继 2012年北京大学出版社出版庞中英著《全球治理与世界秩序》一书，《重建世界秩序》一书由中国经济出版社于2015年1月出版，收入了庞中英在21世纪 10年代以来发表在中英文期刊上的一些论文，全书40万字，大十六开，280多页。本书的主题是宏大而困难的“全球治理的转型”与“世界秩序的重建”，尤 其是中国与全球治理转型、中国与世界秩序重建之间的关系，试图回答一些急迫而棘手的全球治理的理论与实践问题。 人大重阳金融研究院高级研究员庞中英新书《重建世界秩序——关于全球治理的理论与实践》于2015年1月出版发行。作者庞中英，20世纪六十年代出生，职业学者。现为中国人民大学国际关系学院教授、博士生导师。兼任人大重阳金融研究院高级研究员；国际金融论坛（IFF）学术委员；北京大学国际政治经济学研究中心研究院；江苏省对外友好交流研究中心研究院；江苏省对外友好交流促进会常务理事。主要著述和研究领域：世界经济、世界秩序、世界和平、世界外交。曾在中国外交部系统工作，任中国国际问题研究院副研究员和中国驻印尼使馆政治外交官。 该书是人大重阳金融研究书系的新书，已出版的还有：《重新发现中国优势》，《谁来治理新世界：关于G20的现状和未来》，《金融是杯下午茶》，《走在山坡上的中国》，《金融消费者保护统合法论》，《十问中国梦：给梦想多一点时间》，《大国的印象:行走世界的日记与思考》，《金融战》，《狙击中国：金融局，华盛顿的掠夺攻略》，《法学院》，《金融服务统合法论》等。（欢迎关注人大重阳新浪微博：@人大重阳，微信公众号：rdcy2013) 附本书目录： 第一部分 全球治理的转型与世界秩序的重建 全球治理的转型——从世界治理中国到中国治理世界 欧洲与全球治理的转型 全球治理的“新型”最为重要——新的全球治理如何可能 G20是西方主导的世界秩序新版本 G20峰会：看上去很美 全球经济治理处在不进则退的关键时刻——评2013年二十国集团圣彼得堡峰会 G20的崩溃不符合任何方面的利益——站在世界历史新起点上，中国能挽救G20吗 既非“金”，也非“砖”——“金砖合作”、全球治理与世界秩序 中国、巴西与全球治理的转型 “新型大国关系”与治理21世纪的大国体系 Debating International Institutions and Global Governance：The Missing Chinese IPE Contribution 第二部分 在全球治理中的中国 中国需要制定全面、长期而可行的在全球治理中发挥不可或缺的作用的国家战略 中国不能再“削足适履”——中国要认真研究关于全球经济规则的国际政治学 Does China Need a New Foreign Policy The Non-interference Dilemma：Adapting China’s Approach to the New Context of African and International Realities 关于中国的“外交红利” 克服内在矛盾，寻求正确方向 为什么“经济上靠中国，安全上靠美国”的观点是荒唐的 “金砖合作”与中国对“新兴大国”的战略 中国提供全球问题的解决方案 论世界价值体系中的“中国价值” China and Global Governance：Will China Finally Take the Lead for the New Globally Governable World China’s Non-intervention Question Issues in the Transformation of China’s Engagement with International Peacekeeping 第三部分 地区治理与地区秩序 Rebalancing Relations between East Asian and trans-Pacific Institutions：Evolving regional Architectural Features 地区主义浪潮陷入低谷 走向实质性与实用性的“亚洲联盟”——面对持续恶化的全球危机，需要重新思考亚洲合作 东亚合作向何处去——论东亚地区秩序的困境与中国的战略选择 日本：在维持与改变国际秩序之间 介入欧债危机符合中国的长远利益 中美利益需要新型大国关系来实现 Forging an Asian Community：Prospects and Dilemmas 转自： http://rdcy-sf.ruc.edu.cn/displaynews.php?id=10809
迪恩·斯通（Diane Stone）教授于1993年获得澳大利亚国立大学（Australian National University） 政治学 与国际关系（ Political Science and International Relations）专业博士学位，至今已出版6部有关智库研究和治理研究的高影响力著作，均为相关研究的必读之经典文献，值得重点推荐！ 这是她的靓照哦~~~ 由于其个人信息量较大，而本人时间较紧，这里不做一一翻译。 请见两个重要的参考来源： ① http://profiles.murdoch.edu.au/myprofile/diane-stone/ ② http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/stone/ 现摘取部分信息以飨读者。（Diane Stone is Professor of Governance in the School of Management and Governance which she joined in July 2013. Concurrently she is a Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick which she joined in January 1996 and continues to teach in the Autumn term. Currently she is a founding member of the Executive Committee and Vice President of the newly created International Public Policy Association (http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/). She is also an Editorial Advisory Board Member of the international peer-reviewed journal ‘Policy and Politics’ (http://www.policypress.co.uk/journals_pap.asp). From 2004 to 2012 she was Professor of Public Policy at Central European University (CEU) in Budapest and a European Commission Marie Curie Chair (2004-08). At CEU she was the founding professor of public policy and graduate degree programs including the architect of the Erasmus Mundus dual degree consortium funded by the European Commission for 5 years from 2007. From late 2010 to mid 2013 she was Winthrop Professor in Politics and International Relations at University of Western Australia.）
