今早又读了一段康德。每当中文译文费解，就找来费解的原文再读一遍。粘贴此处，以备他日再读起来链接方便。 汉英德语言对比学习：判断力批判/导言/哲学的划分： 导言 Ⅰ. 哲学的划分 如果我们就哲学 凭借概念而包含有事物 的理性认识的诸原则(而不单是像逻辑学那样不对客体作区别而包含有 一般思维形式的诸原则 )而言,把哲学像通常那样划分为 理论哲学和实践哲学 ,那么我们做得完全对。但这样一来, 为这个理性认识的诸原则指定了它们的客体的那些概念必定是特别各不相同的 ,因为否则它们将没有理由作出划分,划分总是以属于一门科学的各个不同部分的那些理性知识之诸原则的某种对立为前提的。 Wenn man die Philosophie, sofern sie Prinzipien der Vernunfterkenntnis der Dinge 如果我们就哲学 包含凭借概念而对事物的理性认识 的诸原则 If you have the philosophy, provided they have principles of reasoning of things (nicht bloß, wie die Logik, Prinzipien der Form des Denkens überhaupt, (not merely, like logic, principles of the form of thinking in general, (而不单是像逻辑学那样不对客体作区别而包含有 一般思维形式的诸原则 )而言, ohne Unterschied der Objekte) durch Begriffe / enthält, without distinction of objects) through concepts, contains wie gewöhnlich in die theoretische und praktische einteilt: so verfährt man ganz recht. as usual divided into the theoretical and practical: so one proceeds quite right. 把哲学像通常那样划分为 理论哲学和实践哲学 ,那么我们做得完全对。 Aber alsdann müssen auch die Begriffe, welche den Prinzipiens dieser Vernunfterkenntnisihr Objekt anweisen, spezifisch verschieden sein, But then also the concepts which instruct the object of the principles of this knowledge of reasonmust be specifically different, 但这样一来, 为这个理性认识的诸原则指定了它们的客体的那些概念必定是特别各不相同的, weil sie sonst zu keiner Einteilung berechtigen würden, because otherwise they would not qualify for classification 因为否则它们将没有理由作出划分, welche jederzeit eine Entgegensetzung der Prinzipien, which at any time an opposition of the principles, der zu den verschiedenen Teilen einer Wissenschaft gehörigenVernunfterkenntnis, voraussetzt. which to the different parts of a science belongingthe knowledge of reason presupposes 划分总是 以 属于一门科学的各个不同部分的那些理性知识之诸原则的某种对立 为前提的。 Pluhar 翻译 ： Insofar as philosophy contains principles for the rational cognition of things through concepts (and not merely, as logic does, principles of the form of thought in general without distinction of objects 13 ), it is usually divided into theoretical and practical. That division is entirely correct, provided there is also a difference in kind between the concepts that assign to 分配给 / 归因于 the principles of this rational cognition their respective objects: otherwise the concepts would not justify a division, since a division presupposes that the principles of the rational cognition pertaining to the different parts of a science are opposed to one another. 他译： Philosophy may be said to contain the principles of the rational cognition that concepts afford us of things (not merely, as with logic, the principles of the form of thought in general irrespective of the objects), and, thus interpreted, the course 过程 , usually adopted, of dividing it into theoretical and practical is perfectly sound. But this makes imperative a specific distinction on the part of the concepts by which the principles of this rational cognition get their object assigned to them, 这就必须对概念部分作出具体的区分，通过这些概念 理性认识的原则得到了分配给他们的客体 / 对象， for if the concepts are not distinct they fail to justify a division, which always presupposes that the principles belonging to the rational cognition of the several parts of the science in question are themselves mutually exclusive. 因为如果概念不明确，它们就不能证明一种划分是正当的，这种划分总是假定 属于所讨论科学的几个部分的理性认识的原则 本身是相互排斥的。 / 但是,只有两类概念,是容许它们的对象的可能性有正好两种各不相同的原则的：这就是 自然诸概念和自由概念 。既然前者使按照先天原则的某种 理论知识 成为可能,后者却在这些理论知识方面在其概念本身中就已经只具有某种否定的原则(单纯对立的原则),相反,对于意志的规定则建立起扩展性的原理,这些原理因而叫作 实践的原理 :所以,哲学被划分为在原则上完全不同的两个部分，即作为 自然哲学 的理论部分和作为 道德哲学 的实践部分(因为理性根据自由概念所作的实践立法就是这样被称呼的),这是有道理的。 