertheless, Obama has also always advocated making permanent the tax cuts that Bush Republicans granted the “middle class.” Those middle class cuts were more important, both politically and fiscally. Bush lowered taxes on the middle class in order to secure broad electoral support. Now, politically, Democrats cannot afford to approach the American electorate as the party that raised taxes on the middle class. Meanwhile middle class Americans are not contributing as much as they must to fund the social programs they expect. Thus, in the Cliff Deal, the main accomplishment of Obama and the Democrats was to fulfill a campaign promise to raise taxes on the rich. In addition to raising the rate on high income, the Cliff Deal raised taxes on the wealthy by other means as well. The increase in the tax on capital gains and dividends was one. Earners of $250,00 or more will lose some tax deductions. The wealthy will contribute more to funding Obama’s health care reform (currently about $24 billion per year, as previously scheduled). Obama emphasized his accomplishment in raising taxes on the rich in his announcement of the Cliff Deal. The Cliff Deal left income taxes on the middle class low. Another tax favor to the middle class was fixing the “alternative minimum tax” (at a cost in foregone revenue currently about $105 billion a year). This tax was originally an attempt to ensure that the wealthy paid at least SOME taxes. However, inflation made it gradually impact more and more middle incomes. The Cliff Deal permanently “patched” that by pegging the threshold for having to pay the tax to inflation, protecting about 30 million middle class taxpayers. In addition, in 2009 Obama had enacted expansions of tax credits for families, workers and college students. The Cliff Deal extends those for five more years. Extra-long unemployment benefits were extended for one year (at a cost of about $30 billion). (On the history of the “alternative minimum tax,” see 130103 “The phantom tax that made the deficit look better” at npr.com.) Emphasizing tax increases on the rich obscures the fact that the Cliff Deal DOES, to some extent, raise taxes on the middle class as well. The deal lets a temporary 2% reduction of the tax on wages expire, returning the payroll tax to its previous 6.2% (generating additional revenues currently about $115 billion a year). That tax funds a program that is a favorite of the middle classes, the government’s retirement program, Social Security. The longterm solvency of Social Security is already in doubt, so evidently Democrats did not want to jeopardize it further. Emphasizing tax increases on the rich also obscures the fact that, in the bargaining over the Cliff Deal, Republicans managed to secure some significant tax breaks for the rich. For example, the Cliff Deal did raise from 15% to 20% the taxes on capital gains and dividends (money made from money). However, that rate remains lower than before 2001. Similarly, the Cliff Deal did raise from 35% to 40% the tax on the portion of inheritances over $5 million. However, that is lower than the 55% that would have gone into effect without the Deal. Luckily the amount of inheritance that can be bequeathed tax free was not raised from $5 million to $7, as conservatives had proposed. Mostly the USA does not tax inter-generational transfer of assets within rich families, a tax that is a logical means of progressive taxation for funding a socially democratic regime. The Cliff Deal also contained some specific favors for specific companies. (Bob Greenstein 121218 “Further estate tax cut would be a disgrace” at huffingtonpost.com. On favors see Matt Stoller 130101 “Eight corporate subsidies in the Fiscal Cliff bill, from Goldman Sachs to Disney to NASCAR” at twitter.com/matthewstoller .) Failures 1.3 Although the Cliff Deal was a significant tax accomplishment, it did not much address any of the other fiscal problems that constituted the Fiscal Cliff and that the Fiscal Cliff had been created to force congress to solve. This leaves the congress looking INCOMPETENT, both economically and politically. The unresolved issues remain in at various time horizons of the American fiscal policy agenda. That leaves a great deal of UNCERTAINTY, both economic and political. (On unresolved issues, see Neil Irwin 130202 “Get used to more fiscal cliffs” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.) The Cliff Deal did not address SPENDING, except by simply postponing the automatic cuts ($110 billion a year) from the beginning of January until the beginning of March. On spending reduction, the Cliff Deal did enact cuts in discretionary spending (currently worth $60 billion a year, totaling perhaps a trillion dollars over the next ten years). Obama had agreed to those cuts (which were not to entitlements) in August 2011 during the negotiations to raise the debt limit. Republicans now claim that, because Obama had agreed to that cut in the PAST, it does not count as a new spending cut in PRESENT negotiations. (An interesting temporal argument: imagine if you could not claim credit for having lost twenty pounds over the past six months, only the few ounces you lost this week.) Some Republicans even claimed that that trillion did not count because it was merely a promise not to spend that money in the FUTURE. (Another interesting temporal argument: ALL spending cuts are decisions not to spend money in the future!) In striving for a comprehensive deal, Obama had demanded that congress raise the DEBT LIMIT (the total amount that the congress authorizes the national government to borrow). At first Obama had demanded a five year extension, then only a one year extension: eventually he got none. Correspondingly, the Republicans did not get the main concession that evidently Obama was willing to make in return, a change in the method of calculating Social Security benefits that would lower them gradually over time (“chained CPI”). Technically on 31 December 2012 the USA actually did hit its $16.4 trillion borrowing limit. The Treasury can use “extraordinary measures” to avoid a government default, but only for a couple of months. (Joseph J. Schatz and Patrick Reis 130101 “Enjoy the fiscal cliff debate? Just wait for the debt ceiling” at politico.com. For the two sides already squaring off against each other, see Zachary A. Goldfarb 130102 “Lawmakers clash over federal debt ceiling” at washingtonpost.com, in its Fiscal Cliff series. On Obama’s strategy going into the forthcoming debt limit crisis, see Carrie Budoff Brown and Manu Raju 130104 “Obama's debt ceiling gambit” at politico.com.) Another fiscal issue that will arise in early 2013 is reauthorization of the ANNUAL BUDGET for the current fiscal year. A 1921 Budget and Accounting Act specifies that the president must submit a budget to Congress each year and that Congress should process it expeditiously. Nevertheless, in recent years, Congress has not passed all of the appropriations bills before the start of the fiscal year (1 October). Instead, Congress has passed “continuing resolutions” authorizing temporary funding. The government is currently operating under a continuing resolution – signed by President Obama on 28 September 2012 – that provides funding through 27 March 2013. So, by then, the USA will need another continuing resolution, providing another opportunity for fiscal politics and even fiscal crisis. (On authorization as a policy tool, see Thad Hall 2004. Authorizing policy. Columbus : Ohio State University Press, 147 pages.) The Cliff Deal made an only marginal contribution to reducing America’s longrun TOTAL DEBT. Raising taxes on the rich raises revenue by about $42 billion a year (current value) or $600 billion over the next ten years, which should reduce the cumulative debt by that amount. “However, that represents just 7% of the projected increase in the national debt over that time. Instead of a $25.4 trillion debt in 2022, the debt would be $24.8 trillion. Little wonder that bond-rating agencies, not to mention both Democratic and Republican budget experts who have worked on deficit deals in the past, are unimpressed.” (Susan Page 130102 “ 4 lessons for round 2 of 'fiscal cliff' fight” at usatoday.com. Also Matthew Yglesias 120102 “The next Fiscal Cliff “ at slate.com.) To most commentators, even bigger than economic failure was political failure. The politicians involved seem to have quite different versions of what is happening. The divisions are not just between the two parties, but also between factions within them: radical versus moderate conservative Republicans and a moderate president versus the more liberal Democrats. Commentators note the divergence of views and wonder what their clash would produce in early 2013. (See Ezra Klein 121231 “Why the White House thinks it’s winning the ‘fiscal cliff’” and “Why Republicans think they’re winning the ‘fiscal cliff.”