（首先感谢亦明先生考证的资料） 按照西方历史，“科学”大致可以分为“古代科学”、“中世纪科学”和“现代科学”三大部分。有“科学史之父”之称的乔治•萨顿（George Sarton）在1948年说： “When one speaks of the history of science most people think of experimental and mathematical knowledge as we know it now, with its inexhaustible harvest of applications; they think of what we would call ‘modern science’ the development of which was hardly started before the seventeenth century. This is of course justifiable in some respects, yet he who was acquainted only with that part of the story would have a very misleading idea of the whole evolution. It is as if he knew a man only in his maturity and was not aware that such maturity was made possible only by the long years of childhood and adolescence. ”（Sarton, G. East and West in the History of Science. in THE LIFE OF SCIENCE: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION. Henry Schuman, Inc., 1948. p. 131）（一提到科学史，绝大多数人会联想到我们今天所了解的试验知识和数学知识，以及这些知识的广泛应用。他们以为，在十七世纪以前，我们现在所说的“现代科学”几乎不存在。从某些方面来看，这种观点当然有其合理性。但是，一个人的目光如果仅限于那几个方面，他就不会了解科学的整个进化过程。这就像是他只认识一个成年阶段的人，而不知道这个人之所以能够成年，乃是因为他经历了漫长的童年和青春期。） 某科普作家的书中有一句是怎么说的： “中医作为中国古代文化的一部分，其诞生的时间远在科学之前。中医的理论体系建立在四本中医著作的基础之上，即《黄帝内经》、《伤寒杂病论》、《难经》、《神农本草经》。除了《伤寒杂病论》可确定为东汉末年张仲景所著，其他三本书的作者都不详，但出书时间都在两汉时期。此后中医的理论体系未再有重大的变化。既然中医理论体系远在人类有科学之前就已确立，那么中医学不是科学，本来是很自然的事。”。 看到该作家把“现代科学”的概念偷换成“科学”了吗？这套把戏，就如同这样：先指着树木的顶端说，树木都是有枝叶的，然后再指着树根和树干说，你看它没有枝叶，因此它不是树木。显然，使用这种诡辩逻辑的人，或者是一个纯粹的无知，或者是一个纯粹的无赖。 如果把“科学”看成某种范式和标准的定义。“科学”的内涵还可以细分为古代科学、现代科学等等。因此，完全可以这么说：中医的理论和实践与“现代科学”格格不入，所以它不是所谓的“现代科学”。但假如他真的这么说的话，那就相当于承认中医是某种意义上的“科学”、中医有权利宣布自己是“科学”，我们却没有任何理由宣布中医是“伪科学”。也就是因为如此，某些人才宁可耍无赖，使用偷换概念的卑鄙手段，把“现代”二字偷偷抹去。实际上，这是科学斗士们所熟习的共通把戏。 再来说说李约瑟，李约瑟认为中国古代有“科学”——所谓的“李约瑟难题”是，“以伽利略为代表的近代科学”为什么没有在中国产生。李约瑟的巨著《中华科学文明史》主要是讲述中国在“人类有科学之前”所做出的科技成就。 李约瑟是实事求是的，至于某些人说什么：李约瑟“极端恋华”。本人怀疑这些人不是无知，就是无耻。 墨子与《墨经》 在春秋战国时代的诸子百家之中，有两家“显学”，一是儒，一是墨。（见《韩非子•显学》）。但是，这两家的命运在汉朝以后却截然相反：儒家思想成了统治阶级的正统思想，而墨家的思想和文章却几乎到了湮灭的地步。只是到了清朝时，墨家的著作《墨子》才被后人认真整理。在拭去历史的尘埃之后，人们发现这部书中蕴藏着极为宝贵的思想和知识。《墨子》一书现存53篇，其中的《经》、《经说》各有上下两篇，一般认为是墨子所作，称为《墨经》。墨子比孔子晚出生大约五十年，生活于公元前四百年以前，比亚里士多德早大约一百年，比阿基米德早大约两百年。墨家学说中的科学知识，主要见于《墨经》之中。 大致说来，《墨经》在数学、物理学以及逻辑学等方面均有突出的成就。在物理学方面的成就，以杠杆原理和光学论述最让人惊讶不已。众所周知，杠杆原理的发明人是阿基米德。但是，在《墨子•经说下》，有这样一段话： “衡，加重于其一旁，必捶。权重相若也，相衡则本短标长。两加焉，重相若，则标必下，标得权也。” 据今人的解释，这些话的意思是： “衡即衡器称，经文意为秤杆平正，是秤锤放在合适的位置的缘故。经说则说得更清楚，在称的一旁加重，秤杆必下垂；要称出物体的重量，就需要秤杆平正，此时则必然是‘本’（重臂）短而‘标’（力臂）长。如果权和重物增加相同的重量，那么‘标’（即称尾）必然下垂。写成力学公示，就是力X力臂=重X重臂。虽然墨子没有用公式的形式来表述，但其文字表述的意思已是相当清楚的。”（见科学出版社1998年版《中国科学技术史•人物卷》8页）。 如果说墨子的数学、力学论述显得比较零散、不系统的话，那么他的光学论述则全无这样的缺陷。在《墨子》的《经下》和《经说下》，有八条、约三百字阐述光学知识。科学史专家席泽宗评论说： “《墨经》中的光学部分，虽然只有8条，仅300余字，但次序安排合理，逻辑严密，堪称为世界上最早的几何光学著作。前5条，首论影的成因，次述光和影的关系，第三以针孔成像论证光的直线进行，接着又说明光的反射，最后讨论光、物、影三者的关系，这样，光学中的影论部分已基本具备了。后3条分别论述平面镜、凹面镜、凸面镜的成像规律，正是光学中像论部分的基本内容，8条和起来即为几何光学的基础，没有做过实验是写不出来，没有实验的忠实记录也是写不出来的。”（席泽宗：《科学史十论》，复旦大学出版社2003年版34页）。 在与希腊人的光学研究进行了比较之后，李约瑟这样评价墨子的光学研究： “墨家光学研究的开始，比我们所知道的希腊的情况为早（显然印度也不能与之相比）。……墨家肯定广泛而仔细地应用了实验方法，但他们由于缺乏发达的几何学而受到局限。”（李约瑟：《中国科学技术史》第四卷第一分册，科学出版社2003年版81-82页）。 李约瑟所说的墨子“局限”，是与托勒密的光学理论相比较的。但是，托勒密生活于公元二世纪，距离墨子大约六百年。当时的中国，已经进入了“罢黜百家，独尊儒术”的东汉末年。显然，墨子的光学没能够发扬光大，是有着深厚的历史文化背景的，而不仅仅是因为“缺乏发达的几何学”。 墨子的学说虽然没落，但这一显学却一直影响着中华民族 ，此后中国能称为科学家的,如张衡 沈括等， 这些科学家的成就丝毫不输给西方古代科学大家，中国古代无科学论可以休矣。
Cultural history holds back Chinese research Confucius and Zhuang have produced a culture in China that values isolation and inhibits curiosity. Neither is good for science, says Peng Gong 2 1 . 25 January 2012 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently lamented that, when it comes to scientific research, China is now ahead of India. “India's relative position in the world of science has been declining,” he said. “And we have been overtaken by countries like China.” But although China is now second only to the United States in the number of scientific papers produced, many say that the quality of its research needs to improve. Misconduct is a common problem, but there are other, cultural, reasons for China's poor performance, too. Two cultural genes have passed through generations of Chinese intellectuals for more than 2,000 years. The first is the thoughts of Confucius, who proposed that intellectuals should become loyal administrators. The second is the writings of Zhuang Zhou, who said that a harmonious society would come from isolating families so as to avoid exchange and conflict, and by shunning technology to avoid greed. Together, these cultures have encouraged small-scale and self-sufficient practices in Chinese society, but discouraged curiosity, commercialization and technology. They helped to produce a scientific void in Chinese society that persisted for millennia. And they continue to be relevant today. One consequence is that every member of the academic community in China wants to do leading research, with few willing to play assisting roles. Not everyone, however, is qualified to lead, so this results in wasteful repetition and redundancy. Investigators use all kind of excuses to purchase similar types of equipment and do similar types of data processing. We see this problem even at the largest scale. In any Chinese collaboration, universities, research institutions and separate government agencies all want to be the lead organization, which makes it extremely hard for the participating scientists to share data with each other. For example, the China Meteorological Administration has some 2,000 weather stations, from which it gathers the information used to issue weather forecasts, among other things. In addition, the Bureau of Hydrology operates some 20,000 gauge stations, which also collect weather data and could be used to substantially improve the spatial precision of the Meteorological Administration's forecasts, yet it does not make them available. A related problem is the lack of division of work. Research administrators tend to value, and therefore reward, only those who claim to be doing original research, which forces people away from (useful) supporting roles. It also explains why, libraries and instrument retail companies aside, there are few specialized research services inside China. That leaves research labs with no choice but to do everything themselves, even routine work such as sample analysis and database development. With no sensible allocation of duties to people and organizations with different talents, delays in research are inevitable. “China should begin to divide its research work and assign jobs to personnel with the appropriate specializations.” What can be done about these cultural obstacles? First, the scientific spirit must be established early in the education system. China has already improved its universities, using successful models copied from the Western world. It must now do the same in its schools. China's schoolteachers must do more to encourage curiosity in children, and science education should begin in the earliest years. This would require significant reforms to school curricula, as well as investment in teacher training. The importance of collaborative research should be formally recognized and encouraged, by individual scientists as well as research administrators. Financial incentives in the form of grants, merit increases or promotion should be given to those involved in successful collaborations, with the intellectual contribution of each collaborator clearly identified. China should also begin to divide its research work and assign jobs to personnel with the appropriate specializations. Positions must be created for chemical analysts, computer engineers, experimentalists, instrumentation staff and specialized data providers. Finally, it must make more effort to help its scientists participate in international projects, and to entice outstanding foreign scientists to China. We need international evaluations for proposal review and strategic planning. For major research projects, it would be helpful to invite critique at the design and completion stages. The same should be done at universities to help them become internationally influential. China must learn from the European Union and provide financial support to international collaborators. For example, when the Chinese government funded a 46-million-renminbi (US$7-million) global land-cover mapping project in 2009, it ruled that none of the money could be paid to collaborators in foreign countries. A global project, of course, needs samples to be collected from all over the world, yet it is impossible for Chinese scientists to do this in many foreign countries. China must realize that isolation and self-sufficiency is no recipe for success in modern science. It will be a difficult change, but the price is affordable. And the result will be a strong China and the peaceful world that Chinese people have dreamed of for generations.