Pluhar: There are, however, only two kinds of concepts, which : so wird die Philosophie in zwei, which, therefore, are called practical: thus is the philosophy divided into two, den Prinzipien nach ganz verschiedene, Teile, in die theoretische als Naturphilosophie , und die praktische als Moralphilosophie (denn so wird die praktische Gesetzgebung der Vernunft (for then the practical legislation of reason is named nach dem Freiheitsbegriffe genannt) mit Recht eingeteilt. after the concept of freedom) rightly divided. 所以,哲学被划分为在原则上完全不同的两个部分.即作为自然哲学的理论部分和作为道德哲学的实践部分(因为理性根据自由概念所作的实践立法就是这样被称呼的),这是有道理的。 但迄今为止,在以这些术语来划分不同的原则、又以这些原则来划分哲学方面,流行着一种很大的误用: 由于人们把按照自然概念的实践和按照自由概念的实践等同起来,这样就在理论哲学和实践哲学这些相同的名称下进行了一种划分, 通过这种划分事实上什么也没有划分出来(因为这两部分可以拥有同一些原则)。 In the past, however, these terms have been badly misused for dividing the different principles and along with them philosophy. For no distinction was made between the practical governed by concepts of nature and the practical governed by the concept of freedom , with the result that the same terms, theoretical and practical philosophy, were used to make a division that in fact did not divide anything (since the two parts might have the same kind of principles). // Hitherto, however, in the application of these expressions to the division of the different principles, and with them to the division of philosophy, a gross misuse of the terms has prevailed; for what is practical according to concepts of nature has been taken as identical with what is practical according to the concept of freedom, with the result that a division has been made under these heads of theoretical and practical, by which, in effect, there has been no division at all (seeing that both parts might have similar principles). 所以意志,作为欲求的能力,它是尘世间好些自然原因之一，就是说,它是那种 按照概念起作用的原因 ;而一切被设想为通过意志而成为可能(或必然)的东西,就叫作实践上可能(或必然)的,以与某个结果的自然的可能性或必然性区别开来,后者的原因不是通过概念(而是像在无生命的物质那里通过机械作用,在动物那里通过本能) 而被规定为原因性的 ——而现在,就实践而言在这里还没有规定, 那赋予意志的原因性以规则 的概念是一个自然概念,还是个自由概念。 The will—for this is what is said—is the faculty of desire 欲望的能力 and, as such, is just one of the many natural causes in the world, the one, namely, which acts by concepts; 通过概念来行动的； and whatever is represented as possible (or necessary) through the efficacy of will 意志的效力来表现 is called practically possible (or necessary ): the intention being to distinguish its possibility (or necessity) from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect 某种效应的物理可能性或必然性 /the causality of whose cause is not determined to its production by concepts (but rather, as with lifeless matter, by mechanism, and, as with the lower animals, by instinct). Now, the question in respect of the practical faculty 关于实践能力的问题是 : whether, that is to say, the concept, by which the causality of the will gets its rule, is a concept of nature or of freedom, is here left quite open. 也就是说，意志的因果关系藉此得到其规则的概念，是自然的概念还是自由的概念，在这里是完全开放的。 Der Wille, als Begehrungsvermögen, ist nämlich eine von den mancherlei Naturursachen in der Welt, nämlich diejenige, welche nach Begriffen wirkt; The will, as faculty of desire, is in fact one of the many causes of nature in the world, namely, that which works according to concepts; und alles, was als durch einen Willen möglich (oder notwendig) vorgestellt wird, heißt praktisch-möglich (oder notwendig): and everything ,what as ,by a will as possible (or necessary) is presented , called practical-possible (or necessary): zum Unterschiede von der physischen Möglichkeit oder Notwendigkeit einer Wirkung , to the difference of the physical possibility or necessity of an effect, wozu die Ursache nicht durch Begriffe (sondern, wie bei der leblosen Materie, durch Mechanism, und bei Tieren, durch Instinkt) zur Kausalität bestimmt wird. for which the cause is determined not by concepts (but, as in inanimate