“ Also 130102 “The lessons of the fiscal cliff.” All on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.) POLITICS 2 This section treats the interaction within politics of shortrun partisan strategy, midrun regime shift, and longrun institutions. Here the main inter-temporal contradiction – already strongly manifest in the present – is between the present shortrun configuration of American politics (which will probably persist into the midrun) and the USA’s longrun constitutional design. We discuss that contradiction below under 2.3, longrun institutions. There is no longer any ideological overlap between Republicans and Democrats. Moreover, there are strong forces driving them further apart – or, at least, driving Republicans ever further to the Right. Now among the fiercest battles in American politics are those within the Republican party, between what used to be considered quite conservative conservatives (now called “moderate” or “establishment” conservatives) and truly radical conservatives (the young Republican insurgents). The radical-Republican opposition to raising taxes even on the very rich further polarized American politics and reduced the capacity of partisan sides to cooperate with each other in resolving future fiscal crises. Both parties face a political contradiction between shortrun and midrun. Most directly relevant to fiscal politics is the Democrats’ dilemma. In the shortrun, they remain committed to maintaining and even extending the liberal social policy regime that they have put in place. They want to maintain it not only for those already enjoying it (shortrun), but also for the next generation (midrun) and generations to come (longrun). At the same time, Democrats cannot show how, in the longrun, they are going to pay for this. With relatively minor adjustments, Social Security is sustainable. In contrast, even with proposed measures for economizing, health care is not. Particular liberal Democrats may understand this, but the policy positions taken by the liberal wing of the Democratic party do not reflect such understanding. For example, during the “cliff” negotiations, Republicans proposed, and in principle Obama accepted, a method of fiscal adjustment that is politically easy. Instead of guaranteeing generous regular increases in welfare payments to compensate for inflation, government social programs could still make such adjustments, but adopt a less generous formula for calculating the rate of inflation (“chained CPI”). The cumulative longterm effect on seniors would be substantial. Nevertheless, this form of fiscal adjustment is politically easy now because the cost will be imposed only in the future – even then in an incremental and relatively invisible way. Presumably understanding that, “chained CPI”is one concession that Obama was willing to make to Republicans in exchange for raising the debt limit. Liberal Democrats denounced Obama for offering even this. Republicans face an even sharper contradiction than Democrats between their shortrun positions and midrun adjustments. Their present ideology is a free market one of self-reliance. Their present political base is, disproportionately, prosperous white people, particularly in the South. In the shortrun, Republicans cannot deeply offend that base. Nevertheless, in the midrun, that base is declining as a proportion of the American electorate, even within the regions where, historically, it has been most dominant (the South and mountain West). So. Somehow, Republicans must adjust their ideology and base. Shortrun partisan strategy 2.1 Most media commentary focused on shortrun strategy. Did Obama play his hand as well as he could have? How about Boehner? As Speaker of the House of Representatives, he was the main Republican leader and negotiator with Obama until near the end of the cliff process. How about the radically conservative Republicans in the House, who gradually destroyed Boehner’s effectiveness? In turning to the attitudes of various commentators toward these questions, let us note a wise qualitative piece by Nate Silver, the New York Times’ quantitative analyst of electoral politics. Silver notes another interaction between politics and policy: how you evaluate the Cliff Deal depends not just on overall partisanship but also on your priorities among particular policy objectives. For example, some Democrats might prioritize redistribution, some the relationship between taxes and spending, still others the effect of expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy on the economy. It becomes extremely difficult – even for a skilled quantitative analyst – to assess the Cliff Deal as a whole. There are too many policy components, too many substantive objectives, and each component has different implications for different objectives. (Nate Silver 130102 “Why it’s hard to score the fiscal deal” at nytimes.com.) Liberal Democrats appear genuinely divided. Some regard the Fiscal Deal as a great victory for OBAMA: after all, he did fulfill his campaign pledge to raise taxes on the rich. Evidently that was Obama’s own evaluation, since it was the first thing he said after victory. Republicans too were eager portray Obama as inordinately successful: He won this round for Democratic tax increases, so Republicans deserve to win the next round for Republican spending cuts. (For a roundup of liberal Democratic reaction and an argument for a positive evaluation, see Ezra Klein 130102. “Calm down, liberals. The White House won” on his Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com. Another roundup is 130104 “Liberals in a dither over whether Obama blew it, or nailed it” at npr.com.) Other liberals blame Obama for once again proving to be a poor negotiator. The Fiscal Cliff deadline was his moment of maximum leverage for his entire remaining time in office, and he failed to make the most of it. The Cliff Deal was not as good a result as he could have obtained by being willing to “go over the cliff.” Nevertheless, the fiscal result was tolerable. What was disastrous was the political result. Obama “caved” on some major issues and offered concessions on other issues in an effort to achieve a bigger deal. All confirms Republicans’ assumption that not only does Obama make too many concessions too early, in the end he does always cave. (For polite concern about the strategic situation in which the Cliff Deal leaves Obama see David Leonhardt 130102 “For Obama, a victory that also holds risks” at nytimes.com. For stronger statements see Noam Scheiber 121231 “Democrats' cliff compromise is bad; but the strategic consequences are disastrous” at tnr.com. Also Paul Krugman 121231 “Conceder In chief?” and 130101 “Perspective on the Deal,” both on Krugman’s blog The conscience of a liberal at krugman.blogs.nytimes.com.) Personally, although I greatly admire Obama, I can’t understand his approach to this episode and its upcoming sequels, perhaps because I don’t have access to the “inside” political information that he does. I would agree that the Fiscal Cliff deadline gave him leverage that he did not use and that that is important less for the content of the Cliff Deal than for his negotiating position in future policy crises. Going forward, I do not see anything equivalent to the leverage that the Fiscal Cliff gave him. This is particularly so because he has already renounced the idea of raising the Debt Limit himself, by declaring that the Constitution gives him the responsibility to protect the “faith and credit” of the USA. Evidently he does see alternative sources of leverage, presumably his ability to bring popular pressure to bear from outside Washington on inside Washington Republicans. As for CONGRESS, because the House is constitutionally responsible for deciding fiscal affairs, during the Fiscal Cliff negotiations, the Senate and McConnell had deferred to the House and its leader Boehner. From the moment Obama was reelected, Boehner knew he would have to adjust Republican positions to accommodate that victory. Moreover, with the 2014 elections in mind, Republican leaders did not want Republicans to stumble further into the pro-rich position in which their failed presidential candidate Romney had put them. Insisting on continuing tax cuts for millionaires would allow Democrats to continue to pillory Republicans. ((On the fate of Boehner’s plan for dealing with a reelected Obama, see the very detailed John Aloysius Farrell+ 130102 “The GOP's failed 'Plan O': Inside the fiscal-cliff Saga.” at nationaljournal.com.) (For background on congressional budgeting, see Lance T. LeLoup 2005. Parties, rules, and the evolution of congressional budgeting. Columbus OH: The Ohio State University Press, 250 pages. On budgeting by state legislatures, see Glenn Beamer 1999. Creative politics : taxes and public goods in a federal system. Ann Arbor MI : University of Michigan Press, 179 pages.) As negotiations began over a Cliff Deal, to his surprise Boehner discovered that Obama intended to keep his campaign pledge to raise taxes on the rich. So eventually Boehner adjusted the Republican position, from refusing to raise taxes on anyone or anything, to accepting the resumption of higher taxes only on the VERY rich. That adjustment was intended to protect Republicans, politically. Nevertheless, young radical-conservative House Republicans rebelled against Boehner, declaring their principled opposition to any compromise with Democrats, particularly over allowing taxes to rise on anyone, including millionaires. The young radicals rejected not only Obama’s proposals but their own leader Boehner’s as well! The negotiation process eventually broke down, not least because Boehner – no longer able to deliver Republican support for anything that he and Obama negotiated – could no longer act as the main Republican negotiator vis a vis Obama. McConnell watched in increasing dismay at the collapse, not only of