1901: Monsanto was founded in St. Louis,Missouri by John Francis Queeny, a 30-year veteran of the pharmaceuticalindustry. Queeny funded the start-up with capital from Coca-Cola (saccharin).Founder John Francis Queeny named Monsanto Chemical Works after his wife, OlgaMendez Monsanto. Queeny's father in law was Emmanuel Mendes de Monsanto,wealthy financier of asugar company active in Vieques, Puerto Rico and based inSt. Thomas in the Danish West Indies. 1902: Monsanto manufactures its firstproduct, the artificial sweetener （增甜剂） Saccharin, which Monsanto sold to the Coca-Cola Company. The U.S.government later files suit over the safety of Saccharin - but loses. 1904: Queeny persuaded family and friendsto invest $15000, Monsanto has strong ties （纽带） to The WaltDisney Company, it having financial backing from the Order's Bank of Americafounded in Jesuit-ruled San Francisco by Italian-American Roman-Catholic Knightof Malta Amadeo Giannini. 1905: Monsanto company was also producingcaffeine （咖啡因） and vanillin （香兰素） and was beginning to turn a profit. 1906: The government's monopoly （垄断） on meatregulation began, when in response to public panic resulting from thepublication of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, Teddy Roosevelt signed legislationmandating federal meat inspections. Today, Salatin claims that agriculturalregulation favors multinational corporations such as ConAgra and Monsantobecause the treasonous （叛逆的） science that supports the USDA regulatory framework is paid for bythese corporations, which continue to give large grants to leading schools andresearch facilities. 1908: John Francis Queeny leaves hispart-time job as the new branch manager of another drug house thePowers-Weightman-Rosegarten Company to become Monsanto's full-time president. 1912: Agriculture again came to theforefront with the creation of the DeKalb County Farm Bureau, one of the firstorganizations of its kind. In the 1930s the DeKalb AgResearch Corporation(today MONSANTO) marketed its first hybrid seed corn. 1914–1918: During WWI, cut off fromimported European chemicals, Monsanto was forced to manufacture it's own, andit's position as a leading force in the chemical industry was assured. Unableto import foreign supplies from Europe during World War I, Queeny turned tomanufacturing his own raw materials. It was then his scientists discovered thatthe Germans, in anticipation of the war, had ripped out vital pages from theirresearch books which explained various chemical processes. 1915: Business expanded rapidly. Monsantosales surpass the $1,000,000 mark for the first time. 1917: U.S. government sues （起诉） Monsantoover the safety of Monsanto's original product, saccharin （糖精） .Monsanto eventually won, after several years in court. 1917: Monsanto added more and moreproducts: vanillin, caffeine, and drugs used as sedatives （镇静剂） andlaxatives （泻药） . 1917: Bayer, The German competition cutprices in an effort to drive Monsanto out of business, but failed. Soon,Monsanto diversified into phenol (a World War I -era antiseptic), and aspirinwhen Bayer's German patent expired in 1917. Monsanto began making aspirin, andsoon became the largest manufacturer world-wide. 1918: With the purchase of an Illinois acidcompany, Monsanto began to widen the scope of its factory operations. Mar 15, 1918: More than 500 of the 750employees of the Monsanto Chemical Works, which has big contracts for theGovernment, went on strike （罢工） , forcing the plant to dose down. Aug 15, 1919: Thereafter much of it wasdeclared surplus, and a contract was entered into with the Monsanto ChemicalCo., of St. Louis, Mo., by which contract the Director of Sales authorized theMonsanto Co. to sell for the United States its surplus phenol, estimated at27521242 pounds, for a market price to be fixed from time to time by therepresentative of the contracting officer of the United States, but with aminimum price of 9 cents a pound. 1919: Monsanto established its presence inEurope by entering into a partnership with Graesser's Chemical Works at CefnMawr near Ruabon, Wales to produce vanillin, salicylic acid, aspirin and laterrubber. 1920s: In its third decade, Monsantoexpanded into basic industrial chemicals like sulfuric acid （硫酸） andother chemicals. Jan 5, 1920: The petitioner （请愿人） wasauthorized to sell two tracts of land in the Common Fields of Cahokia, St.Clair County, containing 2.403 acres and 3.46 acres respectively, to theMonsanto Chemical Works for the sum of $1500. 1920-1921: A postwar depression during theearly 1920s affected profits, but by the time John Queeny turned over Monsantoto Edgar in 1928 the financial situation was much brighter. 1926: Environmental policy was generallygoverned by local governments, Monsanto Chemical Company founded andincorporated the town of Monsanto, later renamed Sauget, Illinois, to provide amore business friendly environment for one of its chemical plants. For years,the Monsanto plant in Sauget was the nation's largest producer ofpolychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). And although polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)were banned in the 1970s, they remain in the water along Dead Creek in Sauget. 1927: Monsanto had over 2,000 employees,with offices across the country and in England. 1927: Shortly after its initial listing onthe New York Stock Exchange, Monsanto moved to acquire 2 chemical companiesthat specialized in rubber. Other chemicals were added in later years,including detergents. 1928: John Queeny's son Edgar MonsantoQueeny takes over the Monsanto company. Monsanto had gone public, a move thatpaved the way for future expansion. At this time, Monsanto had 55 shareholders,1,000 employees, and owned a small company in Britain. 1929: Monsanto acquires Rubber ServicesLaboratories. Charlie Sommer joined Monsanto, and later became president ofMonsanto in 1960. October 1929: The folks at Monsanto Co.fished through their records, but they couldn't find out why the company'ssymbol is MTC. Monsanto went public in October 1929, just a few days before thegreat stock market crash. Some symbols are holdovers from the 19th century,when telegraph operators used single-letter symbols for the most active stocksto conserve wire space, says the New York Stock Exchange. Mergers, acquisitionsand failure have caused many single-letter symbols to change 1929: Monsanto began production of PCBs(polychlorinated biphenyls 多氯联苯 ) in the United States. PCBs were considered an industrial wonderchemical - an oil that would not burn, was impervious to degradation and hadalmost limitless applications. Today PCBs are considered one of the gravestchemical threats on the planet. PCBs, widely used as lubricants, hydraulicfluids, cutting oils, waterproof coatings and liquid sealants, are potentcarcinogens and have been implicated in reproductive, developmental and immunesystem disorders. The world's center of PCB manufacturing was Monsanto's planton the outskirts of East St. Louis, Illinois, which has the highest rate offetal death and immature births in the state. Monsanto produced PCBs for over 50 yearsand they are now virtually omnipresent in the blood and tissues of humans andwildlife around the globe - from the polar bears at the north pole to thepenguins in Antarctica. These days PCBs are banned from production and someexperts say there should be no acceptable level of PCBs allowed in theenvironment. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency says, PCB has beendemonstrated to cause cancer, as well as a variety of other adverse healtheffects on the immune system, reproductive system, nervous system and endocrinesystem （内分泌系统） . But the evidence of widespread contamination from PCBs andrelated chemicals has been accumulating from 1965 onwards and internal companypapers show that Monsanto knew about the PCB dangers from early on. The PCB problem was particularly severe inthe town of Anniston in Alabama where discharges from the local Monsanto plantmeant residents developed PCB levels hundreds or thousands of times theaverage. As The Washington Post reported, for nearly 40 years, whileproducing the now-banned industrial coolants known as PCBs at a local factory,Monsanto Co. routinely discharged toxic waste into a west Anniston creek anddumped millions of pounds of PCBs into oozing open-pit landfills. And thousandsof pages of Monsanto documents : many emblazoned with warnings such as'CONFIDENTIAL: Read and Destroy' : show that for decades, the corporate giantconcealed what it did and what it knew. Ken Cook of the Environmental Working Groupsays that based on the Monsanto documents made public, Monsanto knew thetruth from the very beginning. They lied about it. They hid the truth fromtheir neighbors. One Monsanto memo explains their justification: Wecan't afford to lose one dollar of business. Eventually Monsanto wasfound guilty of conduct so outrageous in character and extreme in degreeas to go beyond all possible bounds of decency so as to be regarded asatrocious and utterly intolerable in civilized society. 1930s: DeKalb AgResearch Corporation (todayMONSANTO) marketed its first **HYBRID** seed corn (maize). 1933: Incorporated as Monsanto ChemicalCompany 1934: I recognized my two selves: acrusading idealist and a cold, granitic believer in the law of the jungle- Edgar Monsanto Queeny, Monsanto chairman, 1943-63, The Spirit ofEnterprise 1935: Edward O'Neal (who became chairpersonin 1964) came to Monsanto with the acquisition of the Swann Corporation.Monsanto goes into the soap and detergents industry, starts producingphosphorus. 1938: Monsanto goes into the plasticbusiness (the year after DuPont helped ban hemp because it was superior totheir new NYLON product made from Rockefeller OIL). Monsanto became involved inplastics when it completely took over Fiberloid, one of the oldestnitrocellulose （硝化纤维素） production companies, which had a 50% stake in Shawinigan Resins. 1939: Monsanto purchased Resinox, asubsidiary （副产品） of Corn Products, and Commercial Solvents, which specialized inphenolic resins. Thus, just before the war, Monsanto's plastics interestsincluded phenol-formaldehyde thermosetting resins, cellulose and vinylplastics. 1939-1945: Monsanto conducts research onuranium for the Manhattan Project in Dayton, Ohio. Dr. Charles Thomas, wholater served as Monsanto's chairman of the board, was present at the first testexplosion of the atomic bomb. During World War II, Monsanto played asignificant role in the Manhattan Project （曼哈顿工程） to develop theatom bomb. Monsanto operated the Dayton Project, and later Mound Laboratoriesin Miamisburg, Ohio, for the Manhattan Project, the development of the firstnuclear weapons and, after 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission. 1940s: Monsanto had begun focusing onplastics and synthetic fabrics like polystyrene （聚苯乙烯） (still widelyused in food packaging and other consumer products), which is ranked 5th in theEPA's 1980s listing of chemicals whose production generates the most totalhazardous waste （危险废品） From the 1940s onwards Monsanto was one of the top 10 US chemicalcompanies. 1941: By the time the United States enteredWorld War II, the domestic chemical industry had attained far greaterindependence from Europe. Monsanto, strengthened by its several acquisitions,was also prepared to produce such strategic materials as phosphates andinorganic chemicals. Most important was Monsanto's acquisition of a researchand development laboratory called Thomas and Hochwalt. The well-known Dayton, Ohio,firm strengthened Monsanto at the time and provided the basis for some of itsfuture achievements in chemical technology. One of its most importantdiscoveries was styrene monomer ( 苯乙烯 ) a key ingredient in synthetic rubber and a crucial product for thearmed forces （军队） during the war. Edward J. Bock joined Monsanto in 1941 as anengineer - he rose through the ranks to become a member of the board ofdirectors in 1965 and president in 1968. 1943: Massive Texas City plant startsproducing synthetic rubber for the Allies in World War II. 1944: Monsanto began manufacturing DDT,along with some 15 other companies. The use of DDT in the U.S. was banned byCongress in 1972. 1945: Following WW2, Monsanto championedthe use of chemical pesticides in agriculture, and began manufacturing theherbicide 2,4,5-T, which contains dioxin （戴奥辛） . Monsanto hasbeen accused of covering up or failing to report dioxin contamination in a widerange of its products. 1949: Monsanto acquired American Viscosefrom England's Courtauld family. 1950: Monsanto began to produce urethanefoam （尿烷泡沫塑料） - which was flexible, easy to use, and later became crucial inmaking automobile interiors （汽车内饰） . 1953: Toxicity tests on the effects of 2PCBs showed that more than 50% of the rats subjected to them DIED, and ALLofthem showed damage. 1954: Monsanto partnered with Germanchemical giant Bayer to form Mobay and market polyurethanes in the USA. 1955: Monsanto acquired Lion Oil refinery,increasing its assets by more than 50%. Stockholders during this time numbered43,000. Monsanto starts producing petroleum （石油） -basedfertilizer. 1957: Monsanto moved to the suburbancommunity of Creve Coeur, having finally outgrown its headquarters （总公司） indowntown St. Louis, Missouri. 