The Union ofConcerned Scientists is a science-based advocacy nonprofit that putsrigorous, independent science to workto solve our planet's most pressing problems. We combine technical analysis andeffective advocacy to create innovative, practical solutions for a healthy,safe, and sustainable future. In Cambridge, MA or Washington, DC Science and Policy Analyst http://www.ucsusa.org/about/jobs-ucs#CSDanalyst TheCenter for Science and Democracy at Union of Concerned Scientists is dedicatedto strengthening and defending the essential role of science in democraticdialogue and policymaking. Through cutting-edge analysis and effective outreachand advocacy, we hold decisionmakers, media, and vested interests accountable,and defend the scientific process and scientists in order to secure a healthyand safe environment for all. The science and policy analyst works as aneffective and collaborative member in the development of research objectivesand strategies around independent science, justice and equity, environment, andpublic health; and conceptualizes and undertakes robust, timely, accessible,and policy-relevant research to help advance the mission of the Center. InCambridge, MA Science Network Outreach Coordinator http://www.ucsusa.org/about/jobs-ucs#SNoutreach The outreachcoordinator conceptualizes and implements plans to grow and maintain the Science Network. S/hecollaborates across the organization to ensure the Science Network is active in UCS campaigns,strengthens the mobilization and cultivation of the Science Network members. S/he also works to diversifyways scientists can engage on issues they care aboutthrough UCS, develops trainings and engagement opportunities uniquely tailoredearly career scientists,and works to ensure a diverse and inclusive Science Network. S/he is also responsible for developing leadershipamong Network members. The ideal candidate will be astrong organizer comfortable working with experts and people from a widevariety of backgrounds.
2015年《Research Policy》上刊发了一篇有意思的论文：How do alumni faculty behave in research collaboration? An analysis of Chang Jiang Scholars in China。这篇论文由三位中国大陆学者合著，讨论的是一个 能引起国际关注的话题：人才回流。 中国的人才回流无非有两种选择：其一，回母校；其二，不回母校。回母校可能意味着更多的人脉，更多的学术资源，不回母校很可能会去一个人生地不熟的机构，所有的人脉与学术资源只能从零开始。研究假设之一是“与非母校的学者相比，母校的学者更倾向于利用过去在该校建立的人脉开展学术合作”，而以长江学者为例的实证研究发现结果正好与研究假设相反： 非母校的学者比母校的学者更倾向于寻求校内合作 。 采用非结构化的访谈的方式，我从周围若干同事那里寻求对这一结论的解释。有意思的是，回母校的访谈对象几乎一致认为，他们太清楚同事们过去的恩恩怨怨了，当然不会去触碰他人的雷区，因此选择合作对象时，更倾向于选择校外的学者。而非母校的访谈对象为了拓展校内人脉，倾向于从合作发表论文开始。 这篇论文从回流人才的合作倾向揭示出： 高校的人际关系其实很紧张 。当然，论文还有其他重要的结论，不过不在我的关心范围之内，如有兴趣，可查看全文。附摘要如下： Recruiting overseas alumni as faculty within their Chinese alma mater has become a common phenomenon in Chinese universities. This paper studies how the alumni linkage, the connection betweenalumni faculty members and their alma mater, influences the individual collaborative behaviour ofreturnee scholars. The results show that alumni faculty are inclined to conduct less intra-institutional col-laboration than non－alumni faculty, and the impact of alumni linkage on a scholar’s propensity towardsinternational collaboration is not significant. Both results are inconsistent with expectations. The impor-tance of local networking and other factors in Chinese research culture may cause returnee scholars toexhibit such unexpected behaviours in collaborative propensities. Another central finding is that alumnifaculty members tend to publish in journals with an average greater impact factor than non-alumni faculty. We therefore argue that alumni linkage has played an important role in bringing about the prosocialbehaviour of alumni faculty by strengthening their motivation to pursue quality research, and that thestrength of a returnee scholar’s local academic network also has a great impact on their tendency towardshigh impact research.
Public Policy and Sustainability Behavior University of Michigan The Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy of the University of Michigan invites applications from outstanding candidates to fill a tenure-track position that focuses on the behaviors of individuals and institutions on issues of sustainability . Our preference is to hire at the assistant professor level, although we are open to more senior candidates with exceptional qualifications, and a postdoctoral position may be possible. Applicants should demonstrate expertise in the role of public policy in advancing the goals of sustainability. Applications are welcome from a range of policy science disciplines, including psychology, sociology, political science, economics, and history, with particular interest in candidates who transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries. We would be particularly receptive to candidates with expertise in such areas as experimental social science, risk-aversion, common-pool resource protection, temporal choice problems, or decision-making under uncertainty. This university-year appointment will begin on September 1, 2014. Initial consideration will be given to applications received by December 1, 2013 , but applications will be considered until the position has been filled. The following application materials should be sent in PDF format to sustainability@fordschool.umich.edu : · a letter of interest · curriculum vitae · writing samples · statement of current and future research plans · statement of teaching philosophy and experience · teaching evaluations · and three letters of recommendation. The University of Michigan is an AA/EO employer. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply. The University is supportive of the needs of dual career couples.
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130105 background FISCAL “CRISIS”: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS Dancing to the music of time ***** TAGS: ***** usa only. policy politics. economy , Fiscal Crisis. national. shortrun, midrun, longrun. commentary, analysis. background. FISCAL “CRISIS” 1 Scenarios 1.1 Accomplishments 1.2 Failures 1.3 POLITICS 2 Shortrun partisan strategy 2.1 Midrun “regime shift” 2.2 Longrun Constitution 2.3 ECONOMICS 3 Shortrun recovery 3.1 Midrun change 3.2 Longrun growth 3.3 SE I National GREETING HAPPY NEW YEAR to all readers.I will strive to achieve the MISSION of this Blog: First, call the attention of Chinese readers to the best COMMENTARY on American politics in the American media. Second, relate that Commentary to the best ANALYSIS in academic research on American politics, particularly explanations. Third, relate both of those to relevant EVALUATION, whether through elite frameworks or mass sentiments. THIS POST This week we focus on America’s turn-of-the-year fiscal crisis, relating much media Commentary to a little academic Analysis. The first section on FISCAL CRISIS summarizes the basic fiscal and political problems involved and how they were or were not solved. The second section unravels some of the POLITICS involved, at varying time scales. The third section provides some of the ECONOMIC background of America’s fiscal difficulties, again at varying time scales. America’s fiscal crisis is a complex subject, so this is a long Post. It provides BACKGROUND, not only for the partisan battle over how to avoid the recent “Fiscal Cliff,” but also for more battles over the same issues in coming months and years. The many media comments on this episode add up to a detailed account, but are difficult to assemble and are subject to partisan simplification. Accordingly, this Post begins by summarizing that journalistic Commentary and only gradually shifts toward more academic Analysis. Readers are welcome to proceed only as far as their interest carries them. (For further BACKGROUND, readers may wish to consult a previous Post on this Blog: 121201 “The politics of “fiscal crisis.”) A first theme of this Post is that partisan POLITICS drives policy-making more than does the substance of policy. In economic policy-making, political logic often overwhelms economic logic. A second theme is that the particular current configuration of American politics tends to turn problems into CRISES. In American policy politics, “crisis” is becoming the new “normal”. A third theme is explicit attention to TIME as a dimension of policy politics. Time is intrinsic both to the substance of policies and to the strategies of politics through which policies are formed. Both policy and politics involve interactions between shortrun, midrun, and longrun (“inter-temporality”). Overall, the main temporal contradiction is between shortrun political advantage and longrun economic benefit. However, we also note temporal contradictions within politics and economics. (The New York Times collects its articles on the Fiscal Cliff – along with links to relevant resources – under Federal Budget in its Times Topics at topics.nytimes.com. For general literature on American fiscal politics, an expert and accessible introduction is David Wessel 2012 Red ink : inside the high-stakes politics of the federal budget. New York : Crown Business, 204 pages (using 2011 as example). A competent textbook is the similarly titled Gary Evans 1997 Red ink : the budget, deficit, and debt of the U.S. government. San Diego CA: Academic Press, 297 pages. An incisive analysis is Simon Johnson and James Kwak 2012 White House burning : the Founding Fathers, our national debt, and why it matters to you . New York NY: Random House, 268 pages. An history is Dennis S. Ippolito 2003 Why budgets matter : budget policy and American politics. University Park PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 329 pages. On a formative period, see Jonathan Kahn 1997. Budgeting democracy : state building and citizenship in America, 1890-1928. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 222 pages. On recent decades see Iwan Morgan 2009 The age of deficits : presidents and unbalanced budgets from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush. Lawrence KN: University Press of Kansas, 375 pages.) FISCAL “CRISIS” 1 As readers know, approaching the end of 2012, America was approaching a “Fiscal Cliff”: an already scheduled combination of sharp rise in taxes and sharp fall in spending. Those drastic changes did not result from a crisis in the real economy. They were an artificial punishment that in 2011 American political leaders had scheduled to force themselves to compromise on fiscal policy in 2012. Nevertheless, failure to meet this artificial challenge would put the real economy back into recession. (For an acerbic critique of this episode, see Paul Krugman 121230 “Brewing up confusion” at nytimes.com. Also Clive Crook 130102 “When governing means lurching between phony crises” at bloomberg.com.) Most liberal commentators deplore both the political process and its policy outcome. Some very liberal commentators say the policy outcome is not too bad but that strategic situation in which the negotiating process leaves Obama is disastrous. Most conservative commentators deplore the policy outcome (higher taxes but not lower spending) and defend the confrontational political process as necessary – in the face of potential future fiscal catastrophe – for pursuing any and all possible means to cut spending. A rare positive view of the legislative process that produced the Cliff Deal sees democracy prevailing over usually anti-democratic conduct of congressional business (Steven Pearlstein 130102 “Congress tries democracy for a change!” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.) Before plunging into details, let’s OVERVIEW both policy and politics. On the POLICY side, the main argument is between radical conservatives and moderate liberals over how to manage America’s longrun TOTAL DEBT. Conservatives call for drastic action in the shortrun, liberals for gradual adjustment over the midrun. The radical-conservative analysis views America’s longrun total debt with deservedly great alarm. Debt is currently about 23% of GDP and currently growing faster than GDP. So the DEBT/GDP RATIO is rising. If debt continues to grow at the current rate, within a few decades it could reach 40% of GDP. That will make us into “Greece,” the current exemplar of an unsustainable situation from which there is no easy escape. Any current strategies to avoid such a future national catastrophe are justified. These include using any and every issue in the current fiscal crisis as leverage to force reduction in spending. Conservatives should demand spending cuts in exchange for again raising the Debt Limit and, if it does not get such cuts, should threaten to allow the country to DEFAULT on its debt obligations. Obama and the Democrats have already raised taxes, so all further debt reduction should come from decreasing spending. As quickly as possible, the USA should totally restructure existing social programs to remove them from the national government budget. (Such arguments, much data, and other specifics are available at a website of the very conservative Cato Institute, downsizinggovernment.org.) The moderate liberal response is that what the USA needs to do is, over the next ten years, achieve a sustainable relationship of total debt to GDP. Getting there requires that debt grow slower than GDP, so that debt gradually falls as a proportion of GDP. That requires a total of about $3.3 trillion in debt reduction over the next ten years, during which total GDP will be about $200 trillion. Of the $3.3 trillion needed reduction, $2.1 trillion have already been achieved: $1.5 trillion in spending cuts during the August 2011 negotiations over raising the Debt Limit and $0.6 trillion in tax increases in the Cliff Deal just passed. So we need only another $1.2 trillion in debt reduction, notionally half from spending cuts and half from tax increases. Although that will be painful and difficult, a rational congress should be able to do it. If so, of the $3.3 trillion in debt reduction, $2.1 trillion will have come from spending cuts, and $1.2 trillion from tax increases. If, as the Republicans now demand, all further debt reduction comes from spending cuts, then $2.7 trillion will have come from spending cuts and only $0.6 trillion from tax increases. (See Jared Bernstein 130106 “A little table (or two) showing why we’re neither Greece nor in need of default” at jaredbernsteinblog.com. That Post contains links to longer analysis supporting that argument and that Blog contains earlier Posts on the Fiscal Cliff crisis. Jared Bernstein formerly was economic advisor to Vice President Joe Biden and is now at the liberal Center for Budget and Policy Priorities.) On the POLITICS side, a main disappointment is that it took American politicians so long and such effort to arrive at a policy outcome on which they all agreed from the beginning: taxes should not rise on the American middle class. Commentators expect policy outcomes to be even harder to reach about issues on which the parties actually disagree, such as whether to cut spending on defense or on social programs. To understand why political conflict over the Fiscal Cliff exceeded the actual extent of policy disagreement, commentators use a variety of explanations. Most commentary involves an IDEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION: That Republicans have become increasingly radical in their conservatism and are not interested in compromise. Politicians in both parties have become more uncompromising because, through redistricting, their constituencies have become safer and more homogenous. Some commentary also involves a GENERATIONAL EXPLANATION. When formerly the views of the two parties overlapped, older politicians experienced the advantages of compromise. Now that the views of the two parties do not overlap, younger politicians have not had experience