伊姆雷拉卡托斯（ Imre Lakatos ）（ 1922-1974 ），著名数学哲学家和科学哲学家，当代西方科学哲学历史学派主要代表人物之一。国内有其《科学研究纲领方法论》译本。拉卡托斯与波普尔的证伪主义方法论与库恩的非理性主义科学心理学不同，他提出了一个理论演替的合理的动态的科学发展模式，主张以科学史检验科学方法论，并倡导以典型历史实例进行案例研究的方法。他提出科学研究纲领（ scientific research programme ）的概念，并且认为科学进步是由进步性的研究纲领（ progressive research programme ）取代退步性的研究纲领（ degenerating research programme ）或进步性的问题转移（ progressive problem-shift ）达成的。 On close inspection both Popperian crucial experiments and Kuhnian revolutions turn out to be myths: what normally happens is that progressive research programmes replace degenerating ones. 他指出理性评论的单位实是一个科学研究纲领，即是一整串不停发展及不断修正的理论。进步性的科学研究纲领乃是指新的研究纲领较前一个纲领有更多的实情內容，亦即指能预测若干新的前所未有的事实；实情上进步則指这种进步的实情內容是可证实的。相反的，假若科学研究纲领仅是因为不断发现的新事实面调整其內容，則称之为退步的。应接受哪一个研究纲领 , ，应看长期表现。 以下《科学与伪科学》英文版本从伦敦经济政治学院（ The London School of Economics and Political Science ， LSE ）（ http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/lakatos/scienceAndPseudoscienceTranscript.htm ）转贴；中文版本在天涯杂谈上找到（ http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/Content/no01/1/295541.shtml ），自《科学研究纲领方法论》，上海译文出版社， 2005 年。 Science and Pseudoscience 科学与伪科学 【 NB The following transcript of the talk contains additional passages that Lakatos subsequently included in the text version of his talk published in Philosophy in the Open and in The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers Volume 1. They are highlighted in italics within square brackets. Other passages he omitted from the published text are emboldened. 】 Man's respect for knowledge is one of his most peculiar characteristics. Knowledge in Latin is scientia, and science came to be the name of the most respectable kind of knowledge. But what distinguishes knowledge from superstition, ideology or pseudoscience? The Catholic Church excommunicated Copernicans, the Communist Party persecuted Mendelians on the ground that their doctrines were pseudoscientific. But then the problem of the demarcation between science and pseudoscience is not merely a problem of armchair philosophy: it is of vital social and political relevance. 尊重知识是人最突出的特征之一。拉丁文知识为 scientia ，从而 science （科学）一词便成为最受尊敬的那一部分知识的名称。但是，知识与迷信、空想或伪科学的区别是什么呢？天主教教会借口说哥白尼理论是伪科学而开除了日心论者的教籍，前苏联共产党借口说孟德尔学说是伪科学而迫害了孟德尔论者。可见科学与伪科学的分界不全然是一个书斋里的哲学问题：它是一个与社会和政治息息相关的问题。 Many philosophers have tried to solve the problem of demarcation in the following terms: a statement constitutes knowledge if sufficiently many people believe it sufficiently strongly. But the history of thought shows us that many people were totally committed to absurd beliefs. If the strengths of beliefs were a hallmark of knowledge, we should have to rank some tales about demons, angels, devils, and of heaven and hell as knowledge. Scientists, on the other hand, are very sceptical even of their best theories. Newton's is the most powerful theory science has yet produced, but Newton himself never believed that bodies attract each other at a distance. So no degree of commitment to beliefs makes them knowledge. Indeed, the hallmark of scientific behaviour is a certain scepticism even towards one's most cherished theories. Blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue: it is an intellectual crime. 许多哲学家试图按照下面的说法来解决分界问题：如果足够多的人足够强烈地相信一个陈述，那么，这个陈述就构成了知识。但是，思想史告诉我们，许多人完全虔信荒唐的信仰。如果信仰的强度是知识的标志，我们就不得不不把关于神灵、天使、魔鬼和天堂、地狱的某些故事看作知识。另一方面，科学家们甚至对自己最好的理论也是非常怀疑的。牛顿理论是科学所曾产生的最有力的理论，但牛顿本人从不相信超距的物体会互相吸引。因此，不管怎样虔信，都不能使信仰成为知识。实际上，科学行为的标志是甚至对自己最珍爱的理论也持某种怀疑态度。盲目虔信一个理论不是理智的美德，而是理智的罪过。 Thus a statement may be pseudoscientific even if it is eminently 'plausible' and everybody believes in it, and it may be scientifically valuable even if it is unbelievable and nobody believes in it. A theory may even be of supreme scientific value even if no one understands it, let alone believes in it. 因此，即使一个陈述似乎非常 有理 ，每一个人都相信它，它也可能是伪科学的；而一个陈述即使是不可信的，没有人相信它，它在科学上也可能是有价值的。一个理论即使没有人理解它，更不用说相信它了，它也可能具有至高的科学价值。 The cognitive value of a theory has nothing to do with its psychological influence on people's minds. Belief, commitment, understanding are states of the human mind. But the objective, scientific value of a theory is independent of the human mind which creates it or understands it. Its scientific value depends only on what objective support these conjectures have in facts. As Hume said: 一个理论的认识价值与它对人们的心智的心理影响毫无关系。信仰、虔信、理解是人类心智的状态，但理论的客观的、科学的价值与创造理论或理解理论的人类心智无关。它的科学价值只取决于这些猜测事实上所得到的客观支持。正如休谟所说的那样： If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames. For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. 如果我们拿起任何一本书，例如，关于神学或学院形而上学的著作。让我们问一下，它包含任何涉及量或数的抽象推理吗？没有。它包含任何涉及事实和存在的经验的推理吗？没有。那就将它付之一炬，因为它含有的不过是诡辩和幻想。 