1957-1967: Monsanto was the creator ofseveral attractions in Disney's Tom morrow land. Often they revolved around thethe virtues of chemicals and plastics. Their House of the Futurewas constructed entirely of plastic, but it was NOT biodegradable. Afterattracting a total of 20 million visitors from 1957 to 1967, Disney finallytore the house down, but discovered it would not go down without a fight.According to Monsanto Magazine, wrecking balls literally bounced off theglass-fiber, reinforced polyester material. Torches, jackhammers, chain sawsand shovels did not work. Finally, choker cables were used to squeeze off partsof the house bit by bit to be trucked away. 1959: Monsanto sets up Monsanto ElectronicsCo. in Palo Alto, begins producing ultra-pure silicon for the high-techindustry, in an area which would later become a Superfund （超级基金） site. 1960: Edgar Queeny turned over the chair ofMonsanto to Charles Thomas, one of the founders of the research and developmentlaboratory so important to Monsanto. Charlie Sommer, who had joined Monsanto in1929, became president. According to Monsanto historian Dan Forrestal,Leadership during the 1960s and early 1970s came principally from ...executives whose Monsanto roots ran deep. Under their combined leadershipMonsanto saw several important developments, including the establishment of theAgricultural Chemicals division with focus on herbicides, created toconsolidate （巩固） Monsanto's diverse agrichemical product lines. 1961-1971: Agent Orange was a mixture of2,4,5-T and 2,4-D and had very high concentrations of dioxin. Agent Orange wasby far the most widely used of the so-called Rainbow Herbicidesemployed in the Herbicidal Warfare program as a defoliant during the VietnamWar. Monsanto became one of 10-36 producers of Agent Orange for US Militaryoperations in Vietnam. Dow Chemical and Monsanto were the two largest producersof Agent Orange for the U.S. military. The Agent Orange produced by Monsantohad dioxin levels many times higher than that produced by Dow Chemicals, theother major supplier of Agent Orange to Vietnam. This made Monsanto the keydefendant in the lawsuit brought by Vietnam War veterans in the United States,who faced an array of debilitating symptoms attributable to Agent Orangeexposure. Agent Orange is later linked to various health problems, includingcancer. U.S. Vietnam War veterans have suffered from a host of debilitatingsymptoms attributable to Agent Orange exposure. Agent Orange contaminated morethan 3,000,000 civilians and servicemen. According to Vietnamese Ministry ofForeign Affairs, 4.8 million Vietnamese people were exposed to Agent Orange,resulting in 400,000 deaths and disabilities, plus 500,000 children born withbirth defects, leading to calls for Monsanto to be prosecuted for war crimes.Internal Monsanto memos show that Monsanto knew of the problems of dioxincontamination of Agent Orange when it sold it to the U.S. government for use inVietnam. Look at what the EFFECTS of agent orange look like... keepin mind it was used to remove leaves from the trees where AMERICAN SOLDIERSwere breathing, eating, sleeping. 1962: Public concern over the environmentbegan to escalate （逐步增强） . Ralph Nader's activities and Rachel Carson's book Silent Springhad been influential in increasing the U.S. public's awareness of activitieswithin the chemical industry in the 1960s, and Monsanto responded in severalways to the pressure. 1962: Monsanto's European expansioncontinued, with Brussels （孢子甘蓝） becoming the permanent overseas headquarters. 1964: Monsanto changed its name to MonsantoCompany in acknowledgment of its diverse product line. The company consisted of8 divisions, including petroleum, fibers, building materials, and packaging.Edward O'Neal became chairperson (came to Monsanto in 1935 with the acquisitionof the Swann Corporation) was the first chair in Monsanto history who had notfirst held the post of president. 1964: Monsanto introducedbiodegradable detergents （清洗剂） . 1965: While working on an ulcer drug in December,James M. Schlatter, a chemist at G.D. Searle Company, accidentallydiscovers aspartame （天冬甜精） , a substance that is 180x sweeter than sugar yet has no calories. 1965: AstroTurf (fake grass) wasco-invented by Donald L. Elbert, James M. Faria, and Robert T. Wright,employees ofMonsanto Company. It was patented in 1967 and originally sold underthe name Chemgrass. It was renamed AstroTurf by Monsanto employeeJohn A. Wortmann after its first well-publicized use at the Houston Astrodomestadium （休斯顿航空体育馆） in 1966. 1965: The evidence of widespreadcontamination from PCBs and related chemicals has been accumulating andinternal Monsanto papers show that Monsanto knew about the PCB dangers fromearly on. 1967: Monsanto entered into a joint venturewith IG Farben = the German chemical firm that was the financial core of theHitler regime, and was the main supplier of Zyklon-B gas to the Germangovernment during the extermination phase of the Holocaust; IG Farben was notdissolved until 2003. 1967: Searle began the safety tests onaspartame that were necessary for applying for FDA approval of food additives.Dr. Harold Waisman, a biochemist at the University of Wisconsin, conductsaspartame safety tests on infant monkeys on behalf of the Searle Company. Of the7 monkeys that were being fed aspartame mixed with milk, 1 monkey DIED and 5other monkeys had grand mal seizures （癫痫发作） . 1968: Edgar Queeny dies, leaving no heirs （继承人） . EdwardJ. Bock (who had joined Monsanto in 1941 as an engineer) become a member of theboard of directors in 1965, and became president of Monsanto in 1968. 1968: With experts at Monsanto in no doubtthat Monsanto's PCBs were responsible for contamination, Monsanto set up acommittee to assess its options. In a paper distributed to only 12 people butwhich surfaced at the trial in 2002, Monsanto admitted that the evidenceproving the persistence of these compounds and their universal presence asresidues in the environment is beyond question ... the public and legalpressures to eliminate them to prevent global contamination areinevitable. Monsanto papers seen by The Guardian newspaper reveal nearpanic. The subject is snowballing. Where do we go from here? Thealternatives: go out of business; sell the hell out of them as long as we canand do nothing else; try to stay in business; have alternative products,wrote the recipient of one paper. 1968: Monsanto became the firstorganization to mass-produce visible LEDs, using gallium arsenide phosphide toproduce red LEDs suitable for indicators. Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) usheredin the era of solid-state lights. From 1968 to 1970, sales doubled every fewmonths. Their products (discrete LEDs and seven-segment numeric displays)became the standards of industry. The primary markets then were electroniccalculators, digital watches, and digital clocks. 1969: High overhead costs and a sluggishnational economy led to a dramatic 29% decrease in earnings. 1969: Monsanto wrote a confidentialPollution Abatement Plan （污染治理计划） which admitted that the problem involves the entire UnitedStates, Canada and sections of Europe, especially the UK and Sweden. 1969: Monsanto produces Lasso herbicide,better known as Agent Orange, which was used as defoliant （落叶剂） by theU.S. Government during the Vietnam War （越南战争） . success turns around the struggling Agriculture Division,Monsanto's web page reads. 1970s: Monsanto was a pioneer ofoptoelectronics （光电子） in the 1970s. Although Bock had a reputation for being a committedMonsanto executive, several factors contributed to his volatile term aspresident. Sales were up in 1970, but Bock's implementation of the 1971reorganization caused a significant amount of friction among members of theboard and senior management. In spite of the fact that this move, in whichMonsanto separated the management of raw materials from Monsanto'ssubsidiaries, was widely praised by security analysts, Bock resigned from thepresidency in February 1972. 1970: Cyclamate (the reigning low-calorieartificial sweetener) is pulled off the market in November after somescientists associate it with cancer. Questions are also raised about safety ofsaccharin, the only other artificial sweetener on the market, leaving the fieldwide open for aspartame. December 18, 1970: Searle Companyexecutives lay out a Food and Drug Sweetener Strategy that theyfeel will put the FDA into a positive frame of mind about aspartame. Aninternal policy memo describes psychological tactics Monsanto should use tobring the FDA into a subconscious spirit of participation with them onaspartame and get FDA regulators into the habit of saying Yes. 1971: Neuroscientist Dr. John Olney (whosepioneering work with monosodium glutamate MSG was responsible for having itremoved from baby foods) informs Searle that his studies show that asparticacid (one of the ingredients of aspartame) caused holes in the brains of infantmice. One of Searle's own researchers confirmed Dr. Olney's findings in asimilar study. 1972: The use of DDT was banned by U.S.Congress, due in large part to efforts by environmentalists, who persisted inthe challenge put forth by Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring in 1962, whichsought to inform the public of the side effects associated with theinsecticide, which had been much-welcomed in the fight againstmalaria-transmitting mosquitoes. 1973: Monsanto developed and patented theglyphosate molecule in the 1970s. Monsanto began manufacturing the herbicideRoundup, which has been marketed as a safe, general-purposeherbicide for widespread commercial and consumer use, even though its keyingredient, glyphosate, is a highly toxic poison for animals and humans. 1973: After spending tens of millions ofdollars conducting safety tests, the G.D. Searle Company applies for FDAapproval and submits over 100 studies they claim support aspartame's safety.One of the first FDA scientists to review the aspartame safety data states thatthe information provided (by Searle) is inadequate to permit an evaluationof thepotential toxicity of aspartame. She says in her report that inorder to be certain that aspartame is safe, further clinical tests are needed. 1974: Attorney Jim Turner (consumeradvocate who was instrumental in getting cyclamate taken off the market) meetswith Searle representatives in May to discuss Dr. Olney's 1971 study whichshowed that aspartic acid caused holes in the brains of infant mice. 1974: The FDA grants aspartame its firstapproval for restricted use in dry foods on July 26. 1974: Jim Turner and Dr. John Olney filethe first objections against aspartame's approval in August. 1975: After a 9-month search, John W.Hanley, a former executive with Procter Gamble, was chosen as president.Hanley also took over as chairperson. 1976: The success of the herbicide Lassohad turned around Monsanto's struggling Agriculture Division, and by the timeAgent Orange was banned in the U.S. and Lasso was facing increasing criticism,Monsanto had developed the weedkiller Roundup (active ingredient:glyphosate) as a replacement. Launched in 1976, Roundup helped make Monsantothe world's largest producer of herbicides. RoundUp was commercialized, andbecame the world's top-selling herbicide. Within a few years of its 1976launch, Roundup was being marketed in 115 countries. The success of Roundup coincided with therecognition by Monsanto executives that they needed to radically transform acompany increasingly under threat. According to a recent paper by DominicGlover, Monsanto had acquired a particularly unenviable reputation inthis regard, as a major producer of both dioxins and polychlorinated biphenyls(PCBs) - bothpersistent environmental pollutants posing serious risks to theenvironment and human health. Law suits and environmental clean-up costs beganto cut into Monsanto's bottom line, but more seriously there was a real fearthat a serious lapse could potentially bankrupt the company. According toGlover, Roundup Sales grew by 20% in 1981 and as the company increased productionit was soon Monsanto's most profitable product (Monsanto 1981, 1983)... It soonbecame the single most important product of Monsanto's agriculture division,which contributed about 20% of sales and around 45% of operating income to thecompany's balance sheet each year during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today,glyphosate remains the world's biggest herbicide by volume of sales. 1976: Monsanto produces Cycle-Safe, theworld's first plastic soft-drink bottle. The bottle, suspected of posingacancer risk, is banned the following year by the Food and Drug Administration. 1976: Turner Olney's petition onMarch 24 triggers an FDA investigation of the laboratory practices ofaspartame's manufacturer, G.D. Searle. The investigation finds Searle's testingprocedures shoddy, full of inaccuracies and manipulated test data.The investigators report they had never seen anything as bad as Searle'stesting. January 10, 1977: The FDA formally requeststhe U.S. Attorney's office to begin grand jury proceedings to investigatewhether indictments should be filed against Searle for knowinglymisrepresenting findings and concealing material facts and making falsestatements in aspartame safety tests. This is the first time in the FDA'shistory that they request a criminal investigation of a manufacturer. January 26, 1977: While the grand juryprobe is underway, Sidley Austin, the law firm representing Searle,begins job negotiations with the U.S. Attorney in charge of the investigation,Samuel Skinner. March 8, 1977: G. D. Searle hires prominentWashington insiderDonald Rumsfeld as the new CEO to try to turn the beleagueredcompany around. A former Member of Congress and Secretary of Defense in theFord Administration, Rumsfeld brings in several of his Washington cronies astop management. Donald Rumsfeld followed Searle as CEO, and then as Presidentof Searle from 1977-1985. July 1, 1977: Samuel Skinner leaves theU.S. Attorney's office on July 1st and takes a job with Searle's law firm. (seeJan. 26th) August 1, 1977: The Bressler Report,compiled by FDA investigators and headed by Jerome Bressler, is released. Thereport finds that 98 of the 196 animals died during one of Searle's studies andweren't autopsied until later dates, in some cases over one year after death.Many other errors and inconsistencies are noted. For example, a rat wasreported alive, then dead, then alive, then dead again; a mass, a uterinepolyp, and ovarian neoplasms were found in animals but not reported ordiagnosed in Searle's reports. December 8, 1977: U.S. Attorney Skinner'swithdrawal and resignation stalls the Searle grand jury investigation for solong that the statue of limitations on the aspartame charges runs out. Thegrand jury investigation is dropped. (borderline treason)