at compromise and perhaps never will. Most commentary relies also on an INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION: to prevent rash action, American institutions deliberately fragment and delay decision-making. Most observers think the Fiscal Cliff takes that too far. A more STRATEGIC EXPLANATION is that the various sides were exploring all possibilities for taking apart or putting together the various policy elements involved. Of course they were doing that for their own partisan purposes, but the effect was to consider a lot of alternatives. The strategic explanation may be paralleled by an ANALYTICAL EXPLANATION. The most advanced formulations in American political science argue that, under certain analytical conditions, decision processes are inherently chaotic. Under those conditions, the main things that makes any decisions possible at all are institutional rules. With that overview in hand, we continue by noting the range of possible scenarios that the recent Cliff Crisis involved. The same range will apply to the several more fiscal crises that will erupt in coming months and years. Indeed, that range of scenarios could apply to any policy crises that American politics creates. That includes crises that result from linking resolution of fiscal crises to solving other problems – such as the upcoming issues of gun control, energy, and immigration. In other policy domains, the specific policy items will be different, but the range of policy packages and political processes will be similar. A classic academic formulation of this range of scenarios contrasted “synoptic” policy-making – which overviews all aspects of a matter at one time – with “incremental” policy-making – which addresses problems piecemeal over time. That author thought incremental policy-making more feasible and effective. (See Charles Lindblom 1959 “The science of 'muddling through'. Public Administration Review 19, 2 (Spring) 79–88.) Scenarios 1.1 In late 2012, the range of SCENARIOS for avoiding the Fiscal Cliff included the following. (See Carrie Budoff Brown and Jake Sherman 121112 “5 fiscal cliff scenarios” at politico.com.) At one end was a comprehensive agreement in late 2012 on all the main fiscal issues for early 2013: increasing TAX, cutting SPENDING, raising the DEBT LIMIT, authorizing the annual BUDGET and, in the long run, reducing America’s cumulative TOTAL DEBT. A comprehensive agreement would have been an exemplary policy process, hopefully leading to wise policy. At the other end of the spectrum of possibilities was simply “going over the cliff” of the arbitrary 31 December deadline, without resolving ANY of these issues in 2012 or establishing ANY common FRAMEWORK for solving them in 2013. That would have revealed a completely DYSFUNCTIONAL policy process that produced no policy at all. In between were various possible combinations of (1) resolving some issues but not others and (2) for the unresolved issues, creating or not creating a framework for addressing them. There was also the possibility of aggregating issues into packages and treating them together, versus the possibility of disaggregating packages into single issues and treating those sequentially. Most observers of the current congress predicted a relatively dysfunctional policy process that would, nevertheless, produce some policy result in the end. Congress would do what it usually does: as little as possible until as late as possible, then do the minimum necessary to avoid crisis. Expecting congress to try to do just that, a few canny observers added that the only way the USA would actually “go over the cliff” was through one side or the other making a tactical miscalculation in the final stages of bargaining. Nevertheless, as it became clear that the “cliff” was only a “slope,”an increasing number of observers predicted that the deadlocked sides would simply “go over” it. Those observations correctly anticipated the PROCESS that actually occurred. Policymaking remained deadlocked even until shortly AFTER the deadline had already passed. The process was made even more messy and uncertain because key actors DID made tactical miscalculations, For example, approaching negotiations with Obama, House Speaker Boehner miscalculated the firmness of Obama’s determination to raise taxes on the rich – in Obama’s plan, all income over $250,000. Attempting to adjust for that miscalculation, Boehner proposed an alternative plan, but miscalculated his ability to obtain House Republican support for it. Breaking recent Republican principles, Boehner’s plan allowing taxes to rise, but only on income over $600,000.) The final compromise in the Cliff Deal was to allow the Bush tax cuts to expire on all income over $400,000 ($450,000 for couples) – effectively the USA’s new definition of “the rich.” (On the overall process, see Jennifer Steinhauer 121231 “Grand deals give way to legislative quick fixes” at nytimes.com) Accomplishments 1.2 Despite the messiness of the process, the resulting POLICY was a solid accomplishment on TAX matters. It avoided tax increases of more than $200 billion a year that might have driven the economy back into recession. It replaced “temporary” Bush policies with notionally permanent ones. That somewhat reduced economic uncertainty and thereby should promote economic growth. Taken as a whole, the Cliff Deal probably reduced government taxation of the economy by about 1-1.5% of GDP, most of the contraction in the first half of the year. So on balance, despite continuing tax cuts for the middle class, the Deal probably had some “austerity” effect. (A good short summary of the fiscal details and their likely economic effects is 130105 “Nothing to be proud of” at economist.com. A particularly positive view of the policy substance of the deal is E.J. Dionne Jr. 130102. “The cliff deal is better than it looks” at washingtonpost.com. A particularly negative view is Dylan Matthews 130102 “Everything is terrible” on Wonkblog at wasingtonpost.com.) To understand why this tax accomplishment was a “big deal” in American politics we must briefly review the tax policies of recent administrations. The Republican Reagan administration significantly lowered tax rates in 1981 but, when that produced deficits, endorsed tax increases that took back about half of the cut. Under Reagan, nominal marginal rates on the highest incomes began at about 50% and ended at about 28%. Famously breaking a campaign pledge, the Republican first Bush administration raised top marginal rates to 31%. The Democratic Clinton administration raised the top marginal rate to 39.6%, which helped balance the budget and evidently did not harm economic prosperity. The Republican Bush administration repeatedly LOWERED taxes, including top marginal rates to 35%, until 2012. This was accompanied by budget deficits and, in the end, the Great Recession. One expected the Democratic Obama administration, once past the Great Recession, to RAISE taxes to prevent cuts to social programs while reducing deficits. Obama had long promised to raise taxes on very high incomes from their Bush 35% back to their previous Clinton 39.6%. With the Cliff Deal, he has succeeded in doing that. (Throughout all this, effective rates differed from nominal rates.) Nevertheless, Obama has also always advocated making permanent the tax cuts that Bush Republicans granted the “middle class.” Those middle class cuts were more important, both politically and fiscally. Bush lowered taxes on the middle class in order to secure broad electoral support. Now, politically, Democrats cannot afford to approach the American electorate as the party that raised taxes on the middle class. Meanwhile middle class Americans are not contributing as much as they must to fund the social programs they expect. Thus, in the Cliff Deal, the main accomplishment of Obama and the Democrats was to fulfill a campaign promise to raise taxes on the rich. In addition to raising the rate on high income, the Cliff Deal raised taxes on the wealthy by other means as well. The increase in the tax on capital gains and dividends was one. Earners of $250,00 or more will lose some tax deductions. The wealthy will contribute more to funding Obama’s health care reform (currently about $24 billion per year, as previously scheduled). Obama emphasized his accomplishment in raising taxes on the rich in his announcement of the Cliff Deal. The Cliff Deal left income taxes on the middle class low. Another tax favor to the middle class was fixing the “alternative minimum tax” (at a cost in foregone revenue currently about $105 billion a year). This tax was originally an attempt to ensure that the wealthy paid at least SOME taxes. However, inflation made it gradually impact more and more middle incomes. The Cliff Deal permanently “patched” that by pegging the threshold for having to pay the tax to inflation, protecting about 30 million middle class taxpayers. In addition, in 2009 Obama had enacted expansions of tax credits for families, workers and college students. The Cliff Deal extends those for five more years. Extra-long unemployment benefits were extended for one year (at a cost of about $30 billion). (On the history of the “alternative minimum tax,” see 130103 “The phantom tax that made the deficit look better” at npr.com.) Emphasizing tax increases on the rich obscures the fact that the Cliff Deal DOES, to some extent, raise taxes on the middle class as well. The deal lets a temporary 2% reduction of the tax on wages expire, returning the payroll tax to its previous 6.2% (generating additional revenues currently about $115 billion a year). That tax funds a program that is a favorite of the middle classes, the government’s retirement program, Social Security. The longterm solvency of Social Security is already in doubt, so evidently Democrats did not want to jeopardize it further. Emphasizing tax increases on the rich also obscures the fact that, in the bargaining over the Cliff Deal, Republicans managed to secure some significant tax breaks for the rich. For example, the Cliff Deal did raise from 15% to 20% the taxes on capital gains and dividends (money made from money). However, that rate remains lower than before 2001. Similarly, the Cliff Deal did raise from 35% to 40% the tax on the portion of inheritances over $5 million. However, that is lower than the 55% that would have gone into effect without the Deal. Luckily the amount of inheritance that can be bequeathed tax free was not raised from $5 million to $7, as conservatives had proposed. Mostly the USA does not tax inter-generational transfer of assets within rich families, a tax that is a logical means of progressive taxation for funding a socially democratic regime. The Cliff Deal also contained some specific favors for specific companies. (Bob Greenstein 121218 “Further estate tax cut would be a disgrace” at huffingtonpost.com. On favors see Matt Stoller 130101 “Eight corporate subsidies in the Fiscal Cliff bill, from Goldman Sachs to Disney to NASCAR” at twitter.com/matthewstoller .) Failures 1.3 Although the Cliff Deal was a significant tax accomplishment, it did not much address any of the other fiscal problems that constituted the Fiscal Cliff and that the Fiscal Cliff had been created to force congress to solve. This leaves the congress looking INCOMPETENT, both economically and politically. The unresolved issues remain in at various time horizons of the American fiscal policy agenda. That leaves a great deal of UNCERTAINTY, both economic and political. (On unresolved issues, see Neil Irwin 130202 “Get used to more fiscal cliffs” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.) The Cliff Deal did not address SPENDING, except by simply postponing the automatic cuts ($110 billion a year) from the beginning of January until the beginning of March. On spending reduction, the Cliff Deal did enact cuts in discretionary spending (currently worth $60 billion a year, totaling perhaps a trillion dollars over the next ten years). Obama had agreed to those cuts (which were not to entitlements) in August 2011 during the negotiations to raise the debt limit. Republicans now claim that, because Obama had agreed to that cut in the PAST, it does not count as a new spending cut in PRESENT negotiations. (An interesting temporal argument: imagine if you could not claim credit for having lost twenty pounds over the past six months, only the few ounces you lost this week.) Some Republicans even claimed that that trillion did not count because it was merely a promise not to spend that money in the FUTURE. (Another interesting temporal argument: ALL spending cuts are decisions not to spend money in the future!) In striving for a comprehensive deal, Obama had demanded that congress raise the DEBT LIMIT (the total amount that the congress authorizes the national government to borrow). At first Obama had demanded a five year extension, then only a one year extension: eventually he got none. Correspondingly, the Republicans did not get the main concession that evidently Obama was willing to make in return, a change in the method of calculating Social Security benefits that would lower them gradually over time (“chained CPI”). Technically on 31 December 2012 the USA actually did hit its $16.4 trillion borrowing limit. The Treasury can use “extraordinary measures” to avoid a government default, but only for a couple of months. (Joseph J. Schatz and Patrick Reis 130101 “Enjoy the fiscal cliff debate? Just wait for the debt ceiling” at politico.com. For the two sides already squaring off against each other, see Zachary A. Goldfarb 130102 “Lawmakers clash over federal debt ceiling” at washingtonpost.com, in its Fiscal Cliff series. On Obama’s strategy going into the forthcoming debt limit crisis, see Carrie Budoff Brown and Manu Raju 130104 “Obama's debt ceiling gambit” at politico.com.) Another fiscal issue that will arise in early 2013 is reauthorization of the ANNUAL BUDGET for the current fiscal year. A 1921 Budget and Accounting Act specifies that the president must submit a budget to Congress each year and that Congress should process it expeditiously. Nevertheless, in recent years, Congress has not passed all of the appropriations bills before the start of the fiscal year (1 October). Instead, Congress has passed “continuing resolutions” authorizing temporary funding. The government is currently operating under a continuing resolution – signed by President Obama on 28 September 2012 – that provides funding through 27 March 2013. So, by then, the USA will need another continuing resolution, providing another opportunity for fiscal politics and even fiscal crisis. (On authorization as a policy tool, see Thad Hall 2004. Authorizing policy. Columbus : Ohio State University Press, 147 pages.) The Cliff Deal made an only marginal contribution to reducing America’s longrun TOTAL DEBT. Raising taxes on the rich raises revenue by about $42 billion a year (current value) or $600 billion over the next ten years, which should reduce the cumulative debt by that amount. “However, that represents just 7% of the projected increase in the national debt over that time. Instead of a $25.4 trillion debt in 2022, the debt would be $24.8 trillion. Little wonder that bond-rating agencies, not to mention both Democratic and Republican budget experts who have worked on deficit deals in the past, are unimpressed.” (Susan Page 130102 “ 4 lessons for round 2 of 'fiscal cliff' fight” at usatoday.com. Also Matthew Yglesias 120102 “The next Fiscal Cliff “ at slate.com.) To most commentators, even bigger than economic failure was political failure. The politicians involved seem to have quite different versions of what is happening. The divisions are not just between the two parties, but also between factions within them: radical versus moderate conservative Republicans and a moderate president versus the more liberal Democrats. Commentators note the divergence of views and wonder what their clash would produce in early 2013. (See Ezra Klein 121231 “Why the White House thinks it’s winning the ‘fiscal cliff’” and “Why Republicans think they’re winning the ‘fiscal cliff.”