But what exactly is 'experimental' reasoning? 但什么是 经验的 推理？如果我们看一下 17 世纪关于巫术的浩瀚文献，它充斥着关于认真观察和宣誓证词甚至实验的报告。早期皇家协会的住会哲学家格兰维尔把巫术看成经验推理的范例。在我们按休谟的说法去焚书之前，我们必须首先明确什么是经验推理。 In scientific reasoning, theories are confronted with facts; and one of the central conditions of scientific reasoning is that theories must be supported by facts. Now how exactly can facts support theory? 在科学推理中，理论要面对事实；科学推理的主要条件之一就是理论必须得到事实的支持。那么，事实能够在多大程度上支持理论呢？ Several different answers have been proposed. Newton himself thought that he proved his laws from facts. He claimed that he deduced his laws from the 'phenomena' provided by Kepler. But his boast was nonsense, since according to Kepler, planets move in ellipses, but according to Newton's theory, planets would move in ellipses only if the planets did not disturb each other in their motion. But they do. This is why Newton had to devise a perturbation theory from which it follows that no planet moves in an ellipse. 人们已经提出了几种不同的答案。牛顿本人认为事实证明了他的定律，他以不作纯假说而感到自豪：他只发表由事实得到证明的理论。尤其是，他声称他由开普勒所提供的 现象 推出了自己的定律。但他这一吹嘘却大谬不然，因为，开普勒认为，行星沿椭圆轨道运行；而按照牛顿的理论，只有当行星在运行中互不干扰时，它们才沿椭圆轨道运行。但是，行星实际上是相互干扰的。这就是牛顿不得不发明摄动理论的原因，由此理论推知，任何行星都不按椭圆轨道运行。 One can today easily demonstrate that there can be no valid derivation of a law of nature from any finite number of facts; but we still keep reading about scientific theories being proved from facts. Why this stubborn resistance to elementary logic? 今天，人们可以很容易地证明，从任何有限数量的事实中不可能合法地推出一条自然定律；但我们仍然不断地获悉由事实证明地科学理论。为什么对基本逻辑的抵抗会这样顽强呢？ There is a very plausible explanation. Scientists want to make their theories respectable, deserving of the title 'science', that is, genuine knowledge. Now the most relevant knowledge in the seventeenth century, when science was born, concerned God, the Devil, Heaven and Hell. If one got one's conjectures about matters of divinity wrong, the consequence of one's mistake was no less than eternal damnation. Theological knowledge cannot be fallible: it must be beyond doubt. Now the Enlightenment thought that we were fallible and ignorant about matters theological. There is no scientific theology and, therefore, no theological knowledge. Knowledge can only be about Nature, but this new type of knowledge had to be judged by the standards they took over straight from theology: it had to be proven beyond doubt. Science had to achieve the very certainty which had escaped theology. A scientist, worthy of the name, was not allowed to guess: he had to prove each sentence he uttered from facts. This was the criterion of scientific honesty. Theories unproven from facts were regarded as sinful pseudoscience, heresy in the scientific community. 对此有这样一个非常可信的说明。科学家想使自己的理论受到尊敬，配得上 科学 即真正的知识这个称号。在科学诞生的 17 世纪中，大多数重要的知识都与上帝、魔鬼、天堂和地狱有关。如果一个人对关于神学的事情作了错误的猜测，那么他就要为此遭到永久的谴责。神学知识是不容出错的：它必须是不容怀疑的。而启蒙运动认为我们是可以出错的；而且对神学的东西，我们是无知的。科学的神学是没有的，因而神学的知识也是不存在的。知识只能是关于自然的。但这种新型的知识却不得不根据它们直接由神学继承过来的标准加以判定：它必须被证明是确凿无疑的。科学必须达到神学未达到的那种确实性。一个名副其实的科学家是不容许猜测的：他必须由事实来证明他所说的每一句话。这就是科学诚实性的标准。未经事实证明的理论在科学界被认为是罪孽深重的伪科学和异端。 It was only the downfall of Newtonian theory in this century which made scientists realize that their standards of honesty had been utopian. If all scientific theories are equally unprovable, what distinguishes scientific knowledge from ignorance, science from pseudoscience? 只是由于本世纪中牛顿理论的垮台，才使科学家们认识到他们的诚实性标准原来是乌托邦。在爱因斯坦之前，大多数科学家认为牛顿通过事实的证明已经揭示出了上帝的最终定律。在 19 世纪初，安培感到他必须把自己有关对电磁学的推测的一本书叫做：《明确地由实验推出地关于电动现象地数学理论》。但在该书的末尾，他漫不经心地承认有一些实验从未进行过，甚至连必要的仪器也未曾建造过！如果所有科学理论都是同样不可证明的，那么科学知识与无知、科学与伪科学的区别到底是什么呢？ One answer to this question was provided in the twentieth century by 'inductive logicians'. Inductive logic set out to define the probabilities of different theories according to the available total evidence. If the mathematical probability of a theory is high, it qualifies as scientific; if it is low or even zero, it is not scientific. Thus the hallmark of scientific honesty would be never to say anything that is not at least highly probable. 20 世纪的 归纳逻辑学家 对这个问题提出了一个答案。归纳逻辑根据可资利用的全部证据来着手确定不同理论的概率。如果一个理论的数学概率很高，它就够得上科学的资格；如果它的概率很低，甚至概率是零，它就不是科学的。因而，科学诚实性的标志就在于永远只讲至少有很高或然性的事情。概率主义具有一个吸引人的特点：它不是在科学与伪科学之间提出一种截然分明的区别，而是提出一个从概率低的差理论到概率高的好理论的连续的尺度。 But, in 1934, Karl Popper, one of the most influential philosophers of our time, argued that the mathematical probability of all theories, scientific or pseudoscientific, given any amount of evidence is zero. If Popper is right, scientific theories are not only equally unprovable but also equally improbable. 但是，当代最有影响的哲学家之一卡 尔 波普尔于 1934 年论证到，在任何特定数量的证据下，所有理论，无论是科学的理论还是伪科学的理论，其数学概率都等于零。如果波普尔是正确的，那么，科学理论不仅是同样不可证明的，而且是同样不可证伪的。 