金蝉脱壳？孟山都要退出转基因路线吗？_转帖直言了 (2014-02-05 16:48:34) 转载 ▼ 标签： 转基因 信息战 科学 杂谈 分类： 转基因辩论 顾秀林按语： 中国正在被“舍了孩子去打狼”的战略引向转基因的悬崖绝壁。领路的是当然美国孟山都公司，它正在悄悄转向。磨叽好几年了，孟山都退下转基因快车道、部分转向有机农业的迹象，越来越明确了。只要脑子还没有灌迷汤，谁都可以“悟”出来，转基因育种那个终极的高技术，只有一条很短的“生命线”，它不可能持续、也不可能长久。不过是个兔子的尾巴、秋后的蚂蚱。其实只需要捅破一层窗户纸就够了。 中国被对手蓄意地培养出足够多吃转基因奶的技术专家大队。国际上的技术专家也被中国的转基因“国策”的吸引大批前来。中国在转基因死路上飞奔，国内利益集团比国外的更卖力更疯狂。看国运吧。——顾秀林注 龙头鸡尾和孟山都放弃转基因。一号文件的漏洞（二）。 直言了， 2014-02-03 | 2014-2-5 14:48:57。 http://zhiyanle.blog.hexun.com/91384378_d.html 。 引子： 相亲节目《非诚勿扰》有个常见的景象：一些男嘉宾明明是还在职场上挣扎呢，却高调吹牛说他必将创造出一个“世界五百强”的企业。结果呢，几乎是所有女嘉宾都给个灭灯、拒绝相亲牵手。于是，主持人开导男嘉宾，说：过日子需要的是实在、不是假大空的想法。男嘉宾辩解说：连想都不想，怎么能做到“世界五百强”？主持人接着开导说：若您自己跟自己过日子，那您怎么假大空都行；可您是来相亲的、是要找个今后天天生活在一起的伙伴，那您就得考虑别人能否接受您的想法了。 无独有偶。若新华社关于“育种”的解读符合本意，那么，一号文件说的是要搞转基因种子的“龙头”企业且要“覆盖全球”，就跟《非诚勿扰》节目里的男嘉宾搞假大空吹牛是一类表现。 譬如：该文件说：建立以企业为主体的育种创新体系，鼓励发展混合所有制农业产业化龙头企业。农业部说：要推进农业产业化龙头企业扶持政策落实；转基因种子是其主要内容。进一步诠释，有李二号为两会工作报告而做的征求意见，说：袁隆平提出建议，要多鼓励龙头种业企业、抢占国际市场；我的一个梦想，就是让杂交水稻覆盖全球。那说法得到李二号的高度赞赏。 那个要搞转基因种子“龙头”企业且要“覆盖全球”的泡沫，吹得与《非诚勿扰》那些男嘉宾所吹的假大空，简直是一模一样。若要说不同，那就是：男嘉宾为泡沫破裂所付出的代价是女嘉宾全部灭灯和相亲牵手失败；而中国搞转基因商业化的农业泡沫破裂所付出的代价呢，是全国民众的灭灯和全国民心的丧失，是全国的粮食安全、人口安全和国土安全等国家安全失去保障。 一：假大空的“覆盖全球”。 美国农业部的统计说明，亚洲国家的稻米消费占全球总数的81%左右，欧美发达国家的消费很少（譬如，美国的人均年消费数量不到食品总数的1%，本国生产满足需要是绰绰有余，略有进口也大都是为少数民族需要或贸易平衡）。西方发达国家已经完成了彼此保障天然有机食品供应的合作协约，其防范中国转基因大米几乎扩展到防范所有中国大米的程度了（自2009年中国号称“转基大米三五年上餐桌”以来、美国从中国进口大米大幅度减少，就是个例子）。欧盟国家严禁严防中国转基因大米的法规已经生效。面对如此实际状态，您还想用您的转基因大米覆盖全球？那不是假大空、还能是啥？ 美国早就搞出了各种转基因大米了，至今没搞商业化。人家是老牌资本主义，不懂抓机会赚钱而让您去覆盖全球？人家当然懂，比您懂得多。然而，人家更懂得效益和风险是并行，而转基因大米的危害风险远远大于极少数人赚钱的效益，所以至今没搞商业化。此外，美国FDA-已强化了对中国大米（包括转基因大米）的监测。至少，欧美发达国家的防范转基因大米之盾已经披甲上阵了，您要还去覆盖？哈。 在亚洲，泰国和印度等国家的稻子单产几乎可与中国的并驾齐驱（某些地方还有所超过），且多是天然有机的。如此，人家为什么要买您的品种、且是没有科学证明是安全的转基因大米呢？再说了，一个地方培育出来的种子、到另一个地方就很可能不灵，那是农业常识。如此，自然条件大不相同的国家，为什么要用您那可能根本不适合当地条件的品种呢？连亚洲都不能覆盖，您还要覆盖全球？ 此外，袁隆平搞起了转基因玉米水稻杂交品种。不同类别作物杂交失败，早有案例。譬如，俄国曾搞梨苹果，结果还不是惨败了么？如今呢，您换个手段、不用嫁接而用转基因了，那自然规律就变了？哈！您以为别国都是跟中国的为转基因商业利益而摧毁本国豆业的中国农业部官员一样、为购买必将失败的转基因水稻而摧毁本国的米业？哈。 顺便说说：2007年前后，在中国，官商学媒之“四位一体”的转基因商业既得利益团伙形成；为其商业利益，该团伙雇用的打手方舟子和入伙的媒体人民日报媒体科技频道合伙，对袁隆平的自然杂交水稻搞起了恶毒攻击。我等对袁隆平表示了支持。如今呢，在商业利益和农业部门压力面前，袁隆平失去了自我、改弦易辙去搞必将失败的转基因玉米水稻杂种，公开加入了转基因假大空的吹牛队伍，即袁隆平原本的榜样意义已经不复存在；如此，我收回我的支持（尽管我的支持是微不足道的）。 一：龙头，还是鸡尾？ 至于中国要搞转基因食品作物种子“龙头企业”？我看，能搞个“鸡尾”企业就不错了。 前车之鉴：中国的联想公司。如今，中国的联想公司拥有的电脑业务，不但是拥有产品、且大都具有那些产品的产权，销售额也足够可观。可联想公司是电脑业的“龙头企业”么？不过是个“鸡尾”企业而已。不信？看看吧：英特尔和微软公司稍微动动小指头，整个联想公司就得跟着人家屁股后面转。如此，用比方说，联想公司不过是英特尔和微软公司的“鸡尾巴”公司。 为啥叫“鸡尾巴”公司？很简单：英特尔和微软公司是“鸡头”公司；在其屁后转的（譬如联想公司等）就是“鸡尾”公司。美国的“鸡头“公司掌控市场，靠的不仅仅是“硬实力”的专利产权，更还有“软实力”的“商业模式”（美国英文叫“business models）。正因为如此，尽管联想公司收购了手提计算机等业务都有产权、即联想公司是有自己的产权的，但还是改变不了它是个“鸡尾”公司的地位。 同样，在转基因作物领域，孟山都公司不但掌握了大量的专利产权，更还掌握着该领域的“商业模式”。简单说，其模式大致内容是：测出目标作物的基因序列，然后， 从中找到可以作业的基因片段；开发目标功能的蛋白农药（往往是毒素，譬如杀虫或除草，等等）；用基因技术将蛋白农药植入目标作物。这往往是DNA-水平作业。 从中找到可以关闭某功能的作业的基因片段；用基因技术实行功能关闭。这往往是RNA-水平作业。搞成了，就进入商业化。就此模式，孟山都公司享有专利、且实行“数据封闭”。 一旦进入那个商业模式，不管公司大小，也不管农民农户生意如何，也不管那些公司或农户有无产权，就为孟山都公司所掌控。譬如，足够超级的跨国公司杜邦公司，陷入了该商业模式，就是“打开”相关品种做数据分析、也会受到孟山都公司的“侵权”诉讼而败了官司。杜邦或巴斯夫都有自己享有产权的转基因种子；但他们做得越多，孟山都公司的模式所控制的范围就越大和程度越深，其中包括对使用他们的种子的农民农户的控制（公司以农户自留种子而把农户告上法庭、就是个例子）。就是说，尽管杜邦和巴斯夫都是举世闻名的超级跨国公司，但在孟山都模式下、就是“龙尾”而几乎没机会成为“龙头”企业。 中国状态如何？且不说许多转基因作物开发和蛋白农药开发是大量使用、套用、借用或“山寨版”使用孟山都等外国的专利，仅说中国化工系统和农业系统根本就没有杜邦或巴斯夫那样超级跨国公司的基础，甚至连中国企业做转基因作物捆绑的农药生产销售的业务、也主要是来自孟山都等外国公司转让、迁移或授权等等（草甘磷就是个例子）。如此，您想在孟山都的模式下而一跃成为跟孟山都平起平坐的“龙头”？说实在的，在孟山都的转基因作物之商业模式下，不管您有没有或有多少所谓“国产”专利产权，您能当个杜邦或巴斯夫那样的“龙尾”企业都没份，顶多象联想公司那样去当个“鸡尾”公司。 更值得注意的是，一旦中国的食品及其农业陷入转基因化工农业的商业模式，整个中国的食品农业就将成为极少数人掌控和可以随意动手动脚的“鸡尾巴”，且那极少数可以用其控制手段来要挟中国当局的决策必须符合他们的既得利益，否则，他们手指动一动，整个中国食品农业就会面临崩溃的威胁，从而中国的国家安全就会面临严重威胁。奸商及其勾结的政客用控制粮食（或控制其它食品，譬如盐等）的手段而要挟当局的事情，在中国历史上发生过多次。且不说别的时候，仅新中国就遇到过（详情故事、在陈云等前辈的作品里有足够详细的记录）。 美国当局是足够精明的，其迟迟不搞麦子等所谓“主粮”或“主食”的转基因作物商业化，有健康、生态和技术等等方面的危害风险之考虑，也有国家安全和国家管理等方面、即必须防止极少数人掌控国家命脉物资供应的危害风险之考虑。换句话说，美国当局对现用的转基因化工农业模式、是保持着高度警惕的。正因为如此，美国当局花费大量资金人力不断强化以防止转基因技术武器攻击为主要内容的生物国防的建设（包括对转基因作物的危害风险之管理），而对转基因种子商业开发方面几乎就没花多少钱（当局曾对某些个别项目做了不到50万美元的小规模投资，遭到全国民众的严重抗议）、更是几乎就没花钱去搞“国家投资、个人发财”的所谓转基因种子“龙头”企业。 欧洲发达国家则是警惕性更高，甚至干脆把转基因种子公司赶出了欧洲市场。他们不知道搞个“龙头”企业去赚钱？当然知道，且是资本主义发祥地、当然知道赚钱。然而，他们更知道，若是国家安全和国家管理的决策要服从极少数掌控了粮食农业的人，那么，搞转基因化工农业的“龙头”企业就无异于国家自杀或民族自杀。如是，把转基因种子公司赶出欧洲市场，就是维护国家安全的正确 或必然的选择。 一：孟山都要放弃转基因，中国却把鸡毛当令箭。 上述中国要搞的“龙头企业”且要“覆盖全球”的转基因作物育种技术，都是跟在孟山都等化工公司屁后颠颠的“垃圾技术”（2004年，美国反思转基因作物商业化，清楚指出，转基因食品作物都是些“垃圾技术”的东西）。那种技术的科学依据，即所谓基于DNA-水平的“一个基因、一个蛋白”，是大约半个世纪以前的东西，早就被科学发现和科学实验所证明了是错误的依据，即实际上、事实是RNA-水平的“一个基因、多种蛋白”。把一个依据错误而成为“垃圾技术”的东西，当作“世界前沿”而“重点发展”且还要搞“龙头”企业去“覆盖全球”，那不是拿鸡毛当令箭和搞假大空，还能是什么呢？ 最近的发展迹象，更能说明问题。根据WIRED和MOTHER-JONES等媒体今年01月下旬的报道述评说，孟山都公司正在改弦易辙、似乎要告别转基因作物和开始走有机育种的道路了。 譬如，述评《孟山都走向有机》的一个情节说，新年之际，孟山都的头头们在公司总部的封闭地下室，开了个聚餐会议，策划公司的未来十年。他们会餐吃的是有机蔬菜水果；你一言、我一语，说的是有机蔬菜水果多么好、公司将如何搞有机种子开发业务，不再搞转基因了。就此，述评为孟山都的最新策划做了个发展途径对比列单： 常规育种； 转基因育种； 孟山都策划的新式育种。述评说，在孟山都最新策划的蔬菜水果的种子业务发展列单里，转基因化工种子不见踪影。述评字里行间透露说，孟山都公司终于开始重视消费者民众抵制转基因食品的声音了，终于看到该公司因转基因而蒙受到前所未有的信用危机，如此，再不寻找新的发展途径、那公司就将面临严重的幸存危机。这就是该公司新策划的主要背景缘故之一。 又譬如，《孟山都要放弃转基因吗？》的报道说，尽管孟山都公司花费数千万美元试图扼杀转基因食品标识立法工作、似乎该公司要在转基因的树上是不吊死不甘心的，但是，若您细细观察，孟山都公司似乎已经开始考虑甚至开始筹备如何放弃转基因食品作物了。譬如，在过去一年，上报美国农业部申请核准的转基因作物有10来个品种、孟山都公司只有两个，与其过去 占多数的情景形成鲜明对比。又譬如，孟山都总部明确向蔬菜水果分部说明、没有搞转基因品种的计划。该公司头头甚至公开说，为每个转基因品种的开发来支付一亿美元和花费10年时间、也不一定能取得预期效果； ，世界上最好的基因也就顶个屁用（原文：The best gene in the world doesn't fix dogshit germplasm。这是美国土话，恶搞味道远比我的意译要浓重。我的翻译水平很低，难以做到保持原意的同时又保持原本浓厚的恶搞味道。因此，若您能做出两全其美的翻译，请用您自己的翻译。）。报道说，迹象显示，孟山都似乎在筹备放弃转基因作物开发业务、转向以基因技术为主要内容的“作物数据咨询”服务，就如同IBM公司逐步放弃计算机硬软件开发业务而转向计算机数据咨询服务的做法一样。 我的看法是：自美国社会于2004年首次反思转基因商业化以后，孟山都公司就开始做上述故事的放风了。2010年做第二次反思，有孟山都公司参与的美国学界报告更是说明，长期搞转基因作物商业化种植很可能是得不偿失或事与愿违（纽约时报曾有报道）；那以后，孟山都公司做上述故事的放风就更频繁了。就是说，不管孟山都为其今后十来年的最新策划到底是什么内容，转基因食品作物商业化以来18年左右的发展事实说明，基于“一个基因、一个蛋白”的转基因食品作物的“垃圾技术”必将彻底失败的命运，则是难免的或是“大局已定”了。 可是呢，中国农业部和科学院生物部门的官员学者们，还在说那个垃圾东西是“农业现代化”的“大势所趋”、是“世界前沿”和“战略制高点”、要“重点发展”且要搞“龙头企业”去“覆盖全球”。嘿嘿，如此把 开始被抛弃的鸡毛当令箭，不是搞假大空、还能是什么呢？ 简而言之吧，就中国种业所反映的中国农业现代化发展到底应该走什么道路和实行什么政策？今年一号文件的漏洞是实在太大了，甚至颇有些“假大空”的味道。如前所说，男嘉宾相亲搞假大空，顶多是落个女嘉宾全部灭灯之类的个人失败；而国家政策搞转基因育种商业化的假大空呢，泡沫破裂的代价就是全国民众的灭灯和全国民心的丧失，是全国的粮食安全、人口安全和国土安全等国家安全失去保障。如此，希望中国当局能有足够重视、把漏洞问题及时解决好，请别再把必将失败的转基因食品作物的“垃圾技术”当作“农业现代的必然趋势”而去搞必将失败的“重点发展”和“龙头企业”了吧。 （待续）。 参考阅读： 一号文件的漏洞（一）：什么是粮食安全？ 2014-1-20 10:37:09。 http://zhiyanle.blog.hexun.com/91248611_d.html . . 孟山都撤出欧洲背后的地缘政治。 2013-07-25 8:17:26。 https://sites.google.com/site/zhiyanpage/view/zy20130722-us-food-paris . http://zhiyanle.blog.hexun.com/87228935_h.html 。 # # # *************************************** Is Monsanto Giving Up on GMOs? —By Tom Philpott | Wed Jan. 29, 2014 3:00 AM GMT。 http://www.motherjones.com/tom-philpott/2014/01/monsanto-gmo-technology-genetically-modified-organisms Is genetically modified seed giant Monsanto doing the unthinkable and moving away from genetically modified seeds? It sounds crazy, but hear me out. Let’s start with Monsanto's vegetable division, Seminis, which boasts it is the largest developer and grower of vegetable seeds in the world. Monsanto acknowledges Seminis has no new GM vegetables in development. According to a recent Wired piece, Seminis has has reverted instead to good old-fashioned crossbreeding, the same technology that farmers have been using to optimize crops for millennia. Why? The article points to people's growing avoidance of genetically modified foods. So far, consumers have shown no appetite to gobble up GM vegetables. (But that doesn't mean people aren't eating GMOs: Nearly all GMOs currently on the market are big commodity crops like corn and soy, which, besides being used as livestock feed, are regularly used as ingredients in processed food—think high-fructose corn syrup and soy oil.) But the Wired piece also suggests a factor that doesn't get nearly enough attention: GM technology doesn't seem to be very good at generating complex traits like better flavor or more nutrients, the very attributes Monsanto was hoping to engineer into veggies. Here's Wired: Furthermore, genetically modifying consumer crops proved to be inefficient and expensive. Stark estimates that adding a new gene takes roughly 10 years and $100 million to go from a product concept to regulatory approval. And inserting genes one at a time doesn't necessarily produce the kinds of traits that rely on the inter-actions of several genes. Well before their veggie business went kaput, Monsanto knew it couldn't just genetically modify its way to better produce; it had to breed great vegetables to begin with. As Stark phrases a company mantra: The best gene in the world doesn't fix dogshit germplasm. Okay, that's vegetables. What about Monsanto's core business, selling seeds for big industrial commodity crops like corn, soybeans, cotton, and alfalfa? Monsanto has come to dominate these markets with its Roundup Ready products, which are designed to withstand Monsanto's flagship herbicide, and, for corn and cotton, its Bt products, which are engineered to produce a toxin found in Bacillus thuringiensis, an insect-killing bacteria. Does the company have lots of novel GM products in mind for this vast, lucrative sector? Monsanto's latest Annual RD Pipeline Review, a document released earlier this month that showcases the company's research into new product lines, foretells all kinds of impressive-sounding stuff. But a surprising amount of the company's new research, even for its most lucrative crops like corn and soy, promise either new iterations of herbicide tolerance and Bt, or rely on classical breeding—not biotechnology. The one major exception is a corn seed relying on a new kind of GMO: RNA interference (RNAi) technology, a recently discovered way to turn off certain genes, which Monsanto plans to engineer into crops to kill certain insects. According to Monsanto's pipeline review, RNAi corn remains in the early proof of concept phase. In a recent piece, the New York Times' Andrew Pollack reports that the technology is showing promise—Monsanto hopes to have it on the market late this decade. But it's also generating controversy even in normally Monsanto-friendly regulatory circles because researchers have suggested it may kill beneficial insects like ladybugs along with targeted pests. Pollack points to this 2013 paper by Environmental Protection Agency scientists, which warned that the unfamiliar technology presented unique challenges for ecological risk assessment that have not yet been encountered in assessments for traditional chemical pesticides. So RNAi corn may be coming—and could bring public relations and regulatory complications for Monsanto, not to mention unpredictable ecological consequences for the rest of us. But how much other GMO-based stuff does Monsanto have up its sleeve? According to the US Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the agency that oversees the rollout of new GM crops, not much. Of the 13 new GMOs APHIS is tracking, only 2 are from Monsanto: an alfalfa engineered to be more easily digestible as animal feed, and a soybean designed to withstand a harsh old herbicide called dicamba (a variation on the familiar Roundup Ready herbicide-tolerance theme). Just two crops in the final stages of USDA deregulation, from the ballyhooed GMO seed giant? That makes me think of Monsanto's recent $1 billion purchase of Climate Corp., a company that proposes to use GPS-backed data analysis tools to help farmers make planting decisions, for a fee. The move reminds me of IBM's mid-2000s decision to transition out of the business that made it famous by ditching the personal computer and focusing on IT products and consulting. I've called Monsanto's press office to ask about their plans, and I'll return to this topic if they get back to me. And in the meanwhile, to be sure, Monsanto still makes loads of money selling GMO seeds—along with their matching proprietary herbicide, and likely will for a long time. But the facts have me wondering if the company's quiet exit from genetically engineered vegetables and placement of a billion-dollar wager on data services signal that the GMO giant just might be hedging its bets on GM technology. Mother Jones is a nonprofit news organization that specializes in investigative, political, and social justice reporting. We currently have two main platforms: an award-winning bimonthly national magazine (circulation 240,000), and a website featuring new, original reporting 24-7. (In the past we've had a radio show and TV specials; theme parks are in the conceptual stage.) Why should you read or support us? Because smart, fearless journalism keeps people informed—informed being pretty much indispensable to a democracy that actually works. Because we've been ahead of the curve time and again. Because this is journalism not funded by or beholden to corporations. Because we bust bullshit and get results. Because we're expanding our investigative coverage while the rest of the media are contracting. Because you can count on us to take no prisoners, cleave to no dogma, and tell it like it is. Plus we're pretty damn fun. Read our FAQ for the deets. # Monsanto Is Going Organic in a Quest for the Perfect Veggie。 