matter, by mechanism, and by animals, by instinct) to causality. – Hier wird nun in Ansehung des Praktischen unbestimmt gelassen: Here, with regard to the practical, it is left indefinitely: ob der Begriff, der der Kausalität des Willens die Regel gibt, ein Naturbegriff, oder ein Freiheitsbegriff sei. whether the concept, which gives the rule to the causality of the will, is a concept of nature, or a concept of freedom. Pluhar: For the will, as the power of desire, is one of the many natural causes in the world, namely, the one that acts in accordance with concepts; and whatever we think of as possible (or necessary) through a will we call practically possible (or necessary), as distinguished from the physical possibility or necessity of an effect whose cause is not determined to its causality through concepts (but through mechanism, as in the case of lifeless matter, or through instinct, as in the case of animals). It is here, concerning the practical, that people leave it undetermined whether the concept that gives the rule to the will's causality is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom. 在这里，关于实践，人们不确定 赋予意志因果关系以规则的概念是自然概念还是自由概念。 但辨明后面这点是根本性的。因为如果规定这原因性的概念是一个自然概念，那么这些原则就是 技术上实践的； 但如果它是一个自由概念，那么这些原则就是 道德上实践的 ;而由于在对理性科学的划分中完全取决于 那些需要不同原则来认识的对象 的差异性,所以前一类原则就属于 理论哲学 (作为自然学说),后一类则完全独立地构成第二部分,也就是(作为道德学说的)实践哲学。 Yet this distinction is essential. For if the concept that determines the causality is a concept of nature, then the principles will be technically * practical; but if it is a concept of freedom , then the principles will be morally practical. And since the division of a rational science depends entirely on that difference between the respective objects which requires different principles for cognition, the technically practical principles will belong to theoretical philosophy (natural science , while the morally practical ones alone will form the second part, practical philosophy (moral theory ). * Der letztere Unterschied aber ist wesentlich. Denn, ist der die Kausalität bestimmende Begriff ein Naturbegriff, so sind die Prinzipien technisch-praktisch ; ist er aber ein Freiheitsbegriff, so sind diese moralisch-praktisch : und weil es in der Einteilung einer Vernunftwissenschaft gänzlich auf diejenige Verschiedenheit der Gegenstände ankommt, deren Erkenntnis verschiedener Prinzipien bedarf, so werden die ersteren zur theoretischen Philosophie (als Natur lehre) gehören, die andern aber ganz allein den zweiten Teil, nämlich (als Sittenlehre) die praktische Philosophie, ausmachen. 一切技术上实践的规则(亦即艺术和一般熟练技巧的规则,或者也有作为对人和人的意志施加影响的熟练技巧的明智的规则),就其原则是基于概念的而言,也必须只被算作对理论哲学的补充。因为它们只涉及到按照自然概念的物的可能性, 属于自然概念的 不只是在自然界中可以为此找到的 手段 ,而且甚至有 意志 (作为欲求能力、因而作为自然能力),就其可以按照那种规则被自然冲动所规定而言。 All technically practical rules (i.e., those of art and of skill in general, or for that matter of prudence, i.e., skill in influencing people's volition), insofar as their principles rest on concepts, must be included only in theoretical philosophy, as corollaries.For they concern nothing but the possibility of things according to concepts of nature; and this includes not only the means we find in nature for producing them, but even the will (as power of desire and hence as a natural power ), as far as it can be determined, in conformity with the mentioned rules, by natural incentives. Ⅱ . 一般哲学的领地 Ⅲ . 判断力的批判作为把哲学的这两部分结合为一个整体的手段 Ⅳ . 判断力，作为一种先天立法能力 Ⅴ . 自然的形式的合目的性原则是判断力的一个先验原则 Ⅵ . 愉快的情感和自然合目的性概念的联结 Ⅶ . 自然的合目的性的审美表象 Ⅷ . 自然合目的性的逻辑表象 Ⅸ . 知性和理性的各种立法通过判断力而联结部分 相关链接： The Critique of Judgment /Preface 康德 形而上学导论 实践理性批判 定理 纯粹的知性概念 范畴表 相关原理 纯粹知性概念的先验演绎 康德之“先天”、“先验”与“超验” 实践理性批判 序言 纯粹理性批判 第二版序 康德 理性批判要点 纯粹理性批判中一段重要论述的翻译
标签: Critique