A new demarcation criterion was needed and Popper proposed a rather stunning one. A theory is 'scientific' if one is prepared to specify in advance a crucial experiment (or observation) which can falsify it, and it is pseudoscientific if one refuses to specify such a 'potential falsifier'. But if so, we do not demarcate scientific theories from pseudoscientific ones, but rather scientific methods from non-scientific method. Thus a proposition may petrify into pseudo-scientific dogma or become genuine knowledge, depending on whether we are prepared to state observable conditions which would refute it. 这就需要一个新的分界标准，波普尔提出了一个相当惊人的分界标准。一个理论即使没有丝毫有利于它的证据，也可能是科学的；而即使所有的现有证据都支持一个理论，它也可能是伪科学的。也就是说，确定一个理论的科学性质或非科学性质可不依靠事实。假如人们事先就能规定出一项能够证伪理论的判决性实验（或观察），那么该理论便是 科学的 ；假如人们拒绝规定这样的一种 潜在的证伪者 ，该理论便是伪科学的。但如果这样的话，我们就不是区分科学的理论和伪科学的理论，而是区分科学的方法和非科学的方法了。波普尔论者认为，如果马克思主义者准备规定一些事实，这些事实一旦被发现，就会使他们放弃马克思主义，那么，马克思主义就是科学的。如果他们拒绝这样做，马克思主义就成了伪科学。有什么可能事件将使马克思主义者放弃自己的马克思主义，向马克思主义者提出这样的问题总是有趣的。如果他虔信马克思主义，那么他必然会感到规定一种可以证伪马克思主义的情况是不道德的。因而，根据我们是否准备规定可以反驳一个命题的可观察条件，该命题或许僵化为伪科学的教条，或许变为真正的知识。 Is, then, Popper's falsifiability criterion the solution to the problem of demarcating science from pseudoscience? No. For Popper's criterion ignores the remarkable tenacity of scientific theories. Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory because facts contradict it. They normally either invent some rescue hypothesis to explain what they then call a mere anomaly and if they cannot explain the anomaly, they ignore it, and direct their attention to other problems. Note that scientists talk about anomalies, and not refutations. History of science, of course, is full of accounts of how crucial experiments allegedly killed theories. But all such accounts are fabricated long after the theory has been abandoned. 那么，波普尔的可证伪性标准解决了科学与伪科学的分界问题吗？没有。因为波普尔的标准忽视了科学理论明显的坚韧性。科学家的脸皮很厚，他们不会只因为事实与理论相矛盾就放弃理论。他们通常发明某种挽救假说以说明他们届时称为只是一种反常的东西，如果不能说明这一反常，他们便不理会它，而将注意力转向其他的问题。注意，科学家谈论的是反常、顽例，而不是反驳。当然，科学史充满了理论如何被所谓的判决性实验所扼杀的说法。但这些说法是理论被放弃之后很久才杜撰出来的。假如波普尔问牛顿派科学家，在什么实验条件下他将放弃牛顿理论，某些牛顿派科学家就会像一些马克思主义者一样不知所措。 What, then, is the hallmark of science? Do we have to capitulate and agree that a scientific revolution is just an irrational change in commitment, that it is a religious conversion? Tom Kuhn, a distinguished American philosopher of science, arrived at this conclusion after discovering the naivety of Popper's falsificationism. But if Kuhn is right, then there is no explicit demarcation between science and pseudoscience, no distinction between scientific progress and intellectual decay, there is no objective standard of honesty. But what criteria can he then offer to demarcate scientific progress from intellectual degeneration ? 那么，什么是科学的标志呢？难道我们不得不投降并赞同科学革命只是一种信念的非理性变化，是一种宗教的皈依吗？杰出的美国科学哲学家汤姆 #8226; 库恩在发现了波普尔证伪主义的朴素性之后得出了这个结论。但是，假如库恩是正确的，那么科学与伪科学之间就没有明确的分界，科学进步与知识退化就没有区别，就没有客观的诚实性标准。那么，他能够提出什么标准以区分科学进步与知识退化呢？ In the last few years I have been advocating a methodology of scientific research programmes, which solves some of the problems which both Popper and Kuhn failed to solve. 最近几年，我一直在倡导科学研究纲领方法论，它解决了某些波普尔和库恩所未能解决的问题。 First, I claim that the typical descriptive unit of great scientific achievements is not an isolated hypothesis but rather a research programme. 'All swans are white' may be falsified by the discovery of one black swan. But such trivial trial and error does not rank as science. Newtonian science, for instance, is not simply a set of four conjectures - the three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation. These four laws constitute only the 'hard core' of the Newtonian programme. But this hard core is tenaciously protected from refutation by a vast 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses. And, even more importantly, the research programme also has a 'heuristic', that is, a powerful problem-solving machinery, which, with the help of sophisticated mathematical techniques, digests anomalies and even turns them into positive evidence. For instance, if a planet does not move exactly as it should, the Newtonian scientist checks his conjectures concerning atmospheric refraction, concerning propagation of light in magnetic storms, and hundreds of other conjectures which are all part of the programme. He may even invent a hitherto unknown planet and calculate its position, mass and velocity in order to explain the anomaly. 首先，我主张典型的描述重大科学成就的单位不是孤立的假说，而是一个研究纲领。科学决不是试错法、一系列的猜测与反驳。 所有天鹅都是白的 可以由于发现一只黑天鹅而被证伪。但这种不足道的试错法算不上是科学。例如，牛顿科学决不是四个猜测 力学三定律和万有引力定律 的组合。这四个定律只构成了牛顿纲领的 硬核 ，而一个巨大的辅助假说 保护带 顽强地保护这一硬核使之不致遭到反驳。