Foreword China’s modernization is viewed as a transformative revolution in the human history of modernization. As such, the Chinese Academy of Sciences(CAS) decided to give higher priority to the research on the science and technology (ST) roadmap for priority areas in China’s modernization process.What is the purpose? And why is it? Is it a must? I think those are substantial and significant questions to start things forward. Significance of the Research on China’s ST Roadmap to 2050 We are aware that the National Mid- and Long-term ST Plan to 2020 has already been formed after two years’ hard work by a panel of over 2000 experts and scholars brought together from all over China, chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao. This clearly shows that China has already had its ST blueprint to 2020. Then, why did CAS conduct this research on China’s ST roadmap to 2050? In the summer of 2007 when CAS was working out its future strategic priorities for ST development, it realized that some issues, such as energy, must be addressed with a long-term view. As a matter of fact, some strategic researches have been conducted, over the last 15 years, on energy, but mainly on how to best use of coal, how to best exploit both domestic and international oil and gas resources, and how to develop nuclear energy in a discreet way. Renewable energy was, of course, included but only as a supplementary energy. It was not yet thought as a supporting leg for future energy development. However, greenhouse gas emissions are becoming a major world concern overthe years, and how to address the global climate change has been on the agenda. In fact, what is really behind is the concern for energy structure, which makes us realize that fossil energy must be used cleanly and efficiently in order to reduce its impact on the environment. However, fossil energy is, pessimistically speaking, expected to be used up within about 100 years, or optimistically speaking, within about 200 years. Oil and gas resources may be among the first to be exhausted, and then coal resources follow. When this happens, human beings will have to refer to renewable energy as its major energy, while nuclear energy as a supplementary one. Under this situation, govern ments of the world are taking preparatory efforts in this regard, with Europe taking the lead and the USA shifting to take a more positive attitude, as evidenced in that: while fossil energy has been taken the best use of, renewable energy has been greatly developed, and the RD of advanced nuclear energy has been reinforced with the objective of being eventually transform ed into renewable energy. The process may last 50 to 100 years or so. Hence, many ST problems may come around. In the field of basic research, for example, research will be conducted by physicists, chemists and biologists on the new generation of photovoltaic cell, dye-sensitized solar cells (DSC), high-efficient photochemical catalysis and storage, and efficient photosynthetic species, or high-efficient photosynthetic species produced by gene engineering which are free from land and water demands compared with food and oil crops, and can be grown on hillside, saline lands and semi-arid places, producing the energy that fits humanity. In the meantime, although the existing energy system is comparatively stable, future energy structure is likely to change into an unstable system. Presumably, dispersive energy system as well as higher-efficient direct current transmission and storage technology will be developed, so will be the safe and reliable control of network, and the capture, storage, transfer and use of CO2, all of which involve ST problems in almost all scientific disciplines. Therefore, it is natural that energy problems may bring out both basic and applied research, and may eventually lead to comprehensive structural changes. And this may last for 50 to 100 years or so. Taking the nuclear energy as an example, it usually takes about 20 years or more from its initial plan to key technology breakthroughs, so does the subsequent massive application and commercialization. If we lose the opportunity to make foresighted arrangements, we will be lagging far behind in the future. France has already worked out the roadmap to 2040 and 2050 respectively for the development of the 3rd and 4th generation of nuclear fission reactors, while China has not yet taken any serious actions. Under this circumstance, it is now time for CAS to take the issue seriously, for the sake of national interests, and to start conducting a foresighted research in this regard. This strategic research covers over some dozens of areas with a longterm view. Taking agriculture as an example, our concern used to be limited only to the increased production of high-quality food grains and agricultural by-products. However, in the future, the main concern will definitely be given to the water-saving and ecological agriculture. As China is vast in territory, diversified technologies in this regard are the appropriate solutions. Animal husbandry has been used by developed countries, such as Japan and Denmark, to make bioreactor and pesticide as well. Plants have been used by Japan to make bioreactors which are safer and cost-effective than that made from animals. Potato, strawberry, tomato and the like have been bred in germfree greenhouses, and value-added products have been made through gene transplantation technology. Agriculture in China must not only address the food demands from its one billions-plus population, but also take into consideration of the value-added agriculture by-products and the high-tech development of agriculture as well. Agriculture in the future is expected to bring out some energies and fuels needed by both industry and man’s livelihood as well. Some developed countries have taken an earlier start to conduct foresighted research in this regard, while we have not yet taken sufficient consideration. Population is another problem. It will be most likely that China’s population will not drop to about 1 billion until the end of this century, given that the past mistakes of China’s population policy be rectified. But the subsequent problem of ageing could only be sorted out until the next century. The current population and health policies face many challenges, such as, how to ensure that the 1.3 to 1.5 billion people enjoy fair and basic public healthcare; the necessity to develop advanced and public healthcare and treatment technologies; and the change of research priority to chronic diseases from infectious diseases, as developed countries have already started research in this regard under the increasing social and environ mental change. There are many such research problems yet to be sorted out by starting from the basic research, and subsequent policies within the next 50 years are in need to be worked out. Space and oceans provide humanity with important resources for future development. In terms of space research, the well-known Manned Spacecraft Program and China’s Lunar Exploration Program will last for 20 or 25 years. But what will be the whole plan for China’s space technology? What is the objective? Will it just follow the suit of developed countries? It is worth doing serious study in this regard. The present spacecraft is mainly sent into space with chemical fuel propellant rocket. Will this traditional propellant still be used in future deep space exploration? Or other new technologies such as electrical propellant, nuclear energy propellant, and solar sail technologies be developed? We haven’t yet done any strategic research over these issues, not even worked out any plans. The ocean is abundant in mineral resources, oil and gas, natural gas hydrate, biological resources, energy and photo-free biological evolution, which may arise our scientific interests. At present, many countries have worked out new strategic marine plans. Russia, Canada, the USA, Sweden and Norway have centered their contention upon the North Pole, an area of strategic significance. For this, however, we have only limited plans. The national and public security develops with time, and covers bothconventional and non-conventional security. Conventional security threats only refer to foreign invasion and warfare, while, the present security threat may come out from any of the natural, man-made, external, interior, ecological, environmental, and the emerging networking (including both real and virtual) factors. The conflicts out of these must be analyzed from the perspective of human civilization, and be sorted out in a scientific manner. Efforts must be made to root out the cause of the threats, while human life must be treasured at any time. In general, it is necessary to conduct this strategic research in view of the future develop ment of China and mankind as well. The past 250 years’ industrialization has resulted in the modernization and better-off life of less than 1 billion people, predominantly in Europe, North America, Japan and Singapore. The next 50 years’ modernization drive will definitely lead to a better-off life for 2–3 billion people, including over 1 billion Chinese, doubling or tripling the economic increase over that of the past 250 years, which will, on the one hand, bring vigor and vitality to the world, and, on the other hand, inevitably challenge the limited resources and eco-environment on the earth. New development mode must be shaped so that everyone on the earth will be able to enjoy fairly the achievements of modern civilization. Achieving this requires us, in the process of China’s modernization, to have a foresighted overview on the future development of world science and human civilization, and on how science and technology could serve the modernization drive. ST roadmap for priority areas to 2050 must be worked out, and solutions to core science problems and key technology problems must be straightened out, which will eventually provide consultations for the nation’s ST decision-making. Possibility of Working out China’s ST Roadmap to 2050 Some people held the view that science is hard to be predicted as it happens unexpect edly and mainly comes out of scientists’ innovative thinking, while, technology might be predicted but at the maximum of 15 years. In my view, however, ST foresight in some areas seems feasible. For instance, with the exhaustion of fossil energy, some smart people may think of transforming solar energy into energy-intensive biomass through improved high-efficient solar thinfilm materials and devices, or even developing new substitute. As is driven by huge demands, many investments will go to this emerging area. It is, therefore, able to predict that, in the next 50 years, some breakthroughs will undoubtedly be made in the areas of renewable energy and nuclear energy as well. In terms of solar energy, for example, the improvement of photoelectric conversion efficiency and photothermal conversion efficiency will be the focus. Of course, the concrete technological solutions may be varied, for example, by changing the morphology of the surface of solar cells and through the reflection, the entire spectrum can be absorbed more efficiently; by developing multi-layer functional thin-films for transmission and absorption; or by introducing of nanotechnology and quantum control technology, etc. Quantum control research used to limit mainly to the solution to information functional materials. This is surely too narrow. In thefuture, this research is expected to be extended to the energy issue or energybased basic research in cutting-edge areas. In terms of computing science, we must be confident to forecast its future development instead of simply following suit as we used to. This is a possibility rather than wild fancies. Information scientists, physicists and biologists could be engaged in the forward-looking research. In 2007, the Nobel Physics Prize was awarded to the discovery of colossal magneto-resistance, which was, however, made some 20 years ago. Today, this technology has already been applied to hard disk store. Our conclusion made, at this stage, is that: it is possible to make long-term and unconventional ST predictions, and so is it to work out China’s ST roadmap in view of long-term strategies, for example, by 2020 as the first step, by 2030 or 2035 as the second step, and by 2050 as the maximum. This possibility may also apply to other areas of research. The point is to emancipate the mind and respect objective laws rather than indulging in wild fancies. We attribute our success today to the guidelines of emancipating the mind and seeking the truth from the facts set by the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1979. We must break the conventional barriers and find a way of development fitting into China’s reality. The history of science tells us that discoveries and breakthroughs could only be made when you open up your mind, break the conventional barriers, and make foresighted plans. Top-down guidance on research with increased financial support and involvement of a wider range of talented scientists is not in conflict with demand-driven research and free discovery of science as well. Necessity of CAS Research on China’s ST Roadmap to 2050 Why does CAS launch this research? As is known, CAS is the nation’s highest academic institution in natural sciences. It targets at making basic, forward-looking and strategic research and playing a leading role in China’s science. As such, how can it achieve this if without a foresighted view on science and technology? From the perspective of CAS, it is obligatory to think, with a global view, about what to do after the 3rd Phase of the Knowledge Innovation Program (KIP). Shall we follow the way as it used to? Or shall we, with a view of national interests, present our in-depth insights into different research disciplines, and make efforts to reform the organizational structure and system, so that the innovation capability of CAS and the nation’s science and technology mission will be raised to a new height? Clearly, the latter is more positive. World science and technology develops at a lightening speed. As global economy grows, we are aware that we will be lagging far behind if without making progress, and will lose the opportunity if without making foresighted plans. ST innovation requires us to make joint efforts, break the conventional barriers and emancipate the mind. This is also what we need for further development. The roadmap must be targeted at the national level so that the strategic research reports will form an important part of the national long-term program. CAS may not be able to fulfill all the objectives in the reports. However, it can select what is able to do and make foresighted plans, which will eventually help shape the post-2010 research priorities of CAS and the guidelines for its future reform. Once the long-term roadmap and its objectives are identified, system mechanism, human resources, funding and allocation should be ensured for full implementation. We will make further studies to figure out: What will happen to world innovation system within the next 30 to 50 years? Will universities, research institutions and enterprises still be included in the system? Will research institutes become grid structure? When the cutting-edge research combines basic science and high-tech and the transformative research integrates the cutting- edge research with industrialization, will that be the research trend in some disciplines? What will be the changes for personnel structure, motivation mechanism and upgrading mechanism within the innovation system? Will there be any changes for the input and structure of innovation resources? If we could have a clear mind of all the questions, make foresighted plans and then dare to try out in relevant CAS institutes, we will be able to pave a way for a more competitive and smooth development. Social changes are without limit, so are the development of science and technology, and innovation system and management as well. CAS must keep moving ahead to make foresight ed plans not only for science and technology, but also for its organizational structure, human resources, management modes, and resource structures. By doing so, CAS will keep standing at the forefront of science and playing a leading role in the national innovation system, and even, frankly speaking, taking the lead in some research disciplines in the world. This is, in fact, our purpose of conducting the strategic research on China’s ST roadmap. Prof. Dr.-Ing. Yongxiang Lu President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