“ Also 130102 “The lessons of the fiscal cliff.” All on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.) POLITICS 2 This section treats the interaction within politics of shortrun partisan strategy, midrun regime shift, and longrun institutions. Here the main inter-temporal contradiction – already strongly manifest in the present – is between the present shortrun configuration of American politics (which will probably persist into the midrun) and the USA’s longrun constitutional design. We discuss that contradiction below under 2.3, longrun institutions. There is no longer any ideological overlap between Republicans and Democrats. Moreover, there are strong forces driving them further apart – or, at least, driving Republicans ever further to the Right. Now among the fiercest battles in American politics are those within the Republican party, between what used to be considered quite conservative conservatives (now called “moderate” or “establishment” conservatives) and truly radical conservatives (the young Republican insurgents). The radical-Republican opposition to raising taxes even on the very rich further polarized American politics and reduced the capacity of partisan sides to cooperate with each other in resolving future fiscal crises. Both parties face a political contradiction between shortrun and midrun. Most directly relevant to fiscal politics is the Democrats’ dilemma. In the shortrun, they remain committed to maintaining and even extending the liberal social policy regime that they have put in place. They want to maintain it not only for those already enjoying it (shortrun), but also for the next generation (midrun) and generations to come (longrun). At the same time, Democrats cannot show how, in the longrun, they are going to pay for this. With relatively minor adjustments, Social Security is sustainable. In contrast, even with proposed measures for economizing, health care is not. Particular liberal Democrats may understand this, but the policy positions taken by the liberal wing of the Democratic party do not reflect such understanding. For example, during the “cliff” negotiations, Republicans proposed, and in principle Obama accepted, a method of fiscal adjustment that is politically easy. Instead of guaranteeing generous regular increases in welfare payments to compensate for inflation, government social programs could still make such adjustments, but adopt a less generous formula for calculating the rate of inflation (“chained CPI”). The cumulative longterm effect on seniors would be substantial. Nevertheless, this form of fiscal adjustment is politically easy now because the cost will be imposed only in the future – even then in an incremental and relatively invisible way. Presumably understanding that, “chained CPI”is one concession that Obama was willing to make to Republicans in exchange for raising the debt limit. Liberal Democrats denounced Obama for offering even this. Republicans face an even sharper contradiction than Democrats between their shortrun positions and midrun adjustments. Their present ideology is a free market one of self-reliance. Their present political base is, disproportionately, prosperous white people, particularly in the South. In the shortrun, Republicans cannot deeply offend that base. Nevertheless, in the midrun, that base is declining as a proportion of the American electorate, even within the regions where, historically, it has been most dominant (the South and mountain West). So. Somehow, Republicans must adjust their ideology and base. Shortrun partisan strategy 2.1 Most media commentary focused on shortrun strategy. Did Obama play his hand as well as he could have? How about Boehner? As Speaker of the House of Representatives, he was the main Republican leader and negotiator with Obama until near the end of the cliff process. How about the radically conservative Republicans in the House, who gradually destroyed Boehner’s effectiveness? In turning to the attitudes of various commentators toward these questions, let us note a wise qualitative piece by Nate Silver, the New York Times’ quantitative analyst of electoral politics. Silver notes another interaction between politics and policy: how you evaluate the Cliff Deal depends not just on overall partisanship but also on your priorities among particular policy objectives. For example, some Democrats might prioritize redistribution, some the relationship between taxes and spending, still others the effect of expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy on the economy. It becomes extremely difficult – even for a skilled quantitative analyst – to assess the Cliff Deal as a whole. There are too many policy components, too many substantive objectives, and each component has different implications for different objectives. (Nate Silver 130102 “Why it’s hard to score the fiscal deal” at nytimes.com.) Liberal Democrats appear genuinely divided. Some regard the Fiscal Deal as a great victory for OBAMA: after all, he did fulfill his campaign pledge to raise taxes on the rich. Evidently that was Obama’s own evaluation, since it was the first thing he said after victory. Republicans too were eager portray Obama as inordinately successful: He won this round for Democratic tax increases, so Republicans deserve to win the next round for Republican spending cuts. (For a roundup of liberal Democratic reaction and an argument for a positive evaluation, see Ezra Klein 130102. “Calm down, liberals. The White House won” on his Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com. Another roundup is 130104 “Liberals in a dither over whether Obama blew it, or nailed it” at npr.com.) Other liberals blame Obama for once again proving to be a poor negotiator. The Fiscal Cliff deadline was his moment of maximum leverage for his entire remaining time in office, and he failed to make the most of it. The Cliff Deal was not as good a result as he could have obtained by being willing to “go over the cliff.” Nevertheless, the fiscal result was tolerable. What was disastrous was the political result. Obama “caved” on some major issues and offered concessions on other issues in an effort to achieve a bigger deal. All confirms Republicans’ assumption that not only does Obama make too many concessions too early, in the end he does always cave. (For polite concern about the strategic situation in which the Cliff Deal leaves Obama see David Leonhardt 130102 “For Obama, a victory that also holds risks” at nytimes.com. For stronger statements see Noam Scheiber 121231 “Democrats' cliff compromise is bad; but the strategic consequences are disastrous” at tnr.com. Also Paul Krugman 121231 “Conceder In chief?” and 130101 “Perspective on the Deal,” both on Krugman’s blog The conscience of a liberal at krugman.blogs.nytimes.com.) Personally, although I greatly admire Obama, I can’t understand his approach to this episode and its upcoming sequels, perhaps because I don’t have access to the “inside” political information that he does. I would agree that the Fiscal Cliff deadline gave him leverage that he did not use and that that is important less for the content of the Cliff Deal than for his negotiating position in future policy crises. Going forward, I do not see anything equivalent to the leverage that the Fiscal Cliff gave him. This is particularly so because he has already renounced the idea of raising the Debt Limit himself, by declaring that the Constitution gives him the responsibility to protect the “faith and credit” of the USA. Evidently he does see alternative sources of leverage, presumably his ability to bring popular pressure to bear from outside Washington on inside Washington Republicans. As for CONGRESS, because the House is constitutionally responsible for deciding fiscal affairs, during the Fiscal Cliff negotiations, the Senate and McConnell had deferred to the House and its leader Boehner. From the moment Obama was reelected, Boehner knew he would have to adjust Republican positions to accommodate that victory. Moreover, with the 2014 elections in mind, Republican leaders did not want Republicans to stumble further into the pro-rich position in which their failed presidential candidate Romney had put them. Insisting on continuing tax cuts for millionaires would allow Democrats to continue to pillory Republicans. ((On the fate of Boehner’s plan for dealing with a reelected Obama, see the very detailed John Aloysius Farrell+ 130102 “The GOP's failed 'Plan O': Inside the fiscal-cliff Saga.” at nationaljournal.com.) (For background on congressional budgeting, see Lance T. LeLoup 2005. Parties, rules, and the evolution of congressional budgeting. Columbus OH: The Ohio State University Press, 250 pages. On budgeting by state legislatures, see Glenn Beamer 1999. Creative politics : taxes and public goods in a federal system. Ann Arbor MI : University of Michigan Press, 179 pages.) As negotiations began over a Cliff Deal, to his surprise Boehner discovered that Obama intended to keep his campaign pledge to raise taxes on the rich. So eventually Boehner adjusted the Republican position, from refusing to raise taxes on anyone or anything, to accepting the resumption of higher taxes only on the VERY rich. That adjustment was intended to protect Republicans, politically. Nevertheless, young radical-conservative House Republicans rebelled against Boehner, declaring their principled opposition to any compromise with Democrats, particularly over allowing taxes to rise on anyone, including millionaires. The young radicals rejected not only Obama’s proposals but their own leader Boehner’s as well! The negotiation process eventually broke down, not least because Boehner – no longer able to deliver Republican support for anything that he and Obama negotiated – could no longer act as the main Republican negotiator vis a vis Obama. McConnell watched in increasing dismay at the collapse, not only of responsible public policy but also of Republican unity and effectiveness. Finally, at the last minute, McConnell took the initiative of calling his old friend Joe Biden and offering to negotiate some deal. Biden got permission from Obama to answer the call, and Biden and McConnel negotiated a compromise. The compromise passed the Senate at 2am in the morning on 1 January (89-8, only three Democrats and five Republicans against). That bill then went to the House, where radical Republicans threatened to amend it, which would have required sending it back to the Senate, where reportedly Democratic Senate leader Harry Reid would have refused to bring it up for Senate consideration. (For a detailed narrative of the McConnell-Biden interaction, see David A. Fahrenthold, Paul Kane and Lori Montgomery 130102 “How McConnell and Biden pulled Congress away from the fiscal cliff” at washingtonpost.com.) Passing the unamended bill in the House required some delicate maneuvering. Normal Republican House procedure has been to bring bills up for a vote only if the bill was approved by “a majority of the majority.” That rule gives a minority of Republicans a veto over the work of the whole House. Boehner broke that rule in order to bring the Senate bill up for a vote. Probably the radical Republicans in the House could have prevented that if they had been determined to do so. By allowing the bill to come to a vote they in effect indicated that they were willing to accept it. But then, evidently not willing to go on record as accepting it, most of them (151) voted against the bill, which passed (257-167) only with support from Democrats (172). Only 16 Democrats opposed the bill. Midrun “regime shift” 2.2 From the point of view of possible incipient “shift” in America’s political-economic “regime,” the current fiscal crisis is the main current battleground: between a liberal-Democratic regime and a conservative-Republican regime. In policy terms, the liberal-Democratic regime is the legacy of Roosevelt’s New Deal and Johnson’s Great Society, as moderated, defended, and even extended by Clinton and Obama. The Republican Reagan Revolution in the 1980s inaugurated a shift away from that liberal Democratic regime toward a “neoliberal” one (free markets), a shift mostly continued by Bush senior and Bush junior. In political terms, the classic New Deal was achieved and attacked through two strong political parties, both run mostly by professional politicians and both containing a wide range of views. The Democratic side relied on considerable mass mobilization by labor. Both parties are now greatly transformed. It is not professional politicians who choose their party’s candidate but popular primaries in which extremists within both parties have an advantage. Redrawing of congressional districts has produced more and more districts that are “safe” for an incumbent from one side or the other, making those incumbents more independent of the national leaders of their parties. Finally, even the population has “sorted” itself into districts that are increasingly either Republican or Democratic. All of these processes have produced the polarization and indiscipline that plagued the Cliff Deal. And, in turn, the Cliff Deal has aggravated polarization and accelerated the transition from old to new styles of politics. These changing partisan alignments reflect changing political geography. In the 1960s the Democratic party over-rode its Southern faction and finally unequivocally supported the rights of African Americans in the South and elsewhere. In response, Southerners began shifting from Democrat to Republican. The Republican party, whose base was long in the North, has now shifted largely to the South, Midwest, and Mountain West. The crucial last-minute votes on the Cliff Deal reflect this. (See Alex Isenstadt 130102 “Why 85 House Republicans said ‘yes’ to taxes: The biggest dividing line within the Republican conference was geography” at politico.com.) The reappearance, late in the Cliff process, of two “senior statesman,” McConnell Biden, embodies the difference between the old and new political styles. “Adults” from the older political generation had to step in and pick up the pieces of what “kids” from the younger political generation had smashed. This highlights that some “regime shift” may be occurring in American politics and highlights the uncertainty that prevails during such a transition. Going through the normal channels of formal institutions (on fiscal matters, negotiations between President and House) failed to produce a solution. Personal networks had to intervene to save the day – networks between persons other than those managing the formal channels. No one any longer knows exactly how American national policy making works. (On Biden see Michael Hirsh 121231 “Biden May Be the Most Influential Vice President Ever” at nationaljournal.com. For a rebuttal, see Timothy Noah 130105 “Stop acting surprised by powerful Veeps” at tnr.com. On political uncertainty, see Karen Tumulty and Peter Wallsten 130102. “Has the ‘fiscal cliff’ fight changed how Washington works?” at washingtonpost.com, in its Fiscal Cliff series.) Longrun Constitution 2.3 Our theme here is the confrontation between recently polarized American politics (midrun) with the institutional design of the American Constitution (longrun). Most readers will already know that this combination is not working well. The American political system has worked quite well during periods when politics was “multi-polar”: more than one issue dividing political actors in more than one way, so that opponents on one issue often allied on another. For most of the period after the Civil War between North and South, the Republicans who had won the war dominated the North, while Democrats sought support in both North and South. There were many liberal Republicans in the progressive North and many conservative Democrats in the conservative South. There was much ideological overlap between the two parties. Diverse politicians formed diverse alliances with each other on diverse issues. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, many American political scientists expressed disgust at America’s ideologically “confused” parties. They admired “programmatic” British parties, which embraced relatively consistent conservative or liberal principles and were highly disciplined in pursuing those principles. In the centralized British parliamentary system, if a party won an election, it controlled all branches of government. Now, however, both the Republican and Democratic parties have become much more ideologically consistent: virtually no liberal Republics, fewer and fewer conservative Democrats. Democrats vote mostly with Democrats and Republicans vote almost exclusively with other Republicans. Party discipline has increased. The result is that the decentralized American bicameral presidential system is now run by the parliamentary-type parties for which American political scientists once longed. And it doesn’t work. (See Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein 2012 It's even worse than it looks : how the American constitutional system collided with the new politics of extremism New York : Basic Books, 226 p.) ECONOMICS 3 We now turn to the interaction of fiscal policy with economic performance, particularly with the economy’s still slow recovery from the Great Recession. (For academic analysis, see Richard W. Kopcke, Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Robert K. Triest eds, 2006. The macroeconomics of fiscal policy. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 383 pages.) Here the main temporal contradiction is between shortrun and longrun. In the shortrun one must maintain spending in order to propel recovery. Nevertheless, somewhere in the midrun – in a “timely” fashion, as soon as possible – one must reduce spending in order to balance annual budgets and reduce cumulative longterm debt. This problem is sufficiently nuanced – requiring timely optimization among contradictory goals – that it would challenge even a single smart human. Unfortunately, in politics, this sort of problem lends itself to tendentious framings and partisan demagoguery. Thus the question of timing is central to partisan disagreements over American fiscal policy – or at least to how those disagreements are argued in public. Democrats want to continue to spend and invest in the immediate future in order to restart the American economy and generate more revenue. Republicans look at the longrun consequences of continuing current practices and demand the complete reform of those practices – evidently even at some cost in shortrun economic growth. To Republicans, the Democratic insistence on current “stimulus” and investment is just an excuse (in the name of an uncertain future benefit) to continue their irresponsible “tax and spend” ways. To Democrats, the Republican invocation of longrun disaster is just an excuse to demolish the liberal Democratic Welfare State as quickly and completely as possible. Shortrun economic recovery 3.1 One question about the shortrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance is what the impact on the economy would have been of “going over the fiscal cliff.” Higher taxes and lower spending would have kicked in only gradually, over the course of 2013. However, spending would fallen immediately, reducing funding for all government agencies and programs. Further loss of confidence in American decision-making would also have been immediate. Evidently markets expected American politics to reach some sort of Cliff Deal, and would have been unpleasantly surprised if it had not. The other main question about the shortrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance is what the impact of the Cliff Deal will be on the economy. After the Deal, stock markets rallied – but moderately, knowing that more Fiscal Cliffs lay ahead. But the Deal did not meet the requirements of the prescriptions of at least three rival economic theories: Keynesian stimulus, conservative reduction of both spending and debt, and reduction of uncertainty. The best any of these theories could say about the Cliff Deal was that things could have been worse. (See Jim Tankersley 130101‘Fiscal cliff’ deal falls short under three economic theories” at washingtonpost. Also Zachary A. Goldfarb 130103 “How the fiscal cliff deal will affect the economy and deficits, in six charts” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com On any economic theory, fiscal and economic affairs interact. Decline in government spending would slow recovery. The speed and extent of economic recovery greatly affects both government revenues and government spending. Of course, liberals and conservatives have different theories of the connection. Liberal Democratic economic policy is based on Keynes’ insight that, in order to prevent recessions from deepening into depressions, during recession governments must combat them by spending money to stimulate the economy. When severe economic downturn threatens to occur, deficit spending is not only prudent but necessary. Unfortunately, the American political leaders who ran the liberal regime – both Democrat and Republican – failed to heed the other side of Keynes’ advice, that during periods of prosperity governments should run budget surpluses and save the money, so that they would have the resources to engage in deficit spending when necessary. The result was a gradual accumulation of total American national debt, during both recession and prosperity. In fact, along with the Bush tax cuts, the Great Recession has been the main explanation for persistent annual government deficits during the Obama administration. Downturn in economic activity produced both downturn in government revenue and a rise in government spending to combat the downturn (by stimulating the economy and relieving unemployment). Perfidiously, Republicans portrayed all this spending – that Obama had to do in order to rescue the country from the financial and fiscal disaster that Republican Bush had allowed – as just further proof of Democrats’ incurable preference for “taxing and spending.” It therefore became imperative for Democrats, both economically and politically, that the USA recover from the Great Recession as quickly as possible. The postwar American economy experienced periodic recessions, most of them cycles in inventories or inflation. The American economy regularly recovered from those recessions within two or three years. As Obama took office in 2009, the mainstream expectation among both economists and politicians was that this would occur within two or three years. Accordingly, Obama unwisely promised a quick recovery. When it did not occur, Republicans demanded to know why. Their answer was that “big government” taxing and spending depressed economic activity. Liberal Keynesian economists provided an opposite answer, in advance. Around 2009, their calculations showed that the shortfall in demand caused by the Great Recession was well over a trillion dollars. Therefore a “stimulus package” to combat the Great Recession effectively needed to be about that size. Liberal economist Paul Krugman even warned that if the initial stimulus were not that large, it would fail to restart the economy, increasing congressional opposition to any further stimulus spending and jeopardizing Obama’s reelection. Obama judged that such a large expenditure was not politically feasible and instructed that the stimulus package be kept under a trillion dollars. As Krugman had predicted, this failed to do the job – though towards the very end of Obama’s first term signs of recovery began to appear. Overall, one of Obama’s most amazing short-term accomplishments has been to achieve reelection despite that problematic economic record. (For a critical liberal account of Obama economic policymaking, see Noam Scheiber 2012 The escape artists: How Obama's team fumbled the recovery. New York NY: Simon and Schuster 368 pages.) Midrun economic change 3.2 We now turn to the midrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance. Here one question is the exact nature of the Great Recession. During 2009, a deeper answer to that question emerged from economists and quickly spread within the Obama administration. On this academic analysis, the Great Recession was not an ordinary recession but a rare and deadly FINANCIAL form – in the past, financial “panics” that frequently turned into depressions. Recessions precipitated by financial crises are usually deeper and longer than ordinary recessions. It takes a long time for a capitalist economy to get back on track when its basic mechanisms for savings, investment, and commerce have been disrupted. (Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 2009. This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 463 pages.) Another midterm issue with a somewhat longer time scale concerns INTER-GENERATIONAL TRANSFER, in particular between the generation currently in or near retirement and the next generation or two. All Americans pay to maintain the social security system, but not by saving to pay for their own benefits. Instead, each working generation pays for the benefits that go to the previous, now retired generation. This can be a sound system. However, one problem is that – in America, over the past several generations – each generation has collected more in benefits than it had paid into the system in payroll taxes. Other problems are demographic. People are living longer and retiring earlier. Successive generations have produced fewer children than the one before, shrinking the population of young people relative to the population of old people they are supporting. For example, in 1950, average life expectancy was 68 years and 16 workers supported one retiree. By around 2000 the average life expectancy reached around 78 and three workers support one retiree. The ongoing retirement of the large “baby boom” generation will straining the system. (On interactions between fiscal policy and demography, see Alan J. Auerbach, Ronald D. Lee eds. 2001. Demographic change and fiscal policy. New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 446 pages.) The Northwestern University economist Bob Gordon, an expert on American labor productivity (and my college roommate) notes six “headwinds” that may slow American economic growth in the midrun, even if the Great Recession had never happened. We just mentioned two of them: overhang of debt (consumer and government) and the end of the “demographic dividend” (a high proportion of productive young people). Other domestic headwinds are rising inequality, deteriorating education, and government burdens (environmental regulations and taxes). A global headwind is “factor price equalization stemming from the interplay between globalization and the Internet.” Meaning that, increasingly, workers everywhere compete equally.(Robert J. Gordon 2012 “Is U.S. economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds.” Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. (NBER working papers, 18315, August. At nber.org/papers/w18315) Longrun economic growth 3.3 Finally, we turn to longrun interaction between fiscal policy and economic performance. Gordon’s headwinds may amount to a midrun structural shift that produces longrun structural change in the American economy. Between 1860 and 2007, per capita real GDP in the USA grew by an annual rate of about 1.9%. In the future, the six headwinds might reduce that to half or less, as low as 0.5% for the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution! Slow economic growth will increase fiscal problems and constrain their solution, which will in turn contribute to slow economic growth. As commonly described in economic journalism, the structural shift might be one in which many high employing, high paying industries move from America to other countries, including China, of course. In that case, if there is to be a recovery, it is unlikely to be recovery of already lost jobs (though some businesses ARE moving some operations back to the USA). If there is to be economic recovery to a previous level of prosperity , it will have to be recovery to some new set of high employing, high paying industries. Many people hope those might be high technology industries. However, the problem arises that hitech industries might be high paying but not high employing. In fact, the high technology they produce might put low skilled workers out of employment. However, Bob Gordon provides a more pessimistic and profound analysis, concerning the longrun growth in per capita real GDP produced by technological innovation. Increase in productivity – the value that workers produce per unit of time – is what raises per capita real output and consumption. Over the past three centuries the USA has benefitted from three relatively brief waves of technological innovation that have provided the basis for subsequent relatively long phases of economic growth – except in the third wave. The question is, what went wrong in the third wave and is America likely to benefit from any more major waves of technological innovation in the foreseeable future? Gordon says no. Many of the innovations from the second wave – such as urbanization – could happen only once. The first technological revolution (1750 to 1830) replaced animal and human power with mechanical power: steam and railroads. The second technological revolution (1870 to 1900) introduced numerous innovations: electricity and the internal combustion engine, running water and indoor toilets, communications and entertainment, chemicals and petroleum. Many basics of America’s modern economy were created in the half century between 1870 and 1920. Later elaborations of similar technologies produced airplanes, air conditioning, and interstate highways. Thus the second technological revolution laid the basis for eighty years of rapid growth in per capita real GDP from 1890 to 1972. After that, from 1972 to 1996, such growth slowed. The third technological revolution (1960 to the present) was in information technology: computers, the web, mobile phones. However, the spurt of growth in real per capita GDP that it produced was brief, lasting only from 1996 to 2004. Here Gordon’s pessimistic assessment becomes controversial. He has long expressed skepticism about the contribution of IT to actual productivity. From his point of view, the earlier technological revolutions enabled humans to do things they never could have done before. The IT revolution just gives humans new ways of doing things that they already know how to do. Some economists disagree. Nevertheless, Gordon has a striking chart showing the rate of growth in per capita real GDP between 1300 and 2100. (To get such a long run, he links the early record from Britain to the later record from America.) There is virtually no growth before 1750, per capita real GDP languishing at a very low level until then. During the mid 1900s growth surges to a very high peak but then, according to Gordon’s estimates, is likely to plunge back down to the pre-1750 level!