更重要的是，牛顿研究纲领还有一个 启发法 ，即一种有力的解题手段，借助于复杂地数学技术以消化反常，甚至把反常变成肯定地证据。例如，如果一颗行星的运行出现了反常，牛顿派科学家就会检查他关于大气折射的猜测、关于光线在磁暴中传播的猜测以及成百上千的其他猜测，这些猜测都是牛顿纲领的组成部分。他甚至可以发明一颗迄今不为人知的行星并计算出它的位置、质量和速度以说明行星运行的反常。 Now, Newton's theory of gravitation, Einstein's relativity theory, quantum mechanics, Marxism, Freudism, are all research programmes, each with a characteristic hard core stubbornly defended, each with its more flexible protective belt and each with its elaborate problem-solving machinery. Each of them, at any stage of its development, has unsolved problems and undigested anomalies. All theories, in this sense, are born refuted and die refuted. But are they equally good? Until now I have been describing what research programmes are like. But how can one distinguish a scientific or progressive programme from a pseudoscientific or degenerating one? 牛顿的万有引力理论、爱因斯坦的相对论、量子力学、马克思主义、弗洛伊德主义都是研究纲领，它们各有一个受到顽强保护的独特的硬核，各有自己较为灵活的保护带，并且各有自己精心考虑的解题手段。这些研究纲领在自己发展的任何阶段上，都有未解决的问题和未消化的反常。从这一意义上说，所有理论之遭受反驳是与生而来、随死而去的。但所有这些研究纲领都是同样好的吗？直到现在我还是在描述研究纲领是怎样的东西，但怎样才能区分科学的或进步的纲领与伪科学的或退化的纲领呢？ Contrary to Popper, the difference cannot be that some are still unrefuted, while others are already refuted. Kaufmann, a distinguished physicist, refuted Einstein's relativity theory in the very year it was published. But all the research programmes I admire have one characteristic in common. They all predict novel facts, facts which had been either undreamt of, or have indeed been contradicted by previous or rival programmes. In 1686, when Newton published his theory of gravitation, there were, for instance, two current theories concerning comets. The more popular one regarded comets as a signal from an angry God warning that He will strike and bring disaster. A little known theory of Kepler's held that comets were celestial bodies moving along straight lines. Now according to Newtonian theory, some of them moved in hyperbolas or parabolas never to return; others moved in ordinary ellipses. Halley, working in Newton's programme, calculated on the basis of observing a brief stretch of a comet's path that it would return in seventy-two year's time; he calculated to the minute when it would be seen again at a well-defined point of the sky. This was incredible. But seventy-two years later, Halley's comet returned exactly as Halley predicted. Similarly, Newtonian scientists predicted the existence and exact motion of small planets which had never been observed before. Thus, in a progressive research programme, theory leads to the discovery of hitherto unknown novel facts. 与波普尔的观点相反，它们之间的区别不在于有的纲领尚未遭到反驳，而其他的纲领已经遭到反驳。当牛顿发表他的《原理》时，它甚至不能适当地说明月球的运动，这是众所周知的；事实上，月球的运动反驳了牛顿。就在爱因斯坦相对论发表的那一年，杰出的物理学家考夫曼就反驳了相对论。但我所敬佩的所有纲领都与一个共同的特点，它们都预测了新颖的事实，这些事实要么是先前的纲领所梦想不到的，要么是实际上与先前的或竞争的纲领相矛盾。例如，当 1686 年牛顿发表他的万有引力理论时，关于彗星有两种流行的理论。其中较为流行的一种理论认为彗星是上帝愤怒的信号，预示他要打击人类并使人类遭难。另一个鲜为人们所知的开普勒理论认为，彗星是沿直线运动的天体。现在，牛顿理论认为，有一些彗星沿双曲线或抛物线运行，永远不再返回；另外一些彗星沿普通的椭圆轨道运行。按牛顿纲领从事研究的哈雷，观察了一颗彗星的一段轨道，据此计算出它将在 72 年的时间内返回，计算出它再次出现在天空某个明确规定的点上的时刻，精确至分钟，这是难以置信的。但 72 年之后，牛顿和哈雷都去世很久了，哈雷彗星正像哈雷所预测的那样再次出现了。同样地，牛顿派科学家还预测了过去从未被观察到的小行星的存在及其精确的运行轨道。让我们再以爱因斯坦的纲领为例。爱因斯坦作出了惊人的预测，如果在晚上测量两颗恒星之间的距离，并且再在白天测量这两颗恒星之间的距离（在日食的时候可观察到它们），两次测量的结果将是不同的。在爱因斯坦的纲领之前，没有人想到过作这种观察。因此，在一个进步的研究纲领中，理论导致发现迄今不为人们所知的新颖事实。 In degenerating programmes, however, theories are fabricated only in order to accommodate known facts. Has, for instance, Marxism ever predicted a stunning novel fact successfully? Never! It has some famous unsuccessful predictions. It predicted the absolute impoverishment of the working class. It predicted that the first socialist revolution would take place in the industrially most developed society. It predicted that socialist societies would be free of revolutions. It predicted that there will be no conflict of interests between socialist countries. Thus the early predictions of Marxism were bold and stunning, but they failed. 相反，在退化的研究纲领中，理论只是为了适应已知的事实才构造出来的。例如，马克思主义可曾成功地预测过惊人的新颖事实没有？从来没有！它只有一些著名的失败的预测。它预测过工人阶级的绝对贫困。它预测过第一次社会主义革命将发生在工业最发达的社会。它预测过社会主义社会将不再发生革命。它预测过在社会主义国家之间将没有任何厉害冲突。可见，马克思主义的这些早期预言是大胆的、惊人的，但这些预言都破产了。 Marxism 'explained' all its failures. It 'explained' the rising living standards of the working class by devising a theory of imperialism; it 'explained' even why the first socialist revolution occurred in industrially backward Russia. It 'explained' Berlin 1953, Budapest 1956, Prague 1968. It 'explained' the Russian-Chinese conflict. But their auxiliary hypotheses were all cooked up after the event to protect Marxian theory from the facts. The Newtonian programme led to novel facts; the Marxian programme lagged behind the facts and has been running fast to catch up with them. 