Yale Peabody Museum of Natural History 掠影 ( 二 ) 黄安年文 黄安年的博客 /2011 年12 月8 日 ( 美东时间 ) 发布 2010 年 12 月 23 日 , 家人带领两个外孙参观了位于耶鲁大学的 170 Whitney Avenue, New Haven, CT 的 Yale Peabody Museum of Natural History, 这个博物馆引发孩子的极大兴趣。 照片（一） 26 张 , （二） 26 张 , （三） 16 张 , 是即时拍摄的。 *********************************** Yale Peabody Museum Mission The mission of the Peabody Museum is to serve Yale University by advancing our understanding of earth ’ s history through geological, biological, and anthropological research, and by communicating the results of this research to the widest possible audience through publication, exhibition, and educational programs. Fundamental to this mission is stewardship of the Museum ’ s rich collections, which provide a remarkable record of the history of the earth, its life, and its cultures. Conservation, augmentation and use of these collections become increasingly urgent as modern threats to the diversity of life and culture continue to intensify. A short history of the Yale Peabody Museum Yale University ’ s earliest museum collection, begun in the 18th century, was a miscellaneous assortment of “ natural and artificial curiosities ” from around the world typical of college collections of the time. Systematic collecting of specimens for teaching and research began in 1802 with the appointment of Benjamin Sillimanas Professor of Chemistry and Natural History. The outstanding mineral collection Silliman built for Yale, which he used in his pioneering teaching of geology and mineralogy, became an important source of public entertainment and one of the principal attractions for visitors to New Haven. Silliman ’ s activities helped to establish Yale as a major center of scientific education in the first half of the 19th century. Among the undergraduates attracted to the University by its scientific reputation was Othniel Charles Marsh. Marsh ’ s education and his postgraduate studies abroad were funded by his uncle, the wealthy international financier George Peabody.When toward the end of his life Peabody began to distribute his vast fortune to, among others, institutions concerned with education, Marsh persuaded his uncle to include Yale in his philanthropies. In 1866 the Peabody Museum of Natural History at Yale University was founded with a gift of $150,000 for the construction of a museum building and the care and increase of the museum and its collections. O.C. Marsh was appointed Professor of Paleontology at Yale in 1866, the first such professorship in the United States, and only the second in the world. In addition to serving as director of the Peabody Museum, Marsh, with George Jarvis Brush (Mineralogy) and Addison Emery Verrill(Zoology), was also one of the Peabody Museum ’ s first three curators. Using his inheritance from his uncle, who died in 1869, Marsh proceeded to amass large collections vertebrate skeletons, vertebrate and invertebrate fossils, fossil footprints, and archaeological and ethnological artifacts. The first Peabody Museum building opened to the public in 1876, but its capacity was soon strained by the huge dinosaur bones that Marsh ’ s collectors were sending in to the rapidly growing collections. In 1917 it was demolished to make way for a major dormitory complex, the Harkness Quadrangle. Construction of a new building was delayed by World War I, and the collections were in nearly inaccessible storage for seven years, until the current Peabody Museum building became ready for occupancy in 1924. Dedicated in December 1925, the new building ’ s two-story Great Hall was specifically designed to accommodate some of O.C. Marsh ’ s dinosaurs, such the mounting of the giant “ Brontosaurus ” (Apatosaurus), completed in 1931 after six years of labor. In 1947 Rudolph F. Zallinger finished the fresco secco painting that is probably the Yale Peabody Museum ’ s best known feature, the 110-foot mural The Age of Reptiles on the south wall of the Great Hall. The new building, like the old one, quickly filled with growing collections and the people studying them. Bingham Laboratory, completed in 1959, and the Kline Geology Laboratory (1963), each connected to the Museum and helped to relieve the need for storage, work, and classroom space. Museum collections and staff are also housed in parts of three additional buildings, and a field station a few miles away on Long Island Sound provides varied research opportunities. In recognition of the importance of conserving the collections and of enabling scientists and scholars to study them properly, the University constructed the new Class of 1954 Environmental Science Center to house approximately half of the Museum ’ s collections and to provide space for collections-based teaching and research. Current efforts are addressing the conservation, education and research needs of the collections that make up the remaining portion of the Yale Peabody Museum ’ s more than 11 million specimens and objects requiring upgraded storage, lab and classroom facilities. Until 1922, the directorship was unofficially assumed by the Curator of Geology. The title was first used officially in 1922. 1866 – 1899 Othniel Charles Marsh 1899 – 1904 Charles Emerson Beecher 1904 – 1922 Charles Schuchert 1922 – 1938 Richard Swann Lull (Acting, 1936 – 38) 1938 – 1942 Albert Eide Parr 1942 – 1959 Carl Owen Dunbar 1959 – 1964 Sidney Dillon Ripley II 1964 David Challinor (Acting) 1964 – 1970 Alfred Walter Crompton 1970 – 1976 Charles Gald Sibley 1976 – 1979 Keith Stewart Thomson (Acting, 1976-77) 1979 – 1982 Karl Mensch Waage (Acting, 1979-80) 1982 – 1987 Leo Joseph Hickey 1987 – 1990 Willard Daniel Hartman (Acting, 1987-90; Director, 1990 July – December) 1991 – 1994 Alison Fettes Richard 1994 Edward Allen Adelberg (Acting) 1995 – 2002 Richard Lewis Burger 2003 – 2008 Michael John Donoghue 2008 Jay John Ague (Acting, July to December) 2009- Present Derek Ernest Gilmor Briggs http://peabody.yale.edu/about-us/mission-history ****************** George Peabody From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search This article is about the London-based banker and philanthropist. For the southern USA capitalist, see George Foster Peabody. George Peabody Born February 18, 1795(1795-02-18) Peabody , Massachusetts, U.S. Died November 4, 1869(1869-11-04) (aged 74) London , England Resting place Harmony Grove Cemetery, Salem, Massachusetts Occupation Financier, Banker, Entrepreneur Net worth USD $16 million at the time of his death (approximately 1/556th of US GNP) Religion Unitarian Spouse none Children none Parents Thomas Peabody and Judith Dodge George Peabody (/?pi?b?di/ PEE-b?-dee; February 18, 1795 – November 4, 1869) was an American-British entrepreneur and philanthropist who founded the Peabody Trust in Britain and the Peabody Institute in Baltimore, and was responsible for many other charitable initiatives. Peabody was born in what was then South Danvers (now Peabody), Massachusetts. His family had Puritan antecedents in the state, but was poor, and as one of eight children George suffered some deprivations during his upbringing: these factors influenced his later philanthropic tendencies. His birthplace at 205 Washington Street in Peabody is now the George Peabody House Museum, a museum dedicated to preserving his life and legacy. One of his longtime business associates and friends was renowned banker and art patron William Wilson Corcoran. In 1816, he moved to Baltimore, where he would live for the next 20 years. Peabody first visited the UK in 1827 for business reasons, and over the next decade made four more trans-Atlantic trips, establishing a branch office in Liverpool, and later the banking firm of George Peabody Co. in London. In 1837 he took up permanent residence in London, remaining there for the rest of his life. In February 1867, on one of several return visits to the United States, and at the height of his financial success, Peabody's name was suggested by Francis Preston Blair as a possible Secretary of the Treasury in the cabinet of President Andrew Johnson. At about the same time, his name was also mentioned in newspapers as a future presidential candidate. Peabody described the presidential suggestion as a "kind and complimentary reference", but considered that he was too old for either office. Although he was briefly engaged in 1838 (and later allegedly had a mistress, who bore him a daughter, in Brighton), Peabody never married. He died in London on November 4, 1869, aged 74, at the house of his friend Sir Curtis Miranda Lampson. At the request of the Dean of Westminster and with the approval of the Queen, Peabody was given a temporary burial in Westminster Abbey. Peabody 's funeral in Westminster Abbey. His will provided that he be buried in the town of his birth, Danvers, Massachusetts, and Prime Minister Gladstone arranged for Peabody's remains to be returned to America on HMS Monarch, the newest and largest ship in Her Majesty's Navy. He was laid to rest in Harmony Grove Cemetery, in Salem, Massachusetts, on February 8, 1870. Peabody's death and the pair of funerals were international news, with hundreds of people participating in the ceremonies and thousands attending. Business While serving as a volunteer in the War of 1812, Peabody met Elisha Riggs, who, in 1814, provided financial backing for what became the wholesale dry goods firm of Riggs, Peabody Co., specializing in importing dry goods from Britain. Branches were opened in New York and Philadelphia in 1822. Riggs retired in 1829, and the firm became Peabody, Riggs Co., with Peabody as senior partner. Peabody first visited the UK in 1827 to purchase wares, and to negotiate the sale of American cotton in Lancashire. He subsequently opened a branch office in Liverpool, and British business began to play an increasingly important role in his affairs. He appears to have had some help in establishing himself from William and James Brown, the sons of another successful Baltimore businessman, the Irishman Alexander Brown, who managed their father's Liverpool office, opened in 1810. In 1835, Peabody established the banking firm of George Peabody Co. in London. It was founded to meet the increasing demand for securities issued by the American railroads, and – although Peabody continued to deal in dry goods and other commodities – he increasingly focused his attentions on merchant banking. The bank rose to become the premier American house in London. In 1854, Peabody took Junius Spencer Morgan (father of J. P. Morgan) into partnership to form Peabody, Morgan Co., and the two financiers worked together until Peabody ’ s retirement in 1864. Peabody frequently entertained and provided letters of introduction for American businessmen visiting London, and became known for the Anglo-American dinners he hosted in honor of American diplomats and other worthies, and in celebration of the Fourth of July. In 1851, when the US Congress refused to support the American section at the Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace, Peabody advanced ?3000 to improve the exhibit and uphold the reputation of the United States. During the run on the banks of 1857, Peabody had to ask the Bank of England for a loan of ?800,000: although rivals tried to force the bank out of business, it managed to emerge with its credit intact. Following this crisis, Peabody began to retire from active business, and in 1864 retired fully (taking with him much of his capital, amounting to over $10,000,000, or ?2,000,000). Peabody, Morgan Co. was then renamed J. S. Morgan Co. The former UK merchant bank Morgan Grenfell (now part of Deutsche Bank), international universal bank JPMorgan Chase and investment bank Morgan Stanley can all trace their roots to Peabody's bank. Philanthropy Peabody Estates provide cheap housing in Central London even today. This sign is on the side of an estate in Westminster. Peabody is the acknowledged father of modern philanthropy, having established the practice later followed by Johns Hopkins, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller and Bill Gates. In the United States, his philanthropy largely took the form of educational initiatives. In Britain, it took the form of providing housing for the poor. In America, Peabody founded and supported numerous institutions in New England and elsewhere. At the close of the American Civil War, he established the Peabody Education Fund to "encourage the intellectual, moral, and industrial education of the destitute children of the Southern States." His grandest beneficence, however, was to Baltimore; the city in which he achieved his earliest success. The first block of Peabody dwellings in Commercial Street, Spitalfields, London. A wood-engraving published in the Illustrated London News in 1863, shortly before the building opened. In April 1862, Peabody established the Peabody Donation Fund, which continues to this day as the Peabody Trust, to provide housing of a decent quality for the "artisans and labouring poor of London". The trust's first dwellings, designed by H. A. Darbishire in a Jacobethan style, were opened in Commercial Street, Spitalfields in February 1864. Peabody's philanthropy was recognised and on 10 July 1862 he was made a Freeman of the City of London, the motion being proposed by Charles Reed in recognition of his financial contribution to London's poor. He became the first of only two Americans (the other being Dwight D. Eisenhower) to have received the award. A statue of him was unveiled by the Prince of Wales in 1869 next to the Royal Exchange, London, on the site of the former church of St Benet Fink (demolished 1842-6). George Peabody is known to have provided benefactions of well over $8 million, most of them in his own lifetime. Among the list are included: 1852 The Peabody Institute (now the Peabody Institute Library), Peabody, Mass: $217,000 1856 The Peabody Institute, Danvers, Mass (now the Peabody Institute Library of Danvers): $100,000 1857 The Peabody Institute (now the Peabody Institute of the Johns Hopkins University), Baltimore: $1,400,000 1862 The Peabody Donation Fund, London: $2,500,000 1866 The Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University: $150,000 1866 The Peabody Museum of Natural History, Yale University: $150,000 1867 The Peabody Academy of Science, Salem, Mass: $140,000 1867 The Peabody Institute, Georgetown, District of Columbia: $15,000 (today the Peabody Room, Georgetown Branch, DC Public Library). 1867 Peabody Education Fund: $2,000,000 1875 George Peabody College for Teachers, now the Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. The funding came from the Peabody Education Fund 1866 The Georgetown Peabody Library, the public library of Georgetown, Massachusetts 1866 The Thetford Public Library, the public library of Thetford, Vermont: $5,000 1901 The Peabody Memorial Library, Sam Houston State University, Texas Recognition and commemoration In 1862, Peabody was made a Freeman of the City of London. On March 16, 1867, he was awarded the United States Congressional Gold Medal. Also in 1867, he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Laws by Harvard University, and an Honorary Doctorate in Civil Law by Oxford University. The town of South Danvers, Massachusetts, changed its name in 1868 to The City of Peabody, Massachusetts, in honor of its favorite son. Statue by Royal Exchange (London) A statue sculpted by William Wetmore Story stands next to the Royal Exchange in the City of London, unveiled in 1869 shortly before Peabody's death. A replica, erected in 1890, stands next to the Peabody Institute, in Mount Vernon Park, part of the Mount Vernon neighborhood of Baltimore, Maryland. In 1900, Peabody was one of the first 29 honorees to be elected to the Hall of Fame for Great Americans, located on what was then the campus of New York University (and is now that of Bronx Community College), at University Heights, New York. Wikimedia Commons has media related to: George Peabody References 1. ^ Klepper, Michael; Gunther, Michael (1996), The Wealthy 100: From Benjamin Franklin to Bill Gates — A Ranking of the Richest Americans, Past and Present, Secaucus, New Jersey: Carol Publishing Group, p. xii, ISBN 9780806518008, OCLC 33818143 2. ^ This is the standard pronunciation in the United States, and presumably how Peabody himself pronounced his name. In Britain, however, the name of George Peabody himself, and of the Peabody Trust, is invariably pronounced as spelt, Pea-body (/?pi?'b?di/). 