Vladimir Putin held a meeting on implementing social policy measures set out in presidential executive orders, in particular, public-sector wage rises, state support for big families, and the education system’s development. Mr Putin set out the objectives for improving social policy of the state in a series of programme articles during the presidential election campaign. The principles formulated in these articles became the basis of the presidential executive orders: On Measures to Implement State Social Policy ; On Measures to Implement the Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation ; and On Measures to Implement State Policy in Science and Education , all signed on the day of Mr Putin’s inauguration, May 7, 2012. At the meeting, the President said that he has signed an executive order establishing a presidential Commission for Monitoring Progress towards the Socioeconomic Development Targets Set by the President of Russia. PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA VLADIMIR PUTIN: Good afternoon, Colleagues, I have invited you here to talk about the following issue. We have plans set out for our nation’s long-term development through 2020. The majority of the colleagues here today participated in preparing these plans which are consistently implemented. No doubt, life necessitates adjustments at various stages. I am referring, for example, to the crisis we faced in 2008-2009, as well as most of 2010. But overall, we have been generally able to resolve current problems and give the necessary attention to prospects for development and addressing strategic challenges. Our current plans through 2020 and for certain sectors longer-term plans, through 2030 and even further, are not enough to address specific matter in the medium-term perspective. That is why we are adopting three-year budgets and preparing various suggestions for developing sectors in the short-term – over the course of two or three years. Naturally, in our country as in any other, during major political processes or electoral campaigns the people who intend to run the country propose detailed plans to the people, to the voters. Such plans are not pure theories which are only comprehensible to specialists, but ones that are clear to the common citizen as well. Of course, first and foremost, these are plans for the social programmes, since the result of the efforts of any Government, any leadership of any nation, efforts in the economic sector should lead to corresponding results in the social programmes so that people could feel that life is changing for the better. In this sense, our country is no exception and during previous electoral campaigns, including the presidential campaign, we also prepared our medium-range and short-term plans for the economy, security, law enforcement and assurance of citizens’ safety, including in the social sphere. We showed what we will strive for and what results we will try to reach in the near future . Let me point out that when people went to the polls, many factors are at play in making a decision: first and foremost, the factor of trust, as well as sympathy or antipathy, but there are also important substantive elements that citizens always pay attention to. And once the elections were held, government agencies were formed, including the Government of the Russian Federation (gathered at this table are mainly the heads of various ministries and agencies within the Government of Russia), it is certainly expected that we will fulfil the promises we made in the election campaigns. As you know, I expounded on these short-term and medium-term challenges in my pre-election articles, and later, in the executive orders of the President of the Russian Federation of May 7, 2012. Today, we have come together specifically to discuss our work on the absolute fulfilment of the obligations we have taken on. The work to implement these executive orders is already underway; it has begun. We have already held various of meetings where we engaged in a detailed analysis of our progress in fulfilling the state armament programme. I want to draw your attention again to the fact that all of those executive orders are in line with the programme to transform our nation, which was presented during the election campaign, as I have already said. The Government is given specific instructions which must be executed fully and within the deadlines specified in the executive orders. The efficiency of this work greatly depends on its organisation not at a federal level only, but at the regional and municipal level as well. The regions and municipalities must design effective mechanisms for achieving the designated goals and providing the required funding. I am asking you to view these goals as priorities. I am speaking not just to members of the Government of the Russian Federation, but our colleagues in the regions and municipalities as well. “Short-term and medium-term challenges were expounded on in my pre-election articles, and later in the executive orders of the President of the Russian Federation of May 7, 2012. Today, we have come together specifically to discuss our work on the absolute fulfilment of the obligations we have taken on.” In order to strengthen cooperation and coordination between various authorities, a decision has been made to set a special commission to monitor the achievement of socioeconomic development targets indicated in the executive orders of May 7, 2012. I intend to direct the work of this commission myself, and there will be two deputies: Presidential Aide and former Economic Development Minister Elvira Nabiullina, who played a significant role in drafting these executive orders with her colleagues, and Deputy Prime Minister Vladislav Surkov, who is also Chief of Government Staff. Yesterday, Dmitry Medvedev and I discussed this matter. I think these are indeed the best official posts for carrying out these monitoring and supervisory functions. How do I perceive the commission’s key goals? What are they? First, this commission must have access to the full scope of information regarding all the stages, deadlines and mechanisms for achieving the targets outlined in the executive orders. Second, it is under the commission’s jurisdiction to monitor the execution of the planned measures in practice and, as I already said, within the deadlines set in the executive orders. And third, if the steps being taken are not helping to resolve the challenges at hand, additional measures must be taken for adjusting toward the intended trajectory. Colleagues, here are the areas I believe require particular attention. The development points have been established, they have been outlined for the future, for years ahead, but this does not mean that we can now sit back and wait while these goals achieve themselves. Naturally, to reach any kind of goal, we must work every day to ensure that they are carried out. Every ministry and agency should develop timelines with clearly indicated deadlines for implementing specific measures within the framework of its competence. These documents must in the very near future be examined by the respective Deputy Prime Ministers and forwarded to the commission I have referred to, once it is set. I am asking for a work group to monitor the development of these timelines and report back. Furthermore, switching gears now to the social sector, we have taken on the responsibility to increase salaries for teachers, scientists, doctors, medium- and lower-level medical staff, cultural employees and social services workers. That applies to approximately six million of our citizens, employees of federal and municipal organisations. Beginning on September 1 of this year, we are to increase salaries for professors and lecturers at universities to fall in line with average wages in each region. This year, we must likewise increase salaries for school teachers (clearly, we have already reached this targeted level in many regions, almost everywhere, which means that they should be regularly increased to stay within the parameters set), and salaries for educators at nursery schools should be increased to the average income level within the general education sector for each region. Right now, it is important to develop the optimal algorithm for solving this challenge, assuring cooperation and coordination between federal, regional and municipal authorities. Increasing salaries for professors and lecturers at universities is certainly a federal challenge. I would like to request a report today on whether enough funding has been planned for these goals within the federal budget. Now is the very time to talk about it, since we are conducting our most active work on shaping the federal budget. I want to draw special attention to two key issues. First, salary increases should be correlated with the quality of work by specific specialists and the quality of granted state and municipal services. Indeed, we have been talking about this constantly over the last few years. This is one of our main goals. To do this, it is imperative that we transfer over to the so-called effective contract mechanism which means that a specialist’s salary will not depend on showing up to the job, but rather, the efficacy of his or her performance. This approach will allow us to maintain workforce capacity and attract qualified and talented specialists to work in education, healthcare, science and culture. An effective contract should form the basis of a programme for gradually improving salaries of the public sector employees, the programme to be adopted by December 1 of this year. Second, it is unacceptable when low-quality services are paid for using state budgetary funds. We must ensure that the social services are offered only by those organisations that are performing services with the greatest level of benefit for citizens. We can no longer put off conducting so-called structural transformations, structural reforms in the social services sector. I stress again: additional funds we can get as a result of restructuring the network of state-funded organisations will be one of the planned sources for increasing salaries in the public sector. But if we are unable to do this fully and, most importantly, on time, if there still is a serious shortfall in funding after the structural changes involved, in resolving these social challenges, including increasing salaries, then we will need to find sufficient funds within the budget. We all understand this is a complicated issue. The last Cabinet tried to tackle it as well, and some progress was made. Not all of the efforts were successful, and I know that this is a difficult process, but it must certainly be completed. We will need a certain increase in public funding. Then, of course, to abide by macroeconomic targets, and that is the most important thing we have in our public sector today, we will have to review spending accordingly. I would like the Government and the regions to note that this is your area of responsibility; people should not become hostages to inaction or sluggishness by the authorities or municipal governments. And it is up to you to decide on the sources for increasing salaries, but it must be done. All obligations must be fully secured financially. At the same time, I expect that non-public funding will also be used, but nevertheless, you will need to ensure that you maintain access to free social services stipulated by the law and by the Constitution. Speaking of increasing the quality of the social services, I would like to talk about the education system in more detail. It also requires serious structural transformations and changes. We have higher education institutions, which provide students with services that very simply are not in demand on the labour market – very simply, low-quality education. We have spoken about this several times as well. Some of these so-called universities are often unable to even fill their student positions covered by the budget allocations. It is imperative to identify state universities that are working ineffectively by the end of this year. We must develop and approve a programme for restructuring them, in part by consolidating them with better schools, by May 2013 at the latest. If we are able to do it earlier, that would be even better. Improving our higher education system will allow us to boost funding for the best universities and increase salaries for lecturers and professors. What’s most important is to ensure the necessary volume of free but high-quality higher education. Incidentally, this does not mean that we should only provide assistance to the best schools; I am not saying that at all. Rather, I urge the Government to help the promising and effective ones. They are not always the best even economically; there are some universities that have good capacities, good opportunities and great prospects, and we should help them in other areas, perhaps through financial support as well. But I am talking about restructuring the universities that are clearly functioning ineffectively and stand little chance of improvement, and perhaps even removing them from the market entirely. It is the fact that we are also significantly increasing targeted support for students from low-income families. Beginning on September 1 of this year, stipends for well-performing second-year students should increase to 6,300 rubles . This is the minimum cost of living. First-year students who received the grades of “good” and “excellent” in their first semester will be granted such stipend as well. I am asking the Finance Ministry and Education Ministry to do everything in their power so that these funds are provided to the students in a timely manner. Let me stress that in the coming years, we will need to improve the quality of and access to all kinds of education, including through the creation of a modern legislative framework. By the end of July, the Government must submit a draft law on education to the State Duma. I am not exaggerating when I say that it concerns every Russian family. Thus, even during the revision phase for this draft law within the Government and during its discussion in parliament, we should take into account all constructive suggestions from educational and student organisations, as well as parents. There is another important issue that we will examine today: the implementation of measures outlined in the executive orders to support families with many children. One such measure is to provide special payments beginning next year for families where a third or subsequent child is born, equal to the minimum living cost for that child. As you recall, we initially discussed supporting needy families and families in regions with unfavourable demographic trends over the last few years. The documents I have received indicate that 34 of Russia’s federal constituent entities have already adopted the decision to introduce special payments beginning next year. According to the Labour and Social Protection Ministry, corresponding decisions will soon be made in 27 more federal territories. I believe that regional authorities can and should find funding to resolve priority demographic challenges. At the same time, we must provide assistance to regions that have unfavourable demographic situations and objectively lack their own resources, from the federal budget. Currently, 5.9 billion rubles are reserved in the federal budget for providing payments to multi-child families in 2013, 17.1 billion in 2014 and 26.9 billion in 2015. These are preliminary plans, and I am asking for them to be clarified and for corresponding decisions to be made. I am also asking you to report on what has been done at the federal and regional levels to assure timely payments for families with many children. In addition, I would like to hear about the envisaged practical implementation of the programme for the high-priority improvement of living conditions for families with three and more children. One key issue is providing infrastructure to land plots that are provided to these families for free. That decision was made earlier. Overall, people perceive this as a positive step, but the main problem encountered when receiving such land is the lack of infrastructure. Naturally, the availability of infrastructure would radically improve living conditions for families with many children. This is a partial list of the issues that I would like to discuss with you today. Let’s begin our work. 原文见 http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4153