为什么中国在国际上鲜有真心朋友？ 澳洲矿业大亨帕尔默周一晚在电视节目上，狠批中国政府拖欠他5亿澳元，并不打算还钱，又指中国企图还想把工人带来澳洲，破坏澳洲的薪金制度，并企图夺取他们的港口和资源，进一步接管澳洲，且毫无司法制度可言，形容中国政府是“杂种”(Bastards and Mongrels)。据报道称，帕尔默与中资的中信泰富有生意纠纷，中信泰富之前从西澳洲运走了价值2亿澳元的铁矿，却没缴付分文。帕尔默称，他并不介意站起来对抗“中国杂种”。 澳洲这个矿业大亨由于与中资的中信泰富有生意纠纷， 加之不了解中国，怒骂，虽然不地道，但尚可理解。可是，那些曾经住在中国很久，并与中国政界接触较多的西方外交人员，回国后也常指责中国，就不能不令人深思了。例如， 加拿大前驻华大使马大维（DAVID MULRONEY）先生最近在加拿大一家大报公开发表文章，给政府出点子，让加拿大如何应对“道貌岸然的中国及间谍”。 他的文章转录如下： 中国的间谍活动不会停止，加拿大应该纯熟应对，而非巧言令色 近日，加拿大政府点名指控「一名由中国支持技术高超的黑客」攻击其国家研究委员会(NRC)。该消息一出，无疑是对近日出访北京的加拿大外交部长John Baird抛出一个烫手山芋。我们确信，他与中国方面的交流是「充分和坦率」的。而我们也可以把其中的一些坦诚用在加拿大。 这次事件并不是中国第一次针对加拿大的间谍活动，却提示我们认真地思考，如何维护这段风险和回报并不平衡的关系。 首先，我们应该无视中国道貌岸然的否认，包括中国外交部周四所指出的，加拿大缺乏「可靠的证据」证明最近有关NRC的事件与其有关。尽管中国素来强调不干涉主义，其工作原理却甚为片面。长期以来，中国的工业化发展战略都是依靠间谍作为去获取关键技术的手段之一。 当然，中国除了间谍，还有别的方法来达到目的。它可以随意地抗议任何对「敏感」话题表示不当兴趣的人。对达赖喇嘛、新疆地区的动荡不安和法轮功学员的困境表达过关注的加拿大的议员、市长、学者和社区领袖们，都曾因此而受到欺压。 这是不可接受的，但也正是真正困难的部分：我们将会看到更多的相同案例。一个崛起中但不安的中国为了推动自身利益，不会从秘密且完全不友好的战略中畏缩。 面对此事，我们必须保持清醒的头脑。但我们也要认识到，我们未来的繁荣、安全和幸福，都取决于我们如何有智慧地保持与中国的关系。 所以，我们要从排除那些巧言令色开始。中国不是我们最好的朋友，而是所有恐惧的总和。我们必须承认和解决，中国对我们的安全带来的威胁。 政府必须带路，但加拿大企业也要加紧脚步。首先是加强安全的意识。高层管理人员由于害怕得罪好奇的中国游客，而对带有安全意识的职员过度统治，这类轶闻已经太多了。然而这份细腻和敏感，在轮到中国招待外宾时，从未得到回报。 明确态度也很重要。中国官员并不害怕坦率的谈话。每当中国政府想要向渥太华发出强硬的信息，我就会被传唤到座谈接受指责。中国驻加拿大大使却时常被小心谨慎地对待。他是一位强硬而且经验丰富的专业外交官。如果我们感到愤怒，他需要感受到我们的痛苦。 我们应支持多边合作，以减少网络间谍活动。必须承认，在爱德华·斯诺登的揭露事件之后，还要做大量的工作来弥补不同思想之间的鸿沟。但我们不仅仅是中立的观察者。我们应该加强与美国和澳大利亚等盟友的合作，打击危害我们集体安全的威胁。 我们应该避免关闭合作的大门。不幸的是，这已经发生，太平洋两岸的企业正在为此付出代价。中国的媒体将美国技术部门描绘为一个主要的安全威胁。这使得它过于热切的监管机构迅速介入，对中国的长期倾向更加明显，从而令外国公司的日子更加难过。这一周，调查人员突然出现在微软驻中国的办事处。同时，美国芯片制造商高通公司的中国业务也正在审查中。像苹果公司和谷歌公司已经感到一阵类似的寒意。 在北美，中国的电信巨头华为是我们的大黑马，它被指控为中国安全机构的代理。如最近的民意调查表明，愈来愈多加拿大的公众对中国表示出担心。 当对方是中国时，反驳谨慎十分困难。但我们正从天真验收跳至完全地规避风险。减轻风险是折中的一步。尽管这种办法仍然存在争议，英国已经与华为达成合作伙伴关系，此举被视为中国公司在英国提供经费来设计检查进程，以减少安全风险。 完整地规避风险，或对中国关上我们的大门所造成的代价，会落在消费者、寻求进入全球市场的小型公司和寻求投资社区身上。 加拿大与中国在自利议题的议程必然涉及在政府、大学和私人部门的范围内的人员。这反过来，让我们暴露于比过去向更高的风险之下。尽管这变得很困难，我们别无选择，还是要保持渠道畅通。 前进没有容易的道路。中国正处在世界交换的心脏，这让我们处于威胁和不确定性的之中。我们需要回应与技巧，目的和信心。唯一比与中国共事更危险的，就是不与它共事。 China will keep spying. Canada must respond with skill, not rhetoric. DAVID MULRONEY The Globe and Mail Published Thursday, Jul. 31 2014, 9:37 AM EDT David Mulroney, Canada’s ambassador to China from 2009 to 2012, is a distinguished senior fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. He tweets Ottawa’s allegation that “a highly sophisticated Chinese state sponsored actor” targeted computers at Canada’s National Research Council threw a wrench into Foreign Minister John Baird’s visit to Beijing this week. We’re assured that his exchange with his Chinese counterpart was “full and frank.” We could use some of some of that frankness here in Canada. More Related to this Story · Canada’s ‘baseless’ hacking claims a blow to relations, Beijing says · Hacking Chinese hacked government computers, Ottawa says · Canadian intelligence sweeps often intercept private data, spy document reveals This latest incident, and remember that it is hardly the first example of Chinese espionage in Canada, should prompt serious thinking