马克思主义者对他们所有的失败作了说明：他们发明了一个帝国主义论来说明工人阶级生活水平的不断提高；他们甚至说明了为什么第一次社会主义革命发生在工业落后的俄国。他们 说明 了 1953 年的柏林事件、 1956 年的布达佩斯起义、 1968 年的布拉格之春。他们 说明 了俄华冲突。但他们的辅助假说都是事后为了保护马克思主义理论不受事实的反驳而编造出来的。牛顿的纲领导致新颖的事实；而马克思主义的纲领落后于事实，并正在迅速奔跑以赶上事实。 To sum up: so-called 'refutations' are not the hallmark of empirical failure, as Popper has preached, since all programmes grow in a permanent ocean of anomalies. What really counts are dramatic, unexpected, stunning predictions: a few of them are enough to tilt the balance; where theory lags behind the facts, we are dealing with miserable degenerating research programmes. 总之，经验进步的标志不是微不足道的证实：波普尔正确地指出，这种证实当以百万计。掷石坠地，这无论重复多少次，也不是牛顿理论地成功。但波普尔所鼓吹的所谓的 反驳 也不是经验失败的标志，因为所有的纲领永远都是在大量的反常中成长的。真正重要的是戏剧性的、出乎意料的、惊人的预测：这种预测只要有几个就足以改变局面；一旦理论落后于事实，我们所论述的纲领就可悲的退化了。 Now, how do scientific revolutions come about? If we have two rival research programmes, and one is progressing while the other is degenerating, scientists tend to join the progressive programme. This is the rationale of scientific revolutions. But while it is a matter of intellectual honesty to keep the record public, it is not dishonest to stick to a degenerating programme and try to turn it into a progressive one. 那么，科学革命是怎样到来的呢？假设我们有两个竞争的研究纲领，一个是进步的，而另一个是退化的，科学家们倾向于参加进步的纲领，这就事科学革命的基本原理。但是，尽管公开竞赛记录是知识诚实性的问题，坚持一个退化的纲领并试图把它转化为进步的却不是不诚实的。 As opposed to Popper the methodology of scientific research programmes does not offer instant rationality. One must treat budding programmes leniently: programmes may take decades before they get off the ground and become empirically progressive. Criticism is not a Popperian quick kill, by refutation. Important criticism is always constructive: there is no refutation without a better theory. Kuhn is wrong in thinking that scientific revolutions are sudden, irrational changes in vision. On close inspection both Popperian crucial experiments and Kuhnian revolutions turn out to be myths: what normally happens is that progressive research programmes replace degenerating ones. 与波普尔相反，科学研究纲领方法论并不提供即时的合理性。必须宽厚地对待年轻地纲领：研究纲领可能需要几十年的时间才开始发展并成为经验上进步的纲领。批评并不是像波普尔所说的那样通过反驳很快地扼杀一个纲领。重要的批评总是建设性的：没有一个更好的理论，就构不成反驳。库恩认为科学革命是突发的、非理性的视觉变化，这是错误的。科学史驳斥了波普尔，也驳斥了库恩：仔细地观察一下就会发现，无论是波普尔地判决性实验还是库恩的科学革命其实都是神话：通常发生的情况是进步的研究纲领取代退化的研究纲领。 The problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience has grave implications also for the institutionalization of criticism. Copernicus's theory was banned by the Catholic Church in 1616 because it was said to be pseudoscientific. It was taken off the index in 1820 because by that time the Church deemed that facts had proved it and therefore it became scientific. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1949 declared Mendelian genetics pseudoscientific and had its advocates, like Academician Vavilov, killed in concentration camps; after Vavilov's murder Mendelian genetics was rehabilitated; but the Party's right to decide what is science and publishable and what is pseudoscience and punishable was upheld. The new liberal Establishment of the West also exercises the right to deny freedom of speech to what it regards as pseudoscience, as we have seen in the case of the debate concerning race and intelligence. All these judgments were inevitably based on some sort of demarcation criterion. And this is why the problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience is not a pseudo-problem of armchair philosophers: it has grave ethical and political implications. 科学与伪科学的分界问题对批判的制度化也具有重大的意义。哥白尼理论在 1616 年被天主教教会所禁止，因为据说它是伪科学。 1820 年天主教教会从禁书录中解放了哥白尼理论，因为这时教会认为事实已经证明了哥白尼理论，因而它成为科学的。 1949 年苏联共产党中央委员会宣布孟德尔遗传学是伪科学，并在集中营处死了孟德尔遗传学的拥护者，如瓦维洛夫院士；处死瓦维洛夫之后，孟德尔遗传学说被恢复了名誉。但党仍然持有决定什么是科学，可以发表，什么是伪科学，应该惩处的权利。西方的新自由派势力集团同样对它所认为的伪科学行使否定言论自由的权利，就像我们在关于种族和智力的辩论中所看到的那样。所有这些判定都不可避免地取决于某种分界标准。这就是为什么科学与伪科学的分界问题不是一个书斋哲学家的伪问题的原因：它有着重大的伦理意义和政治意义。
题解： 第一个伪科学是名词，第二个伪科学是动宾词组。 从蔣勁松 先生的博客《偽科學的科學價值》（ http://www.sciencenet.cn/m/user_content.aspx?id=221488 ）引出的一个话题。伪科学是我自以为了解，其实我并不怎么了解的一个词，所以我也不确定 蒋 先生从伪科学里寻找科学价值是先知还是强辩。 一、北京大学哲学系 吴国盛 教授《科学与人文》中说到 学问普遍的科学化倾向和功利化，导致了社会科学的兴起，也使人文学科的地位进一步下降。近代以来，运用自然科学的方法来解决社会问题的学科即社会科学日渐兴起，它们进一步挤占了传统人文学科的地盘。人文学科甚至到了只有栖身在社会科学这个牌子才有生存机会的地步。社会 科学 的概念取代了 人文 的概念， 功利 的概念取代了 理想 的概念。在一个科学化的时代，为了争得在学术殿堂中的位置，人文学界也出现了 人文科学 的说法。这个词组的用意并不是想阐明科学本质上就是人文 ―― 就象我们在第一二节所阐明的那样 ―― 而是说，人文也是一种象近代科学那样的 力量型 的学问，借以在科学时代合法地谋得一席之地。 在我看来，人文学科要争着戴科学这顶帽子，不仅是由于当今科学的功用性日趋强大，而且还在于人们对科学具有前所未有的信任和依赖。伪科学又何尝不如此呢？正如人们相信蛋白质是好的营养，才会有人往奶粉中填加三聚氰胺冒充蛋白质。 二、科学是从我国近代从西方引入的观念，伪科学的概念出现应该也不会太早。由于人们习惯于用科学的标准来评判一切，因此中国一切古代的和现代的东西都被重估。