responsible public policy but also of Republican unity and effectiveness. Finally, at the last minute, McConnell took the initiative of calling his old friend Joe Biden and offering to negotiate some deal. Biden got permission from Obama to answer the call, and Biden and McConnel negotiated a compromise. The compromise passed the Senate at 2am in the morning on 1 January (89-8, only three Democrats and five Republicans against). That bill then went to the House, where radical Republicans threatened to amend it, which would have required sending it back to the Senate, where reportedly Democratic Senate leader Harry Reid would have refused to bring it up for Senate consideration. (For a detailed narrative of the McConnell-Biden interaction, see David A. Fahrenthold, Paul Kane and Lori Montgomery 130102 “How McConnell and Biden pulled Congress away from the fiscal cliff” at washingtonpost.com.) Passing the unamended bill in the House required some delicate maneuvering. Normal Republican House procedure has been to bring bills up for a vote only if the bill was approved by “a majority of the majority.” That rule gives a minority of Republicans a veto over the work of the whole House. Boehner broke that rule in order to bring the Senate bill up for a vote. Probably the radical Republicans in the House could have prevented that if they had been determined to do so. By allowing the bill to come to a vote they in effect indicated that they were willing to accept it. But then, evidently not willing to go on record as accepting it, most of them (151) voted against the bill, which passed (257-167) only with support from Democrats (172). Only 16 Democrats opposed the bill. Midrun “regime shift” 2.2 From the point of view of possible incipient “shift” in America’s political-economic “regime,” the current fiscal crisis is the main current battleground: between a liberal-Democratic regime and a conservative-Republican regime. In policy terms, the liberal-Democratic regime is the legacy of Roosevelt’s New Deal and Johnson’s Great Society, as moderated, defended, and even extended by Clinton and Obama. The Republican Reagan Revolution in the 1980s inaugurated a shift away from that liberal Democratic regime toward a “neoliberal” one (free markets), a shift mostly continued by Bush senior and Bush junior. In political terms, the classic New Deal was achieved and attacked through two strong political parties, both run mostly by professional politicians and both containing a wide range of views. The Democratic side relied on considerable mass mobilization by labor. Both parties are now greatly transformed. It is not professional politicians who choose their party’s candidate but popular primaries in which extremists within both parties have an advantage. Redrawing of congressional districts has produced more and more districts that are “safe” for an incumbent from one side or the other, making those incumbents more independent of the national leaders of their parties. Finally, even the population has “sorted” itself into districts that are increasingly either Republican or Democratic. All of these processes have produced the polarization and indiscipline that plagued the Cliff Deal. And, in turn, the Cliff Deal has aggravated polarization and accelerated the transition from old to new styles of politics. These changing partisan alignments reflect changing political geography. In the 1960s the Democratic party over-rode its Southern faction and finally unequivocally supported the rights of African Americans in the South and elsewhere. In response, Southerners began shifting from Democrat to Republican. The Republican party, whose base was long in the North, has now shifted largely to the South, Midwest, and Mountain West. The crucial last-minute votes on the Cliff Deal reflect this. (See Alex Isenstadt 130102 “Why 85 House Republicans said ‘yes’ to taxes: The biggest dividing line within the Republican conference was geography” at politico.com.) The reappearance, late in the Cliff process, of two “senior statesman,” McConnell Biden, embodies the difference between the old and new political styles. “Adults” from the older political generation had to step in and pick up the pieces of what “kids” from the younger political generation had smashed. This highlights that some “regime shift” may be occurring in American politics and highlights the uncertainty that prevails during such a transition. Going through the normal channels of formal institutions (on fiscal matters, negotiations between President and House) failed to produce a solution. Personal networks had to intervene to save the day – networks between persons other than those managing the formal channels. No one any longer knows exactly how American national policy making works. (On Biden see Michael Hirsh 121231 “Biden May Be the Most Influential Vice President Ever” at nationaljournal.com. For a rebuttal, see Timothy Noah 130105 “Stop acting surprised by powerful Veeps” at tnr.com. On political uncertainty, see Karen Tumulty and Peter Wallsten 130102. “Has the ‘fiscal cliff’ fight changed how Washington works?” at washingtonpost.com, in its Fiscal Cliff series.) Longrun Constitution 2.3 Our theme here is the confrontation between recently polarized American politics (midrun) with the institutional design of the American Constitution (longrun). Most readers will already know that this combination is not working well. The American political system has worked quite well during periods when politics was “multi-polar”: more than one issue dividing political actors in more than one way, so that opponents on one issue often allied on another. For most of the period after the Civil War between North and South, the Republicans who had won the war dominated the North, while Democrats sought support in both North and South. There were many liberal Republicans in the progressive North and many conservative Democrats in the conservative South. There was much ideological overlap between the two parties. Diverse politicians formed diverse alliances with each other on diverse issues. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, many American political scientists expressed disgust at America’s ideologically “confused” parties. They admired “programmatic” British parties, which embraced relatively consistent conservative or liberal principles and were highly disciplined in pursuing those principles. In the centralized British parliamentary system, if a party won an election, it controlled all branches of government. Now, however, both the Republican and Democratic parties have become much more ideologically consistent: virtually no liberal Republics, fewer and fewer conservative Democrats. Democrats vote mostly with Democrats and Republicans vote almost exclusively with other Republicans. Party discipline has increased. The result is that the decentralized American bicameral presidential system is now run by the parliamentary-type parties for which American political scientists once longed. And it doesn’t work. (See Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein 2012 It's even worse than it looks : how the American constitutional system collided with the new politics of extremism New York : Basic Books, 226 p.) ECONOMICS 3 We now turn to the interaction of fiscal policy with economic performance, particularly with the economy’s still slow recovery from the Great Recession. (For academic analysis, see Richard W. Kopcke, Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Robert K. Triest eds, 2006. The macroeconomics of fiscal policy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 383 pages.) Here the main temporal contradiction is between shortrun and longrun. In the shortrun one must maintain spending in order to propel recovery. Nevertheless, somewhere in the midrun – in a “timely” fashion, as soon as possible – one must reduce spending in order to balance annual budgets and reduce cumulative longterm debt. This problem is sufficiently nuanced – requiring timely optimization among contradictory goals – that it would challenge even a single smart human. Unfortunately, in politics, this sort of problem lends itself to tendentious framings and partisan demagoguery. Thus the question of timing is central to partisan disagreements over American fiscal policy – or at least to how those disagreements are argued in public. Democrats want to continue to spend and invest in the immediate future in order to restart the American economy and generate more revenue. Republicans look at the longrun consequences of continuing current practices and demand the complete reform of those practices – evidently even at some cost in shortrun economic growth. To Republicans, the Democratic insistence on current “stimulus” and investment is just an excuse (in the name of an uncertain future benefit) to continue their irresponsible “tax and spend” ways. To Democrats, the Republican invocation of longrun disaster is just an excuse to demolish the liberal Democratic Welfare State as quickly and completely as possible. Shortrun economic recovery 3.1 One question about the shortrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance is what the impact on the economy would have been of “going over the fiscal cliff.” Higher taxes and lower spending would have kicked in only gradually, over the course of 2013. However, spending would fallen immediately, reducing