about how we manage a relationship that presents such a precarious balance of risk and reward. Let’s start by ignoring China’s sanctimonious denials, including the one Thursday from the foreign ministry accusing Canada of lacking ‘credible evidence’ for its most-recent allegations regarding the NRC. Although China invokes the doctrine of non-interference, it has a somewhat one-sided sense of how this works. China’s industrial development strategy has long relied on spying as a means of acquiring key technologies. Of course, China uses its long reach for objectives other than espionage. It feels free to confront any Canadian who shows undue interest in “sensitive” topics. Members of Parliaments, mayors, academics and community leaders have been bullied for displaying interest in the Dalai Lama, conditions in China’s restive Xinjiang region, or the plight of Falun Gong practitioners. This is unacceptable, but here’s the hard part: we can expect more of the same. A rising but insecure China will not shrink from clandestine and downright unfriendly tactics to advance its interests. We need to be clear-eyed in facing up to this. But we also need to recognize that our future prosperity, security and well-being depend on maintaining our own intelligently self-interested relationship with China. So let’s start by banishing the rhetoric. China is not our best friend, any more than it is the sum of all fears. We do need to acknowledge and address the real threat China poses to our security. Government needs to lead the way, but Canadian companies also need to step up their game. Enhanced security consciousness starts at the top. There are all too many anecdotes about security minded employees being over-ruled by senior executives who are worried about offending inquisitive Chinese visitors. That exquisite sensitivity is never reciprocated when it is the turn of the Chinese to host foreign guests. Being clear is also important. Chinese officials are not afraid of frank talk. I was summoned for finger-wagging lectures whenever the Chinese government wanted to send a tough message to Ottawa. China’s ambassador to Canada typically gets the kid gloves treatment. He’s a tough and experienced professional. If we’re angry, he needs to feel our pain. We should support multilateral efforts to reduce cyber spying, acknowledging that, in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations, there is work to do on both sides of the ideological divide. But we are more than disinterested observers. We should step up work with allies like the U.S. and Australia in combating threats to our collective security. The one thing that we should avoid doing is closing doors to co-operation. Unfortunately, that’s already happening, and companies on both sides of the Pacific are paying a price. The Chinese media are portraying the U.S. technology sector as a major security threat. This makes it fair game for overly zealous regulators, and plays into the longstanding Chinese inclination to make life tougher for foreign firms. This week, investigators descended on Microsoft offices in China. Meanwhile the China operations of U.S.