Russia is a social welfare state. We have a much higher level of social guarantees than countries with a comparable level of labour productivity and per capita incomes. In the past few years, spending on the social sphere has accounted for over 50% of overall budgetary spending. In the past four years alone, it has gone up by 50% in absolute terms. Its percentage share of GDP has increased from 21% to 27%. The 2008-2009 downturn failed to undermine any of these social guarantees. Moreover, during this period the wages of public sector employees actually went up, as did pensions and other social payments. But Russian citizens are by no means satisfied with the current situation, and their dissatisfaction is perfectly justified. Social policy has many objectives and many dimensions. It entails providing support for the poor and those who are unable to earn a living for valid reasons. It means implementing social mobility and providing a level playing field for every person on the basis of his or her capabilities and talents. The effectiveness of social policy is measured by whether popular opinion believes the society we live in is a just one or not. I will not discuss the obvious successes. We have made great strides in improving the situation in the demographic sphere, in pensions and in reducing poverty. We have achieved tangible results in the fields of education, healthcare and culture. But today we have to discuss the as yet unresolved issues, as well as the objectives which must form the agenda for the next stage of Russia’s development. Firstly. Many people are unable to make use of their professional knowledge, to find a job that offers them a decent salary and enables them to develop and build a career. Our system of social mobility functions badly and inconsistently, starting from the education system. This problem has worsened considerably in the past few years, at a time when most young specialists have been graduating from universities and entering the labour market. Secondly. The glaring income disparity is unacceptably high. Every eighth Russian citizen still lives below the official poverty line. Thirdly. The perception of the ordinary needs and opportunities of the average Russian household has changed dramatically in the first decade of the 21 st century. Only 10-12 years ago, people's main goal was simply to stay above the official poverty line. At that time, entire social groups, pensioners mostly, were forced to exist below that line. Today, the bulk of the population is making entirely different demands, something to which the social sphere has so far failed to adapt. People, primarily the “middle class,” well-educated and well-paid individuals, are dissatisfied with the level of social services on the whole. The quality of education and healthcare is still quite low, despite higher budgetary allocations. Services that you have to pay for in these areas are still rife. The goal of creating a comfortable living environment is still a long way off. Fourthly. The decline in the national workforce and an increasingly ageing population means the efficiency of social spending has to be increased. We simply have no choice, if we want to preserve and improve the situation. The social dimension of the economy People of different vocations, including businesspeople, workers, specialists and state employees, must be given the opportunities to realise their potential, as well as opportunities for professional and social growth. Firstly. Every specialist, every engineer, agronomist, economist and designer, must be give the chance not only to work in their chosen field but to build a professional career. This means that they must be constantly working to improve their qualifications and skills and studying new applied technologies and production processes. At the same time, the qualifications and aptitudes of each specialist must be clearly visible to employees. As far back as 2006 we agreed with business associations that they will undertake to create a system of professional qualifications. Unfortunately, this has produced very modest results. Only 69 standards have been approved in five years. This is a drop in the ocean, to put it mildly. It appears that we overestimated the interest of major corporations in the national system of qualifications open to small and medium businesses. This means we have to tackle this issue on a national level and involve all the resources of the state. I suggest that the government teams up with business and professional associations and the country’s leading universities and adopts a national plan for the development of professional standards and the creation of an open database of members of professional associations before the year is out. Secondly. Every country looks upon its teachers, doctors, scientists and cultural workers as the backbone of the “creative class”, as the people who contribute to the sustained development of society and serve as the pillar of public morality. We will without fail improve the efficiency of our education and healthcare systems. We will put a stop to the situation where we finance blatantly poorly performing agencies through sheer inertia. But this work has been going on since the 1990s. Organisational and economic reforms have been implemented, managerial systems changed, and external assessment mechanisms introduced. This has so far failed to lead to any noticeable changes in the quality of education or healthcare. It appears that we have overlooked the most important factor -- the motivation of the specialists working in these sectors. I believe that healthcare and education reforms are only possible when they guarantee decent pay for public sector professionals. A doctor, teacher or professor should be able to earn enough on their basic jobs not to have to seek outside earnings. If we fail to fulfill this condition our efforts to change the organisation of the economic mechanisms and renew the material base of these sectors will come to nothing. The quality of medical care, educational programmes and scientific research can be efficiently controlled only by relying on the authority of the professional community. Society has the right to expect the restoration of professional morality, self-management and self-purification of professional collectives as it reviews its relations with the medical, teaching and scientific communities. Public sector pay should be linked to the specific conditions of regional jobs markets. After all, people don't compare their salaries with abstract figures in a statistical handbook, but with what their neighbours and acquaintances earn and what they themselves could earn by moving from the public to the private sector. A mechanical rise in pay for one and all does not work. It is necessary to take more account of the qualifications and professional ratings of employees for their salaries. This means that basic pay should be combined with a more rapid increase in incentive bonuses and supplemental payments. We have made the first step towards concluding an efficient contract with teachers – this is a million people. Beginning this year, the legal entities of the Federation must, with federal budget support, ensure that the average salary of a teacher is no lower than the average in the region’s economy. Starting on September 1, we will raise the pay of lecturers in state educational establishments – up to the average salary for the region. In the course of 2013-2018, the average salary of professors and lecturers will be gradually increased twofold to double the average in the economy. Increased pay must be provided immediately for those with a research background and who enjoy the respect of students and graduates. Each year the proportion of such top professionals will grow. By singling out the best and most deserving lecturers, we can guarantee the continuous renewal of higher school personnel. Resources for the implementation of this objective will be provided by the state – through regular increases in the normative funding for higher education programmes. College and university rectors will be made individually responsible for its implementation – we will insert appropriate provisions into their contracts. In the same way, the pay of faculty members will be gradually increased over the course of several years – lecturers in colleges and professional lyceums, production training instructors, other teachers, doctors, paramedical personnel, research workers in the Russian Academy of Sciences and state scientific centres, and staff of cultural institutions. In the case of doctors and researchers, the target for 2018 is the same as for higher school lecturers – 200% of the average pay across the region. The implementation of this objective will require considerable resources – up to 1.5% of GDP a year. Making use of the significant internal reserves of industries is important here – in particular, restructuring ineffective organisations and programmes. Such restructuring could provide as much as one third of the required funds. In the final analysis, salaries should be paid not for belonging to a certain institution, but for making a real contribution to science, education, healthcare or culture, and for providing specific services to society. The heads of colleges, universities, medical and research establishments should be obliged to report their incomes on the same lines as those introduced earlier for state corporations. Thirdly. A no less significant problem is the professional qualifications and social feelings of workers – those people who make up the backbone of any economy. Long gone are the days when workers had low standards of living and levels of education. Today’s worker is a responsible person executing complicated and ever changing technical requirements. At a time when competitive businesses are regularly updating their technologies and low-quality goods are quickly forced out of the market – workers’ qualifications, outlook, professional pride and ability to constantly learn things have become the decisive factor in staying competitive. Meanwhile some business owners and managers continue to behave as though they were living at the turn of the last century. As if one can establish oneself in the market by skimping on one's employees. Between 2004 and 2010, the economy saw a sizeable (17%) increase in the percentage of workers employed in conditions that did not meet the required standards of hygiene. The proportion of these types of jobs rose from 21% to 29%. Together with the trade unions we have to consider legislation to broaden the participation of workers in the management of enterprises. This kind of participation is practiced, for example, in Germany in the form of what are known as works councils. In Russia, such councils could be responsible for organising daily staff routines – from drawing up work schedules to making plans for social safety nets in the event of the closure of a particular plant, or providing staff training. The skilled jobs market is in need of serious change. We have to provide social mobility within workers' professions. Russia needs to reestablish its labour aristocracy. By 2020, this aristocracy should make up at least one third of skilled workers – about ten million people (25 million including their families). Skilled workers must be included in the national system of professional qualifications. Assessment of their professional competencies and obtaining new qualifications should not be restricted to isolated enterprises, as is the case now. This will improve workers’ chances on the job market, increase their mobility and, ultimately, raise their pay. Fourthly. We make little if any provision on the jobs market to help those people who have the same talents and same desire to work and earn money, but who find it difficult to fit into standard employment conditions. These are above all people with disabilities (wheelchair users, the visually impaired, those with impaired hearing, and members of certain other health groups). In recent years, we have adopted a series of decisions on tax incentives for employers hiring people with disabilities. The government, together with the public bodies concerned, should assess the efficacy of these measures by the end of the year – and, if necessary, take further steps in this area. In the next few years, we must create a system to help every disabled person who is able and willing to learn and work find their educational and professional niche in life: from specialised educational programmes to jobs adapted to an individual's specific requirements. Fifthly. Businessmen still lack confidence in our society. This is largely a legacy of the 1990s, when business as a career, on the one hand, often involved risking one's life because of the criminal gangs who operated with impunity, and, on the other hand, frequently came down to nothing more than dividing up state property. This led to mistrust of businessmen from many people, while businessmen felt mistrust of society and the state. Many of our citizens still have a tendency to regard any substantial property as ill-gotten gains and see big businessmen as high society personages rather than as creative drivers of the country’s development (admittedly some businessmen do give grounds for these suspicions). Theirs must be a story not just of success, but of justified success from the perspective of others, a hard-won success, coupled with an ability to take risks and assume responsibility for others. There is already a massive section of people in Russian business who are set for change and want to live the new way. These are small and medium-sized businessmen, and second or third tier managers. These people are well aware of the inefficiency of the current business model. The young business elite stands a good chance in the next decade – to manage a new type of private corporations, which will accumulate the money of tens and hundreds of thousands of people like them on the Russian stock market. These are public corporations, they have no individual owner and are therefore resistant to corruption and vested bureaucratic interests. While incomes are growing, the gap between the richest and the poorest population groups is decreasing too slowly. Income disparity in Russia is comparable to that in the Untied States but is considerably higher than in Western Europe. A certain degree of income differentiation is logical for a mature market economy, but too large a gap can be seen as inequality and can fuel social tensions. Hence our priority is to reduce material inequality by making social policy more targeted and effective, but above all by giving people an opportunity to earn enough to ensure a desirable level of income. Oil and gas revenue is not channelled into the economy uniformly. We cannot stretch the government’s redistribution capacity any further. I am sure that we must develop new economic sectors and continue to develop the processing sector, agriculture and modern transport and intellectual services. This will allow us to perceive Russia as a more equitable country where everyone earns his or her income with their own labour and talent. And the government will provide targeted assistance to those who cannot earn an income or are too young to work. Pensions and social assistance About 60% of all families receive government payments and benefits. We have increased pensions considerably and will continue to raise them so the increases will not be outpaced by inflation. However, assisting families with children is becoming a priority. The government is taking measures to support families’ desire to have two or more children. These measures, in particular maternity capital, have produced the first positive results: the birth rate has increased, which is a positive factor. However, mothers with more children, especially three or four children, often cannot work and the parents cannot buy their children the things their peers from only-child families receive. There can be problems even when a young family has its first child because the parents have yet to become established in their professions and have to rent housing. It is absolutely unacceptable for the birth of a child to bring a family to the edge of poverty. A national goal for the next three or four years is to make this totally impossible. Today the regional governments approve the size of most child benefits, and it should be said that they are scandalously small in many regions. In 2006, I proposed a package of measures to encourage the birth of a second child, including the allocation of maternity capital that is regularly adjusted to inflation. Practice has shown that these measures are bringing positive results. I think the time is right to take the next step: I propose introducing special benefits for the birth of a third and subsequent children in the regions where the population continues to decline, in the amount of a child subsistence minimum payable until the child reaches three years of age. In practical terms, this would amount to about 7,000 roubles a month. The federal budget will help those regions that introduce this allowance by providing up to 90% of the required funding in 2013, provided the regions gradually increase their contribution to 50% by 2018. This is only the beginning; we should wait to see how the programme fares. If it fares well and the economic conditions favour further development, we will consider ways to help other regions too. It is worth recalling that in the Soviet period various support measures were also provided to individual groups of regions, for example to the Russian Far East. I expect regions with high budget revenues to contribute to this initiative substantially, by shouldering the bulk of the expenditures or increasing allocations to families with children. However, such assistance should not be provided to families with high incomes. It would be correct to grant such assistance upon request. Families where per capita income is not higher than the average in their region will have the right to apply for such child allowances. These benefits would be provided without protracted prior verification, but local tax agencies would conduct random audits of the income of benefit recipients, for example, paying special attention to owners of expensive real estate. I believe that we should eventually use this approach in providing other payments to the poor. We should not stop improving our pension system either. Retirement insurance can perhaps be described as one of our best achievements and also the biggest headache. We spend over 10% of our GDP, or 25% of the “enlarged government’s” budget on pensions. When the economy crashed in the 1990s, we had only one option – to increase the income of our senior citizens to the subsistence level. The very first year after we launched the reforms, in 1992, the real size of pensions shrank by half compared to the year before. After a period when we made feeble attempts to increase pensions through indexing and additional payments, the 1998 crisis provoked a new pension collapse. It was not enough to live on. It took us more than ten years to restore a reasonable pension rate. Recovering the pay and the general income level was not completed until the mid-2000s, but pensions were restored to the pre-crisis level of the 1990s only in 2010, thanks to pension rights valorisation and additional payments that increased the smallest pensions to pensioners’ subsistence level. Debts must be repaid. The Russian government has repaid this debt. Some wonder why the government increased pensions in 2009, soon after the presidential election. They argue that had the government done it today, this would have determined the election results because pensioners are the most active part of the electorate. I can tell them that we did it as soon as we could, as soon as we had the first economic opportunity to do so. Any other decision would have been immoral. Pensions will certainly continue to grow. And – I want to say it again – I am still against increasing the retirement age. However, we should take into account the interests of those who plan to continue working upon reaching the retirement age, who receive a large salary and so would like to delay drawing their pensions in order to increase them. We should stipulate this possibility without undue delay. We should draft a fundamentally new pension policy for the middle class so as to give people broader opportunities for making a responsible choice of scenarios for resolving their problems. Solutions to problems should not be found by the government alone but by people jointly with the government and with the assistance of the government. This presupposes developing the