3. ^ Parker 1995, pp. 164-5, 203, 214. 4. ^ Parker 1995, pp. 29-33. 5. ^ "Funeral of George Peabody at Westminster Abbey". The New York Times. 1869-11-13. p. 3. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9804E0D7123BE63BBC4B52DFB7678382679FDE. "As soon as the ceremony within the church was over the procession formed again, and advanced to a spot near the western entrance, where a temporary grave had been prepared... Here the body was deposited, and will remain until it is transported to America." 6. ^ Parker, Franklin (July 1966). "The Funeral of George Peabody". Peabody Journal of Education (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (Taylor Francis Group)) 44 (1): 21 – 36. doi:10.1080/01619566609537382. JSTOR 1491421. 7. ^ Chernow: The House of Morgan 8. ^ Bernstein, Peter (2007). All the Money in the World. Random House. p. 280. ISBN 0307266125. "Even before the Carnegies and Rockefellers became philanthropic legends, there was George Peabody, considered to be the father of modern philanthropy." 9. ^ Davies, Gill (2006). One Thousand Buildings of London. Black Dog Publishing. p. 179. ISBN 1579125875. "George Peabody (1795-1869) — banker, dry goods merchant, and father of modern philanthropy..." 10. ^ "Peabody Hall Stands as Symbol of University's History". University of Arkansas. December 2009. http://coehp.uark.edu/colleague/7657.php. Retrieved 2010-03-12. "George Peabody is considered by some to be the father of modern philanthropy." 11. ^ "George Peabody Library History". Johns Hopkins University. http://www.peabodyevents.library.jhu.edu/history.html. Retrieved 2010-03-12. "After the Civil War he funded the Peabody Education Fund which established public education in the South." 12. ^ "London People: George Peabody". http://www.london-footprints.co.uk/peopeabody.htm. Retrieved 2010-03-12. "By 1867 Peabody had received honours from America and Britain, including being made a Freeman of the City of London, the first American to receive this honour." 13. ^ Peabodylibrary.org 14. ^ Danverslibrary.org 15. ^ Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives - Congressional Gold Medal Recipients 16. ^ Parker 1995, p. 203. Further reading * Burk, Kathleen (1989). Morgan Grenfell 1838-1988: the biography of a merchant bank. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0198283067. * Burk, Kathleen (2004). "Peabody, George (1795 – 1869)". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/21664. Retrieved 24 Sept 2011. (Subscription required.) * Hanaford, Phebe Ann (1870). The Life of George Peabody: Containing a Record of Those Princely Acts of Benevolence Which Entitle Him to the Esteem and Gratitude of All Friends of Education and the Destitute, Both in America, the Land of His Birth, and in England, the Place of His Death. B.B. Russell. * Parker, Franklin (1995). George Peabody: A Biography (2nd ed.). Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. ISBN 0826512569. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Peabody
Thought experiments are devices of the imagination used to investigate the nature of things. Thought experimenting often takes place when the method of variation is employed in entertaining imaginative suppositions. They are used for diverse reasons in a variety of areas, including economics, history, mathematics, philosophy, and physics. Most often thought experiments are communicated in narrative form, sometimes through media like a diagram. Thought experiments should be distinguished from thinking about experiments, from merely imagining any experiments to be conducted outside the imagination, and from psychological experiments with thoughts. They should also be distinguished from counterfactual reasoning in general, as they seem to require an experimental element. The primary philosophical challenge of thought experiments is simple: How can we learn about reality (if we can at all), just by thinking? More precisely, are there thought experiments that enable us to acquire new knowledge about the intended realm of investigation without new data? If so, where does the new information come from if not from direct contact with the realm of investigation under consideration? Finally, how can we distinguish good from bad instances of such thought experiments? These questions seem urgent with respect to scientific thought experiments because most philosophers and historians of science “recognize them as an occasionally potent tool for increasing man's understanding of nature. Historically their role is very close to the double one played by actual laboratory experiments and observations. First, thought experiments can disclose nature's failure to conform to a previously held set of expectations. In addition, they can suggest particular ways in which both expectation and theory must henceforth be revised.” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 241 and 261) The questions are urgent regarding philosophical thought experiments because they play an important role in philosophical discourse. Philosophy without thought experiments seems unthinkable (see e.g., Myers, 1968). There is widespread agreement that thought experiments play a central role both in philosophy and in the natural sciences and general acceptance of the importance and enormous influence and value of some of the well-known thought experiments in the natural sciences, like Maxwell's demon, Einstein's elevator or Schrödinger's cat. The 17th century saw some of its most brilliant practitioners in Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz. And in our own time, the creation of quantum mechanics and relativity are almost unthinkable without the crucial role played by thought experiments. Much of ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind is based firmly on the results of thought experiments as well, including Searle's Chinese room or Putnam's twin earth. Philosophy, even more than the sciences, would be severely impoverished without thought experiments, which suggests that a unified theory of thought experiments is desirable to account for them in both the sciences and the humanities (see Cooper, 2005, pp. 329–330; Gähde, 2000). There have been attempts to define “thought experiment”, but likely (contrary to Haggqvist, 2009) it will be better to leave the term loosely characterized, so as not to prejudice the investigation. Many of the most important concepts we deal with are like this, e.g., religion or democracy. A few more examples will circumscribe our subject matter well enough: Newton's bucket, Heisenberg's gamma-ray microscope, Parfit's people who split like an amoeba, Mary the colour scientist, and Thomson's violinist. Everyone is probably familiar with some of these. Less familiar thought experiments include “the dome”, a relatively young thought experiment and probably the simplest example of indeterminism in Newtonian physics. Imagine a mass sitting on a radially symmetric surface in a gravitational field. Guided by Newton's laws of motion one comes to realize that the mass can either remain at rest for all times or spontaneously move in an arbitrary direction. (see Norton, 2008) This thought experiment triggers a number of very interesting questions concerning the nature of Newtonian theory (see Norton, 2008, pp. 791–792), the meaning of “physical” (see Norton, 2008, pp. 792–794), the role of idealizations in physics (see Norton, 2008), pp. 794–796), and also with respect to free will (see Fehige, 2005b). In the following we will first highlight some of the most common features of thought experiments. A proposal follows for classifying thought experiments, before reviewing the state of the debate on thought experimenting. We conclude by highlighting some of the recent developments surrounding the “laboratory of the mind,” as some have called it. 1. Common Features of Thought Experiments 2. Types of Thought Experiments: A Taxonomy 3. The Debate Over Thought Experiments 3.1 Some Historical Background 3.2 Systematic Exploration 4. Recent Developments Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries 1. Common Features of Thought Experiments Thought experiments are conducted for diverse reasons in a variety of areas, be it in the moral, mathematical, or natural realm (see De Mey, 2006). We leave aside those that simply entertain. Some thought experiments fulfil a specific function within a theory (see e.g., Boorsboom et al., 2002). Others are executed because it is impossible to run the experimental scenario in the real world (see Sorensen, 1992, pp. 200–202). Sometimes thought experiments help to illustrate and clarify very abstract states of affairs, thereby accelerating the process of understanding (see Behmel, 2001). Again others serve as examples in conceptual analysis (see Cohnitz, 2006). Most attention is received by those that are taken to provide evidence in favour of or against a theory, putting them on a par with real-world experiments (see Gendler, 2004). The different ways to use thought experiments are, of course, not exclusive to each other. Theorizing about thought experiments usually turns on the details or the patterns of specific cases. Familiarity with a wide range of examples is crucial for commentators. One of the most beautiful early examples of thought experimenting (in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.951–987; see Bailey, 1950, pp. 58–59) attempts to show that space is infinite: If there is a purported boundary to the universe, we can toss a spear at it. If the spear flies through, it isn't a boundary after all; if the spear bounces back, then there must be something beyond the supposed edge of space, a cosmic wall that stopped the spear, a wall that is itself in space. Either way, there is no edge of the universe; space is infinite. This example nicely illustrates many of the most common features of thought experimenting: We visualize some situation; we carry out an operation; we see what happens, and we draw a conclusion. It also illustrates their fallibility. Since the time of Lucretius, we've learned how to conceptualize space so that it is both finite and unbounded. Imagine a circle, which is a one dimensional space. As we move around, there is no edge, but it is nevertheless finite. The universe might be a many-dimensional version of it. Figure 1. “Welcome to the edge of the Universe” Often a real experiment that is the analogue of a thought experiment is impossible for physical, technological, ethical, or financial reasons (see e.g., Sorensen, 1992, pp. 200–202); but this needn't be a defining condition of thought experiments. The main point is that we seem able to get a grip on nature just by thinking, and therein lies the great interest for philosophy. How is it possible to learn apparently new things about nature without new empirical data? One possible answer is to claim that we possess a great store of “instinctive knowledge” picked up from experience. This is the solution that Ernst Mach offered (see Mach, 1897 and 1905, for a most instructive assessment of his views see Kühne, 2006, pp. 165–202; Sorensen, 1992, pp. 51–75). One of Mach's favourite examples of thought experimenting is due to Simon Stevin (see Mach, 1883, pp. 48–58). When a chain is draped over a double frictionless plane, as in Fig. 2a, how will it move? Add some links as in Fig. 2b. Now it is obvious. The initial setup must have been in static equilibrium. Otherwise, we would have a perpetual motion machine; and according to our experience-based “instinctive knowledge”, says Mach, this is impossible. We do not have to perform the experiment in the real world. The outcome seems compelling. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) “How will it move?” Judith Thomson provided one of the most striking and effective thought experiments in the moral realm (see Thomson, 1971). Her example is aimed at a popular anti-abortion argument that goes something like this: The foetus is an innocent person with a right to life. Abortion results in the death of a foetus. Therefore, abortion is morally wrong. In her thought experiment we are asked to imagine a famous violinist falling into a coma. The society of music lovers determines from medical records that you and you alone can save the violinist's life by being hooked up to him for nine months. The music lovers break into your home while you are asleep and hook the unconscious (and unknowing, hence innocent) violinist to you. You may want to unhook him, but you are then faced with this argument put forward by the music lovers: The violinist is an innocent person with a right to life. Unhooking him will result in his death. Therefore, unhooking him is morally wrong. However, the argument, even though it has the same structure as the anti-abortion argument, does not seem convincing in this case. You would be very generous to remain attached and in bed for nine months, but you are not morally obliged to do so. The parallel with the abortion case is evident. Thomson's thought experiment is effective in distinguishing two concepts that had previously been run together: “right to life” and “right to what is needed to sustain life.” The foetus and the violinist may each have the former, but it is not evident that either has the latter. The upshot is that even if the foetus has a right to life (which Thomson does not believe but allows for the sake of the argument), it may still be morally permissible to abort. Those opposed to Thomson's view can either dismiss her thought experiment as useless fiction or provide a different version of the same scenario to challenge the conclusion. It is a very intriguing feature of thought experiments that they can be “rethought” (Bokulich, 2001). Thought experiments can evolve and undergo modifications over time. This raises the interesting question of what it is that preserves the identity of a thought experiment (see e.g., Bishop, 1999). That thought experiments can be rethought coheres with another feature of thought experiments, namely that they have “evidential significance only historically and locally, i.e., when and where premises that attribute evidential significance to it are endorsed” (McAllister, 1996, p. 248). 