我觉得这一重估结果不应该用 科学、伪科学二分法，中间还应该有一个非科学。只有那些将非科学的东西伪装或声称为科学时，就划分到伪科学中去。 三、伪科学是有害的，还是无害的？我认为伪科学有些是有害的，有些是无害的。在伪科学是否有害的问题上，似乎也有争议。例如在百度百科的定义中提到 某些拥护伪科学的人纯粹是因为他们对科学或科学方法的本质有所误解；但亦有人会蓄意去杜撰、散布虚假的知识去欺骗大众，以得到金钱上或其它的利益。有些人觉得所有伪科学都只是无害的娱乐；相反也有些人（如理查德 道金斯）则认为所有伪科学都是有害的。科学哲学家波普尔则有一句名言： 科学经常是错的，而伪科学倒有时是对的 。 （见后） 四、伪科学要打击？还是容忍？ 根据 1990 年第四次人口普查，中国 15 岁及 15 岁以上的文盲、半文盲人口有一亿八千万，占总人口的 15.88 ％，其中 70 ％为妇女。文盲、半文盲主要在农村（ http://www.m188.com/zhfw/content_show.asp?id=23829 ）。城乡户籍制度对教育的影响显著：在农业户口的居民中，拥有大学本科学历的人口仅占 0 ． 7 ％，达到初中教育以上水平的不足 20 ％。而在非农业户口的人中，对应的比例分别为 12.3 ％和 85 ％（ http://xsh.gxun.edu.cn/excl/2009/0306/article_1220.html ）。 2005 年全国 1% 人口抽样调查主要数据。全国人口中，具有大学程度 ( 指大专及以上 ) 的人口为 6764 万人，高中程度 ( 含中专 ) 的人口为 15083 万人，初中程度的人口为 46735 万人，小学程度的人口为 40706 万人。（ http://info.edu.hc360.com/2006/03/17090690868.shtml ）。 在这样的一种情况下，我认为中国目前的主要任务仍然是要普及科学，反对伪科学，尤其是要反对有害的伪科学。现在商家以科学的名义大量制作虚假骗人的广告, 以及前几年发生的几次严重的社会事件表明，伪科学对社会的危害能量还很大。 五、什么是伪科学？我查了一下网上对伪科学的定义。 1 、 A pseudoscience is a belief or process which masquerades as science in an attempt to claim a legitimacy which it would not otherwise be able to achieve on its own terms; it is often known as fringe- or alternative science. The most important of its defects is usually the lack of the carefully controlled and thoughtfully interpreted experiments which provide the foundation of the natural sciences and which contribute to their advancement. Above: Johathan Hope: Theodorus' Spiral (2003) Of course, the pursuit of scientific knowledge usually involves elements of intuition and guesswork; experiments do not always test a theory adequately, and experimental results can be incorrectly interpreted or even wrong. In legitimate science, however, these problems tend to be self-correcting, if not by the original researchers themselves, then through the critical scrutiny of the greater scientific community. Critical thinking is an essential element of science. 详细见： http://www.chem1.com/acad/sci/pseudosci.html 2 、把没有科学根据的非科学理论或方法宣称为科学或者比科学还要科学的某种主张，如星占学、维里科夫斯基碰撞理论、李森科的无产阶级遗传学等。伪科学不同于一时的科学错误，它是一种社会历史现象，要害在于，它在特定的时间和地点冒充科学，把已经被科学界证明不属科学的东西当作科学对待，并且长期不能或者拒绝提供严格的证据。非科学的事物大量存在，而且通常自有其存在的价值，如文学、艺术、魔术等等，一旦有人把它们宣称为科学，则这种宣称本身也就成为一种伪科学。 伪科学是指据称是事实或得到科学支持、但实际上不符合科学方法的 知识 。伪科学是一些虚假的 科学 或者骗局，经常借用科学名词进行装饰，但实际上与科学在本质上并无关联。 某些拥护伪科学的人纯粹是因为他们对科学或科学方法的本质有所误解；但亦有人会蓄意去杜撰、散布虚假的知识去欺骗大众，以得到金钱上或其它的利益。有些人觉得所有伪科学都只是无害的娱乐；相反也有些人（如理查德 道金斯）则认为所有伪科学都是有害的。科学哲学家波普尔则有一句名言： 科学经常是错的，而伪科学倒有时是对的 。 详细见百度百科 ： http://baike.baidu.com/view/428.htm 3 、伪科学（英語： Pseudoscience ）又稱疑似科學，是指任何經宣稱為科學，或描述方式看起來像科學，但實際上並不符合科學方法基本要求的知識、方法論、信仰或是實務經驗。偽科學一詞最早的使用紀錄出現於 1843 年，使用者是法國哲學家弗朗索瓦馬讓迪（ Franois Magendie ）。此用詞帶有貶義，將某一對象指為偽科學，會將其貼上不正確或偽裝成科學的標籤。也因此，被指控者通常拒絕承認這樣的稱呼。 维基百科： http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%BC%AA%E7%A7%91%E5%AD%A6 其英文版本： Pseudoscience is a chiefly derogatory term applied to any knowledge, methodology, belief, or practice that is claimed to be scientific, or that is made to appear to be scientific, but which does not adhere to the scientific method, lacks supporting evidence or plausibility, or otherwise lacks scientific status. The term comes from the Greek root pseudo- (false or pretending) and science (from Latin scientia, meaning knowledge). An early recorded use was in 1843 by French physiologist Franois Magendie, who is considered a pioneer in experimental physiology. 详细见 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ： http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudoscience 4 、 A pseudoscience is set of ideas based on theories put forth as scientific when they are not scientific. Scientific theories are characterized by such things as (a) being based on empirical observation rather than the authority of some sacred text; (b) explaining a range of empirical phenomena; (c) being empirically tested in some meaningful way, usually involving testing specific predictions deduced from the theory; (d) being confirmed rather than falsified by empirical tests or with the discovery of new facts; (e) being impersonal and therefore testable by anyone regardless of personal religious or metaphysical beliefs; (f) being dynamic and fecund, leading investigators to new knowledge and understanding of the interrelatedness of the natural world rather than being static and stagnant leading to no research or development of a better understanding of anything in the natural world; (g) being approached with skepticism rather than gullibility, especially regarding paranormal forces or supernatural powers, and (h) being fallible and put forth tentatively rather than being put forth as infallible or inerrant. Some