-based chip maker Qualcomm are also under review. Firms like Apple and Google have felt a similar chill. Here in North America, China’s telecom giant Huawei is our bête noir, accused of being a proxy for the Chinese security apparatus. These allegations find a ready audience among a Canadian public that, as recent polling has shown, is increasingly wary of China. It’s hard to argue against caution when it comes to China. But we’re jumping from naive acceptance to complete risk avoidance. There is an intermediate step – risk mitigation. Although its approach is not without controversy, the U.K. has opted for a partnership with Huawei that sees the Chinese company funding an inspection process in Britain designed to reduce security risks. Complete risk avoidance, or shutting our door to China, comes at a cost that falls on consumers, on smaller companies seeking access to global markets, and on communities seeking investment. Canada’s self-interested agenda with China necessarily involves a range of players in government, at universities and in the private sector. This, in turn, exposes us to a higher degree of risk than we have faced in the past. As difficult as this is becoming, we have no choice but to keep channels open. There is no easy way forward. China is at the heart of changes that expose us to new levels of threat and uncertainty. We need to respond with skill, purpose and confidence. The only thing more dangerous than engaging China is not engaging it. 马大维(DAVID MULRONEY) , 2009到2012年间任加拿大驻中国大使，现于多伦多大学Munk School of Global Affairs 任高级研究员。 中国对越南支持一向很多，特别是中国自己人勒紧裤带的岁月里，但是越南以发动战争与侵占中国岛屿领土领海作为对中国的“回报”。在一般中国心目中，朝鲜金氏政权是靠我们中国扶植与支撑着的。但是，据去过朝鲜的人说，在朝鲜所列的前10个友好国家中，中国不在其列。这是为什么呢？
书名：《欧盟贸易决策中的公私互动》（英文版，《政治学与国际关系智库丛书》） 作者：王宏禹 出版社：世界图书出版公司 出版时间：2014 . 6 定价：36.00元 ISBN ： 978-7-5100-7928-3 作者简介： 王宏禹，中国人民大学法学博士、比利时布鲁塞尔自由大学政治学博士，对外经济贸易大学国际关系学院讲师、硕士生导师、经济外交研究中心执行主任；比利时布鲁塞尔自由大学欧洲研究所高级兼职研究员。研究领域主要包括中国经济外交、欧洲问题研究、中欧（经贸）关系、贸易决策等；主持教育部人文社会科学基金项目等若干研究项目；近年来在 Journal of Cambridge Studies、 Journal of Global Policy and Governance 、《欧洲研究》、《外交评论(外交学院学报)》、《学术论坛》、《复旦国际关系评论》等刊物上发表论文十余篇，参编中、英文专著或论文集多部，并担任多家英文刊物的匿名评审人。 内容简介： 本书所探讨的欧盟对外贸易决策制定过程中公、私行为体之间的互动行为，是欧盟决策研究中的关键问题和热点问题。本书将欧盟贸易决策视为一种多层网络内公、私行为体之间在资源相互依赖关系的基础上进行物品交易的结果。本书研究的基本问题是：如何通过比较欧盟对外贸易谈判和反倾销立法过程中的公、私行为体及其资源依赖性互动，来分析公私互动的多层网络结构对欧盟贸易政策结果的影响。研究方法主要是，在34个半结构性访谈的基础上，通过文献梳理和政策文件分析，运用比较研究方法对欧盟对外贸易谈判和反倾销立法中的公私互动结构进行研究。 目 录 Introduction 001 1 Multilevel Networks Approach to European Trade Policy making 009 1.1 European Multilevel Governance 010 1.2 Policy Networks Analysis 015 1.2.1 Explicating Policy Networks 016 1.2.2 The Levels of Analysis of Policy Networks 019 1.2.3 The Applicability of Policy Networks to European Policy Studies 023 1.2.4 Summary 028 1.3 Multilevel Networks Approach 029 1.3.1 The Combination of Multilevel Governance and Policy Networks Analysis 029 1.3.2 European Multilevel Network Governance 031 1.3.3 Multilevel Network Approach 034 1.3.4 Summary 043 1.4 Applicability of the Multilevel Networks Approach to the European Trade Policy Making 044 1.4.1 European Trade Policy 044 1.4.2 Applicability of Multilevel Networks Analysis to the European Trade Policy Making 047 1.5 Chapter Summary 052 2 The Actors and Their Roles in European Trade Policy Making 053 2.1 Public Actors and European