funding for all government agencies and programs. Further loss of confidence in American decision-making would also have been immediate. Evidently markets expected American politics to reach some sort of Cliff Deal, and would have been unpleasantly surprised if it had not. The other main question about the shortrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance is what the impact of the Cliff Deal will be on the economy. After the Deal, stock markets rallied – but moderately, knowing that more Fiscal Cliffs lay ahead. But the Deal did not meet the requirements of the prescriptions of at least three rival economic theories: Keynesian stimulus, conservative reduction of both spending and debt, and reduction of uncertainty. The best any of these theories could say about the Cliff Deal was that things could have been worse. (See Jim Tankersley 130101‘Fiscal cliff’ deal falls short under three economic theories” at washingtonpost. Also Zachary A. Goldfarb 130103 “How the fiscal cliff deal will affect the economy and deficits, in six charts” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com On any economic theory, fiscal and economic affairs interact. Decline in government spending would slow recovery. The speed and extent of economic recovery greatly affects both government revenues and government spending. Of course, liberals and conservatives have different theories of the connection. Liberal Democratic economic policy is based on Keynes’ insight that, in order to prevent recessions from deepening into depressions, during recession governments must combat them by spending money to stimulate the economy. When severe economic downturn threatens to occur, deficit spending is not only prudent but necessary. Unfortunately, the American political leaders who ran the liberal regime – both Democrat and Republican – failed to heed the other side of Keynes’ advice, that during periods of prosperity governments should run budget surpluses and save the money, so that they would have the resources to engage in deficit spending when necessary. The result was a gradual accumulation of total American national debt, during both recession and prosperity. In fact, along with the Bush tax cuts, the Great Recession has been the main explanation for persistent annual government deficits during the Obama administration. Downturn in economic activity produced both downturn in government revenue and a rise in government spending to combat the downturn (by stimulating the economy and relieving unemployment). Perfidiously, Republicans portrayed all this spending – that Obama had to do in order to rescue the country from the financial and fiscal disaster that Republican Bush had allowed – as just further proof of Democrats’ incurable preference for “taxing and spending.” It therefore became imperative for Democrats, both economically and politically, that the USA recover from the Great Recession as quickly as possible. The postwar American economy experienced periodic recessions, most of them cycles in inventories or inflation. The American economy regularly recovered from those recessions within two or three years. As Obama took office in 2009, the mainstream expectation among both economists and politicians was that this would occur within two or three years. Accordingly, Obama unwisely promised a quick recovery. When it did not occur, Republicans demanded to know why. Their answer was that “big government” taxing and spending depressed economic activity. Liberal Keynesian economists provided an opposite answer, in advance. Around 2009, their calculations showed that the shortfall in demand caused by the Great Recession was well over a trillion dollars. Therefore a “stimulus package” to combat the Great Recession effectively needed to be about that size. Liberal economist Paul Krugman even warned that if the initial stimulus were not that large, it would fail to restart the economy, increasing congressional opposition to any further stimulus spending and jeopardizing Obama’s reelection. Obama judged that such a large expenditure was not politically feasible and instructed that the stimulus package be kept under a trillion dollars. As Krugman had predicted, this failed to do the job – though towards the very end of Obama’s first term signs of recovery began to appear. Overall, one of Obama’s most amazing short-term accomplishments has been to achieve reelection despite that problematic economic record. (For a critical liberal account of Obama economic policymaking, see Noam Scheiber 2012 The escape artists: How Obama's team fumbled the recovery. New York NY: Simon and Schuster 368 pages.) Midrun economic change 3.2 We now turn to the midrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance. Here one question is the exact nature of the Great Recession. During 2009, a deeper answer to that question emerged from economists and quickly spread within the Obama administration. On this academic analysis, the Great Recession was not an ordinary recession but a rare and deadly FINANCIAL form – in the past, financial “panics” that frequently turned into depressions. Recessions precipitated by financial crises are usually deeper and longer than ordinary recessions. It takes a long time for a capitalist economy to get back on track when its basic mechanisms for savings, investment, and commerce have been disrupted. (Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 2009. This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 463 pages.) Another midterm issue with a somewhat longer time scale concerns INTER-GENERATIONAL TRANSFER, in particular between the generation currently in or near retirement and the next generation or two. All Americans pay to maintain the social security system, but not by saving to pay for their own benefits. Instead, each working generation pays for the benefits that go to the previous, now retired generation. This can be a sound system. However, one problem is that – in America, over the past several generations – each generation has collected more in benefits than it had paid into the system in payroll taxes. Other problems are demographic. People are living longer and retiring earlier. Successive generations have produced fewer children than the one before, shrinking the population of young people relative to the population of old people they are supporting. For example, in 1950, average life expectancy was 68 years and 16 workers supported one retiree. By around 2000 the average life expectancy reached around 78 and three workers support one retiree. The ongoing retirement of the large “baby boom” generation will straining the system. (On interactions between fiscal policy and demography, see Alan J. Auerbach, Ronald D. Lee eds. 2001. Demographic change and fiscal policy. New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 446 pages.) The Northwestern University economist Bob Gordon, an expert on American labor productivity (and my college roommate) notes six “headwinds” that may slow American economic growth in the midrun, even if the Great Recession had never happened. We just mentioned two of them: overhang of debt (consumer and government) and the end of the “demographic dividend” (a high proportion of productive young people). Other domestic headwinds are rising inequality, deteriorating education, and government burdens (environmental regulations and taxes). A global headwind is “factor price equalization stemming from the interplay between globalization and the Internet.” Meaning that, increasingly, workers everywhere compete equally.(Robert J. Gordon 2012 “Is U.S. economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds.” Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. (NBER working papers, 18315, August. At nber.org/papers/w18315) Longrun economic growth 3.3 Finally, we turn to longrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance. Gordon’s headwinds may amount to a midrun structural shift that produces longrun structural change in the American economy. Between 1860 and 2007, per capita real GDP in the USA grew by an annual rate of about 1.9%. In the future, the six headwinds might reduce that to half or less, as low as 0.5% for the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution! Slow economic growth will increase fiscal problems and constrain their solution, which will in turn contribute to slow economic growth. As commonly described in economic journalism, the structural shift might be one in which many high employing, high paying industries move from America to other countries, including China, of course. In that case, if there is to be a recovery, it is unlikely to be recovery of already lost jobs (though some businesses ARE moving some operations back to the USA). If there is to be economic recovery to a previous level of prosperity , it will have to be recovery to some new set of high employing, high paying industries. Many people hope those might be high technology industries. However, the problem arises that hitech industries might be high paying but not high employing. In fact, the high technology they produce might put low skilled workers out of employment. However, Bob Gordon provides a more pessimistic and profound analysis, concerning the longrun growth in per capita real GDP produced by technological innovation. Increase in productivity – the value that workers produce per unit of time – is what raises per