BY BEN PAYNTER01.21.147:00 AM。 http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2014/01/new-monsanto-vegetables/ 。。 In a windowless basement room decorated with photographs of farmers clutching freshly harvested vegetables, three polo-shirt-and-slacks-clad Monsanto execu-tives, all men, wait for a special lunch. A server arrives and sets in front of each a caprese-like salad—tomatoes, mozzarella, basil, lettuce—and one of the execs, David Stark, rolls his desk chair forward, raises a fork dramatically, and skewers a leaf. He takes a big, showy bite. The other two men, Robb Fraley and Kenny Avery, also tuck in. The room fills with loud, intent, wet chewing sounds. Eventually, Stark looks up. “Nice crisp texture, which people like, and a pretty good taste,” he says. “It’s probably better than what I get out of Schnucks,” Fraley responds. He’s talking about a grocery chain local to St. Louis, where Monsanto is headquartered. Avery seems happy; he just keeps eating. The men poke, prod, and chew the next course with even more vigor: salmon with a relish of red, yellow, and orange bell pepper and a side of broccoli. “The lettuce is my favorite,” Stark says afterward. Fraley concludes that the pepper “changes the game if you think about fresh produce.” Changing the agricultural game is what Monsanto does. The company whose name is synonymous with Big Ag has revolutionized the way we grow food—for better or worse. Activists revile it for such mustache-twirling practices as suing farmers who regrow licensed seeds or filling the world with Roundup-resistant super-weeds. Then there’s Monsanto’s reputation—scorned by some, celebrated by others—as the foremost purveyor of genetically modified commodity crops like corn and soybeans with DNA edited in from elsewhere, designed to have qualities nature didn’t quite think of. So it’s not particularly surprising that the company is introducing novel strains of familiar food crops, invented at Monsanto and endowed by their creators with powers and abilities far beyond what you usually see in the produce section. The lettuce is sweeter and crunchier than romaine and has the stay-fresh quality of iceberg. The peppers come in miniature, single-serving sizes to reduce leftovers. The broccoli has three times the usual amount of glucoraphanin, a compound that helps boost antioxidant levels. Stark’s department, the global trade division, came up with all of them. “Grocery stores are looking in the produce aisle for something that pops, that feels different,” Avery says. “And consumers are looking for the same thing.” If the team is right, they’ll know soon enough. Frescada lettuce, BellaFina peppers, and Bene-forté broccoli—cheery brand names trademarked to an all-but-anonymous Mon-santo subsidiary called Seminis—are rolling out at supermarkets across the US. But here’s the twist: The lettuce, peppers, and broccoli—plus a melon and an onion, with a watermelon soon to follow—aren’t genetically modified at all. Monsanto created all these veggies using good old-fashioned crossbreeding, the same tech-nology that farmers have been using to optimize crops for millennia. That doesn’t mean they are low tech, exactly. Stark’s division is drawing on Monsanto’s accumulated scientific know-how to create vegetables that have all the advantages of genetically modified organisms without any of the Frankenfoods ick factor. And that’s a serious business advantage. Despite a gaping lack of evidence that genetically modified food crops harm human health, consumers have shown a marked resistance to purchasing GM produce (even as they happily consume pro-ducts derived from genetically modified commodity crops). Stores like Whole Foods are planning to add GMO disclosures to their labels in a few years. State laws may mandate it even sooner. Nicholas Cope. Beneforté (broccoli). Launched: Fall 2010. Availability: Year-round. Trait: Compared with standard broccoli, contains up to three times the amount of glucora-phanin, a compound that increases antioxidant levels. Method: Crossbreeding commercial broccoli with a strain growing wild in southern Italy. Region Grown: Arizona, California, Mexico. Price : $2.50 per pound. But those requirements won’t apply to Monsanto’s new superveggies. They may be born in a lab, but technically they’re every bit as natural as what you’d get at a farmers’ market. Keep them away from pesticides and transport them less than 100 miles and you could call them organic and locavore too. John Francis Queeny formed Monsanto Chemical Works in 1901, primarily to produce the artificial sweetener saccharin. Monsanto was the family name of Queeny’s wife, Olga. It was a good time for chemical companies. By the 1920s, Monsanto had expanded into sulfuric acid and polychlorinated biphenyl, or PCB, a coolant used in early transformers and electric motors, now more famous as a pernicious environmental contaminant. The company moved on to plastics and synthetic fabrics, and by the 1960s it had sprouted a division to create herbicides, including the Vietnam-era defoliant Agent Orange. A decade later, Monsanto invented Roundup, a glyphosate-based weed killer that farmers could apply to reduce overgrowth between crops, increasing productivity. In the early 1990s, the company turned its scientific expertise to agriculture, working on novel crop strains that would resist the effects of its signature herbicide. Now, breeding new strains of plants is nothing new. Quite the opposite, in fact—optimizing plants for yield, flavor, and other qualities defined the earliest human civilizations. But for all the millennia since some proto-farmer first tried it, successfully altering plants has been a game of population roulette. Basically, farmers breed a plant that has a trait they like with other plants they also like. Then they plant seeds from that union and hope the traits keep showing up in subsequent generations. They’re working with qualities that a biologist would call, in aggregate, phenotype. But phenotype is the manifestation of genotype, the genes for those traits. The roulettelike complications arise because some genes are dominant and some are recessive. Taking a tree with sweet fruit and crossing it with one that has big fruit won’t necessarily get you a tree with sweeter, bigger fruit. You might get the opposite—or a tree more vulnerable to disease, or one that needs too much water, and on and on. It’s a trial-and-error guessing game that takes lots of time, land, and patience. The idea behind genetic modification is to speed all that up—analyze a species’ genes, its germplasm, and manipulate it to your liking. It’s what the past three decades of plant biology have achieved and continue to refine. Monsanto became a pioneer in the field when it set out to create Roundup-resistant crops. Stark joined that effort in 1989, when he was a molecular biology postdoc. He was experiment-ing with the then-new science of transgenics. Monsanto was focusing on GM commodity crops, but the more exciting work was in creating brand-new vegetables for consumers. For example, Calgene, a little biotech outfit in Davis, California, was building a tomato it called the Flavr Savr. Conventional tomatoes were harvested while green, when they’re tough enough to withstand shipping, and then gassed with ethylene at their destination to jump-start ripening. But the Flavr Savr was engineered to release less of an enzyme called polygalacturonase so that the pectin in its cell walls didn’t break down so soon after picking. The result was a tomato that farmers could pick and ship ripe. In the mid-1990s, Monsanto bought Calgene and reassigned Stark, moving him from Roundup research to head a project that almost accidentally figured out how to engineer flavor into produce. He began tinkering with genes that affect the production of ADP-glucose pyrophosphorylase, an enzyme that correlates to higher levels of glycogen and starch in tomatoes and potatoes. Translation: more viscous ketchup and a French fry that would shed less water when cooked, maintaining mass without absorbing grease. And he succeeded. “The texture was good,” Stark says. “They were more crisp and tasted more like a potato.” Nicholas Cope: BellaFina(bell pepper). Launched: Fall 2011 Availability: Year-round Trait: A third the size of regular bell peppers when ripe, mini-mizing waste and allowing for flexibility while cooking. Method: Selectively breeding plants with smaller and smaller peppers. Region grown: California, Florida, North Carolina. Price: $1.50 per three-pepper bag. They never made it to market. Aside from consumer backlash, the EPA deemed StarLink corn, a new biotech strain from another company, unfit for human consumption because of its potential to cause allergic reactions. Another geneti-cally modded corn variety seemed to kill monarch butterflies. Big food conglom-erates including Heinz and McDonald’s—which you might recognize from their famous tomato and potato products—abandoned GM ingredients; some European countries have since refused to grow or import them. Toss in the fact that production costs on the Flavr Savr turned out to be too high and it’s easy to see why Monsanto shut down Stark’s division in 2001. Large-scale farms growing soy or cotton, or corn destined for cattle feed—or corn syrup—were happy to plant GM grain that could resist big doses of herbicide. But the rest of the produce aisle was a no-go. Furthermore, genetically modifying consumer crops proved to be inefficient and expensive. Stark estimates that adding a new gene takes roughly 10 years and $100 million to go from a product concept to regulatory approval. And inserting genes one at a time doesn’t necessarily produce the kinds of traits that rely on the inter-actions of several genes. Well before their veggie business went kaput, Monsanto knew it couldn’t just genetically modify its way to better produce; it had to breed great vegetables to begin with. As Stark phrases a company mantra: “The best gene in the world doesn’t fix dogshit germplasm.” What does? Crossbreeding. Stark had an advantage here: In the process of learning how to engineer chemical and pest resistance into corn, researchers at Monsanto had learned to read and understand plant genomes—to tell the difference between the dogshit germplasm and the gold. And they had some nifty technology that allowed them to predict whether a given cross would yield the traits they wanted. The key was a technique called genetic marking. It maps the parts of a genome that might be associated with a given trait, even if that trait arises from multiple genes working in concert. Researchers identify and cross plants with traits they like and then run millions of samples from the hybrid—just bits of leaf, really—through a machine that can read more than 200,000 samples per week and map all the genes in a particular region of the plant’s chromosomes. Nicholas Cope: Melorange(melon). Launched: Winter 2011. Availability: December through April. Trait: Tastes up to 30 percent sweeter than cantaloupe grown in winter. Method: Crossbreeding cantaloupe and European heritage melons with a gene for a fruity and floral aroma. Region Grown: Arizona, Central America. Price: $3 per melon. They had more toys too. In 2006, Monsanto developed a machine called a seed chipper that quickly sorts and shaves off widely varying samples of soybean germplasm from seeds. The seed chipper lets researchers scan tiny genetic variations, just a single nucleotide, to figure out if they’ll result in plants with the traits they want—without having to take the time to let a seed grow into a plant. Monsanto computer models can actually predict inheritance patterns, meaning they can tell which desired traits will successfully be passed on. It’s breeding without breeding, plant sex in silico. In the real world, the odds of stacking 20 different characteristics into a single plant are one in 2 trillion. In nature, it can take a millennium. Monsanto can do it in just a few years. And this all happens without any genetic engineering. Nobody inserts a single gene into a single genome. (They could, and in fact sometimes do, look at their crosses by engineering a plant as a kind of beta test. But those aren’t intended to leave the lab.) Stark and his colleagues realized that they could use these technologies to identify a cross that would have highly desirable traits and grow the way they wanted. And they could actually charge more for it—all the benefits of a GMO with none of the stigma. “We didn’t have those tools the first time around in vegetables,” Stark says. Also in 2005, Monsanto bought the world’s largest vegetable seed company, Seminis. Think of it as a wholesale supplier of germplasm. It turned out Seminis came with another benefit: something in the pipeline that Stark could turn into his division’s first test product. A decade prior, swashbuckling plant scientists had discovered on the limestone cliffs of western Sicily a strain of Brassica villosa, ancestor of modern broccoli. Thanks to a gene called MYB28, this weedy atavist produced elevated levels of glucoraphanin. Stark’s team bred further enhance-ments to that antioxidant-increasing compound into a more familiar-looking plant—good old broccoli. In 2010 Monsanto started test-marketing the new crop, calling it Beneforté. The strategy was coming together: enhanced premium veggies for an elite buyer. Beneforté broccoli came in a bag of ready-to-cook florets—so convenient!