2. Types of Thought Experiments: A Taxonomy The simplest taxonomy for thought experiments is to classify them according to their use. But, of course, there are many other ways of classifying thought experiments: science vs philosophy, normative (moral or epistemic) vs factual, and so on. Karl Popper's taxonomy has gained some popularity. Popper (1959) distinguishes between heuristic (to illustrate a theory), critical (against a theory) and apologetic (in favour of a theory) thought experiments. His case in favour of a critical and against an apologetic use of thought experiments is very limited. He focuses exclusively on quantum physics and doesn't really say much to address the primary epistemological challenge presented by the success of critical thought experiments. We will present a preliminary taxonomy (see Brown, 1986, pp. 4–11) that has not remained unchallenged (see Norton, 1993b). It is less rough than Popper's and only limited in that it focuses on the class of those thought experiments that are taken to function in theory choice. The main division is constructive vs destructive and resembles Popper's distinction between apologetic and critical thought experiments. Each of these is subject to further divisions. As for the type of destructive thought experiments, the following subtypes could be identified: The simplest of these is to draw out a contradiction in a theory, thereby refuting it. The first part of Galileo's famous falling bodies example does this, as it shows that in Aristotle's account, a composite body (cannon ball and musket ball attached) would have to fall both faster and slower than the cannon ball alone. A second subtype is constituted by those thought experiments that aim to show that the theory in question is in conflict with other beliefs that we hold. Schrödinger's well-known cat paradox, for instance, does not show that quantum theory (as interpreted by Bohr) is internally inconsistent (see Schrödinger 1935, p. 812; translation: Trimmer, 1980, 328): “A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following diabolical device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of one hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The first atomic decay would have poisoned it. The q-function of the entire system would express this by having in it the living and the dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts.” This thought experiment shows that quantum theory (as interpreted by Bohr) is in conflict with some very powerful common sense beliefs we have about macro-sized objects such as cats -- they cannot be both dead and alive in any sense whatsoever. The bizarreness of superpositions in the atomic world is worrisome enough, says Schrödinger, but when it implies that same bizarreness at an everyday level, it is intolerable. There is a third subtype of negative thought experiments, namely when, in effect, a central assumption or premiss of the thought experiment itself is undermined. For example, as we have seen above, Thomson showed with her thought experiment that “right to life” and “right to what is needed to sustain life” had been run together. When distinguished, the argument against abortion is negatively affected. A fourth sub-type of negative thought experiments are “counter thought experiments” (Brown, 2007a) or “thought-experiment/anti-thought-experiment pairs” (Norton, 2004, pp. 45–49). Above, we have already encountered this subtype in our discussion of Lucretius' spear-thought experiment. Here we would like to add two more examples (Brown, 2007, pp. 162–169): Mach produced a counter thought experiment against Isaac Newton, and Daniel C. Dennett produced another against Frank Jackson. In his Principia Mathematica Newton offered a pair of thought experiments as evidence for absolute space. One was the bucket with water climbing the wall, the other was a pair of spheres joined by a cord that maintained its tension in otherwise empty space. The explanation for these phenomena, said Newton, is absolute space: the bucket and the joined spheres are rotating with respect to space itself. In response, Mach claimed that, contra Newton, the two spheres would move toward one another thanks to the tension in the cord, and if we rotated a very thick, massive ring around a stationary bucket, we would see the water climb the bucket wall (see for further discussion of Mach's counter thought experiment to Newton: Kühne, 2006, pp. 191–202). In short, he described the phenomena of the thought experiments' scenarios differently, that is, he declared that different things would happen. Mach's counter thought experiment undermines our confidence in Newton's. Absolute space explained the phenomena in Newton's thought experiments, but now we're not so sure of the phenomena itself (at least, this is Mach's intent). Figure 3. Stages in the bucket experiment Figure 4. Two spheres held by a cord in otherwise empty space Frank Jackson created a much discussed thought experiment that aimed to show that physicalism is false. This is the doctrine that all facts are physical facts. In the thought experiment, Mary is a brilliant scientist who, from birth, is confined to a laboratory with only black and white experiences. She learns all the physical facts about perception there. One day, she leaves the laboratory and experiences colours for the first time; she learns what it's like to experience red. Clearly, says Jackson, she learns something new. Since she already knew all the physical facts, she must have learned something non-physical when she experienced colour. Thus, physicalism must be wrong. Dennett replied to this thought experiment with one of his own. It begins like Jackson's, but when Mary has her first experiences outside the lab, she says “Ah, colour perception is just as I thought it would be.” Like Mach, Dennett denies the phenomenon of the original thought experiment, that Mary would be learning something new. And like Mach, his counter thought experiment is effective in undermining Jackson's in so far as it seems similarly plausible. To be effective, counter thought experiments needn't be very plausible at all. In a court of law, the jury will convict provided guilt is established “beyond a reasonable doubt.” A common defence strategy is to provide an alternative account of the evidence that has just enough plausibility to put the prosecution's case into some measure of doubt. That is sufficient to undermine it. A good counter thought experiment need only do that much to be effective. As for the second type of thought experiments, there are many ways they could provide positive support for a theory. One of these is to provide a kind of illustration that makes a theory's claims clear and evident. In such cases thought experiments serve as a kind of heuristic aid. A result may already be well established, but the thought experiment can lead to a very satisfying sense of understanding. In his Principia Mathematica Newton provided a wonderful example showing how the moon is kept in its orbit in just the same way as an object falls to the earth (see Ducheyne, 2006, pp. 435–437). He illustrated this by means of a cannon shooting a cannon ball further and further. In the limit, the earth curves away as fast as the ball falls, with the eventual result being that the cannon ball will return to the spot where it was fired, and, if not impeded, will go around again and again. This is what the moon is doing. We could arrive at the same conclusion through calculation. But Newton's thought experiment provides that illusive understanding. It's a wonderful example of the “aha effect.” Figure 5. “The shot heard around the world” Thomson's violinist showed that abortion could be morally permissible even when the foetus has a right to life. Similarly, Einstein's elevator showed that light will bend in a gravitational field: According to the principle of equivalence, there is no difference between frames of reference; whether they are inertial or not, the laws of physics are the same in all. Suppose then, an observer is inside an elevator sealed off from the outside so that the observer cannot tell whether he is in a gravitational field or accelerating. If it were accelerating, and if a light beam were to enter one side, then, due to the elevator's motion, the beam would appear to drop or curve down as it crossed the elevator. Consequently, it would have to do the same thing if the elevator was not accelerating, but was in a gravitational field. Therefore, gravity ‘bends’ light. Maxwell's demon showed that entropy could be decreased: The second law of thermodynamics implies that heat won't pass from a cold body to a hot one. In classical thermodynamics this law is quite strict; but in Maxwell's kinetic theory of heat there is a probability, though extremely small, of such an event happening. Some thought this a reductio ad absurdum of Maxwell's theory. To show how it is logically possible to violate the second law Maxwell imagined a tiny creature who controls a door between two chambers. Fast molecules from the cold box are let into the hot box, and slow molecules from the hot are allowed into the cold. Thus, there will be an increase in the average speed in the hot box and a decrease in the average speed of molecules in the cold. Since, on Maxwell's theory, heat is just average speed of the molecules, there has been a flow of heat from a cold body to a hot one. Parfit's splitting persons showed that survival is a more important notion than identity when considering personhood (for a critical discussion see Gendler, 2002). We say they “showed” such and such, but, “purport to show” might be better, since some of these thought experiments are quite contentious. What they have in common is that they aim to establish something positive. Unlike destructive thought experiments, they are not trying to demolish an existing theory, though they may do that in passing. In principle: Given the fact that thought experiments can be rethought (Bokulich, 2001), and that the evidential significance is dependent on historical and local accomplishments (McAllister, 1996), it cannot be irrelevant to identify the intention of the thought experimenter, if one wants to determine the type of a thought experiment: “An imaginary experiment should be judged on its specific purpose.” (Krimsky, 1973, p. 331) 3. The Debate Over Thought Experiments 3.1 Some Historical Background Arguably since the time of the Pre-Socratics thought experimenting has been practiced. They “ invented thought experimentation as a cognitive procedure and practiced it with great dedication and versatility.” (Rescher, 2005, p. 2; see also Diamond, 2002, pp. 229–232; Glas, 1999, Ierodiakonou, 2005; Irvine, 1991; Rescher, 1991 and 2005, pp. 61–72). It seems that medieval science relied rather on thought experiments than real-world experiments (King, 1991). The 17th century saw some of its most brilliant practitioners in Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz (see Brown, 1986; Ducheyne, 2006; Gendler, 1998; Koyré, 1968; Kuhn, 1964, 246–252; McAllister, 1996 and 2005; McMullin, 1985; Palmieri, 2003 and 2005; Prudovsky, 1989). And in our own time, the creation of quantum mechanics (see Kühne, 2005, pp. 280–317; Popper, 1959; Stöltzner, 2003; Van Dyck, 2003; Yourgrau, 1967) and relativistic physics (see Brown, 1987; Kassung, 2004; Kühne, 2005, pp. 227–279; Norton, 1991 and 1993) are almost unthinkable without the crucial function of thought experiments. It is still common to place Mach at the beginning of the history of the term “thought experiment”. “This view is incorrect, however! it can be substantiated that it was used already in 1811.” (Witt-Hansen, 1976, p. 48; see also Buzzoni, 2008, pp. 14–15; 61–65; Cohnitz, 2008; Kühne, 2005, pp. 92–224; Moue et al., 2006, p. 63). This is to say that the term “thought experiment” derived from the Danish “Tankeexperiment.” And before thought experimentation was introduced by word, we find already in the work of the German philosopher-scientist Georg Lichtenberg (1742–1799) a tacit theory of “experiments with thoughts and ideas.” These experiments help to overcome habits of thought that can inhibit scientific progress, and make possible an enlightened philosophy. (See Schildknecht, 1990, pp. 21; 123–169; Schöne, 1982). Lichtenberg's “aphoristic experiments” (see Stern, 1963, pp. 112–126) reflect “that Lichtenberg's scientific preoccupations are the formal and thematic prolegomena to his work as a literary artist.” (Stern, 1963, p. 126) Lichtenberg's reflections on thought experimentation resemble those of Popper and Kuhn. The history of the philosophical investigation into thought experiments can be divided into four stages: In the 18th and 19th century the awareness of the importance of thought experiments in philosophy and science emerges. Special mention should be made of Georg Lichtenberg, Novalis (see Daiber, 2001), and Hans-Christian Ørsted. The topic reemerges in a more systematic manner at the beginning of the 20th century with little relation to the attempts made at the first stage. The stakeholders of the second stage were Pierre Duhem, Mach, and Alexius Meinong. (see Duhem, 1913, pp. 304–311; Mach, 1883, pp. 48–58, 1897 and 1905; Meinong, 1907). A third stage, probably due to the rediscovery of the importance of scientific practice for a proper understanding of science, followed in the first part of the second half of the 20th century. Again, the contributions of this stage bear little relation to the two previous stages. While the third period has seen a number of noteworthy contributions (Cole, 1983; Dancy, 1985; Dennett, 1985; Fodor, 1964; Helm; Gilbert, 1985; Helm et al., 1985; Krimsky, 1973; McMullin, 1985; Myers, 1986; Poser, 1984; Prudovsky, 1989; Rehder, 1980a,b; Yourgrau, 1962 and 1967), the protagonists of this period were Alexandre Koyré, Thomas S. Kuhn and Karl Popper. The ongoing philosophical exploration of thought experiments began in the 1980s, and marks the fourth stage. Arguably, it has been the most prolific one of all four stages. With some very important sign-postings (Horowitz; Massey (eds.), 1991; Sorensen, 1992a, b, c; Wilkes, 1988) the ongoing discussion took off after 1991. James R. Brown and John D. Norton (see for a concise statement of each position Brown, 2004a; Norton, 2004) have carried on a debate that others find useful, especially to contrast with their own alternative accounts. “The views of Brown and Norton represent the extremes of platonic rationalism and classic empiricism, respectively.” (Moue et al., 2006, p. 69) They will be described below. 3.2 Systematic Exploration Not all of the rapidly growing contributions address what we deem to be the primal philosophical challenge of thought experimenting. Still, an astonishing array of different types of views in response to this challenge has already become manifest. We cannot discuss here all the authors who are representative for each type of view which we have identified: the skeptical objection, the intuition based account, the argument view, conceptual constructivism, experimentalism, and the mental model account. We begin with the skeptical objection. Of course, particular thought experiments have been contested. But for the most part, thought experimenting in the sciences has been cheerfully accepted. Duhem, the great historian of physics, is almost alone in what has been understood as an outright condemnation of scientific thought experiments (see Duhem, 1913, pp. 304–311). A thought experiment is no substitute for a real experiment, he claimed, and should be forbidden in science, including science education. However, in view of the important role of actual thought experiments in the history of physics — from Galileo's falling bodies, to Newton's bucket, to Einstein's elevator — it is unlikely that anyone will feel or should feel much sympathy for Duhem's strictures. Philosophers can be as critical as Duhem when it comes to thought experimenting in their own field (see Peijnenburg; Atkinson, 2003). Few are outright skeptics, however. Many take a rather ambiguous stance. Soren Haggqvist, for example, has developed a model for philosophical thought experiments (Haggqvist, 1996 and 2009). Surprisingly, he does not identify a single successful example of the commonly accepted philosophical thought experiments that satisfies his model. And the process of identification is only the first step in addressing what we consider to be the primal philosophical challenge of thought experiments. It gets much more messy once the worry is addressed — how reliable are they? There is some justice in worrying about the reliability of philosophical thought experiments (see. e.g., Klee, 2008). This seems true for ethics (see Dancy, 1985, Jackson, 1992), conceptual analysis (see Fodor, 1964), or philosophy of mind: “A popular strategy in philosophy is to construct a certain sort of thought experiment I call intuition pump. intuition pumps are often abused, though seldom deliberately.” (Dennett, 1985, p. 12) Frequently discussed is the skeptical challenge by Kathleen Wilkes. Wilkes, 1988, expresses a deep suspicion about scenarios like Derek Parfit's people splitting like an amoeba (see Parfit, 1987, Gendler 2002). She wants philosophy “to use science fact rather than science fiction or fantasy” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 1), and therefore to refrain from using thought experiments because they are “both problematic and positively misleading” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 2). She claims that thought experiments about personal identity in particular often fail to provide the background conditions against which the experiment is set (cf. Wilkes, 1988, p. 7). We do agree with Wilkes that underdetermination can be a problem. But instead of dismissing thought experiments in philosophy we should consider it a crucial factor in assessing the quality of a thought experiment. (see Rescher, 2005, pp. 9–14) The more detailed the imaginary scenario in the relevant aspects, the better the thought experiment (Brendel, 2004, 97–99; Haggqvist, 1996, p. 28). We agree that the inferences drawn in thought experimenting are highly problematic if the hypothetical scenario “is inadequately described” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 8). But Wilkes seems to think that the lack of description is unavoidable, which supposedly amounts to a reason against philosophical thought experimenting on personal identity because persons are not natural kinds. This makes it impossible to fill in necessary information to make the thought experiment work given its unavoidable underdetermination. Wilkes thinks that “whenever we are examining the ranges of concepts that do not pick on natural kinds, the problem of deciding what is or what is not ‘relevant’ to the success of the thought experiment is yet more problematic than the same question as it arises in science; and, unlike the scientific problem, it may not even have an answer in principle.” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 15) She adds that scientific laws — especially those describing biological kinds like human beings — “are not disjoint and independent, detachable from one another . They are interrelated, to varying degrees of course” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 29) in many ways. This implies, for example, that “a full psychophysiological account of the processes of human perception must at some stage link up with part at least of linguistic ability; for we very typically see things under a certain description, and that description may be a very sophisticated one.” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 29) These considerations have her rule out experiments that challenge the human monopoly of personhood. No thought experiment, claims Wilkes, is well conceived if it involves non-human animals or computers as persons. But also those thought experiments can be ruled out which involve the “fission or fusion of humans” because it is not theoretically possible. “The total impact of the sum of laws that group us together as human beings (a natural kind category) precludes our splitting into two or fusing with someone else” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 36). One can ascertain here all too well the inherent difficulties in thinking about personal identity and the limited benefit some thought experiments might have for what is deemed the proper metaphysics of personal identity. Nevertheless, good reasons have been given in favour of the use of thought experiments about personal identity (Beck, 2006; Kolak, 1993; Hershenov, 2008). We feel that the problems about thought experiments on personal identity reveal more about the intricate nature of the subject than about the usefulness of philosophical thought experiments. And, disregarding other shortcomings in Wilkes' skepticism (for further discussion of Wilkes' views see Beck, 1992; Brooks, 1994; Focquaert, 2003; Haggqvist, 1996, pp. 27–34), her suggestion that thought experimental scenarios would have to satisfy current scientific knowledge about the relevant entities featured in a thought experiment is highly implausible. We learn a great deal about the world and our theories when we wonder, for instance, what would have happened after the big bang, if the law of gravity had been an inverse cube law instead of an inverse square. Would stars have failed to form? Reasoning about such a scenario is perfectly coherent and very instructive, even though it violates a law of nature. To some extent we should share Wilkes's concern that thought experimenting seems to be constrained only by relevant logical impossibilities and what seems intuitively acceptable. This is indeed problematic because intuitions can be highly misleading and relevant logical impossibilities fairly ungrounded if they cannot be supplemented by relevant theoretical impossibilities based on current science in order to avoid the irrational jump into fantasies. But in order to dismiss thought experimenting as a useful philosophical tool one has to show that intuition cannot be a source of knowledge and that an epistemic tool should be useless because there is a serious chance it can fail. Timothy Williamson has argued that we should forget about intuition as a cushion in the philosophical armchair. (Williamson, 2004a,b, 2008, pp. 179–207, and 2009). The importance of intuitions in philosophy has been neglected in the past (see Williamson, 2004b, p. 109–110), and only recently intuition received some of the attention it deserves (see e.g., DePaul; Ramsey (eds.), 1998). Besides the traditional divide between empiricists, rationalists and skeptics, it is not only a very non-uniform use of the word “intuition” that makes it difficult to assess the progress of the last years of philosophical inquiry about intuitions. The situation has been complicated by the contributions of experimental philosophy on intuitions, adding to questioning of their reliability. Generally speaking, the reliability of intuitions has been challenged on two grounds. One stems from an evolutionary explanation of the capacity to intuit; another emerged due to experiments which supposedly show the cultural relativity of intuitions. The current discussion of intuitions has barely made an impact on philosophical reflections about thought experiments. As far as philosophical thought experiments are concerned, this is as it should be, according to Williamson. In this respect George Bealer can be cited in support of Williamson, because for Bealer the talk about philosophical thought experiments reveals a conceptual confusion. Philosophy, he claims, is about “rational intuitions” and thought experiments can be only about “physical intuitions” (see Bealer, 1998, pp. 207–208, and 2002, p. 74). To many, this is as implausible as are some other elements of his “phenomenology of intuitions”, like the strict separation of “rational intuitions” from “physical intuitions”, or the immutability of “rational intuitions”. There are good reasons to believe that thought experiments appeal to intuitions in order to give us new insights about different realms of investigation, including philosophy. This kind of positive connection is what Williamson has in mind when addressing the role of intuitions in philosophical thought experiments like the famous Gettier cases, which overnight found acceptance by the philosophical community in their aim to refute the view that knowledge is justified true belief. While Williamson expects “armchair methods to play legitimately a more dominant role in future philosophy” (Williamson, 2009, p. 126), he thinks that “we should stop talking about intuition.” (Williamson, 2004b, p. 152). This does not impress proponents of what we call an intuition-based account of thought experiments, and probably for good reasons (see Ichikawa; Jarvis, 2009). The intuition-based account of thought experimenting comes in a naturalistic version (Brendel, 2004; Gendler, 2007; Fehige 2009 and forthcoming), and in the form of Brown's Platonism (Brown, 1986, 1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1993, 2004a,b, 2005, 2007a,b,c). Brown holds that in a few special cases we do go well beyond the old data to acquire a priori knowledge of nature (see also Koyré, 1968). Galileo showed that all bodies fall at the same speed with a brilliant thought experiment that started by destroying the then reigning Aristotelian account. The latter holds that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones ( H L ). But consider (Figure 6), in which a heavy cannon ball ( H ) and light musket ball ( L ) are attached together to form a compound object ( H + L ); the latter must fall faster than the cannon ball alone. Yet the compound object must also fall slower, since the light part will act as a drag on the heavy part. Now we have a contradiction. ( H + L H and H H + L ) That's the end of Aristotle's theory. But there is a bonus, since the right account is now obvious: they all fall at the same speed ( H = L = H + L ). Figure 6. Galileo: “I don't even have to look” This could be said to be a priori (though still fallible) knowledge of nature, since there are no new data involved, nor is the conclusion derived from old data, nor is it some sort of logical truth. This account of thought experiments can be further developed by linking the a priori epistemology to recent accounts of laws of nature that hold that laws are relations among objectively existing abstract entities. It is thus a rather Platonic view, not unlike Platonic accounts of mathematics such as that urged by Kurt Gödel. The two most often repeated arguments against Brown's Platonism are: it does not identify criteria to tell apart good and bad thought experiments, and violates the principle of ontological parsimony. These are poor objections, and most probably find widespread acceptance because Platonism seems to be unfathomable these days, given the general popularity of various forms of naturalism. If intuitions really do the job in a thought experiment, the first objection is weak because neither rationalists nor empiricists have a theory about the reliability of intuitions. So the objection should be that intuitions probably just do not matter in human cognition. However, there are good reasons to reject the argument (see Myers, 2004). As for the second objection, the appeal to Occam's razor is in general problematic when it is employed to rule out a theory. Whatever we eliminate by employing the principle of parsimony we can easily reintroduce by an inference to the best explanation (see Meixner, 2000). And this is exactly what a Platonist contends his or her Platonism about thought experimenting to be, while conceding that the Platonic intuition appears miraculous. But are they really more miraculous than sense perception, which seems similar in many respects to Platonic intuition? One might want to say yes, because supposedly we have no clue at all how Platonic intuition works but we do have some idea about the nature of sense perception. We know that if an object is far away it appears smaller in vision, and under certain light conditions the same object can look very differently. We wonder if it is really true that it is impossible to state similar rules to capture the nature of Platonic intuition? If you are drunk or lack attention you most probably will not be very successful in intuiting anything that makes sense. A review of the relevant psychological literature will reveal further criteria that could be employed to identify good and bad conditions for Platonic intuition while thought experimenting. Yet, proponents of the naturalistic version of the intuition based account wonder how necessary Platonism is once this move is entertained in defence of the reliability of intuitions (see Miščević, 2004). Norton can be cited in support of Williamson as he thinks that his approach offers sufficient reason to dismiss not only Platonism but any intuition based account altogether (Norton, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2004a,b, 2008). Norton is the most important defender of what we call the argument view about thought experiments. Surprisingly, Norton has not many more followers than Brown, even though the argument view seems to be the natural option for a debate that has many empiricists among its participants. Most empiricists find Norton's argument view too strong, only few still too weak (e.g., Bunzl, 1996). Norton claims that any thought experiment is really a (possibly disguised) argument; it starts with premises grounded in experience and follows deductive or inductive rules of inference in arriving at its conclusion. The picturesque features of any thought experiment which give it an experimental flavour might be psychologically helpful, but are strictly redundant. Thus, says Norton, we never go beyond the empirical premises in a way to which any empiricist would object. There are three objections that might be offered against Norton. First, his notion of argument is too vague. However, this is not a good objection: arguments can be deductive (which are perfectly clear) or inductive. If the latter are unclear, the fault is with induction, not with Norton's argument view. Second, it is argued that Norton simply begs the question: every real world experiment can be rephrased as an argument, but nobody would say that they are dispensable. The account does not address the question: Where do the premises come from? A thought experiment might be an essential step in making the Norton-style reconstruction. Third, a thought experiment that is presented in argument form loses its typical force. The soft-point in Brown's Platonism is linked to the strength of Norton's account because he claims that any other view implies a commitment to “asking the oracle.” “Imagine an oracle that claims mysterious powers but never delivers predictions that could not be learned by simple inferences from ordinary experience. We would not believe that the oracle had any mysterious powers. I propose the same verdict for thought experiments in science.” (Norton, 1996, pp. 1142–1143) Defenders of empiricist alternatives deny this dispensability thesis. Among these empiricist alternatives is what we could call conceptual constructivism, taken up recently by Van Dyck (2003), to account for Heisenberg's ɣ-ray microscope, and by Gendler (1998, pp. 415–420), in navigating middle ground between the views of Norton and Brown. The view was first proposed by Kuhn (1964). He employs many of the concepts (but not the terminology) of his well-known structure of scientific revolutions. On his view a well-conceived thought experiment can bring on a crisis or at least create an anomaly in the reigning theory and so contribute to paradigm change. Thought experiments can teach us something new about the world, even though we have no new empirical data, by helping us to re-conceptualize the world in a better way. Next we have what we might term experimentalism, encompassing a wide range of different approaches which all assume that thought experiments are a “limiting case” of ordinary experiments. Experimentalism was proposed first by Mach, 1897 and 1905. He defines experimenting in terms of its basic method of variation and its capacity to destroy prejudices about nature. According to Mach, experimenting is innate to higher animals, including humans. The thought experiment just happens on a higher intellectual level but is basically still an experiment. At the centre of thought experimenting is a “Gedankenerfahrung”, an experience in thought. Such an experience is possible because in thought experimenting we draw from “unwillkürliche Abbildung von Tatsachen”, uncontrollable images of facts — acquired in past experiences with the world. Thought experiments help to prepare real world experiments. Some of them are so convincing in their results that an execution seems unnecessary; others could be conducted in a real-world experiment, which is the most natural trajectory of a scientific thought experiment. In any case thought experiments can result in a revision of belief, thereby demonstrating their significance for scientific progress. Mach also appreciates the didactic value of thought experiments: they help us to realize what can be accomplished in thinking and what can not. In the spirit of Mach, Roy A. Sorensen has offered a very aspiring version of experimentalism that accounts for thought experiments in science and philosophy, and tackles many of the central issues of the topic. Sorensen, 1992, claims thought experiments to be “a subset of unexecuted experiments” (p. 213). By their logical nature they are