funded portion of the pension system, something that has not worked efficiently so far. The profitability of pension accruals is low, which explains their low appeal. However, unless the funded component is increased, we will not be able to reduce the unacceptably large gap between the salaries of the typical members of the middle class and their retirement pensions. The government can and must pay its retired workers enough for meals, medicines, clothes and other basic necessities. But can high-salaried professionals who spend lavishly instead of saving for the future demand that the government maintain their habitual living standards upon retirement? In the absence of the funded component, this can be only done with deductions from the salaries of those who are still working. But the ratio of workers to pensioners (support ratio) will decrease considerably in the coming years. At the same time, it is impossible to fully rely on one’s savings. When the issue at hand is providing for senior citizens, the government must not only ensure the safety of pension accruals but also their sustainable profitability. If and when it is necessary, it should also complement them with government funding. Education and culture Our system of education should be able to meet the challenges of the times, but this does not mean that we will give up our most important achievement – the accessibility of education. But we are definitely experiencing some problems related to the quality of education. Therefore, I see the following immediate national priorities. Firstly, in the space of the next four years we must get rid of waiting lists at preschools and kindergartens, by for example increasing the number of places in private, corporate and family day care centres. The sanitary and other regulations that currently impede the development of such programmes need to be reviewed. Preschools should be locally available. The organisers and teachers at private kindergartens should be included in the municipal systems of financial and methodological support. Secondly, we need to ensure social equality in education. It is already common practice to select children for the most prestigious schools as early as the first school year, and that selection often boils down to competition between parents. On the other hand, there are a number of big city schools with consistently poor results, where there are practically no outstanding grade A students or pupils who take part in academic olympiads, but they do have a lot of students with learning disabilities or disruptive behaviour, or whose first language is not Russian. In this way, schools stop working as a medium for social advancement, and begin reproducing and reinforcing social differences instead. Children should not become hostages to their families’ social status or cultural sophistication. Schools working in difficult social conditions – as opposed to prestigious “gymnasiums” and “lyceums” which for the most part only work with socially stable children – must be given special support, including methodology, staff and financial assistance. Thirdly, in recent decades, the system of supplementary education for children has lost a large part of its human and financial resources. Only half of schoolchildren now attend extracurricular arts or sports groups, and only a quarter of them attend free of charge. In fact children’s sport, which has always been important for socialization, has been seriously cut back. Although the number of clubs and training centres for children is growing, most of them are geared towards high-performance sports, which leads to early selection and screening of children. The system of supplementary education should become the government’s responsibility as before – by that I mean the regional governments, although the federal government should also provide financial support. The salaries of teachers who work in this system should be gradually raised to the level of school teachers, as their professional qualifications as sports coaches and arts teachers are just as high. As a result of our policies, we expect to boost the proportion of students involved in extracurricular programmes to 70%-75% by 2018, with half of them receiving these services free of charge. Fourthly, school curricula and methodologies have to be revised because there is no hiding from the fact that we are lagging behind in those areas. New high school standards have to provide general access to five or six educational profile courses to match teenagers’ preferences and plans for the future. We must play to our strengths. Russia has traditionally had strong mathematics schools at universities and the Academy of Sciences. We could set ourselves the target of raising the level of mathematics teaching in our schools to be the best in the world within the next 10 years. That would give our country a strong competitive edge. Fifthly, we must streamline the system of state benefits for university students. Those students who are in need of financial support and who would not be able to continue their education without it, should receive a monthly allowance for their living costs – that is, provided that they achieve good marks. This means an additional 5,000 roubles on top of what they currently get from the government. This support should at least be provided to first and second year students who need to devote themselves to full-time study without getting distracted by financial concerns. In fact students themselves should keep a close watch on how this system works, because they know precisely how their classmates live and what their incomes are, and they cannot be taken in by fake certificates. At the same time, we will continue providing scholarships and grants to those who show outstanding results in their studies and research work. Sixth point, we will continue improving the Unified State Examination system. This practice has come under a lot of criticism of late, most of it justified, including problems of transparency in a number of regions, and questions as to what extent it reflects a school leaver’s knowledge and skills. This system should be revised both in terms of methodology and organisation. Independent public observers should monitor the process to avoid abuses and distortion of results, while at the same time preserving the system’s advantages and rational core. By this I mean an independent evaluation of the quality of children’s knowledge and the work of their teachers. But most importantly, this system will give students from rural areas and remote regions, as well as from families with varied income levels an opportunity to get into the best regional and federal universities. Seventh, I cannot agree with the opinion that universities should cut admissions to higher education institutes in order to send the majority of school leavers to vocational schools and associate programmes. This proposal does not take into account young people’s wishes and plans which are in fact constructive and beneficial to society. At the same time, we should discourage the practice where university graduates fail to find jobs that correspond to their specialization, and in fact they do not even try, and simply accept jobs where they are required to learn new skills all over again. This happens because the number and distribution of government-financed places in Russian universities do not match the demands of the labour market. School leavers also see the discrepancy, and, while being admitted to government-financed programmes, they do not even intend using what they are being trained for in their future careers. They do not even have the required skills for that. Starting from their third year, more than a half of full-time students rarely attend classes because they find jobs – often full-time as well – which have nothing to do with their degrees. This means we are wasting a quarter of government financing of education, over 100 billion roubles a year. We must restore the prestige of Russian universities and the high quality of education. It is unacceptable to admit students onto government-financed programmes if they do not have the required knowledge and skills to cope with the curriculum, especially in complicated areas such as engineering. We need to create a system in which only the best students in the required subjects or winners of competitions in those subjects will be admitted to government-financed programmes. The curricula, especially the applied parts of them, should be developed jointly with employers’ unions. Along with other developed economies, Russia has already found the ideal format for training professionals in applied competencies. I am referring to the applied baccalaureate option which combines basic education with specific qualifications that comply with market demands. We must develop this practice consistently. Applied baccalaureate degrees should make up 30%-40% of university graduates by 2018. Eighth, we must establish basic order within the system of higher education. There is a large number of higher educational institutions on the market (including state-run universities) that are in direct violation of the human right to receive good-quality knowledge. Rosobrnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Education and Science) has been ineffective in this respect. I suggest that between 2012 and 2014 our leading universities, with the help of scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences and international experts, conduct an audit of all higher professional education curricula, primarily those in the fields of economics, law, management and sociology. Higher educational institutions that have lost labour markets for their graduates and fail to engage in serious research will be joined to strong universities with established faculties and traditions. This process is already under way. The government will allocate additional funds for the restoration of scientific schools and for necessary additional training of students from the "joined" institutions. Ninth, we must revive the prestige and relevance of training in applied skills, and to tie them to concrete technologies that are represented on the market. As a rule, this kind of instruction should be based on a fully-fledged secondary-school education. In this event, no more than one year or even six months will be needed, instead of three or four years like now. But what will unfold will be a very intense training effort at real workplaces involving the best professionals as instructors. An individual will be able to go in for this kind of training as often as he needs, rather than just once. The government will join hands with employers in order to establish such centres. Vocational lyceums and colleges will become multi-disciplinary centres offering training in a wide range of curricula. To be sure, this should be done with caution so as to avoid ruining the existing forms where they are effective and people are pleased with them. Investment in education will be our key budget priority. Not only does education mean that we are training a workforce for the economy, it is also a crucial factor in the social development of society, one that shapes our values and unites us. In this sense, the role of education is inextricable with that of culture. It must be admitted that we have paid insufficient attention to cultural development in the last decade. We were reassured, on the one hand, by a growing solvent demand for concert and theatre attendance, and on the other, by the proliferation of access to the Internet which, among other things, offers very decent cultural assets. Certainly, the government, for its part, has encouraged artistic endeavours and supported museums, libraries and other cultural establishments. But the scale of these activities did not keep up with the growth of the commercial component of leisure activities. Shows aired by federal TV channels have become excessively commercialised (and many say outright that they are vulgar). As a result, we see a growing gap between support for and consumption of culture: the number of museums and theatres has increased since 1990, while their attendance has declined. It would be wrong to suppress commercially orientated activities in this sphere by administrative means. When all is said and done, people vote with their money. But the mission of culture and the arts can by no means be limited to this, and the government, jointly with patrons of the arts, has a duty to create the necessary conditions for the implementation of this mission. First, we must ensure that each citizen enjoys broad and unrestricted access to national and global cultural values. The government will support the creation of public electronic libraries, as well as museum and theatre Internet resources; it will purchase the rights to the free distribution on the Internet of outstanding films and plays. Second, cultural practices should regain their key role as leisure organisations. We will promote a system of amateur creative activities starting from secondary school, where the position of children's creative work organiser should be introduced (in each particular case the position can be filled by a film director, a painter, a choreographer or a musician), and allocate other needed resources. The important thing is that children should become familiar with Russia's national culture while still in school. Large and mid-sized cities will extend museum visiting hours until late at night. "Museum nights" have been a success in Moscow and other cities. The government will pay special attention to how museums, theatres, libraries and creative societies operate in small towns, where there is the greatest deficiency of cultural pastimes. The Ministry of Culture together with heads of regions should draft a government cultural development programme for small towns and put it up for broad discussion by the intellectual community. Given that a considerable part of museum's treasures remain in repositories rather than on display, our national museums should organise a mobile pool that will fill the galleries in small and mid-sized towns, thereby enabling many people to partake of high culture. Third, we will increase funding for a system of grants to be provided, via competitions, to individual cultural figures and artistic companies, including youth organisations. We should borrow the practice of inviting young artists from different countries and providing them with scholarships, conditions for work, and opportunities to communicate with each other. Many cities in Europe have centres of this kind that are major contributors not only to the quality of the cultural environment but also to efforts to disseminate natural cultures across the world. For our part, we will expand scholarship programmes for young Russian artists, who will have a chance to work in new cities and regions. Fourth, digital television makes it possible to organise national specialised channels. We must have channels dedicated to classical music, theatre, visual art and architecture, literature, history and more. And, of course, we should have several channels of "children's classics" for every age group. Protecting people A fundamentally new legal framework for developing the Russian healthcare system was created in 2011, a well-defined mechanism for the fair distribution of funding to healthcare institutions. Patients will be given an opportunity to choose a doctor and a medical facility. It might take several years for this legal framework to take full effect. In the meantime, a number of problems in the healthcare system will have to be resolved. First. Patients are not satisfied with the quality of medical services provided. This is mainly due to insufficient qualification of doctors and nurses. In addition to ensuring that medical personnel earn competitive wages, it is necessary to assess their professional qualifications within the next four years and to complete it with an updated programme for further training. Professional medical associations must play a crucial role in these assessments. Second. A substantial part of upgrading medical services has to do with arranging medical aid. Outpatient treatment is in most cases much more convenient and cheaper for the government. This is why outpatient treatment makes up a larger share of total medical assistance in other developed countries than it does in Russia. But as we make effort to improve medical services, we should consider that their effectiveness depends on the medication that is used. We must work out a thorough roadmap towards an enhanced supply of medication. Otherwise we will just end up spending a great deal of money on what will amount to a "gift" to the foreign pharmaceutical industry. We have already adopted a programme to develop the Russian pharmaceutical industry and production of medical equipment, and have allotted a huge amount of money for that, over 120 billion roubles. Now we must work on making sure this production reaches the market and on the system of consumer information. The latter is the responsibility of doctors and professional associations rather than of medication and equipment manufacturers. Third. We must work on raising the degree of each individual's responsibility for his or her own health. Otherwise no amount of money will ever be enough. According to statistics, 80% of people in Russia do not exercise while 65% drink or smoke regularly and 60% have medical check-ups only if they are ill. Polls indicate, however, that most people believe they look after their health. Fourth. Protecting health means preventing disease in the first place. A healthy lifestyle is a key aspect here. We will create conditions for free sports facilities that are close to home or work, and combat drug addiction, alcohol abuse and smoking. Housing Since the Soviet period, availability of housing for Russian citizens has increased by 40%, up to 22 square metres per person. The share of communal flats has decreased by 75%. But if we compare this to European countries and the United States, this is a modest improvement. The cost of housing is exorbitant and has been subject to unreasonable increase. Only a quarter of our people have an opportunity to build or buy new property. The experts evaluate that in 1989, a person could collect enough money for a 54-sq m flat in two and a half years if that person saved his or her entire salary each month. Now you need four and a half years to do the same, considering that the relative cost of the majority of goods has dropped and their availability is higher. It is the lower availability of housing