—labeled with a bar graph telegraphing how its antioxidant levels stacked up against regular broccoli and cauliflower. It sold, but Monsanto researchers knew that future veggies would need a more compelling hook. Everybody already knows that they’re supposed to eat their broccoli. Stark’s group had one last angle: flavor. In produce, flavor comes from a combina-tion of color, texture, taste (which is to say, generally, sweetness or lack of bitterness), and aroma. But the traits that create those variables are complicated and sometimes nonobvious. For example, Monsanto created an onion—the EverMild—with reduced levels of a chemical called lachrymatory factor, the stuff that makes you cry. That wasn’t too hard. But making a sweet winter version of a cantaloupe took more effort. Stark’s team first found genes that helped a French melon keep from spoiling after harvest. Through crossbreeding, they learned to keep those genes turned on. Now farmers could harvest the melon ripe, and it stayed ripe longer with full aroma. But the researchers didn’t stop there—they also made sure the fruit had the gene for citron, a molecule associated with fruity and floral aromas. They called the final product the Melorange. Figuring out these relationships takes place at a sophisticated sensory and genetics lab perched amid hundreds of acres of experimental farmland in the rural, sun-scorched outskirts of Woodland, a farming town in California’s ag belt. White-coated scientists hover amid tubs full of fruits and vegetables in a lab, probing them with the intensity of forensic investigators. Penetrometers measure squishiness. Instruments called Brix meters track sugar content. Gas spectro-graphs, liquid chromatographs, and magnetic resonance imagers isolate specific aromatic molecules and their concentrations. Eventually volunteers eat the experimental foods and give feedback. In one tasting session, sensory scientist Chow-Ming Lee passes out five plastic cups filled with bite-size squares of cantaloupe, harvested from outside and brought in from a store, to a dozen melon growers and distributors. Each cup is labeled with a three-digit code. Score sheets have two columns: “Sweet/Flavorful” and “Juicy.” After sampling each batch and writing down their assessments, the participants punch their scores into devices that connect to Lee’s laptop, which plots the room’s general sentiment on a screen along a four-quadrant grid ranging from low to high flavor on one axis and low to high juiciness on the other. None of the melons man-age to crack the upper corner of the far right quadrant, the slot Monsanto hopes to fill: a sweet, juicy, crowd-pleasing melon. In the adjoining fields a few hours later, Monsanto breeders Jeff Mills and Greg Tolla conduct a different kind of taste test. There they slice open a classic cantaloupe and their own Melorange for comparison. Tolla’s assessment of the conventional variety is scathing. “It’s tastes more like a carrot,” he says. Mills agrees: “It’s firm. It’s sweet, but that’s about it. It’s flat.” I take bites of both too. Compared with the standard cantaloupe, the Melorange tastes supercharged; it’s vibrant, fruity, and ultrasweet. I want seconds. “That’s the shtick,” Mills says. Of course, sweeter fruit isn’t necessarily better fruit, and it’s perhaps no surprise that critics of Monsanto are unconvinced that this push toward non-GM products represents good corporate citizenship. They question whether these new fruits and vegetables will actually be as healthy as their untweaked counterparts. In 2013, for example, consumer-traits researchers prototyped their Summer Slice watermelon, designed with a more applelike texture (to cut down on the dreaded watermelon-juice-dripping-down-your-chin phenomenon that has scarred so many childhoods). But the denser texture made it taste less sweet. So Stark’s team is breeding in a higher sugar content. Is that unhealthy? No one really knows, but it’s certainly true that the law doesn’t require Monsanto to account for potential long-term effects. (The FDA considers all additive-free, conventionally bred produce to be safe.) Nobody has ever tinkered with sugar levels the way Monsanto is attempting; it’s essentially an experiment, says Robert Lustig, a pediatric endocrinologist and president of the Institute for Responsible Nutrition. “The only result they care about is profit.” Monsanto, of course, denies that charge. Make fruit taste better and people will eat more of it. “That’s good for society and, let’s face it, good for business,” Stark says. Monsanto is still Monsanto. The company enforces stringent contracts for farmers who buy its produce seeds. Just as with Roundup Ready soybeans, Monsanto prohibits regrowing seeds from the new crops. The company maintains exclusion clauses with growers if harvests don’t meet the standards of firmness, sweetness, or scent—pending strict quality-assurance checks. “The goal is to get the products recognized by the consumer, trusted, and purchased,” Stark says. “That’s what I really want. I want to grow sales.” But he gets coy about the company’s longer-term agenda. “I’m not sure we ever really projected what kind of market share we’ll have,” he says. The vegetable division cleared $821 million in revenue in 2013, a significant potential growth area for a $14 billion-a-year company that leans heavily on revenue from biotech corn and soy. More telling is the company’s steady stream of acquisitions, which sug-gests a continuing commitment to the produce aisle. It owns a greenhouse in the Guatemalan mountains, where the dry, warm air allows three or four growth cycles a year—great for research. In 2008 Monsanto bought De Ruiter, one of the world’s biggest greenhouse seed companies, and in 2013 it picked up Climate Cor-poration, a big-data weather company that can provide intel on what field traits might be needed to survive global warming in a given region. Mark Gulley, an analyst at BGC Financial, says the company is following the “virtuous cycle” approach; it spends heavily on marketing and pours much of the proceeds back into RD. The new crops keep coming. In 2012 Monsanto debuted Performance Series Broccoli, a conventionally bred line that stands taller, enabling cheaper, faster mechanical harvesting as opposed to handpicking. Breeders are also growing watermelons with the green-and-white-striped rind patterns familiar to US consumers but also the tiger-striped variety favored in Spain and the oval jade version loved by Australians. “It’s supposed to remind you of where you grew up,” says Mills, the Monsanto melon breeder. That suggests the division plans to be a player in the trillion-dollar global produce market. For his part, Stark hopes that when Monsanto’s affiliation with some of its best sellers becomes more widely known, the company might win back some trust. “There isn’t a reputation silver bullet, but it helps,” he says. In that basement dining room at Monsanto headquarters, he waxes rhapsodic about the lettuce long after he has cleaned his plate. During a recent trip to Holland, where Frescada is gaining popularity, Stark saw folks peeling leaves straight off the heads and munching them without dressing, like extra-large potato chips. “People just ate it like a snack, which was not the intent, but …” Stark trails off and looks around the room. His napkin is still on his lap. He’s savoring the potential. I CAN’T BELIEVE IT’S NOT GMO Agriculture giant Monsanto may be best known for genetic modification—like creating corn that resists the effects of Monsanto’s weed killer Roundup. But when it comes to fruits and vegetables you buy in the store, genetic modification is off the menu. Monsanto thinks no one will buy Frankenfoods, so the company is tweaking its efforts—continuing to map the genetic basis of a plant’s desirable traits but using that data to breed new custom-designed strains the way agronomists have for millennia. Here’s how it works—and how the results differ from GMO crops. Thanks to this cross between high and low tech, a new era of super-produce may be upon us. —Victoria Tang The Old Way: - Identify plants with recognizable, desirable traits. - Crossbreed those plants together. - Grow the offspring. - Wait to see if the traits show up. Repeat as necessary. The Genetic Modification Way: - Identify plants or other organisms with recognizable, desirable traits. - Isolate the genes that manifest those traits. - Use enzymes to clip out those genes and paste them into the genomes of other plants, or inject them using a “gene gun” (for real) or by piggybacking them on a bacteria or virus. - Grow the plant with the inserted gene. If the gene has successfully incorporated into the plant, you’ll have a novel phenotype. The New Monsanto Way: - Identify plants with recognizable, desirable traits. - Crossbreed the plants. - Sift through the offspring genome for known markers for desirable traits. - Grow only the plants with those markers.
【明辨是非】 阿根廷农民状告孟山都公司事件，至少说明了转基因作物带来危害不但有报告且有判决了，再次证明中国挺转帮所谓“转基危害无案例或无报告”都是欺骗。当然，中国对阿根廷蒙受的转基因作物之灾难性的危害，也有贡献：一个贡献是大量进口阿根廷的转基因作物，另一个贡献是向阿根廷大量出口转基作物捆绑的毒素农药。全球三个最大的转基因种植国家分别是美国、巴西和阿根廷，美国已经出现了强烈的反对声音，今天阿根廷民众也醒过来了。 不仅美国本土的“后园起火”，拉丁美洲也是“后园起火”了：阿根廷民众赢得与孟山都较量的第一回合。案件不是特大规模，但意义重大： 它是首次（之前，该国对孟山都转基几乎是百依百顺的）。 阿根廷被美国方面称为“转基因盟国”，而如今是“盟国”那里起火甚至颇有反叛味道了。（若我没记错，就阿根廷所经历的转基因商业化种植之灾难性危害的事情，美联社也有过报道、还有照片。）。 对中国来说，该事件证明转基因作物带来危害不但有报告且有判决了，再次证明中国挺转帮所谓“转基危害无案例或无报告”都是欺骗。当然，中国对阿根廷蒙受的转基因作物之灾难性的危害，也有贡献：一个贡献是大量进口阿根廷的转基因作物，另一个贡献是向阿根廷大量出口转基作物捆绑的毒素农药。 阿根廷蒙受的转基灾难再次说明，中国应该立即叫停转基作物（包括开发、种植、销售和进口等等），否则，中国就将在更大规模和更大损失方面去蒙受阿根廷所经历的转基灾难。 附后是相关报道。 Argentine Activists Win First Round Against Monsanto Plant。 By Fabiana Frayssinet, CORDOBA, Argentina, Jan 25 2014 (IPS)。 http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/01/argentine-activists-win-first-round-monsanto-plant/ CORDOBA, Argentina, Jan 25 2014 (IPS) - Residents of a town in Argentina have won the first victory in their fight against biotech giant Monsanto, but they are still at battle stations, aware that winning the war is still a long way off. For four months activists in Malvinas Argentinas, a town in the central province of Cordoba, have maintained a blockade of the construction site where the U.S. transnational company is building the world’s biggest maize seed treatment plant. In this previously peaceful town, protestors continue to camp in front of the construction site and to block access to it, even after a provincial court order this month put a halt to the works. The campaign against the plant, led by Asamblea Malvinas Lucha por la Vida (Malvinas Assembly Fighting for Life) and other social organisations, began Sept. 18 in this town 17 kilometres from the capital of Cordoba. Tense situations ensued, with attempts by the provincial police to disperse the demonstrators and provocations by construction union envoys, but a provincial labour court ruling on Jan. 8 upheld the activists’ cause. “The ruling shows that the residents’ arguments are just, because they are claiming basic rights that are recognised and established in the constitution and federal legislation,” Federico Macciocchi, the lawyer representing opponents of the plant, told IPS. The court ruled that the municipal ordinance authorising construction of the plant in this mostly working class town of 15,000 people was unconstitutional. It ordered a halt to construction work and banned the Malvinas Argentinas municipality from authorising the construction until two legal requirements are fulfilled: carrying out an environmental impact assessment and a public hearing. “This is a big step forward in the struggle, achieved by working together on institutional demands, along with social activism on the streets,” Matías Marizza, a member of the Malvinas Assembly, told IPS. “This struggle has resulted in guaranteeing respect for the law,” the activist said. The Malvinas Assembly and other organisations have decided to continue to camp out at the site and block access until the project is abandoned for good. Monsanto replied to IPS’s request for comment with a statement that describes local activists as “extremists” who are preventing their contractors and employees from “exercising the right to work.” The court ruling arose from a legal appeal lodged by local residents and the Club de Derecho (Cordoba Law Club), presided by Macciocchi. The labour court has ordered an environmental impact study and a public hearing, he emphasised. The views expressed in the public hearing will be “highly relevant,” he said, although under the General Environment Law, participants’ objections and opinions “are not binding.” However, the law does stipulate that if the opinions of the convening authorities differ from the results of the public hearing, “they must justify them and make them public,” he said. Now the Malvinas Assembly also wants a