pseudoscientific theories are based on an authoritative text rather than observation or empirical investigation. Creation science devotees, for example, make observations only to confirm dogmas, not to discover the truth about the natural world. Such theories are static and lead to no new scientific discoveries or enhancement of our understanding of the natural world. The main purpose of creationism and intelligent design is to defend a set of religious beliefs. A scientific theory like the theory of natural selection is not based on a text. Creationists * distort the truth when they call evolution Darwinism, as if the science were based on a belief in the infallible words found in Origin of Species or Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. Natural selection is one of several mechanisms put forth by scientists to explain the fact of evolution. The various theories of evolution, i.e., mechanisms that explain how evolution occurs, are defended not by deference to texts but by empirical evidence from several scientific fields: embryology, the fossil record, homology, genetics, biogeography, molecular biology. Some pseudoscientific theories explain what non-believers cannot even observe, e.g. orgone energy, N-rays, or chi. Or, if the non-believers make any observations regarding the effects of this alleged energy, their comments regard the psychological mechanisms that lead people to believe in such chimeras. We are not, of course, claiming that science deals only with what can be observed in the present moment. Science often concerns itself with what probably occurred in the past based on inferences from empirical data. Science also often studies causal events that can't be observed such as cigarette smoke causing cancer. Some creationists claim that since nobody has seen a cat evolve into, say, a dog, evolution doesn't happen. That is, they claim that since nobody observes evolution of one species to another in the present, evolution doesn't happen. Anyone who would make such a claim is simply exposing his ignorance of what evolution actually claims. (Another sign of ignorance regarding what evolution actually claims is the assertion that humans evolved from modern apes or monkeys. Evolution claims that humans and modern apes have a common ancestor, not that we evolved from modern apes.) Some pseudoscientific theories can't be tested because they are consistent with every imaginable state of affairs in the empirical world, e.g., L. Ron Hubbard's engram theory. Scientific theories not only explain empirical phenomena, they also predict empirical phenomena. One way we know a scientific theory is no good is that its predictions keep failing. Predictions can't fail unless a theory is falsifiable. Some pseudoscientific can't be falsified because they are consistent with every imaginable empirical state of affairs. Karl Popper noted that psychoanalytic theory, including Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex, is pseudoscientific because they seem to explain everything and do not leave open the possibility of error. Even contradictory behaviors are appealed to in support of the theory. Creationists who claim that evolution can't be disproved are mistaken or lying. All it would take would be to find the presence of mammals in the pre-Cambrian fossil beds or human and dinosaur fossils in the same sedimentary layer. Creationists, on the other hand, are apologists for the faith, not scientists interested in discovering the truth about the world. They already know the truth: it's in their sacred text. So, their whole function is to deny and try to find fault with any scientific claim that is inconsistent with their interpretation of the Bible. Some pseudoscientific theories can't be tested because they are so vague and malleable that anything relevant can be shoehorned to fit the theory, e.g., the enneagram, iridology, the theory of multiple personality disorder, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the theories behind many New Age psychotherapies, and reflexology. Creationists often mistake the fact that discoveries in various sciences keep confirming evolutionary hypotheses as evidence that evolutionists won't give up their theory no matter what. Nonsense! As noted above, all it would take would be to find some fossils of mammals (a rabbit or sheep would do) in pre-Cambrian layers and evolution will have to be re-examined, revised, or even revoked. Some theories have been empirically tested and rather than being confirmed they seem either to have been