that is seen by our people as an aspect that determines a lower quality of life as compared to the Soviet period. The lack of prospects in this respect makes people change the priorities in their lives. Today, we assist war veterans, servicemen and new families to buy property. We help people move from rundown houses where the conditions are unlivable. We determined that we will be able to allot an additional 30 billion roubles for housing for war veterans by the end of 2012. I would like to mention that we will continue this practice – for new families with children, in particular. This is not enough, however. The middle class must have an opportunity to buy property through mortgages. Currently mortgages are not available to the majority of the middle class, especially in big cities where housing costs are unreasonably high. What do we suggest? First, we must reduce the cost of construction – but not through cutting builders’ wages or the money spent on occupational safety, but by reducing the price of construction materials and preventing artificial price inflation as a result of corrupt practices. The construction business is now virtually buried under a mountain of necessary approvals. It seems as though construction companies spend two thirds of their money and time on overcoming various bureaucratic hurdles instead of spending it on production. We will introduce a competitive order for expert assessment of construction projects. Many projects have been waiting around to be assessed for years. Contractors may request assessment by both public and private experts. We will cut back on excessive approval and inspection procedures, with construction companies only able to hand in respective notifications, which should help cut expenses. We must also prevent artificial monopolies among construction companies and suppliers of construction materials at the regional level. For example, there is a monopoly for sand and gravel quarries in some regions. For some reason, these quarries are often owned by relatives and friends of the people who once headed these regions. In total, we can cut the cost of modern comfortable housing at least by 20% and even by 30% in some regions. Second, we should introduce a large amount of land into economic circulation through expansion of metropolitan areas, construction of local road and infrastructure networks (I mentioned this in my article on the economy) and by taking them away from those public organisations that never use them. There is no such thing as "untouchable" property. The land must be given to those contractors that build cost-effective housing, including for public facilities that will be provided free-of-charge (in exchange for restricting the sale price of the property). The government will present a relevant programme no later than this autumn. Third. Mortgage payments must decrease along with lowering inflation rates. We must think about developing mortgage lending institutions such as the building societies that they have in Germany. We started a series of pilot projects in the regions and we will continue to expand them. And last but not least, we will increase support of young families and public sector workers in covering mortgage interest. The money that is left over after completion of the Olympic facilities in Sochi and APEC facilities in Russia’s Far East, and after the completion of the housing programme for servicemen, could be used for these purposes. Fourth. In addition to providing future homeowners with more opportunities to buy an apartment, we also need to create a civilised rental market. Anywhere from one-third to one-half of families in most European countries rent housing all their lives and don’t feel disadvantaged in any way. For us to get there, we need to encourage the establishment of specialised companies run by developers and independent operators. We need to develop standard contracts guaranteeing rights of long-term tenants. Today, all people who rent have to be prepared to vacate premises on short notice. I believe this is important also because affordable housing is an important prerequisite for improving the territorial mobility of our citizens and enhancing economic competition between urban areas and regions. We will proceed to develop a non-profit rental market for prospective low-income tenants. Taken together, these measures will make new housing affordable for 60% of Russian families by 2020 as opposed to the current 25%, and resolve the issue in full by 2030. Housing and utilities Housing and utilities infrastructure is a particularly painful problem for our country. Utilities bills account for a tangible and admittedly growing part of total household spending. Today, consumers are covering over 90% of the so-called economically justified tariff, but there’s no end to what providers are asking for in terms of payments. The quality of a large number of services ranging from janitorial services and upkeep of adjacent areas to housing repairs is far inferior to the price that they charge for them. Information coming from many regions clearly shows that the problem lies in local monopolies and lack of control over providers of such services. It’s also about the inability or unwillingness of local authorities to establish competition on this market. Therefore, unsophisticated customers, most often older people with low incomes, are the ones who suffer most when they have to deal with a monopoly one on one. Regional and local authorities must properly organise the provision of quality housing services and be accountable for this work. You can do this in two ways: subsidise your pet company using budget funds or apply yourself and make the utilities market in a particular urban area attractive to a large number of competing firms. We need to join efforts and get things right in the utilities sector. First. Consumers need to be educated in the legal and economic fundamentals of the provision of housing services. We need to support the establishment of a network of non-profit organisations to organise customers so that they can protect their rights and monitor whether utilities companies meet their obligations. Second. We will establish social standards for using utilities resources, which will help streamline utilities payments. It’s important to develop compensatory measures to protect senior citizens living on their own in large flats provided that they have lived there for over ten years. Third. We won’t be able to upgrade the housing and utilities system if budget and utility bill payments remain our only source of financing. The establishment of favourable conditions for private investors is the key to resolve all issues involved in the modernisation of the utilities sector. The goal of private businesses in the utilities sector is to implement large-scale infrastructure projects as opposed to patching holes with money from utility payments. The cost of utilities will be set for at least the next three years, and tariffs will be calculated based on a formula that needs to be simple enough to be understood both by consumers and investors. Most importantly, tariffs will depend on the quality and reliability of the services provided. Conservation of Russia Our territory is home to about 40% of the world’s natural resources, whereas the population of Russia makes only 2% of the global population. I believe the conclusion is clear. Should we fail to carry out a large-scale and long-term project for demographic development, the buildup of human resources and territorial development, we risk becoming an “empty space” in global terms, and then our fate will be determined by someone else, not us. Russia’s population is 143 million. Experts say that if we keep things unchanged and fail to come up with any new measures, it will shrink to 107 million by 2050. Conversely, if we manage to formulate and implement an effective and comprehensive population conservation strategy, Russia’s population will grow to 154 million. Therefore, the historical price of the choice between action and inaction is almost 50 million human lives within the next 40 years. First. The issue is about supporting families with many children. I have mentioned earlier the measures to overcome temporary poverty resulting from the birth of a third child. A special programme for improving housing conditions for families with three or more children must be in place as well. We will come up with additional solutions, such as flexible hours, telecommuting, nurseries and kindergartens, to promote employment of women with children, which will make it possible to combine motherhood with professional activities. A woman re-joining the workforce after the maternity leave should have the opportunity to attend career advancement training, while the employer that hires her should be provided with some form of assistance from the state. Second. In order for us to be able to address demographic problems, we will objectively need to pursue smart immigration policies built on clear-cut requirements and criteria that preclude potential ethnic, cultural and other risks. We will need about 300,000 immigrant workers a year. First and foremost, we will focus on our compatriots living abroad, highly skilled foreign specialists and promising young people. We have already launched a programme for the relocation of our compatriots to Russia. Let’s be frank: it didn’t work out for us as we planned. We should get back to this issue now that we are in a new stage of national development, and come up with a more effective and comprehensive set of measures to support people who are willing to return to their historic homeland. I have already mentioned in my article on ethnic policy that the key prerequisite for anyone willing to work and live in Russia is the ability to respect our cultural traditions and values. I suggest removing all restrictions for foreign nationals who want to attend our professional training institutions provided they have passed the exams and are pursuing studies in the Russian language. We should greatly simplify the process of obtaining a residence permit and later Russian citizenship for graduates of our universities who work in their respective professions. We should build our social, economic, immigration, humanitarian, cultural, educational, environmental and legislative policies around the promotion of human capital in Russia – not just during election campaigns, but for the long term, a historical perspective in the true sense of the term. The key problem of Russian social policy is not about the amount of resources we use to address social challenges, but the effectiveness and the focus of the measures being implemented. We need to change the situation in the near future, eliminate all sources of loss in the social sector when resources are being wasted or sent to those who can manage without them instead of being sent to the people who need them desperately; when we support institutions out of habit without paying any attention to how their work benefits people; when we have the interests of those who work at social institutions above the interests of those for whom they work. We must reverse this situation in this decade. Each rouble spent on the social sphere must ‘produce justice.’ A just society and economy are the prerequisites of our sustainable development during these years. 原文见 http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18071/
From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Policy Policies are typically promulgated through official written documents. Policy documents often come with the endorsement or signature of the executive powers within an organization to legitimize the policy and demonstrate that it is considered in force. Such documents often have standard formats that are particular to the organization issuing the policy. While such formats differ in form, policy documents usually contain certain standard components including: A purpose statement , outlining why the organization is issuing the policy, and what its desired effect or outcome of the policy should be. An applicability and scope statement, describing who the policy affects and which actions are impacted by the policy. The applicability and scope may expressly exclude certain people, organizations, or actions from the policy requirements. Applicability and scope is used to focus the policy on only the desired targets, and avoid unintended consequences where possible. An effective date which indicates when the policy comes into force. Retroactive policies are rare, but can be found. A responsibilities section, indicating which parties and organizations are responsible for carrying out individual policy statements. Many policies may require the establishment of some ongoing function or action. For example, a purchasing policy might specify that a purchasing office be created to process purchase requests, and that this office would be responsible for ongoing actions. Responsibilities often include identification of any relevant oversight and/or governance structures. Policy statements indicating the specific regulations, requirements, or modifications to organizational behavior that the policy is creating. Policy statements are extremely diverse depending on the organization and intent, and may take almost any form. Some policies may contain additional sections, including: Background , indicating any reasons, history, and intent that led to the creation of the policy, which may be listed as motivating factors . This information is often quite valuable when policies must be evaluated or used in ambiguous situations, just as the intent of a law can be useful to a court when deciding a case that involves that law. Definitions , providing clear and unambiguous definitions for terms and concepts found in the policy document.
让科学在决策中发挥作用 有关科学家如何才能确保他们的研究成为决策的一部分的主意。 来源: NERC 2009年10月1日 | EN Event.observe(window, 'load', function() { var list = $('.article_content .article_index_list') ; if(list!=null){ var html = list.innerHTML; new Insertion.Bottom($('article_index_list_box'), html); list.hide(); } }); This guide, published by the UK's National Environmental Research Council, gives researchers guidance on how they can get involved in the policymaking process. Although it focuses on policy processes in the UK, the advice should be useful to scientists in developing countries. The guide provides compelling reasons for closer collaboration between scientists and policymakers. The authors argue that the main aim of science-to-policy activities should be to ensure that policy-making is underpinned by sound science, but add that it may also help scientists to gain job satisfaction, attract funding, increase collaboration and develop their careers. Background on policymaking is followed by guidelines on how to reach local and international policymaking bodies. Practical advice on what to do and how to get started is summarised in top ten tips for communicating science to policymakers and tools for science-to-policy work. They include keeping communications succinct and the importance of building proactive, long-term relationships with policymakers not just responding when called on. Eleven case studies illustrate how science can impact policy. The guide concludes with examples of opportunities for influencing policy and a list of useful web links. Link to full guide from the National Environmental Research Council This practical guide was written by Helen Clayton and Faith Culshaw of the UK's National Environment Research Council.
Workshop on Tools and Methods for Trade and Trade Policy Analysis Geneva, 11-15 September, 2006 以下是主页和ftp，从workshop主页进去有分类信息，方便查找。 http://vi.unctad.org/tda/ http://vi.unctad.org/tda/presentations/13%20September/Vanzetti/ 【15 September】 CGE-VI-Sept06.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:53 576K Communication with Policy Makers II VM.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:53 147K 【14 September】 Exercise 2_gravity-rev.doc Gravity UNCATD 2006.ppt Modelling Methods for Trade Policy: Gravity Models Workshop TPA - Trade potentials.ppt Using gravity models to calculate trade potentials for developing countries Gravity Model http://vi.unctad.org/tda/gravity.html ? Gravity for Beginners http://vi.unctad.org/tda/background/Introduction%20to%20Gravity%20Models/gravity.pdf ? Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle http://vi.unctad.org/tda/papers/Gravity%20Models_Roberta_Jean/Anderson_van%20Wincoop%20(2003)%20Gravity%20with%20gravitas%20-%20a%20solution%20to%20the%20border%20puzzle.pdf ? Do Free Trade Agreements Actually Increase Members International Trade? http://vi.unctad.org/tda/papers/Gravity%20Models_Roberta_Jean/Baier_Bergstrand_2005.pdf ? Trading Partners and Trading Volumes http://vi.unctad.org/tda/papers/Gravity%20Models_Roberta_Jean/HMR_2006.pdf ? Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? http://vi.unctad.org/tda/papers/Gravity%20Models_Roberta_Jean/Rose_WTO_AER%20in%20NBERw9273%5B1%5D.pdf ? Why Trade Costs Matter? http://vi.unctad.org/tda/papers/Gravity%20Models_Roberta_Jean/Why%20trade%20costs%20matter_ArtNet%2004_06%5B1%5D.pdf 【13 September】 Partial Equilibrium Model http://vi.unctad.org/tda/partequilibrium.html AR_beef.XLS Non-linear Armington model - EU Beef Imports ATPSM.ppt Assessing the agricultural negotiations with ATPSM GSIM_beef.XLS Global Simulation Analysis of Industry Level Trade Policy - 2003 GSIMpaper.pdf PE.ppt Do-it-yourself partial equilibrium modelling Perfect_beef.xls Perfect substitutes model - EU Beef linear.xls Four region non-spatial model data_beef.XLS ===================================== The Toolbox Perfect (single market) Imperfect substitutes (Armington) Multi-region perfect Global Armington (GSIM) Global perfect (ATPSM) ==================================== Some model soft can be downloaded from: www.interceonomics.com 【12 September】 AMAD presentation3.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:53 177K MM Trade Policy wkshop 12Sept06.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:53 3.7M WITS TRaining.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:53 5.8M WITS_TRAINS_Overview_All.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:53 455K 【11 September】 Choosing methodology v1.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:52 103K Vi TDA workshop Sept.06.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:52 106K Vi Website.ppt 24-Nov-2006 09:53 1.1M The UNCTAD Trade Policy Simulation Model: A note on the methodology, data and uses http://vi.unctad.org/tda/background/Partial%20Equilibrium%20Models%20-%20SMART/SMART.pdf
标签: policy