paradoxes that aim to test modal consequences of propositions. The origin of thought experimenting is explained in terms of Darwinian evolution (like in Genz, 1999, pp. 25–29), though the explanation has been criticized to be only “little more than a ‘just so story’ that fails on a posteriori grounds to epistemically underwrite the capacity” for thought experimenting (see Maffie, 1997). Experimentalism does not have to take a naturalistic turn as it does in Sorensen's case. In a number of contributions (Buzzoni, 2004, 2007, 2008) Marco Buzzoni has defended a form of experimentalism that still struggles with its Kantian underpinnings (Buzzoni forthcoming). Buzzoni (2008) argues for the dialectical unity of thought experiments and real-world experiments. Thought experiments and real-world experiments are claimed to be identical on the “technological-operational” level and unproductive for scientific purposes without each other: without thought experiments there wouldn't be real-world experiments because we would not know how to put questions to nature; without real-world experiments there wouldn't be answers to these questions. Given the many scientific thought experiments that cannot be realized in the real-world, Buzzoni might be conflating thought experiments with imagined experiments to be carried out in the real-world. This brings us to the mental model account of thought experimenting (Andreas, forthcoming; Bishop, 1998; Cooper, 2005; Gendler, 2004; Palmieri, 2003; Nersessian, 1992, 1993, 2007; McMullin, 1985; Miščević, 1992, 2007). In thought experimenting, according to champions of this view, we manipulate a mental model instead of a physical model. As the model is non-propositional, it is most often communicated by means of a polished narrative which functions as a kind of user-manual for building the model. This approach could become the most prolific because it does not seem to be much of a stretch to draw connections to the intuition based account and to relate to the bodily component of experimenting (Gooding, 1993). Furthermore, first attempts have been made to place “literary fiction on the level of thought experiments” (Swirski, 2007, p. 6; see also Davies, 2007; Macho; Wunschel (eds.), 2004). The issue here “is not whether but how the arts function cognitively.” (Elgin, 1993, p. 14) This kind of analysis helps “to observe how the narrative aspect of thought experiments have implications for the process whereby one version of a thought experiment can spawn another” (Souder, 2003, pp. 208–209). The narrative of a thought experiment is not the thought experiment but seems to be more than just the indispensable medium of communication. The missing link could be mental modelling because “more than one instantiation or realization of a situation described in the narrative is possible. The constructed model need only be of the same kind with respect to salient dimensions of target phenomena” (Nersessian, 2007, p. 148). 4. Recent Developments Noteworthy contributions have been made exploring the importance of thought experiments in disciplines other than mathematics, philosophy, or physics. They include history (Tetlock et al . (eds.), 2009, pp. 14–44; Rescher, 2003, pp. 238–238, and 2005, pp. 36–46; Reiss, 2009; Weber; De Mey, 2003), the social sciences (Belkin; Tetlock (eds.), 1996; Roberts, 1993; Ylikoski, 2003), and revealed theology (Fehige, 2009 and 2011b). Tentative steps have been undertaken to relate more general epistemological topics to the primal challenge of thought experiments. As we have seen this is true for intuitions. To name another example: Conceivability and Possibility (edited by T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Oxford: Oxford University Press) includes a number of contributions that note the relevance of the discussed topic to thought experiments. According to Bealer, thought experiments seem to involve a conceivability that is too weak to provide reliable possibilities because they only exploit “physical intuitions” (p. 74). David Chalmers thinks that good thought experiments can be a guide to possibilities if the entailments of conceivability and possibility that he defends are sound (p. 153). Alan Sidelle's discussion of the metaphysical contingency of the laws of nature explicitly refers to the “importance of traditional imagining, conceiving, and thought experiment to modal inquiry” (p. 310), and can be read as a challenge to any claim that thought experiments would reveal anything more than a “necessity based in analyticity” (p. 329). There is also an interesting, but relatively unexplored issue concerning the relative importance of thought experiments in different disciplines. Physics and philosophy use them extensively. Chemistry, by contrast, has none of note at all. Why is this the case? Perhaps it is merely an historical accident that chemists never developed a culture of doing thought experiments. Perhaps it is tied to some deep feature of the discipline itself (see Snooks, 2006). Economics and history use thought experiments, but apparently not anthropology. A good explanation would likely tell us a lot about the structure of the discipline itself. Finally, since the interest in simulation is growing among philosophers of science, the relationship between computer simulation and thought experiments has started to attract attention: Behmel, 2001, pp. 98–108; Di Paolo et al ., 2000; Lenhard 2011; Stäudner, 1998. The issue here is whether computer simulations are thought experiments. This is rather unlikely because thought experiments and computer simulations seem to involve different kinds of simulation and have different aims. Still, their relationship is certainly of interest to anyone working on thought experiments, especially if it is true that computer simulations are the new way of doing science that is on a par with science by classical real world experiments (see Morrison, 2009). Bibliography The number of papers, anthologies, and monographs has been growing immensely since the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, it might be useful to highlight that in existing literature Kühne, 2006, is the most substantial study on the exploration of thought experiments since Kant; Sorensen, 1992, is the most extensive philosophical study of thought experiments. More than other monographs (see Behmel, 2001; Buschlinger, 1993; Brown, 1991a; Buzzoni, 2008; Cohnitz, 2006; Haggqvist, 1996; Rescher, 2005; Swirski, 2007), both studies well exceed the author's own systematic contribution to what we consider to be the primal philosophical challenge of thought experimentation. Also, this bibliography does not include the many (we count about eight) popular books on thought experiments (like Wittgenstein's Beetle and Other Classical Thought Experiments by Martin Cohen); nor do we list fiction that is related to the subject (like “The End of Mr. Y” by Scarlett Thomas). Further, for undergraduate teaching purposes one might want to consider Doing Philosophy: An Introduction Through Thought Experiments (edited by Theodore Schick, Jr. and Lewis Vaughn, fourth edition, 2010, Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education). Finally, it is noteworthy that a number of philosophical journals have dedicated part or all of an issue to the topic of thought experiments, including the Croatian Journal of Philosophy (19/VII), Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1/59), Informal Logic (3/17), and Philosophica (1/72). Andreas, Holger, 2011, “Zur Wissenschaftslogik von Gedankenexperimenten”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie , 59: 75–91. Arthur, Richard, 1999, “On Thought Experiments as A Priori Science”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 13: 215–229. Bailey, Cyril, 1950, Lucretius on the Nature of Things, (translation of De Rerum Naturae ), ninth reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Batens, Diderik, 2008, “On Possibilities and Thought Experiments”, in R. 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Yourgrau, Wolfgang, 1964, “On the Logical Status of so-called Thought Experiments”, Proceedings of the Xth International Congress of the History of Science , Paris: Herman, 359–362. –––, 1967, “On models and thought experiments in quantum theory”, Monatsberichte der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin , 9: 886–874. 原文见 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/
History of Palaeobotany: Selected Essays http://www.geolsoc.org.uk/gsl/publications/bookshop/page1794.html History of Palaeobotany: Selected Essays Product Code: SP241 Type: Book Series: GSL Special Publications Ten Digit ISBN: 1-86239-174-2 Thirteen Digit ISBN978-1-86239-174-1 Author/Editor: Edited by A. J. Bowden, C. V. Burek and R. Wilding Publisher: GSL Publication Date: 18 April 2005 Binding: Hardback Pages: 312 Weight1.00kg Description Often regarded as the ‘Cinderella’ of palaeontological studies, palaeobotany has a history that contains some fascinating insights into scientific endeavour, especially by palaeontologists who were perusing a personal interest rather than a career. The problems of maintaining research facilities in universities, especially in the modern era, are described and reveal a noticeable absence of a national UK strategy to preserve centres of excellence in an avowedly specialist area. Accounts of some of the pioneers demonstrate the importance of collaboration between taxonomists and illustrators. The importance of palaeobotany in the rise of geoconservation is outlined, as well as the significant and influential role of women in the discipline. Although this volume has a predominantly UK focus, two very interesting studies outline the history of palaeobotanical work in Argentina and China. Contents l History of Palaeobotany: an Introduction, A J Bowden, C V Burek and R Wilding The Beginnings l From the rise of the Enlightenment to the beginnings of Romanticism, R Wilding l The Moravian Minister Rev. Henry Steinhauer (1782-1818); his work on fossil plants, their first 'scientific' description and the planned Mineral Botany, H S Torrens The early 19th century l John Lindley, the reluctant palaeobotanist, W G Chaloner and H L Pearson l Illustrations and illustrations during the 'Golden Age' of palaeobotany: 1800-1840, C J Cleal, M Lazarus and A Townsend The later 19th century and into the 20th century l Hugh Miller: introducing palaeobotany to a wider audience, L I Anderson l Baron Achille de Zigno: an Italian palaeobotanist of the 19th century, H L Pearson l The palaeobotanical beginnings of geological conservation: with case studies from the USA, Canada and Great Britain, B A Thomas l Palaeobotanical studies and collecting in the 19th century with particular reference to the Ravenhead Collection and Henry Hugh Higgins, W Simkiss and A J Bowden l The palaeobotanical work of Marie Stopes, W G Chaloner l James Lomax (1857-1934): palaeobotanical catalyst or hindrance? A C Howell l D.H. Scott and A.C Seward: modern pioneers in the structure and architecture of fossil plants, R Wilding l Arthur Raistrick: Britain's premier palynologist, J E A Marshall l The life and work of Emily Dix (1904-1972), C V Burek and C J Cleal l The fate of three university schools of palaeobotany/palynology l The 'other' Glasgow Boys: the rise and fall of a school of palaeobotany, J J Liston and H L Sanders l One hundred and fifty years of Palaeobotany at Manchester University, J Watson l Half a century of palynology at the University of Sheffield, C H Wellman From other continents l The history of palaeobotany in Argentina during the 19th century, E G Ottone l The rise of Chinese palaeobotany emphasizing the global context, Q G Sun • Reviews In their superb new book, the editorial team of Bowden. Burek and Wilding have captured the tangled family history of palaeobotany in the only honest and vibrant way: as a series of loosely connected vignettes of its most colourful characters. History of Palaeobotany: Selected Essays is a treasure-trove of extraordinary personalities, baffling experiments, and spectacular discoveries, the latter made more often than not with that essential item of the palaeobotanical toolbox: the tea strainer! Howard Falcon-Lang (University of Bristol) Thisreview was featured in Geology Today, Vol 22, No. 2 March-April 2006 This review was submitted by: Sales Dept 11 January 2006 I hope it is taken by libraries to be a future valuable resource for those interested in the history of science. This review was submitted by: Andrew C. Scott : Geological Magazine, Volume 144/5 - 2007 15 May 2008 ...useful source of information for one part of the global picture. Robert S Hill Faculty of Sciences, University of Adelaide This review was featured in TAG June 2008 This review was submitted by:Mrs Julie Webster 04 March 2009
Skagway 的 Museum of Alaskan History 黄安年文 黄安年的博客 /2011 年 10 月 26 日 ( 美东时间 ) 发布 在阿拉斯加的 Skagway ，还有一座面积不大但内容丰富的具有浓厚本土色彩的 Museum of Alaskan History ， 我们用半个小时光景在 24 日参观浏览。照片 28 张是即时拍摄的。 *************** Corrington's Museum of Alaskan History The Corrington’s Museum of Alaskan History is a well known tourist destination in Skagway, Alaska. It was founded by Dennis Corrington and features several walrus tusks. The Corrington’s Museum of Alaskan History sticks to its name and delivers its promise. It does tell of the state’s local history, in quite an unusual manner, however. Because unlike other museums, this one tells the tale through the walrus scrimshaw tusks, which, as of the last count amounts up to more than 40. If this is not impressive enough, the access to the Corrington’s Museum of Alaskan History is also for free. There are also other exhibits, a gift show with tons of beautiful items, and a bright flower garden outside. It is closed during the winter season and its hours depend on the cruise ships that dock in the area. http://www.cityprofile.com/alaska/corringtons-museum-of-alaskan-history.html ******************** Corrington's Alaskan Ivory and Museum is an outstanding private collection that spans the long and surprising history of Alaska that charges no admission fee. It is located at Fifth and Broadway at the far end of the "Old Town" tourist area. It would be tempting to walk quickly through this small area at the back of the store but take... http://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-g60877-d288270-Reviews-Corrington_s_Museum_of_Alaskan_History-Skagway_Alaska.html
http://intransit.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/plaques-in-prague-commemorate-holocaust-victims/ July 11, 2011, 6:00 am Plaques in Prague Commemorate Holocaust Victims By JULIE O'SHEA The small bronze青铜 cobblestones卵石 can be easy to miss不显眼, but they are scattered, in plain sight, all over the streets of Prague and numerous other cities across Europe. Collectively these simple, handmade stone plaques , called Stolpersteine (“stumbling blocks”), conceived and designed by the German artist Gunter Demnig, comprise one of the largest Holocaust memorials in the world. They serve as poignant public markers, announcing to passersby that the buildings the stones are set in front of were once the homes of men, women and children who were carted away and murdered by the Nazi regime during World War II. Mr. Demnig estimates that hundreds of these memorial stones, each about four inches across, have been placed in the Czech Republic over the past couple of years. The first was laid along a quiet street in Prague’s Jewish quarter in 2008 , and Mr. Demnig recently returned to help install dozens more. Each inscription begins with the words “Here lived …,” followed by the person’s name and what happened to him or her. “It is the largest monument in Europe, perhaps the world, ” Mr. Demnig said. “But most importantly, it has become a social sculpture.” It is also the artist’s personal way of making sure the past is never forgotten, one name at a time. He has no plans to stop, calling it his “life’s work.” Mr. Demnig started his project on the streets of Berlin in 1993. The project has since grown to 30,000 stones in 10 countries. Memorial plaques may be sponsored for 95 euros (about $125) each. A set of new Holocaust memorial stones in Prague.