capita real output and consumption. Over the past three centuries the USA has benefitted from three relatively brief waves of technological innovation that have provided the basis for subsequent relatively long phases of economic growth – except in the third wave. The question is, what went wrong in the third wave and is America likely to benefit from any more major waves of technological innovation in the foreseeable future? Gordon says no. Many of the innovations from the second wave – such as urbanization – could happen only once. The first technological revolution (1750 to 1830) replaced animal and human power with mechanical power: steam and railroads. The second technological revolution (1870 to 1900) introduced numerous innovations: electricity and the internal combustion engine, running water and indoor toilets, communications and entertainment, chemicals and petroleum. Many basics of America’s modern economy were created in the half century between 1870 and 1920. Later elaborations of similar technologies produced airplanes, air conditioning, and interstate highways. Thus the second technological revolution laid the basis for eighty years of rapid growth in per capita real GDP from 1890 to 1972. After that, from 1972 to 1996, such growth slowed. The third technological revolution (1960 to the present) was in information technology: computers, the web, mobile phones. However, the spurt of growth in real per capita GDP that it produced was brief, lasting only from 1996 to 2004. Here Gordon’s pessimistic assessment becomes controversial. He has long expressed skepticism about the contribution of IT to actual productivity. From his point of view, the earlier technological revolutions enabled humans to do things they never could have done before. The IT revolution just gives humans new ways of doing things that they already know how to do. Some economists disagree. Nevertheless, Gordon has a striking chart showing the rate of growth in per capita real GDP between 1300 and 2100. (To get such a long run, he links the early record from Britain to the later record from America.) There is virtually no growth before 1750, per capita real GDP languishing at a very low level until then. During the mid 1900s growth surges to a very high peak but then, according to Gordon’s estimates, is likely to plunge back down to the pre-1750 level!
Dealing with the past: Adjusting Republican strategy 1 Responding to the present: Managing military leaders 2 Anticipating the future: Avoiding fiscal crisis 3 This POST focuses on a few main dynamics, providing some COMMENTARY that provides a FRAMEWORK for a few RECOMMENDATIONS for items to read about American politics during this week (121110-121117). First, dealing with the PAST, how should the Republican party adjust to its 6 November electoral defeat? The eventual specific outcome will affect both Americans and Chinese. The process illuminates the general issue of how a major political party does, or does not, reform in order to adapt to change in its environment. So far, Republicans agree on maintaining their basic principles but disagree over how strongly they should emphasize them. Many Republican leaders have embraced the idea of nominating more minority candidates. Some have even raised the possibility of adjusting the Republican position on some specific issues – particularly immigration, even taxes. However, the prospects for compromises remain uncertain, as the second half of this section discusses. Second, responding to the PRESENT, how should American politics manage USA military leaders following the surprise resignation of former general Petraeus as director of the Central Intelligence Agency? In itself, this specific episode will have little effect on the content or conduct of American security policy. Nor will it provide fuel for further partisan warfare, since Republicans admire Petraeus. Nevertheless, the episode raises significant general issues about government intrusion on personal privacy under emerging technologies, about reasonable standards for the private behavior of public officials, and about the status of the military in American politics. The second half of this section reports something that IS fueling partisan warfare: Continuing Republican attempts to turn the terrorist killing of the American ambassador in Libya into a major national scandal. Third, anticipating the FUTURE, how is American politics going about trying to avoid fiscal crisis at the beginning of 2013? The specific outcome will affect not only Americans but also Chinese. The general process will further illuminate the fundamental dynamics of American politics and economy, for better or worse. The players are mostly the same as before the 2012 election, and will remain the same in 2013. This suggests a continuation of the usual deadlock and recriminations. Nevertheless, the election HAS produced some change in tone – at least for the moment – toward promises of at least SOME cooperation between parties on fiscal issues. For some general reflections on the Obama era in American politics, see Ezra Klein 121111 “A remarkable, historic period of change” at washingtonpost.org/blogs/wonkblog .. DEALING WITH THE PAST: ADJUSTING REPUBLICAN STRATEGY 1 This week, following their unexpected and large defeat in the 6 November elections for President and Senate, Republicans began discussing whether and how to adjust their positions and candidates to prepare for the 2014 and 2016 elections. American political demography is shifting from a past majority of conservative whites toward a future majority of progressive minorities (women and youth, blacks and hispanics, supporters of non-traditional values such as the legality of abortion and same-sex marriage). As noted by last week’s POST (121110), Republicans have three main options for responding to this shift, and this week the debate has indeed unfolded around those options (as reported below). Naturally, such post-mortems are expectable. In American politics, after one party soundly defeats another in a major election, often the winners proclaim that they are achieving a long-lasting dominance, while observers wonder whether the losers will even survive as a party. Usually, within an election or two, the losers are back as winners and the process continues. Sometimes, however, a party DOES gain long-term dominance. For example, in the 1860s, the Republicans won the Civil War and put Democrats on the defensive for many decades to come. In the 1960s, Democrats further advanced civil liberties (of blacks), soon transforming the South from Democratic to Republican, giving the Republicans an overall national advantage that only now may be beginning to end. How can Republicans avoid such a demise? Options 1.1 First, Republicans might continue their policies and candidates mostly as before, changing only the terms and tone in which Republican candidates present those policies to the public. This is the option favored by the radically conservative wing of the Republican party, exemplified by the “Tea Party” movement: older, wealthier, married whites who feel threatened by the rising progressive “minorities.” Moderate Republican leaders blame local Tea Party nomination of problematic candidates for costing Republicans control of the Senate over the last two elections. Moderate national Republican leaders have vowed to exercise more control over party senate nominations for 2014. Nevertheless, radical conservative spokespersons note that the Tea Party strongly maintained its representation in the House and attribute Romney’s loss to the alleged weakness of his conservatism. (See Ken Rudin 112112 “Who gets the blame for the Romney loss? The Tea Party has a theory” at npr.org/news/politics .) The principled argument for this option is that – insofar as Republican “principles” are of general value and would genuinely benefit everyone – Republicans should continue to uphold those principles. Candidates should just do a better job of explaining those principles to the public. A more practical explanation of this option is that it is the one preferred by Republican politicians in those states where traditional Republicans will remain a majority for some time (particularly in the South). The cultural biases that can underlie Republican positions, particularly on socio-cultural issues, remain only implicit, because it is no longer “politically correct” to openly express them in American politics. For example, Romney lost the presidency in part by offending Latinos, and in part because two Republican senate candidates (who also lost) offended women. The economic ideology that can underlie Republican positions, particularly on economic issues, remain explicit – perhaps ill-advisedly. Thus another significant reason why Romney lost the election was that – in private to donors – he had complained that he had little prospect of winning the support of the 47% of Americans who, as he saw it, rely on the government for handouts. Of course, this offended a near-majority of American voters. This week – again to donors – Romney complained that he had lost the election because Obama had “bought” the election with “gifts” to “special interests” (the 47%)! Evidently Romney really does believe that America is divided into “makers” versus “takers” : wealthy elites whose capital and entrepreneurship create jobs versus lazy masses who are a drag on the system. Moreover, Romney is still willing to tell Americans that that’s what he thinks of them! Some right-wing media commentators endorsed Romney’s analysis. Nevertheless, such a pure expression of Republican economic ideology is still NOT a winning strategy for Republicans, as other Republican leaders quickly pointed out.