Trade Policy making 054 2.1.1 Public Actors and Their Roles in European Trade Policy Making 055 2.1.2 The Institutional Power Structure of European Trade Policy Making 070 2.1.3 Consultation Process and the Goods-demand of Public Actors 075 2.1.4 Summary 079 2.2 Private Actors and European Trade Policy Making 080 2.2.1 Companies and Their Roles in European Trade Policy making 082 2.2.2 Trade Associations and Their Roles in European Trade Policy Making 089 2.2.3 Trade Unions and Their Roles in European Trade Policy Making 100 2.2.4 Lobbying Activities and the Goods-supply of Private Actors 101 2.2.5 Summary 109 2.3 Partner actors and European Trade Policy Making 110 2.3.1 External Partners 112 2.3.2 Consultants 114 2.3.3 Civil Society Organizations/NGOs 119 2.3.4 Think Tanks 123 2.3.5 Media 126 2.3.6 Interest intermediation and the Roles of Partner Actors 128 2.3.7 Summary 129 2.4 Resource-interdependency and Goods-exchange Network Structure 130 2.5 Chapter Summary 135 3 The Public/Private Interactions in European External Trade Negotiations 136 3.1 Institutional Background of European External Trade Negotiation 137 3.2 Public/private Interactions in the Commission 139 3.2.1 Policy Communication and Consultation by the Commission in Trade Negotiation 141 3.2.2 Lobbying and Interest Representation by Private Actors 151 3.3 Public/Private Interactions in the Council 158 3.3.1 Private Lobbying to the Council 158 3.3.2 Private Lobbying to the 133 Committee 159 3.3.3 Private Lobbying to the National Authorities 162 3.4 Public/Private Interactions in the European Parliament 163 3.5 Goods-exchange Network Structure and European Trade Negotiation 168 3.6 Chapter Summary 180 4 Public/Private Interactions in European Anti-dumping Policy Making towards Chinese Footwear (2005-2009) 181 4.1 Institutional Setting of Anti-Dumping Regulation 182 4.2 Background of the Example of AD-FLC 187 4.3 Public/Private Interaction during the Initiation, Investigation and Provisional Measures (2005.05-2006.08) 192 4.3.1 Notice of Initiation of an Anti-dumping Investigation by the Commission 192 4.3.2 Imposing a Provisional Measure by the Commission 195 4.3.3 Proposal for Council Regulation on Definitive Measure by the Commission 204 4.4 Public/Private Interaction during the Legislation of Definitive Measure (2006.08-2008.10) 213 4.4.1 Imposing a Definitive Measure by the Council 214 4.4.2 Initiating an Investigation on Possible Circumvention by the Commission 215 4.4.3 Notice of the Impending Expiry of Anti-dumping Measures by the Commission 217 4.4.4 Proposal for Council Regulation on Extending Anti-Dumping Measures to Macao SAR by the Commission 218 4.4.5 Extending the Definitive Anti-dumping Measures to Macao SAR by the Council 221 4.5 Public/Private Interaction during the Expiry Review and Extension (2008.10-2009.12) 222 4.5.1 Initiation of Expiry Review of Anti-dumping Measures by the Commission 222 4.5.2 Imposing a Definitive anti-dumping Duty on Footwear from China and Macao SAR by the Commission and the Council 224 4.6 Goods-exchange Network Structure and Anti-Dumping Policy Making 233 4.7 Chapter Summary 238 Conclusions 239 Reference 247 Index 1 271 Index 2 275 Acknowledgement 277
标签: 国际关系