诺贝尔经济学奖得主道格拉斯·诺斯（ North ）说： History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. Today’s and tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the past. （ 见： North, Douglass C.: Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, 1990. ） 李宁教授的翻译是：“ 历史是重要的，其重要性不仅在于我们可以学习过去的经验，而且在于，因为社会制度的延续性，我们的今天和未来都跟过去有着千丝万缕的联系。今天和未来的选择，是受过去的经验影响 的。 ” 本人试译如下： “历史至关紧要。其紧要性不仅在于，前事不忘，后事之师；而且在于，现在和未来藉由社会制度的连续性与过去有着割不断的联系。我们今天和明天的选择无不受到过去的塑造。” 本人接着说： 欣赏NORTH对历史的点睛论述。既如此，历史演进论（ historical and evolutionary approach ） 是非常重要的。 1924 年胡适提出的“历史演进法”（胡适：“古史讨论的读后感” ）概念与“历史演进论”有类似之处。 事实上，且不说国际上有科技史学科，国内有科技史一级学科（有人说这是“有户口没有口粮”），历史演进论是创新研究 中的一个重要视角， 比如，弗里曼和苏特在《工业创新经济学》中，第一篇共 7 章专论与科学相关的技术和产业的兴起；在法格博格等人主编的《牛津创新手册》中，有一章 专论创新的历史演进。 历史演进论也是科技政策研究和科技政策学研究中的一个重要视角。这是笔者关注的一个研究方向。
http://www.rcpe.ac.uk/journal/issue/journal_40_2/butler.pdf AR Butler(1), S Khan(2), E Ferguson(3) (1) Honorary Reader in Medical Science; (2,3)Medical Student, Bute Medical School, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK J R Coll Physicians Edinb 2010; 40:172–7 doi:10.4997/JRCPE.2010.216 2010 Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh
这是一位不甚熟悉的学者。请见其著作梗概（原为法文）。 1）H ISTOIRES DE SCIENCES I nventions, Dcouvertes et Savants L'Harmattan, Paris, 2006, 278 pages Comment fait-on de la recherche scientifique? Comment les ides viennent-elles aux chercheurs? La crativit est-elle inne ou peut-on la dvelopper, la cultiver? Il n'y a pas de rponse ces questions parce qu'il n'y a pas de recette magique. Il faut croire l'intuition, l'analogie, l'illumination soudaine, la bonne fe, au hasard, l'accident, la chance et mme l'erreur, facteurs qui interviennent tous, plus ou moins forte dose, dans chaque dcouverte scientifique. En s'appuyant sur des tmoignages recueillis dans diverses disciplines, ce livre cherche, dans sa premire partie, faire comprendre ce qu'est la crativit et comment apparaissent les ides nouvelles. On peut saisir ainsi, peu peu, comment se construit la connaissance scientifique. Mais il ne faut pas non plus sparer les dcouvertes de celles et de ceux qui les ont faites. dtacher la science de ses acteurs, on la rend aride et rbarbative. Il ne faut pas oublier qu'avant d'tre des savants, ces femmes et ces hommes ont t des enfants, des adolescents, des tudiants, qu'ils ont fond des familles, eu des changes avec des collgues et qu'ils ont pu tre en but des difficults de tous ordres. Les circonstances et les hasards qui ont pu orienter leurs travaux et mme toute leur vie sont mises en lumire dans les biographies de la seconde partie de l'ouvrage. Table des matires Le mtier de chercheur Les sentiers de la dcouverte Les mathmatiques La physique La chimie Les sciences naturelles Les techniques Les crises de la science Les acteurs Bibliographie 2）C OMMENT L'ESPRIT VIENT AUX SAVANTS L'Harmattan, Paris, 2007, 223 pages ISBN : 978-2-296-03900-1 19,50 Autrefois, on les appelait des savants . Maintenant, on parle de chercheurs . Est-ce dire que les savants savent mais ne cherchent pas et que les chercheurs ne savent rien mais cherchent (ventuellement sans trouver)? Bien entendu, il n'en est rien. Beaucoup de savants ont eux-mmes cherch analyser le fonctionnement de leur esprit et dcrit le processus qui mne la dcouverte scientifique, le chemin qui les a conduit vers le succs. C'est ce chemin que nous essayons d'clairer ici en nous fondant sur leurs tmoignages. On verra que les diverses phases qui conduisent la dcouverte de phnomnes nouveaux ou leur interprtation, l'laboration de concepts ou de thories auxquels personne n'avait song auparavant, que cette succession d'tapes est pratiquement la mme quelle que soit la discipline scientifique concerne. Cette voie est galement celle suivie dans la cration artistique ou littraire. Il y a naturellement plusieurs sortes de chercheurs, plusieurs types de pense comme il y a plusieurs styles en peinture ou en musique. Mais il existe cependant une unit profonde qui permet de dgager un chemin commun pour le processus inventif. Table des matires Avant-propos L'apprentissage de la recherche L'enseignement des sciences La culture gnrale La vie scientifique L'lve devient chercheur Les chercheurs et la recherche Les styles de chercheurs Mthodes de travail La nature des recherches Les premiers pas Les natures d'esprit L'orientation Connaissances et originalit Difficults Beaut et simplicit Thme et variations De la mthode scientifique La vrit scientifique La mthode inductive L'acte crateur Mthode(s)? Le cheminement Les tapes vers la dcouverte Que chercher? Les phases Prparation Incubation Illumination Vrification Et aprs? Former nos tudiants lments biographiques Pistes bibliographiques
Serious 8: I copy a PPT file here to give basic information about CPRS/Causalgia. The PPT file is copy from Raja's website and copyright is belong to him. When I put them together, it mean I think they are one thing rather than the diagnosis criteria of textbooks think them are two different or two subtypes. The situations from the file are present medical situations. I use it to show what we have known and what we haven't known. The latter will lead us to think and listen to my ideas and evidences interestingly. Later, I will put my PPT file here to show what is my understand of CRPS/Causlagia with most strong supporting evidences. Short Review of CRPS from Dr Raja
转载：国外发表的相对正确地表述了青蒿素的发现史的文章！ Cui Artemisinin Discovery 2009 Liwang Cui and Xin-Zhuan Su. The discovery, mechanisms of action, and combination therapy of artemisinin . Exp. Rev. Anti Infect. Ther. 7(8), 999-1013, 2009. 网上资料： http://www.expert-reviews.com/doi/abs/10.1586/eri.09.68 Summary Expert Review of Anti-infective Therapy October 2009, Vol. 7, No. 8, Pages 999-1013 , DOI 10.1586/eri.09.68 (doi:10.1586/eri.09.68) Review Discovery, mechanisms of action and combination therapy of artemisinin Liwang Cui and Xin-zhuan Su Author for correspondence Despite great international efforts, malaria still inflicts an enormous toll on human lives, especially in Africa. Throughout history, antimalarial medicines have been one of the most powerful tools in malaria control. However, the acquisition and spread of parasite strains that are resistant to multiple antimalarial drugs have become one of the greatest challenges to malaria treatment, and are associated with the increase in morbidity and mortality in many malaria-endemic countries. To deal with this grave situation, artemisinin-based combinatory therapies (ACTs) have been introduced and widely deployed in malarious regions. Artemisinin is a new class of antimalarial compounds discovered by Chinese scientists from the sweet wormwood Artemisia annua . The potential development of resistance to artemisinins by Plasmodium falciparum threatens the usable lifespan of ACTs, and therefore is a subject of close surveillance and extensive research. Studies at the ThaiCambodian border, a historical epicenter of multidrug resistance, have detected reduced susceptibility to artemisinins as manifested by prolonged parasite-clearance times, raising considerable concerns on resistance development. Despite this significance, there is still controversy on the mode of action of artemisinins. Although a number of potential cellular targets of artemisinins have been proposed, they remain to be verified experimentally. Here, we review the history of artemisinin discovery, discuss the mode of action and potential drug targets, and present strategies to elucidate resistance mechanisms. Cui教授是在美的中国人，简历在网上可查： Liwang Cui , Ph.D. Professor 537 Ag Sciences Industries Building University Park, PA 16802 Email : luc2@psu.edu Phone : 814-863-7663 http://ento.psu.edu/directory/luc2
Time is limited for graduate. Assistant Professor Bian told me to mentalprepare forthe worste lategraduation. It's only 2 months left, I shouldpublish at leasttwo papers, the fist paper maybe late to publish, so I shouldhave another paper forguarantee. At the same time, I should finish my doctoral thesis. In the past4years, I muddledwith myscientific work, because of uncertain, dependent, irresolution, confusion, vagueness and hesitation. I have no self-confidence in my classmates, teachers and even younger peoper in my lab. I'm afraid to meetthem and be asked. If I make a decision to build a beautiful life for the further, I still have chances in the two months. If I give up, I will lose the life. The relationwithother pepole is based on the rule of mutual respect, tolerance, understanding, cooperation,equality and professionalism. The problem of my slowly reaction in talking, sometimes like amnesia and dementia, is caused by inactivity and reticence. I will give myself a symptomatic treatment and improve myself to be an activeintellectual. Say bye-byeto the bygone.
As the saying goes, history is a mirror. Literature retrieval history itself reflects our studying procedure. If we take notice to save our literature retrieval history, at least the repeated retrieval could be avoided to the greatest extent. In my opinion, culturing our habits to save retrieval history in time is efficient for our research. The other advantageous feature of saving our retrieval history lies in our convenient looking back. Maybe when we browse our retrieval history after a whole day of busy work, a innovative idea comes up with us, as is usually the case of distinguished scientist. Here I introduce how to save our retrieval history in ISI Web of Knowledge platform. Firstly you need to register an ID in ISI Web of Knowledge platform. When your enter ISI Web of Knowledge platform, click sign in, choose register and type your necessary individual information and submit your registration. NOTE: The password must include at least 8 characters. After finished, click continue and you enter the interface displaying your sign in. Secondly, you may start to your search and then save your retrieval history. Here I take a example using retrieval word: Pb immobilization or Pb stabilization and soil contamination or soil pollution for column topic in database ESCI. Click search and we see the retrieval results. Thirdly, save your retrieval history.Click search history in results interface and you will see the corresponding search history interface. You only click save history/create alert, and set your history name and alert choice, finally save , confirm it and you complete the creation of retrieval history. When you enter ISI Web of Knowledge interface next time, you will see the My saved searches column. You may open it and browse the content of your saved retrieval last time.
标签: history