(See Ezra Klein 121115 “From the 47% to ‘gifts’: Mitt Romney’s ugly vision of politics” at washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog. ) Second, Republicans might keep their principles and policies but nominate more minority candidates who espouse them. Obviously this addresses the liability of cultural bias against minorities, but it can also address the liability of economic elitism. Thus this week the most notable espousal of majority Republican principles by a minority Republican politician came from Bobby Jindal. The conservative Republican governor of Louisiana and incoming chairman of the Republican Governors Association, he is of Indian (South Asian) descent. Astonished and alarmed at Romney’s economic “gifts” remark, Jindal sharply disagreed. First, he said, Republicans must stop dividing American voters: “We need to go after 100 percent of the votes, not 53 percent.” Second, Republicans need to show how Republican policies help every voter achieve the American Dream. (James Hohmann and Jonathan Martin 121113 “Bobby Jindal rejects Mitt Romney’s ‘gifts’ theory” at politico.com/news/stories , with videos.) Third, Republicans might adjust some of their policies to actually meet some of the substantive demands of minority voters. A few smart Republicans have begun advocating such adjustments. For example, Romney had alienated Latino voters by promising to make life so miserable for illegal Latino immigrants that they would “self-deport”! Not surprisingly, Romney lost Latino voters by landslide proportions (33% to Obama’s 67%). Immediately after the election, the crucial moderate Republican senator Lindsey Graham (South Carolina) “tweeted” Republican colleagues that they should resume work on immigration reform. (Cameron Joseph 121108 “Graham: Immigration reform must be dealt with 'once and for all’ ” at thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box .) Graham soon indicated possible Republican concessions toward providing some path to legal citizenship for immigrants already in the USA illegally, provided they meet certain requirements for citizenship. Graham and Democratic senate leader Charles Schumer announced that they were resuming negotiations on immigration reform. (Elise Foley 121111 “Senate Immigration Talks....” at huffingtonpost.com , with video.) Compromise? 1.2 This sounds promising, but one should recall that, earlier in the Obama administration, Graham and Schumer had failed in an attempt to orchestrate a “comprehensive” immigration reform. “Comprehensive” then included strengthening border security, improving systems for admitting temporary workers legally, and a path to legalization for immigrants already in the country illegally. To Republican radical conservatives, “comprehensive” is a codeword for admitting to American citizenship immigrants who have broken American laws, which radical conservatives consider utterly unacceptable. Accordingly, back in 2010, Graham soon backed away from anything that looked like unconditional “amnesty” for “illegals.” Moreover, because he thought Latinos were abusing it, Graham even advocated changing the American constitutional principle (in the Fourteenth Amendment) according to which anyone born on USA territory is automatically an American citizen! (Michael Gerson 100730 “ On immigration, Lindsey Graham abandons principle” at voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan .) Incidentally, in 2012-2013, senator Graham remains crucial to negotiating compromises on American policy not only on immigration, but also on climate change and on foreign defense, all issues on which he has tried to compromise with Democrats in the past. Accordingly, when he comes up for reelection in 2014, Republican radical conservatives intend to defeat him in the Republican primary as “too moderate.” A final straw to radical conservatives was Graham’s support for Obama’s Hispanic nominee for the Supreme Court. (Chris Cillizza 100720 “Lindsey Graham's vote on Elena Kagan ensures primary challenge” at voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix .) Meanwhile, on immigration, a leading conservative media pundit quickly announced that his thinking has “evolved” This is significant because, if the conservative media maintain united opposition to any concessions on immigration, that could defeat compromise by mobilizing conservative Republican masses against moderate Republican elites. Conversely, if the conservative media disagree about concessions, or even support them, that could facilitate some compromise, by giving moderate Republican leaders some political “cover.” (See Benjamin Hart 121108 “Sean Hannity flips on immigration reform, now supports pathway to citizenship” at huffingtonpost.com ). A leading conservative journalist even called on Republicans to make concessions on fiscal policy. (For reporting see Suzy Khimm 121111 “Bill Kristol thinks Republicans should be willing to raise taxes” at washingtonpost/blogs/wonkblog . For commentary see Andrew Rosenthal 121112 “Bill Kristol: Go Ahead, Raise Taxes” at takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com . For more on America’s potential fiscal crisis, see below, part 3.) RESPONDING TO THE PRESENT: MANAGING MILITARY LEADERS 2 General Petraeus 2.1 This week, the main new and unexpected development was the sudden resignation of America’s most outstanding military commander (retired) from his civilian post as head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was about to become public that General Petraeus had had an extramarital affair with his woman biographer (a former military intelligence officer), raising the question of whether the affair had posed any “threat to American national security” (leaked secrets, potential blackmail). As usual, the general adopted the right strategy: in the face of such a scandal, resign on principle before your detractors can begin further destroying your reputation and effectiveness (Greg Myre 121114 “What's the punishment for adultery these days?” at npr.org ). On the one hand, the resignation was for entirely personal reasons and, in itself, will have no substantive effect on American intelligence operations or foreign policies. On the other hand, the whole incident raises some significant questions. Arguably the most general question concerns how changes in technology are reducing the privacy of supposedly private communications and increasing the potential relevance of private communications to public politics. This was NOT a case of the FBI deliberately “spying” on anyone. Instead, the FBI inadvertently found itself in a novel and difficult position. Perhaps ill-advisably, the FBI had responded to a citizen request for some investigation into anonymous threatening emails. Looking into that, the FBI accidentally discovered emails that revealed the affair between General Petraeus and his lover. The affair was not a crime, and usually the FBI does not reveal private information unless a crime was indeed involved. (Having an extramarital affair is a military crime under military law, but technically Petraeus had already retired from the military.) However, given that Petraues was America’s second-highest intelligence official, the affair did raise concerns about American national security. Unfortunately, there were few precedents to tell the FBI how far it should pursue such a case, particularly into the endless private emails that commercial companies now retain, and that the government can demand to see, when warranted. This is a significant general issue for the American public, concerning its civil liberties. (See Chris Soghoian 121113 “Surveillance and security lessons from the Petraeus scandal” at aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security. Also Trevor Timm 121114 “Investigate the FBI” at foreignpolicy.com .) Also, there were few precedents for the FBI concerning with what officials in what other branches of government the FBI should share the results of its investigation, particularly in the middle of a highly partisan election campaign. The FBI did officially report to the highest official overseeing American intelligence, who reported to the President. However, the FBI did NOT officially report to the congressional committees that ostensibly oversee the intelligence bureaucracy. This is another significant issue for future American policy, touching on Constititutional relations between branches of government. (Ted Barrett 121113 “Feinstein to investigate why FBI didn't notify Congress of Petraeus affair.” at cnn.com .) An only somewhat less general question concerns the high price the USA now pays for now demanding that the private conduct of public officials be exemplarily moral, regardless of whether that private conduct has anything to do with their public effectiveness or not. Specifically as regards military generals, why do we punish their private failings so harshly when, since the Second World War, we have been so lenient about their military failures? That was the pointed question about the Petraeus affair posed by the