falsified or to require numerous ad hoc hypotheses to sustain them, e.g., applied kinesiology, astrology, biorhythms, facilitated communication, plant perception, and ESP. Yet, despite seemingly insurmountable evidence contrary to the theories, adherents won't give them up. Creationists often point to errors made in science, real or imagined, to defend their notion that evolution is not a science because it will defend things that are not true rather than give up its central tenets. Nonsense! There is nothing in the history of pseudoscience that compares with the convoluted kinds of reasoning creationists have used to argue that all scientific methods of dating are wrong, that Noah's ark landed in Turkey, that the Grand Canyon was formed in a short time by the great flood that sent Noah's ark to Turkey, etc. Creationists often point to Haeckel's embryos as proof that evolution is a pseudoscience. What rubbish! (Click here for more embryo comparisons.) Some pseudoscientific theories rely on ancient myths and legends rather than on physical evidence, even when the interpretations of those legends either requires a belief contrary to the known laws of nature or to established facts, e.g., Velikovsky's, von Dniken', and Sitchen's theories. This is the central feature of so-called Young Earth Creationism (YEC), the notion that the Bible reveals that God created the universe about 6,000 years ago. Scientists date the birth of our solar system to about 4.5 billion years ago and the universe to about 13.7 billion years ago. These scientific notions about the origin of the universe and our solar system are based on a variety of dating techniques, none of which appeal to ancient myths or legends. * The YECs use this belief about a recent creation as the main motivating force to find fault with anything science claims that conflicts with their faith. Scientists, on the other hand, have found trees that are older than what the YECs think the earth is. Of course, the YECs say the scientists are wrong. Some pseudoscientific theories are supported mainly by selective use of anecdotes, intuition, and examples of confirming instances, e.g., anthropometry, aromatherapy, craniometry, graphology, metoposcopy, personology, and physiognomy. Nobody, I would hope, would accuse either creationism or evolution of basing their notions on anecdotes or intuition. The one is based on the Bible and the other on the empirical evidence gathered from a variety of sciences. Some pseudoscientific theories confuse metaphysical claims with empirical claims, e.g., the theories of acupuncture, alchemy, cellular memory, Lysenkoism, naturopathy, reiki, Rolfing, therapeutic touch, and Ayurvedic medicine. Creationism is, in essence, a metaphysical theory about the origins of the universe and of life because it asserts the cause is supernatural. By definition the supernatural is non-empirical. Science maintains that all theories about the causes it studies refer to natural causes that have empirical manifestations and may be supported or refuted by empirical facts. Creationism asserts that no empirical fact could ever refute it because it is known a priori to be absolutely true. Some pseudoscientific theories not only confuse metaphysical claims with empirical claims, but they also maintain views that contradict known scientific laws and use ad hoc hypotheses to explain their belief, e.g., homeopathy. Creationists have tried to maintain that evolution violates the second law of thermodynamics but this idea has been thoroughly discredited by those who understand physics. Pseudoscientists claim to base their theories on empirical evidence, and they may even use some scientific methods, though often their understanding of a controlled experiment is inadequate. Many pseudoscientists relish being able to point out the consistency of their theories with known facts or with predicted consequences, but they do not recognize that such consistency is not proof of anything. It is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition that a good scientific theory be consistent with the facts. A theory which is contradicted by the facts is obviously not a very good scientific theory, but a theory which is consistent with the facts is not necessarily a good theory. For example, the truth of the hypothesis that plague is due to evil spirits is not established by the correctness of the deduction that you can avoid the disease by keeping out of the reach of the evil spirits (Beveridge 1957: p. 118). 详细见： www.skepdic.com/pseudosc.html
标签: 伪科学