public consultation with a secret ballot. Such a ballot would comply with the environmental law and “guarantee citizens’ full rights to decide on which model of local development and what kind of social and economic activities they want for their daily life, and what environmental risks they are prepared to take,” Víctor Mazzalay, another resident, told IPS. “It is the people who should have that information and decide whether or not to accept the costs and risks involved,” said Mazzalay, a social researcher funded by the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET) at the University of Cordoba. “An environmental impact assessment should include a public consultation so that citizens can provide the ‘social licence’ necessary for developing any social, economic and productive activity that may affect their environment and health,” he said. Monsanto’s statement said the company does not agree with the court ruling, but respects judicial decisions and will abide by the verdict. The company stated that it had already conducted an environmental assessment, which is currently under review by the provincial Secretary of the Environment. In Macciocchi’s view, the court’s ruling is definitive and “brings the legal conflict to an end.” “The ruling arose from a legal appeal, so there is no further recourse in ordinary law,” he said. Monsanto can still appeal to have the decision overturned by the provincial High Court (Tribunal Superior de Justicia, TSJ). The company has already said that it will appeal. “We consider our right to build legitimate since we have complied with all legal requirements and have obtained authorization to build according to the regulations, as confirmed by the ruling of the Court of First Instance of Oct. 7, 2013,” their statement said. However, in Macciocchi’s view “this appeal will not overturn the labour court ruling.” “If we consider how long the TSJ takes to process an appeal, by the time there is a decision, the Malvinas municipality and the Environment Secretariat will have complied with the laws they previously violated,” he said. According to the lawyer, the high court takes up to two and a half years for appeals lodged by individuals under sentence, and five to seven years in labour or civil cases. “It would create a real institutional scandal if the TSJ were to deal with this case by leap-frogging all the other cases that have lain dormant in its offices for years,” he said. The Jan. 8 ruling cannot prevent the definitive installation of the plant, which Monsanto plans should become operational during 2014. “But if the citizens’ demonstrations against the plant and the environmental impact assessment are unfavourable to the company, Monsanto will not be able to instal the plant in Malvinas Argentinas,” Macciocchi predicted. Mazzalay emphasised that the “substance” of the arguments of opponents to Monsanto’s plant was “the defence of the people’s right to decide on the kind of productive activities and the type of environmental risks they wish to undertake.” The company announced it was planning to build more than 200 maize silos, and to use agrochemical products to treat the seeds. Monsanto is one of the world’s biggest manufacturers of herbicides and genetically modified seeds, and has operated in Argentina since 1956 when it established a plastics factory. “It is frequently argued that there is a reasonable doubt that this productive activity is harmless to human health,” Mazzalay said. In his view, “a multiplicity of scientific studies have shown negative effects on health from both seed transportation and handling of and exposure to different agrochemical products.” “When there is a health risk related to environmental issues, reasonable doubt should bring the precautionary principle into play, that is, an activity should not be developed until it has definitely been proved to be harmless,” he said. Activists Halt Monsanto Seed Plant Construction in Argentina 。 Elizabeth Renter, Infowars.com, January 23, 2014。 http://www.infowars.com/activists-halt-monsanto-seed-plant-construction-in-argentina/ The seed-giant and GMO evil genius Monsanto is promising to appeal a recent decision by a labor appeals court in Argentina to stop construction of a seed-manufacturing plant there. Activists filed the initial complaint to put the brakes on the factory, citing health and environmental concerns associated with genetically-modified crops and their production. But Monsanto is fighting back. “We have filed a criminal complaint to inform the prosecutor of certain irregularities in violation of environmental law that have occurred in the heart of the Ministry of the Environment which is involved with authorizations of projects,” attorney Raúl Montenegro told Revolution News, according to GMWatch.org. The decision by the court is being celebrated by protestors in Malvinas Argentina in the Cordoba Province, where they’ve blocked Monsanto employees from working on the site for 113 days. They physically prevented the ongoing construction while awaiting a decision by the court. “We consider our right to build legitimate since we have complied with all legal requirements and have obtained authorization to build according to the regulations,” said Monsanto’s statement. The corporation also expressed disdain in the protestors’ actions that left their workers jobless, accusing them, “for over three months Monsanto employees and contractors had not been able to exercise their right to work, due to the action of extremists who blocked the site, incited violence, and systematically ignored judicial decisions.” The 2-1 decision by the court is not a permanent one. They called for an environmental assessment on the area to determine the future effects that the plant may have. The assessment could be complete as soon as next month. While Monsanto says they’ve already completed an environmental assessment, their objectivity is well-recognized as non-existent. Monsanto would have everyone believe its products are safe—not only for human consumption, but for the environment as well. But as activists submitted to the court, not only have pesticides from Monsanto been linked to birth defects and cancer in South America, but they’ve led to water contamination as well. Despite the growing global criticism of the company, they recently reported better-than-expected earnings in the first quarter, jumping from $339 million in the quarter ending November 30, 2012 to $368 million in the same quarter of 2013. What is likely the most-hated corporation across the globe is still reporting gains. How is this possible if not for governments that allow them to prosper. Opponents of Monsanto and their plan to take over global agriculture as we know it, shouldn’t be discouraged by the company’s earnings, but motivated by stories like this one out of South America. By organizing, educating, and being active, we can beat down the giant. This article first appeared at Natural Society.com. This article was posted: Thursday, January 23, 2014 at 3:49 pm Read: 800 Million Pounds of Pesticides Can’t be Washed Off 800 Million Pounds of Pesticides Can’t be Washed Off, are Bred into our Food with GMO。 by Christina Sarich, August 19th, 2013. Updated 08/19/2013 at 8:46 am。 http://naturalsociety.com/800-million-pounds-pesticides-unwashable-bred-food-gmo/ We already know that farmers and farm workers who use conventional methods of planting are exposed to egregious amounts of pesticides, herbicides, and fungicides. They suffer from all kinds of serious health problems due to this contact with multiple poisons. The worst part? There is no eliminating pesticides from our foods once it is sprayed onto our plants, but as if that weren’t enough, now companies like Monsanto are ‘breeding pesticides’ right into our food crops with genetically modified organisms (GMO). In a study of children who didn’t live anywhere close to a farm that were given organic foods for two weeks, they had incredibly lower levels of pesticides in their urine samples during those two weeks. As soon as they were given conventionally grown foods again – those contaminated with pesticides – the levels of poison in their urine spiked again. These pesticides can’t be washed off. The irony of this is that pesticides were used in the first place to try to increase crop yields and protect crops from insect damage; however, a report issued by the Union of Concerned Scientists entitled Failure to Yield: Evaluating the Performance of Genetically Engineered Crops states very clearly that any increases in yield for either GMO or organically grown crops were due to improvements in agricultural practices and not GMO seed. “Biotechnology companies maintain that genetic engineering is essential to meeting this goal. Monsanto, for example, was running an advertising campaign at the time of the report release warning of an exploding world population and claiming that its “advanced seeds… significantly increase crop yields…” The report debunks that claim, concluding that genetic engineering is unlikely to play a significant role in increasing food production in the foreseeable future.” (http://www.ucsusa.org ) Pesticides: The Unwashable Danger The studies which outline the pesticide exposure endured by the farming industry are so prevalent we couldn’t list them all in one place, but a Cornell University study mentions the numerous ways that workers are exposed to pesticides, from dirt-dust on tractors to water contamination to chemical spraying, and just some of the outcomes of this exposure – including cancer. In another study, children exposed to organophosphate pesticides (OPs) have higher chances of developing health problems including impaired motor-coordination and cognitive functioning as well as respiratory disease along with a host of other issues. Even infants can be exposed to high levels of OPs if they live on a farm, through consuming their mother’s breast milk. If farm workers are blatantly poisoned by their exposure to pesticides in our conventionally grown food supply, why is it not a logical conclusion to assume that we will suffer from similar issues even if we live in a more urban setting? While biotechnology has been promising better crop yields since the early 1990s, they have yet to deliver and in the meantime our children are peeing out their poisons in lab tests. Exposure levels are continuing to affect not just farmers and their families, but also the public at large. Instead of 800,000,000 pounds of pesticides, might we not look to organic practices that actually do increase crop yields and save our future generations? Organic farming practices are accumulating some steam. In fact, the number of organic farms nationwide has grown to well over 8,000. These farms have sufficiently dispelled the perception that organic farming is too difficult, too risky, or too expensive to be practical. Improving soil fertility, utilizing well timed interactions of crop rotation, intercropping combinations, planting schedules and maintaining beneficial habitats are just some of the ways we can ditch our pesticide habit as a nation, and make ditching GMO crops a forgone conclusion. . Read more: http://naturalsociety.com/800-million-pounds-pesticides-unwashable-bred-food-gmo/#ixzz2riDJeV3I Follow us: @naturalsociety on Twitter | NaturalSociety on Facebook Read: 7 Nasty Effects of Pesticides
顾秀林老师按语（摘录）：英国友人来电邮，发来ENSSER对撤稿事件的评论，译文和原文在下面。科学杂志向大公司献媚争宠，侮辱了科学，打击了科学，也侮辱了公众。孟山都亲自出马操纵科学，就能掩盖真相？ http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6188d2520102efmj.html 《食品与化学毒理学杂志（ FCT) 》撤稿塞拉利尼大鼠喂养实验报告，是假冒科学之名，实为向大公司低头。 Elsevier 旗下《食品与化学毒理学杂志》撤销了已发表的塞拉利尼教授领衔的论文，该研究发现了孟山都公司的转基因玉米品系 NK603 和与其共用的农达除草剂会严重的毒性效果（包括肝脏充血坏疽和肾脏损伤），更高的肿瘤发生增加和死亡率（ 1 ）。该杂志编辑对撤稿的辩解不仅不符合它自己也声称要遵守的撤稿标准，也不符合任何好的科学所接受的标准。 更严重的是，对撤稿决定负有责任的审查人名单没有公布。由于许多与转基因工业有关的人士特别期望撤销这篇论文，所以此次撤稿行动令人怀疑是向大企业做出的让步。 ENSSER 认为，此次撤稿假冒了科学之名，是对科学的信誉与独立性的沉重打击。 结论不完整成了撤稿的理由 FCT 的出版者 Elsevier 发表了公告 ，声称该杂志的主编， Wallace Hayes 博士说，“没有发现作假，没有刻意曲解数据”。关于撤稿的理由只有一条，即“提出的结果（并非不正确）是不完整的”。据 Hayes 说，所用的实验鼠数量太少、属于易患肿瘤的品系，所以不能导致确定的结论。撤销已发表的科学论文，是有根据有指南的，如关于出版的伦理委员会 COPE . 结论不完整，未被（ COPE ）列为撤稿的理由。而该杂志 FCT 是该委员会的成员 。完整而确定的结论在科学中很少见，而且不是一位编辑和一个秘密委员采用私下的标准和方法所会能决定的。如果这个做法被接受，那么独立的科学将不会存在 。 塞拉利尼的论文是长期毒性研究，不是关于肿瘤的全方位研究。 最显著的一点，首先塞拉利尼和他的合作者在论文中没有提出确定的结论，他们陈述了观察到的现象，做了谨慎的总结，对于还不能确定的问题是了解的。原因在于，这篇论文是一个长期毒性研究，不是一个需要更多实验动物的全方位肿瘤研究。该论文的作者们并非专注于肿瘤问题，但是在研究中发现了实验鼠出现更多肿瘤的现象。第二， Hayes 提到，“实验鼠数量以及易于罹患肿瘤的问题”曾被评审人提出但不反对发表论文。第三，这两个观点在该论文发表后曾在同一个杂志上进行过详细讨论，已经被作者们和其他专业人士辩驳。用更多数量的实验动物，只是在避免漏过毒性效果的实验中才有必要（即避免假阴性结果），而该研究的发现是毒性效果显现、是初步的、可能的致癌性迹象。他们使用的是 SD 大鼠品系，是同类研究常用的标准实验动物。出于这个原因，生化数据的统计显著性是统计学专家所认可的。 生化数据已经确认了毒性效应如肝肾损伤，这已经足够严重了，而观察到的肿瘤出现和动物死亡率还需要经特别的肿瘤研究确认，这需要更大数量的实验动物。对于大众的食品安全而言，刻意地无视这些已经观察到的问题是不明智的 。令人不愉快的结果需要被审查，而不是被无视。即使不谈肿瘤和死亡率，转基因的毒性效应也早就是众所周知的事情了。 谁是重审人？ 相比不具备足够充分的理由就撤稿，更令人担忧的是，杂志的总编没有公布评审人员名单。是什么人协助主编做出该论文应被撤销的结论？再评审采用的是什么衡量标准，什么分析方法？他们凭什么推翻前次的同行评审决定，即可以公开发表该论文？在本例的情形中，谴责该论文的人中，许多与转基因行业有长期密切的关联，因此推翻本研究显然涉及利益，在不透明的情况下决定撤稿是不可饶恕的、非科学的、不能接受的行为。此举令人怀疑这是向利益相关公司即孟山都献媚争宠。 ENSSER 宗旨：致力于独立的批评的讨论 ENSSER 的宗旨之一是推进批评和交流，特别是在欧洲和对于新技术及其应用后果进行批评。科学和技术的推进由于日益被私人利益驱使，有关健康和环境安全的信息（来自外界）通常滞后。科学自身包含不确定性，对同一个发现通常会出现相互冲突的见解就是证明。在发现真相的过程中保持争论的开放性和研究的独立性，是独立的科学存在下去所必需的前提。 在转基因农作物的技术方面也是如此，安全性研究总是由开发者自己进行，以便于通过评审，多数根本就不发表，或者是因为企业秘密，或者是很可能通不过真正独立的同行评审。不仅是塞拉利尼的研究应该被讨论，那些没有发表却被用作评审依据的依据同样原则也应该被讨论。公众有权获知与自己有关的一切食品安全信息。 总之， 撤销塞拉利尼论文的决定，是对科学的公然侮辱，是对科学可信度和独立性的沉重打击。 FCT 和它的出版者 Elsevier 的声誉都受到了损害。这个决定将会使公众更不信任科学。 