distinguished American military journalist Thomas Ricks, who recently published a book called The generals , (Penguin 576 pages). It complains that most post-1945 American generals have been mediocre and that few generals have been punished for mediocrity or rewarded for daring. The irony, of course, is that Petraeus was uniquely daring and successful – and now it is HE who has been punished! (121114 “Gen. Petraeus Is Too Important To 'Be Thrown Out'”“ at npr.org .) Arguably the effect of public politics on the management of American national security is potentially much worse than any likely effects of personal indiscretions. Accordingly, Ricks wished that president Obama had refused Petraeus’ resignation, telling him that his punishment was to continue to lead the CIA, where his leadership could have made a large contribution. Unfortunately, Ricks was stating an ideal. In practice, by now, probably Obama did not have that option. The opposition party would have seized on it to criticize, not Petraeus, but Obama. The news media would have perpetuated the story. The American public would have remained curious. It remains to be seen whether the Petraeus affair will impose yet another high-level personnel cost, by preventing the promotion of the current commander in Afghanistan to become commander of NATO. The FBI investigation stumbled across some questionable social emails by him too (though evidently not a real sexual affair). This whole incident MIGHT slightly move Americans toward more realistic expectations of their military: not assuming that the military is invincible and that its leaders are infallible. This incident MIGHT question the high-rolling life-style surrounding the Central Command in Tampa, Florida, which evidently includes extensive social interaction between base military officers and the local civilian would-be social elite. At the same time, Americans MIGHT better appreciate that, in their PERSONAL lives, military leaders are fallible human beings who, under exceptional professional pressures, sometimes seek exceptional personal support. Such realizations MIGHT slightly lower the perhaps excessively high prestige of the military within American politics. This MIGHT slightly raise the possibility of holding military leaders accountable for any PROFESSIONAL failures. But that will happen only if the media have the perspicuity and airtime to raise these issues and politicians have the wisdom and courage to pursue them. Ambassador Rice 2.2 A further connection of the Petraeus affair concerns his role in American management of the attack in Libya that killed the American ambassador and three other Americans. At first it appeared to outside observers that the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi was an unplanned and spontaneous spillover from a demonstration against an anti-Islamist film made in the USA. However, insiders quickly realized that instead the attack had been deliberately planned by extremist terrorists. Evidently this tragedy resulted from calculated risks being taken in the allocation of American security resources and from American underestimation of the ability of radical Islamists to mount such a concerted attack. In Benghazi the USA had not only a lightly defended branch consulate, but also a nearby CIA outpost. (For background, see “Libya — the Benghazi Attacks” under Times Topics at nytimes.com. ) Evidently the initial classified intelligence assessment that the CIA provided inside the government included details about the planned nature and al Qaeda connections of the attack. However, the unclassified version used for briefing the public omitted those details, reportedly to prevent the terrorists from knowing what the CIA knew about them, perhaps also to prevent details about the CIA station in Benghazi from being revealed. The White House requested the American ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, who had not seen the classified version, to brief Sunday news shows on the basis of the unclassified version, which stated that a spontaneous demonstration had “evolved” to an attack by “extremists.” Unfortunately for Rice, it quickly emerged that in fact there had not been a spontaneous demonstration, only the planned attack. (For what Rice said, and the memo she based it on, see David Weigel 121115 “Susan Rice and Benghazi, take two” at slate.com/blogs/weigel . For background later provided by Petraues, see Ewen MacAskill 121116 “Petraeus tells Congress that Rice was unaware of al-Qaida ties to Benghazi” at guardian.co.uk .). For the text of the memo and how it was prepared, see Louis Martinez 12116 ‘Extremists’=Terrorists: Official on Rice’s Benghazi talking points” at abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics .) The Benghazi attack and Rice news briefing occurred at the height of the 2012 election campaign, when Republicans were desperate for any issue that they could raise against Obama. Accordingly, Republicans claimed that the Benghazi tragedy had been a major catastrophe for American security, part of a general pattern demonstrating Obama’s alleged weak foreign policy leadership, particularly in the Middle East. Historically, “strength” on defense has been a Republican asset, but Obama had neutralized it by a generally strong foreign policy performance during his first term. Possibly losing on domestic cultural and even economic issues, Republicans tried to use the Benghazi tragedy to revive some of their traditional advantage on foreign security. Moreover, they claimed that UN ambassador Rice had been a key player in an alleged conspiracy by the Obama administration to conceal this allegedly major security failure, even though basically Rice had no connection with Libya or security. Republicans claimed that Rice had said definitively that the attack had been strictly spontaneous, when in fact she had said that it also involved more purposive “extremists” and that the final word was not yet in. Evidently the Republicans gained little traction with voters on this issue, and may even have provoked some public backlash at their attempt to use a national tragedy for partisan purposes. The point here is that, after the election, the Republicans not only did not drop the issue, but are pursuing it even more ferociously. Republicans convened hearings, at which they demanded that CIA director Petraeus testify, which he did, even after his resignation, in private. Meanwhile, like the 2012 Republican presidential candidate Romney, the 2008 Republican presidential candidate McCain evidently did not get the message that some change toward a more conciliatory tone was desirable in Washington politics. On the contrary, McCain has demanded a congressional investigation on the scale of the inquiry into the Watergate scandal in the 1970s and the Iran/contra scandal in the 1980s. Moreover, McCain issued a stream of remarks insulting to both president Obama and ambassador Rice. He said that, if Obama did not understand that the Benghazi incident had been a major catastrophe, then the president “does not understand the situation.” McCain called Rice (a former Rhodes scholar) “not very bright” (the impression usually conveyed by McCain of himself). (See Kevin Robillard 121114 “John McCain: Susan Rice ‘not qualified’ for State” at politico.com , with video. For background, see David Weigel 121114 “John McCain's long war against Susan Rice” at slate.com/blogs/weigel) All of this would amount to mere name-calling, except that Obama may wish to nominate Rice as the next American Secretary of State. McCain vowed to prevent that, and was joined in that resolution by, of all people, senator Lindsey Graham. Perhaps the Republicans are just trying to manufacture some leverage over Obama cabinet nominations, and even other issues such as immigration and climate change. Regardless, the spectacle of a Republican white former war hero denouncing an innocent distinguished black woman diplomat was a national disgrace – demagogic, male-chauvinist, and probably racist. Obama, clearly furious, denounced the “besmirching” of Rice’s reputation, as “outrageous.” Obama said that if Republicans wanted to go after someone about this, they should go after HIM. Well, evidently they will, since the most recent reporting reveals that the president knew the truth all along. Of course, in public pronouncements, he may have followed the same line that he induced Rice to follow, and for the same reasons – to protect intelligence secrets. (AP 121116 “Dozen House women angrily defend Rice on Libya, suggest GOP attack racist, sexist” at washingtonpost.com. Also, Jennifer Rubin 121116 “Breaking: The president knew the truth about Benghazi” at washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn. ) ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE: AVOIDING FISCAL CRISIS? 3 This week, the main story to which the media moved on was the resumption of negotiations between Democrats and Republicans over how to avoid going over the “fiscal cliff” that the USA will reach at the beginning of 2013. The combination of an already scheduled automatic sharp rise in taxes and automatic sharp fall in spending could send the economy back into recession. (The combined “shock” starting in 2013 would be about $600 billion, the opposite of and comparable to the $800 billion 2009-2019 “stimulus.”) Our POST last week noted three main possible fiscal scenarios: (1) solving the problem in 2012 through a comprehensive solution, (2) agreeing in 2012 on a framework for how to solve the problem in 2013, and (3) simply “going over the cliff” at the beginning of 2013. Two other possibilities are (4) a “disaggregated” solution making a separate deal on taxes in 2012, and (5) a “multistage” solution requiring some initial revenue increases and spending cuts in 2012, to show that American politics can make at least SOME hard decisions. For a good discussion of all five of these possible scenarios, see Carrie Budoff Brown and Jake Sherman 121112 “5 fiscal cliff scenarios” at politico.com/news/stories . On the cast of characters involved in the negotiations, see Niraj Chokshi 121111 “Fiscal cliff to be decided by a few key players” at nationaljournal.com/budget . On President Obama’s initial position, see Zachary A. Goldfarb and Lori Montgomery 121113 “Obama to open talks with $1.6 trillion plan to raise taxes on corporations, wealthy” at washingtonpost.com/business/economy . For the surprisingly congenial state of play at the end of the week, after Obama’s first meeting with congressional leaders from both parties, see Jackie Calmes 121116 “At White House, top lawmakers say they expect budget deal” at nytimes.com . Topics: Republican party, national security, fiscal policy.