同样它也不能从公众的视野和思考中去除独立的科学和批评的精神。那个时代（愚民的时代 - 译者注）已经过去了。 塞拉利尼教授的发现，在今日看来比当初更加清晰，甚至连那个秘密评审人都说，对研究的专业性、严谨程度以及数据的透明性，他们都没有找到错误，这恰恰是独立的科学立足之处 。他们的数据是否具有完整性，将来会有独立的科学为之做出判断，这决不是密室中的小圈子人士所能为之事。 Contact: office@ensser.org http://www.ensser.org/democratising-science-decision-making/ensser-comments-on-the-retraction-of-the-seralini-et-al-2012-study/ Séralini, G.-E., Clair, E., Mesnage, R., Gress, S., Defarge, N., Malatesta, M., Hennequin, D., de Vendômois, J.S.: Long term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically modified maize, Food and Chemical Toxicology 50 (11), pp. 4221-4231 (2012) http://www.elsevier.com/about/press-releases/research-and-journals/elsevier-announces-article-retraction-from-journal-food-and-chemical-toxicology http://publicationethics.org/files/retraction guidelines.pdf http://publicationethics.org/members/food-and-chemical-toxicology ENSSER Comments on the Retraction of the Séralini et al. 2012 Study Journal's retraction of rat feeding paper is a travesty of science and looks like a bow to industry Elsevier's journal Food and Chemical Toxicology has retracted the paper by Prof. Gilles-Eric Séralini's group which found severe toxic effects (including liver congestions and necrosis and kidney nephropathies), increased tumor rates and higher mortality in rats fed Monsanto's genetically modified NK603 maize and/or the associated herbicide Roundup . The arguments of the journal's editor for the retraction, however, violate not only the criteria for retraction to which the journal itself subscribes, but any standards of good science. Worse, the names of the reviewers who came to the conclusion that the paper should be retracted, have not been published. Since the retraction is a wish of many people with links to the GM industry, the suspicion arises that it is a bow of science to industry. ENSSER points out, therefore, that this retraction is a severe blow to the credibility and independence of science, indeed a travesty of science. Inconclusive results claimed as reason for withdrawal Elsevier, the publisher of Food and Chemical Toxicology, has published a statement saying that the journal's editor-in-chief, Dr. A. Wallace Hayes, found no evidence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation of the data. The statement mentions only a single reason for the retraction, namely that the results presented (while not incorrect) are inconclusive. According to Hayes, the low number of rats and the tumour susceptibility of the rat strain used do not allow definitive conclusions. Now there are guidelines for retractions in scientific publishing, set out by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) . Inconclusiveness of research results is not one of the grounds for retraction contained in these guidelines. The journal Food and Chemical Toxicology is a member of COPE . 'Conclusive' results are rare in science, and certainly not to be decided by one editor and a secret team of persons using undisclosed criteria and methods. Independent science would cease to exist if this were to be an accepted mode of procedure. Séralini paper a chronic toxicity study, not a full-scale carcinogenicity study Most notably, Séralini and his co-authors did not draw any definitive conclusions in the paper in the first place; they simply reported their observations and phrased their conclusions carefully, cognizant of their uncertainties. This is because the paper is a chronic toxicity study and not a full-scale carcinogenicity study, which would require a higher number of rats. The authors did not intend to look specifically for tumours, but still found increased tumour rates. Secondly, both of Hayes's arguments (the number of rats and their tumour susceptibility) were considered by the peer reviewers of the journal, who decided they formed no objection to publication. Thirdly, these two arguments have been discussed at length in the journal following the publication of the paper and have been refuted by the authors of the paper and other experts. Higher numbers of animals are only required in this type of safety studies to avoid missing toxic effects (a 'false negative' result), but the study found pronounced toxic effects and a first indication of possible carcinogenic effects. The Sprague-Dawley strain of rat which was used, is the commonly used standard for this type of research. For these reasons, the statistical significance of the biochemical data was endorsed by statistics experts. The biochemical data confirm the toxic effects such as those on liver and kidney, which are serious enough by themselves. The tumours and mortality rates are observations which need to be confirmed by a specific carcinogenicity study with higher numbers of rats; in view of public food safety, it is not wise to simply ignore them. Unpleasant results should be checked, not ignored. And the toxic effects other than tumours and mortality are well-founded. Who did the reevaluation? Even more worrying than the lack of good grounds for the retraction is the fact that the journal's editor-in-chief has not revealed who the reviewers were who helped him to come to the conclusion that the paper should be retracted; nor has he revealed the criteria and methodology of their reevaluation, which overruled the earlier conclusion of the original peer-review which supported publication. In a case like this, where many of those who denounced the study have long-standing, well-documented links to the GM industry and, therefore, a clear interest in having the results of the study discredited, such lack of transparency about how this potential decision was reached is inexcusable, unscientific and unacceptable. It raises the suspicion that the retraction is a favour to the interested industry, notably Monsanto. ENSSER promotes independent critical discourse It is part of ENSSER's mission to promote the critical discourse, particularly in Europe, on new technologies and their impacts. As scientific and technological advances are increasingly driven by private interest, disinterested independent health and environmental safety information often lags behind. Uncertainty is inherent to science, as is the debate between conflicting explanations of findings. Openness of this debate and independent research to find the truth are crucial prerequisites for the survival of independent science. This holds true in particular for the technology of genetically modified crops, where the safety studies done by the producers for authorisation of the crops are all too often not published at all because of business confidentiality of the data and may not hold up to an independent peer-review. These studies, not only the independent ones like Séralini's, should be subject to debate. The public have a right to be informed of anything related to the safety of their food. In short, the decision to retract Séralini's paper is a flagrant abuse of science and a blow to its credibility and independence. It is damaging for the reputation of both the journal Food and Chemical Toxicology and its publisher Elsevier. It will decrease public trust in science. And it will not succeed in eliminating critical independent science from public view and scrutiny. Such days and times are definitively over. Prof. Séralini's findings stand today more than before, as even this secret review found that there is nothing wrong with either technicalities, conduct or transparency of the data – the foundations on which independent science rests. The conclusiveness of their data will be decided by future independent science, not by a secret circle of people. Contact: office@ensser.org http://www.ensser.org/democratising-science-decision-making/ensser-comments-on-the-retraction-of-the-seralini-et-al-2012-study/ Séralini, G.-E., Clair, E., Mesnage, R., Gress, S., Defarge, N., Malatesta, M., Hennequin, D., de Vendômois, J.S.: Long term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically modified maize, Food and Chemical Toxicology 50 (11), pp. 4221-4231 (2012) http://www.elsevier.com/about/press-releases/research-and-journals/elsevier-announces-article-retraction-from-journal-food-and-chemical-toxicology http://publicationethics.org/files/retraction guidelines.pdf http://publicationethics.org/members/food-and-chemical-toxicology
转基因玉米致癌论文被撤 编委曾就职孟山都 http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2013/11/309924.html 作者：宗和 发布时间：2013-11-30 来源：财经网等 字体： 大 | 中 | 小 法国研究人员2012年在《食品和化学毒物学》杂志上发表转基因玉米致癌论文，已成为部分人士反对转基因食品的重要证据。但杂志出版方爱思唯尔公司28日在美国宣布，由于进一步分析显示论文数据不足以支持其结论，因此决定撤除这篇论文。 爱思唯尔公司在声明中说，《食品和化学毒物学》杂志对所发表的论文及论文所报告的数据进行了彻底的、长时间的分析，对论文发表的同行评议过程也进行了调查，“没有发现欺诈或对数据有意曲解的证据”，然而，“有理由担忧”论文所提及实验中研究人员使用的实验大鼠数量和类型。 声明说：“对原始数据的深入调查表明，用如此小规模的样本数据无法得出明确结论”、“考虑到(实验中所用的)斯普拉格-道利大鼠的已知肿瘤高发生率，喂食转基因玉米组所观察到的更高的死亡率及肿瘤发生率的原因不能排除是正常变化”。 声明说，归根结底，论文的结果“尽管无不妥之处”，但是“没有说服力”，因此这篇论文达不到《食品和化学毒物学》的出版要求。 声明还说，这篇论文发表后编辑部收到多封来信，对论文描述结果的有效性、实验动物的合理使用表达关切，有些来信甚至称其中存在欺诈，多数来信呼吁撤回这篇论文。这些来信以及支持这篇论文的来信，都已和作者的回应一并发表。 英国《自然》杂志网站说，这一撤稿举动并不令人意外，《食品和化学毒物学》杂志主编本月初曾要求作者主动撤回论文，并表示如果作者拒绝，杂志方也将予以撤稿。报道还说， 论文作者把撤稿形容为“丑闻”，并声称，这是因为杂志任命的一名编委此前曾在转基因农业巨头孟山都公司工作过7年 。 2012年，《食品和化学毒物学》杂志刊登了法国卡昂大学分子生物学家塞拉利尼等人的一份研究报告。该报告称，将100只雄性和100只雌性大鼠分成10组，分别喂食孟山都公司的NK603转基因玉米及其他食物，两年后发现，喂食转基因玉米的实验大鼠出现肿瘤的风险高、寿命短。 这一结论在全球引起风波。法国国家卫生安全署、生物技术最高委员会和欧洲食品安全局均对塞拉利尼等人的研究展开调查，结果均认为，该研究存在诸多不足，不能作为评估转基因玉米健康风险的有效依据。 【下面是塞拉利尼团队声明中英对照本。2013-11-28。引用自顾秀林博客】 我们是FCT一年多前发表的论文的作者，关于农达和耐受农达的转基因生物的事（塞拉利尼等2012） 。 对于同样的质疑， 我们已经在同一个刊物上回应过（塞拉利尼等，2013），即：作为正常的科学辩论，仅仅由于实验鼠品系的选择和数量的原因，就判定研究结果“结论不完整”，这是不能接受的。我们坚持我们的结论。我们早已公布了对相同的质疑所做的回答，但至今没有见到对我们的任何回应（塞拉利尼等，2013）。 We, authors of the paper published in FCT more than one year ago on the effects of Roundup and a Roundup-tolerant GMO (Séralini et al., 2012), and having answered to critics in the same journal (Séralini et al., 2013), do not accept as scientifically sound the debate on the fact that these papers are inconclusive because of the rat strain or the number of rats used. We maintain our conclusions. We already published some answers to the same critics in your Journal, which have not been answered (Séralini et al., 2013). 关于实验大鼠品系 同一个大鼠品系，被用在研究致癌性和慢性化学毒理学的美国国家毒理学项目中(King-Herbert et al., 2010)。SD大鼠是常规性用于毒理和致癌效果实验中的动物，其中有孟山都公司的90天实验，被当做批准NK603转基因玉米应用的依据，其他转基因农作物也是这样做的(Sprague Dawley rats did not came from Harlan but from Charles-River) (Hammond et al., 2004; Hammond et al., 2006a; Hammond et al., 2006b). Rat strain The same strain is used by the US national toxicology program to study the carcinogenicity and the chronic toxicity of chemicals (King-Herbert et al., 2010). Sprague Dawley rats are used routinely in such studies for toxicological and tumour-inducing effects, including those 90-day studies by Monsanto as basis for the approval of NK603 maize and other GM crops (Sprague Dawley rats did not came from Harlan but from Charles-River) (Hammond et al., 2004; Hammond et al., 2006a; Hammond et al., 2006b). 这里有一个简明的初步的文献清单，表明在同行评审的杂志上SD大鼠被用在36个月的实验如(Voss et al., 2005) or in 24-month studies by (Hack et al., 1995), (Minardi et al., 2002), (Klimisch et al., 1997), (Gamez et al., 2007).，其中有一些文章就发表在FCT上。 A brief, quick and still preliminary literature search of peer-reviewed journals revealed that Sprague Dawley rats were used in 36-month studies by (Voss et al., 2005) or in 24-month studies by (Hack et al., 1995), (Minardi et al., 2002), (Klimisch et al., 1997), (Gamez et al., 2007).Some of these studies have been published in Food and Chemical Toxicology. Number of rats, OECD guidelines 实验动物数量与OECD实验规范 OECD 实验规范：第408条，关于90天实验，第452条关于慢性毒性试验，第453条关于综合致癌性/慢性毒性试验，都要求用20只动物为一组(1981和2009的规定都这样要求)，尽管可以用10只动物的实验就能取得生物化学参数。我们做的是长期毒性研究而不是致癌性研究，从一开始就不是这样设想的。根据常规10只动物一组已经足够在生物化学水平上进行研究，我们测量的参数数量是非常大的。 OECD guidelines (408 for 90 day study, 452 chronic toxicity and 453 combined carcinogenicity/chronic toxicity study) always asked for 20 animals per group (both in 1981 and 2009 guidelines) although the measurement of biochemical parameters can be performed on 10 rats, as indicated. We did not perform a carcinogenesis study, which would not have been adapted at first, but a long-term chronic full study, 10 rats are sufficient for that at a biochemical level according to norms and we have measured such a number of parameters! 在我们的实验中，性激素干扰的参数以及其它参数对于解释一年之后的严重后果是充分的。我们采用的OPLS-DA统计方法是最适宜的。关于肿瘤和动物死亡，时间效果以及每只动物的平均肿瘤数量都必须被纳入分析。在风险研究中出现的每一个迹象，都必须被充分重视。孟山都公司的研究用了同样的大鼠品系，每组仅10只衡量20个参数，就得出同一种NK603转基因玉米“安全”的结论，而且他们的实验只做了3个月 (Hammond et al., 2004) The disturbance of sexual hormones or other parameters are sufficient in themselves in our case to interpret a serious effect after one year. The OPLS-DA statistical method we published is one of the best adapted. For tumours and deaths, the chronology and number of tumours per animal have to be taken into account. Any sign should be regarded as important for a real risk study. Monsanto itself measured only 10 rats of the same strain per group on 20 to conclude that the same GM maize was safe after 3 months (Hammond et al., 2004). The statistical analysis should not be done with historical data first, the comparison is falsified, thus 50 rats per group is useless 统计分析不应该先做历史数据，用这个方法做比较研究是错误的，用每组50只动物做研究是无意义。 采纳历史数据会把健康风险评估变成研究造假，因为食谱中的材料已经受到化学污染(by dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans (Schecter et al., 1996)和汞污染(Weiss et al., 2005)，镉污染，铬污染等，污染的程度足以改变动物肝脏和肺脏的基因表达，足以扰乱基因分析(Kozul et al., 2008)。以往的食料中还发现农药和增塑剂污染，污染来自箱笼或者水(Howdeshell et al., 2003)。历史数据也有来自可能食用了转基因的动物，很多地方的鼠粮中的确发现了转基因成分。这一切都与污染水平相关，我们已经在实验大鼠和对照组大鼠中检测到这些问题。 