China and the U.S. represent each other’s single most important foreign relationship, yet also each other’s broadest array of foreign policy challenges. While interdependent, since the fall of the Soviet Union they have lacked a common external danger sufficient to incentivize deep cooperation. Now, with China’s rise, both countries are strong simultaneously for the first time. Significant potential exists for Sino-U.S. cooperation, but fundamental differences in political systems, interests, and perspectives will continue to create friction. In 2012, political transitions in both countries will connect bilateral issues to domestic opinion to an unprecedented degree. Welcome to the “new normal” for U.S.-China relations. Now many challenges directly affect each country’s national interests and politics, yet cannot be easily sidestepped, finessed, or bargained away because of unprecedented participation of domestic actors. Examples include fundamentally different approaches to trade and economic policies, international norms, and relations with pariah states. American hopes have dissipated rapidly that China would appreciate America’s post-1978 development assistance and simply embrace existing international norms as it developed economically, without seeking to change factors that it perceived to be unfair. China’s expectations of achieving space and influence on its own terms to right past wrongs have not been met. China’s already-limited willingness to reach accommodation with the U.S.—particularly on Asian issues—will probably decline further as it becomes even more powerful. Despite its coincidence with once-in-a-decade Chinese leadership transition, 2012 will signal challenges to come in Sino-American relations. Political challenges Sino-U.S. ties have become a complex “frenemies”-type relationship—one where close economic and trade ties coexist with military and strategic competition. Chinese leaders’ preoccupation with domestic politics and bureaucratic procedures will collide with the rapid-solution-driven U.S. political-diplomatic approach. Both governments will almost certainly continue to disagree on what constitutes internationally responsible behavior, e.g., with respect to Iranian and North Korean nuclear development. While each nation plays a major role the other’s decision-making, it does not shape every decision definitively—domestic issues come first. The run-up to China’s October 2012 political transition will likely delay decision-making, intensify Beijing’s reluctance to compromise and generate intensified clampdowns internally and assertive rhetoric abroad as China faces rising domestic challenges and finds itself constrained internationally. All this will occur in a growing social media echo chamber, in which netizens and other private actors will have louder, shriller voices. Leaders will be tempted to “ride” these “tigers,” but the costs of “dismounting” to govern effectively will be higher than ever. Economic challenges Multiple economic issues will rise to the forefront of the upcoming U.S. presidential and Congressional elections. The most prominent issues are (1) the valuation of the RMB relative to the dollar, (2) the hollowing-out of the U.S. heavy industrial base, (3) China’s inability thus far to effectively protect U.S. intellectual property, and (4) Beijing’s lack of visible effort to curtail industrial cyber-espionage. Electoral pressures will make it harder for Washington to compromise on these and human rights issues. Yet inflation and rising labor costs will make Beijing particularly unreceptive to U.S. trade and economic policy requests. If continuing financial problems in Europe or other factors trigger a new economic slowdown in the U.S., Beijing could move to further diversify its foreign reserve holdings away from the dollar. China’s Treasury holdings account for a major part of its foreign exchange reserves and Beijing will not want to jeopardize the value of its T-Bills. At the same time, China has leverage due to its ability to put money to work in other ways, such as backing purchases of natural resources and economic assets worldwide or engaging in additional “loans for resources” deals, which may effectively yield higher returns than U.S. financial assets. In short, Beijing’s massive T-Bill holdings provide influence as Washington struggles for fiscal control. As Chinese investors’ work to diversify their holdings, the U.S. is among the countries best placed to benefit from private investments in real estate and other assets by wealthy Chinese. The larger challenge is that economics has long been the “good” aspect of U.S.-China relations, overshadowing disagreements on diplomatic, military, or strategic issues. Yet with monetary, trade, and IPR issues becoming more intense and painful for Americans, the “special” status of economic relations may be disappearing. Security challenges The U.S. will continue reassuring countries like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as other ASEAN members, that it intends to maintain—and possibly strengthen—its focus on the Asia-Pacific while trying not to overly antagonize China. The diplomatic dance (backed by credible military power) will be a delicate one, but robust presence increases Washington’s leverage in dealing with China—and, as such, is a force for regional peace and stability. China’s regional diplomacy will contend that Asia’s longer-term power is China, not the U.S. However, Beijing’s overtures will likely be undermined by its uncompromising approach regarding maritime issues in the East and South China Seas. Pressuring smaller neighbors over areas that in many cases do not have substantial proven energy or mineral reserves contradicts China’s self-portrayal as a benign re-rising power concerned primarily with “peaceful development.” This will continue to motivate regional nations to partner with the U.S. on security issues, even as they trade significantly with China. Unlike the U.S., China has no formal alliance partners to share security burdens. The “friends” that China chooses, including states like Pakistan, Iran, Burma, and Sudan, are useful as natural resource providers or trade partners, but are actually liabilities for security purposes overall—even if they do provide niche benefits, such as helping to contain India in the case of Pakistan. These realities help to motivate China’s sense of international isolation and fears of encirclement. Limit tiger feeding Beijing and Washington have full plates of foreign policy challenges simply dealing with each other, not to mention their other important foreign relationships. Both countries are economically interdependent, and deeply affected by each other’s actions. They can avoid outright conflict, but not bouts of tension or even crises. 2012 will offer continued opportunities, but also specific challenges, for their relationship. Acknowledging this reality frankly, while searching for specific areas of mutual interest, offers the best prospect for maximizing achievements and minimizing problems. Rather than focusing on bridges that will be difficult to cross soon—such as greatly improving military-to-military relations—we suggest focusing on functional areas that rise to the level of national interests for each country, but are less subject to being politicized. The politics of 2012 may limit bilateral relations to modest, trade-focused achievements. But—at a minimum—leaders should avoid aggressively riding the tigers of public opinion only to end up consumed by them. 原文见 http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/domestic-politics-will-buffet-us-china-relations-in-2012/
原来我相信群众智慧，后来我更倾向精英主义的研究和一般的体系，现在我觉得精英主义研究远远不够，得再加上精英主义的体系了。 我强烈建议精英当政。当然，还是得按专业来。生物学的领导当然要由生物界的精英来，当然，在学习一些技巧后。 胡适立志做“国民导师”，鄙视从政。却不知，柏拉图说过，"Those who are too smart to engage in politics are punished by being governed by those who are dumber." （那么太聪明以致不去从政的人们会被一群2B所统治）。 这种后果也导致精英主义的思想不能广泛的传播，无辜群众被一群2B所引导。 马克思说经济基础决定上层建筑，可现在咱们是上层建筑已定，只能由上层建筑决定经济基础。 不过，偶觉得TG大的领导班子是绝对精英，不过具体到各行各业： 该是科学网的精英们出场的时候了，你懂的...... 伪的就别凑热闹了
标签: politics