The use of historical data falsifies health risk assessments because the diet is contaminated by dibenzo-p-dioxins and dibenzofurans (Schecter et al., 1996), mercury (Weiss et al., 2005), cadmium and chromium among other heavy metals in a range of doses that altered mouse liver and lung gene expression and confounds genomic analyses (Kozul et al., 2008). They also contained pesticides or plasticizers released by cages or from water sources (Howdeshell et al., 2003). Historical data also come from rats potentially fed on GMOs, some animal pellets in the world do indicate that. All that corresponds to the contamination levels for which we have detected some effects in our treated rats versus appropriate controls. 在历史数据中，2年SD雌性大鼠罹患乳腺纤维瘤的为13%~62%(Giknis, 2004)，但在我们的实验中对照组的发病率要低得多，这才是真正的对照，而我们的实验鼠发病率比对照组高很多，这使得我们的研究结果有显著性。动物的死亡率也是这样。 2-year historical data mammary fibroadenoma rate from Charles River SD females ranged from 13 to 62% (Giknis, 2004). We obtain a lot less in our controls, the real comparators, a lot more in treated rats. This makes our results significant, like for deaths. Double standards 双重标准 遵循同一个逻辑把塞拉利尼的实验和孟山都公司的实验做一对一的比较，如果前者被认为不足以显示危害，那么后者也不能认为证明了安全。 A factual comparative analysis of the rat feeding trial by the Séralini’s group and the Monsanto trials clearly reveals that if the Séralini experiments are considered to be insufficient to demonstrate harm, logically, it must be the same for those carried out by Monsanto to prove safety. 以往的研究发现凡是显示转基因农作物有负面效果的，都会被监管者从实验到统计方法做严格的重审，凡是声称转基因农作物安全的研究，都被照单接受。只要是没有报告负面效果的研究，都被接受为“安全”的证明，无论他们的研究方法有何种不足(被认为无关紧要)。 Basically, all previous studies finding adverse effects of GE crops have been treated by regulators with the attitude: only those studies showing adverse effects receive a rigorous evaluation of their experimental and statistical methods, while those that claim proof of safety are taken at face value. All studies that reported no adverse effects were accepted as proof of safety regardless of these manifest (but deemed irrelevant) deficiencies of their methods. 来自(Snell et al., 2012) 的一份文献概览研究可以说明这个倾向。如作者在摘要中这样说，“在这里的24项研究的结果都不建议存在任何健康危害问题…”即所有被审阅的研究都被按“票面价值”被接受和通过了。然而在文章中却指出，研究报告的作者们留下了无数缺陷，同他们指责塞拉利尼论文的问题类似，或者更严重。例如24篇中16篇(67%)文章没有交代对照组饲料是否与实验用的饲料属于同基因品种(他们的解释只是“没有采用”)。许多篇文章连讨论所用的方法都没有介绍。此外还有其他被指出的缺陷。 The review by (Snell et al., 2012) illustrates this issue. In the abstract, the authors state Results from all the 24 studies do not suggest any health hazards – taking all those studies at face value. Yet in their review, the authors find numerous weaknesses of similar or greater severity raised for the Séralini group's paper. For example, of the 24 studies they evaluated 16 (67% of all studies) did not mention using the isogenic line as control (interpreted as having not used them), many did not describe the methods in any detail, and according to the reviewers had other deficiencies too. 基于完全相同的原因，FCT应该把Hammond 等人关于耐受农达转基因玉米的那些论文全都撤回。那些论文貌似都是真正的科学讨论，发表它们只是为了给孟山都提供权威证据。 FCT should retract the Hammond et al. paper on Roundup tolerant maize for all these reasons, published for Monsanto’s authorization, or consider that each of these papers is part of the scientific debate. References 参考文献 Gamez, R., Noa, M., Mas, R., Mendoza, N., Pardo, B., Menendez, R., Perez, Y., Gonzalez, R.M., Gutierrez, A., Marrero, G., Goicochea, E., Garcia, H., Curveco, D., 2007. Long-term carcinogenicity of D-003, a mixture of high molecular weight acids from sugarcane wax, in Sprague Dawley rats: a 24 months study. Food Chem Toxicol 45, 2352-2358. Giknis, M.L.A.a.C., C.B., 2004. Charles River Laboratories. Compilation of spontaneous neoplastic lesions and survival in Crl:CD (SD) rats from control groups. Hack, R., Ebert, E., Leist, K.H., 1995. Chronic toxicity and carcinogenicity studies with the insecticide endosulfan in rats and mice. Food Chem Toxicol 33, 941-950. Hammond, B., Dudek, R., Lemen, J., Nemeth, M., 2004. Results of a 13 week safety assurance study with rats fed grain from glyphosate tolerant corn. Food Chem Toxicol 42, 1003-1014. Hammond, B., Lemen, J., Dudek, R., Ward, D., Jiang, C., Nemeth, M., Burns, J., 2006a. Results of a 90-day safety assurance study with rats fed grain from corn rootworm-protected corn. Food Chem Toxicol 44, 147-160. Hammond, B.G., Dudek, R., Lemen, J.K., Nemeth, M.A., 2006b. Results of a 90-day safety assurance study with rats fed grain from corn borer-protected corn. Food Chem Toxicol 44, 1092-1099. Howdeshell, K.L., Peterman, P.H., Judy, B.M., Taylor, J.A., Orazio, C.E., Ruhlen, R.L., Vom Saal, F.S., Welshons, W.V., 2003. Bisphenol A is released from used polycarbonate animal cages into water at room temperature. Environ Health Perspect 111, 1180-1187. King-Herbert, A.P., Sills, R.C., Bucher, J.R., 2010. Commentary: update on animal models for NTP studies. Toxicol Pathol 38, 180-181. Klimisch, H.J., Deckardt, K., Gembardt, C., Hildebrand, B., Kuttler, K., Roe, F.J., 1997. Long-term inhalation toxicity of N-vinylpyrrolidone-2 vapours. Studies in rats. Food Chem Toxicol 35, 1041-1060. Kozul, C.D., Nomikos, A.P., Hampton, T.H., Warnke, L.A., Gosse, J.A., Davey, J.C., Thorpe, J.E., Jackson, B.P., Ihnat, M.A., Hamilton, J.W., 2008. Laboratory diet profoundly alters gene expression and confounds genomic analysis in mouse liver and lung. Chem Biol Interact 173, 129-140. Minardi, F., Belpoggi, F., Soffritti, M., Ciliberti, A., Lauriola, M., Cattin, E., Maltoni, C., 2002. Results of long-term carcinogenicity bioassay on vinyl acetate monomer in Sprague-Dawley rats. Ann N Y Acad Sci 982, 106-122. Séralini, G.E., Clair, E., Mesnage, R. Gress, S., Defarge, N. Malatesta, M. Hennequin, D. Spiroux de Vendômois, J. (2012) Long term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically modified maize. Food and Chem. Tox. 50:4221-4231 Séralini, G.E., Mesnage, R., Defarge, N., Gress, S., Hennequin, D., Clair, E., Malatesta, M., Spiroux de Vendômois, J. (2013) Answers to critics: why there is a long term toxicity due to NK603 Roundup-tolerant genetically modified maize and to a Roundup herbicide. Food and Chem. Tox. 53:461-468 Schecter, A.J., Olson, J., Papke, O., 1996. Exposure of laboratory animals to polychlorinated dibenzodioxins and polychlorinated dibenzofurans from commerical rodent chow. Chemosphere 32, 501-508. Snell, C., Bernheim, A., Berge, J.B., Kuntz, M., Pascal, G., Paris, A., Ricroch, A.E., 2012. Assessment of the health impact of GM plant diets in long-term and multigenerational animal feeding trials: a literature review. Food Chem Toxicol 50, 1134-1148. Voss, C., Zerban, H., Bannasch, P., Berger, M.R., 2005. Lifelong exposure to di-(2-ethylhexyl)-phthalate induces tumors in liver and testes of Sprague-Dawley rats. Toxicology 206, 359-371. Weiss, B., Stern, S., Cernichiari, E., Gelein, R., 2005. Methylmercury contamination of laboratory animal diets. Environ Health Perspect 113, 1120-1122.
南京大学的张辰宇教授是国内生命科学领域少有的、有自己独创概念的学者，其主要的工作都集中在miRNA方面。关于miRNA的介绍很多，这里不做科普。10年的时候，张教授课题组发表了两篇看起来没有什么关联的论文： 1. Identification and characterization of microRNAs in raw milk during different periods of lactation, commercial fluid, and powdered milk products . 2. Secreted monocytic miR-150 enhances targeted endothelial cell migration . 这两篇文章都挺有意思，第一篇发在Cell Research上，讲的是从牛奶，不管是哺乳期、商业化的牛奶，或者是奶粉里，都是可以鉴定出miRNA。第二篇发在Molecular Cell上，讲的是miRNA能够被microvesicles (微泡，MVs)包裹，从而释放到血液里，或者是循环系统里，成为circulating microRNA，并且可以从血清里检测到。我记得10年底的时候去天津参加一个会议，当时张老师讲自己课题组的最新进展，刚讲完会场就炸了锅。大家的态度是：第一，很有趣；第二，不靠谱。很多人当时就讲，你知道课本上都写啥了吗？RNA分子不稳定你看过书了吗？张：...对啊，书上写的是RNA不稳定，但问题是我这个miRNA很稳定啊，你拿金箍棒敲，你拿三味真火烧，照样稳定。全场哗然，已经有人狠不得跳上讲台指着张的鼻子说：你丫这就是伪科学！咱搞蛋白质的，对DNA和RNA不熟，看着这热闹的场面无动于衷，问边上的王文老师，说这帮人吵啥呢？咋吵的这么起劲？王老师鄙视我，说你小子没文化，人家这东西太有意思了，要是真的那都可以拿诺贝尔奖了。我说哪有那么夸张，不过话说回来，RNA不稳定这个好像连火星人都知道吧？张怎么可能从牛奶里鉴定出miRNA呢？王老师非常小心的看看周围，确定大家都在吵架，然后悄悄告诉我，说这个其实不算啥，他们还做了水稻，人吃了水稻血液里也能检测到水稻的miRNA，所以...我当时震惊的嘴巴张的大大的，半天才反应过来：这靠谱不？王老师很肯定的点头：张做东西非常扎实，估计应该是真的。我说那不对吧，这么大的发现如果是真的，怎么不发NCS？王老师摇头，说中国人做点儿新东西有多难？你看我，水稻卖的这么艰难还没卖出去。张当时投NCS都不收的，说是不相信，最后只好投CR。第二篇也是投NCS不收，只好上的MC，老外对咱有歧视呗。 于是，不出意料的，2010年张的研究组在Cell Research继续发表了一篇看上去没有多大意思的论文： 3. Exogenous plant MIR168a specifically targets mammalian LDLRAP1: evidence of cross-kingdom regulation by microRNA 关于这篇论文的解读，网上有不少资料，比如 科学松鼠会 ，和 蒋高明前辈的博客 等等。大概的意思是，第一，中国人的血液里能够稳定的检测到水稻的miRNA，表明植物的miRNA可以进入人体的循环系统里；第二，在喂养了植物性饲料的小鼠、大鼠、牛、马和羊的血清里同样可检测到植物的miRNA；第三，来源植物的miRNA可占到哺乳动物总miRNA的5%，并且某些miRNA的浓度能达到哺乳动物miRNA的平均表达水平；第四，植物的mir168a可以通过下调LDLRAP1的表达水平，从而导致低密度脂蛋白(LDL, 这玩意儿高水平表达好像是跟高血压有关)的表达上升，喂食物之后LDLRAP1的表达显著下降；第五，植物miRNA可以穿过肠道屏障，可能是被包裹在微泡里然后进入循环系统。所以，第一， 我们吃进去的不见得只是materials，也可能包含information ；第二，没准吃什么像什么哦，哈哈 。 你要觉得这就结了，那你就错了。CR是个很有意思的杂志，之所以有意思，是因为其常务副主编李党生是个非常有意思的人，必杀技是：快速发表。很多人问过李，说你怎么都不peer review就发表论文啊？党生答：呃，在Cell那会儿干习惯了，我有peer review啊，只不过确实好的东西，审不审没有太大意义，找个专家给看看，没大问题先发了再说喽。快速发表有多快？这篇文章2011年8月11日投稿，8月23修回，8月26日发表，总共15天。当然这不算快，头天收，第二天修回，第三天收稿这种事儿CR也干了不少。大牌编辑嘛，靠眼力吃饭的。这篇文章发出来自然是够轰动的，可是更让人瞠目结舌的是，党生估计琢磨着还不够乱，于是邀请法国学者写了篇亮点论文： 4. Ingested plant miRNAs regulate gene expression in animals 亮点嘛，自然要夸夸这篇文章，然后谈谈这个工作有意义啦，值得继续深入啦，植物这么多miRNA，有多少可以调控宿主啦，另外，植物的miRNA会不会影响肠道菌群啦，等等。要是在此打住那也就得了，关键是最后一段：基因修饰生物 (genetically modified organisms, GMO) 拿到市场上来，这些转基因食品在消化道里会咋样啊？比如，朊病毒 (prion), 这东西有危险哦，那么RNA有啥影响？ 得，本来转基因就够乱的了，光转进去那个基因有没有问题就已经吵翻天了，在google里搜：孟山都滚出中国，能返回14,200 条结果；搜：孟山都滚出台湾，返回11,600 条结果；搜：孟山都滚出欧洲，居然也返回22,800 条结果。光纠结这个基因啊，蛋白质啊，孟山都已经很头大了，好嘛，现在你张教授唯恐天下不乱，居然又弄出个miRNA！是可忍孰不可忍啊，孟山都的人6月10日向BMC Genomics投了篇论文： 5. Analysis of plant-derived miRNAs in animal small RNA datasets 孟山都这篇文章的思路还挺巧妙：你不是说人和哺乳动物里能有植物的miRNA吗？那好，我就看看已有的小RNA测序数据里，是不是能检测到植物的miRNA？结果...真给他检测到了，当然只存在于部分样本里，比例是0.053%~0.456%，最高值与张的结果差不多一致 (这篇文章的Table 1)。这我就看不明白了，您这唱的是哪出啊？你要批人家的是错的，你验证人家结果干啥？难道是卧底？Table 1的结果白纸黑字的，这个赖不掉了，怎么办呢？孟山都有办法，做虫子实验，给虫子喂植物，测小RNA的序。测完发现，没有植物的miRNA。因此推测，这个植物的miRNA啊，其实就是个污染。 约翰霍普金斯的人也跳出来打抱不平了： 6. Real-time quantitative PCR and droplet digital PCR for plant miRNAs in mammalian blood provide little evidence for general uptake of dietary miRNAs: Limited evidence for general uptake of dietary plant xenomiRs 要不怎么说约翰霍普金斯的人有水平呢，上来先提了个概念xenomiR，说张做的是这个，你瞧瞧，美国大学的水平就是高啊，这概念总结的多好？没准过若干年张拿诺奖就靠这个了。然后是重复张的实验，结果很搞笑，那就是有的能重复出来，有的重复不出来，结论就是重复性不咋滴。这个我看着要内牛满面了：大哥，你没重复出来那是你实验技术不过关好吧？NCS上的所有paper，我实验室随便找个学生来重复，保证重复不出来(这不废话吗，搞计算的咋重复实验？)，那能说明NCS的paper都是假的？由此可见，名牌大学的实验技术也真是该提高一下了。要不张教授开个培训班，让约翰霍普金斯的人来好好学学基本的实验技术？ 按理说，原创的发表了，吹捧的也吹捧过了，不爽的也质疑了，凑热闹的也成功娱乐了，完了吧？No, no, no, 这只是开始。张的文章发了，现在google的引用144次，孟山都的文章9次，约翰霍普金斯的呢，呵呵，1次，您瞧瞧，是不是完美的体现了酱油的本色？这回孟山都真的是彻底气炸了肺：这都什么世道啊？为啥张的引用比我的高这么多呢？张有我钱多吗？张有我势力大吗？看哥们我怎么收拾这小子。于是，这就是11月8日NBT上的打架： 7. Lack of detectable oral bioavailability of plant microRNAs after feeding in mice 孟山都的工作以Correspondence的形式发表(这个估计是不需要评审的)。要点有：第一，他们做了三组动物实验，synthetic chow的食物里无植物，balanced rice chow的食物里包含40.8%的大米，rice chow的食物里包含75的大米，然后是测序，的的确确能测出植物的miRNA，但是读段数非常少，张的论文里说最高的能达到~2000RPM，孟的最多也就44RPM。所以，张的数据有问题，这些植物miRNA很有可能是污染；第二，用RT-PCR验证不出来血清里存在植物的miRNA；第三，喂养大米的chow的的确确发现LDL的表达升高(我靠，又来！你究竟是不是卧底啊？没事儿你老证实人家的工作干啥的？你要收拾人家能不能专业点儿？)，但是呢，这有可能是因为吃这些缺乏胆固醇的食物，需要体内胆固醇的释放，所以LDL的表达就会升高。 NBT也真凑热闹，专门配发了个Editorial： 8. Receptive to replication 说这个吧，咱NBT是个高端大气上档次的杂志，发文章一定要讲novelty，研究结果如果是null或者是阴性的，咱一般不发(啥意思？难道孟山都做的是null?) 为啥要发孟山都的文章呢？对啊，我也纳闷啊，你为啥发这玩意儿呢？别激动哈，大家没说你收孟山都的钱，千万别激动。结果NBT的编辑激动地洋洋洒洒扯了半天，意思就是这个问题很重要，因此重复性的验证很有意义。这就搞笑了，中国人做个东西，老外来重复就有意义，NCS上一天到晚被撤稿的，那是中国人啊，还是老外啊？怎么就没看见NBT发批评的文章呢？当然喽，NBT还不忘顺带抽CR一巴掌，说孟山都的人did submit这篇文章到CR，但是被告知it is a bit hard to publish a paper of which the results are largely negative (大部分结果为阴性的论文很南发表)。您瞧瞧，是吧？国内的杂志多不像话，人家这么重要的工作，CR就给拒了，还是NBT慧眼识珠，收了。英明神武啊。 到这里故事可以结束了是吧？简而言之就是张发了篇文章，孟山都气不过，上去一脚没踢着，气火了接着一巴掌抡上去，完了NBT在一边鼓掌说哇塞打的好帅啊。张被彻底KO，对吧？呵呵，我只能说，故事还没完。这个世界告诉我们：第一，你要抽别人耳光，技术、力度和动作要专业、精确；第二，要抽人请自己上，酱油终归是个酱油，没用处的。所以，张二话不说，丢出个回复： 9. Reply to Lack of detectable oral bioavailability of plant microRNAs after feeding in mice 上来自然要谦虚谦虚啦，说啊，这个这个，咱这个东西肯定得往下做喽，真做清楚了哥们早拿奖了，还用着跟你瞎白乎？完了就开始评论，这个吧，第一，这篇文章的测序方法是有问题的。植物的miRNA跟动物不大一样，一般3‘端有2′-O-methyl的修饰，会降低连接的效率，所以做植物miRNA测序，一般要先氧化一下，不然测出来的序不靠谱。你看，这篇文章即使直接测大米，也就测出1000多个读段，这怎么可能哩？搞植物的请站出来说句话，您测个水稻的miRNA组就只能测出个1000个读段？最起码也是百万以上啊。另外，搞植物的人有结果的，测大米的miR156和miR168怎么测都在10000RPM以上，你总共测出1000个读段，估计是不知道植物的miRNA跟动物的不一样，这个可以理解，做学问嘛，你不懂我可以教你。OK，这部分的意思就是，孟山都的方法不靠谱；第二，你说你RT-PCR验证不出来血清里存在植物的miRNA，这是因为你选的内参不合适，你弄一个表达超高的线虫miRNA做内参，这啥看不见啊。内参要选合适的。得，RT-PCR技术不过关啊(很纳闷哦，RT-PCR有这么难吗？)；第三，你都说LDL水平会升高了，你恐怕得做更多的实验，来表明LDL水平的升高的的确确与miR168无关。 瞧见没？这才是咱中国顶级学者的风范。想抽我？找抽的吧！你测序方法不对，RT-PCR有问题，结果不扎实，踩着西瓜皮讨论，这不是找抽，这是干啥的？ 这事儿还没完呢，NBT这不是批评CR不收别人文章吗？党生不干了，电话里说，这事儿是我处理的，经过是这样的：第一，孟山都从来没有正式投稿，就写了个pre-submission，我一看标题就感觉这个结果太preliminary；第二，这篇文章通篇都是negative结果，这怎么收啊？每个人都送negative结果到我这里来，说做不出来就能发？所以根据这两点，党生回复，意思就是你这个结果太preliminary啦，而且都是negative结果没法发。李老师说，当然喽，他这是pre-submission嘛，又不是正式投稿，就一个摘要，那我只能根据他这个摘要做判断，他如果投全文，没准我会给送审，但我也不能保证他发表。这就是CR”拒收孟山都论文的经过。当然话说回来，即使投了全文，以党生的经验估计也能判断出基本的问题，所以还是会拒收。很正常，无论你发表新的东西，还是批评别人的工作，都要扎实，二半吊子混不过去的。 最后，第一，咱做蛋白质的，DNA/RNA这块儿基本上不懂，有基本概念说错的不妨指出；第二，这些文章内容都挺多，咱也只能挑重点讲讲；第三，咱就凑个热闹，您瞧拳来脚往的多有乐趣；第四，真要打人，技术得过关啊；第五，张老师这通回抽，啧啧，角度、力度、技术、力量、速度，木得挑剔啊！ 总结： 张：欢迎踢场哈！ 孟：我踹！ 约翰霍普金斯：呃，看准点儿成不？ 孟：我打！ NBT: 哇，帅呆了！酷毙了！ 张: 都提醒你看准了好不？算了，看我的吧... 孟：pia...(被动) 党生：诸位诸位，啥事儿这么想不开啊？哎哟，赶紧拨120，有人躺了... ======================================================================== 补充个说明吧。 1. 别丫的找抽拿我这篇博文来挺转和反转，好好的一个科学发现别糟蹋，主要意义我在7楼的评论里讲过了。 2. 这事儿吧，其实就是老外看中国人有原创的工作眼红，千方百计想贬低中国人的工作，这种事儿各位难道遇到的少了？学学张教授的经验有好处。 3. 做科研要扎实，基本功要过硬。 4. 想打人之前先掂量掂量，别没揍成反被人抽大嘴巴子。 5. 这回真的是：打得好！ 修改：2013.11.12，不好意思，搞错了俩小问题，一个是CR的收稿时间是2011年，不是2012年；另一个是mir168a的靶是LDLRAP1，不是LDL。LDLRAP1水平的下降导致LDL的上升，所以党生笑着说大米吃多了未必是好事。先说明哈，我也纳闷中国人血脂高吗？所以这部分我持保留态度。特此修正。 引自： http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-404304-740945.html 上一篇： 恒大是冠军！ 下一篇： 【附】：张教授回信
标签: 孟山都
