No sure under which situation, but I was told by a co-worker to blame myself (first) for any confusion. It takes some practice, but it really works. Here is the latest eample. An unpaid invoice caught my attention, which was issued more than a month ago. So, I decided to email out a reminder. Dear L, May I remind you ... Wait, a small voice told me, what IF she has paid? So, the email went out as follows. Dear L, Would you be kind enough to check the payment status of this invoice, since I have not recieved the payment. By saying I have not received the payment, I do not blame L for not making the payment. It so happened that L did make the payment, but I credited it to another client at the same institue (because I rounded up total word count to 6,500, a lesson learnt). So, try this next time, and you will make others happier by blaming yourself. ps. Actually, this thought came to me yesterday, when a new client blamed the translation company for not doing a good job, etc. I thought, wait a minute, why don't you blame yourself for xxx. pps. This really helps in the situation when you think the journal reviewers misunderstood you. Blame yourself even when it's not your fault!
3/12/2014Wednesday 9:53:09 PM Lifestyle Design---Day 27 My lifein the United States Today’s MorningNourishment I enjoy: Rev.12:1 And a great sign was seen in heaven: a woman clothed with the sun,and the moon underneath her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars. 5And she brought forth a son, a man-child, who is to shepherd all the nations with an iron rod; and her child was caught up to God and to Histhrone. The wonderful, bright woman has no covering, shadow, or darkness. Everything is in the bright open air. This kind of church is a victorious one. The man-child is the stronger part of the people of God. Although God has many angels who will fight against Satan, the final victoryover the enemy will be gained not because of the angels but because of theman-child. God needs the manchild. The fourth aspect of the church as the testimony of Jesus is that it is God's farmto grow the divine crop. This crop is first the one hundred forty four thousand firstfruits, a small number, and then the harvest, the majority (14:1-5,14-16).This tells us that in the church life we all need to grow. Verse 4 shows theway to grow. This verse says concerning the firstfruits, These are they who have not been defiled with women, for they are virgins. These are they who follow the Lamb wherever He may go. In order to grow, we need to stay away from any kind of defilement. Daniel and his three friends were offered the best food by the royal palace in Babylon, but Daniel purposed in his heart notto defile himself by eating food that had been offered to idols. In this way,these young men kept themselves from being defiled (Dan. 1:5-6, 8)....Young people especially must be careful not to be defiled, and they must also follow Jesus wherever He goes....If the young people will do this and separate themselves to the Lord, they will grow every day, and they will be thefirstfruits produced by the church life. The condition for growing quickly is tofollow the Lamb . Wherever He goes, we follow Him, and by following Him we grow more quickly. Then we will be the firstfruits. (The Testimony of Jesus,pp. 106-107, 137-138) What should be improved today: Just off the SE exam… These two exams show Idid not go into depth toward learning… What new life hacks learnt today: Focus on your game It is very easy to get distracted and become envious of what other people are doing or achieving. Try not to compare yourlife with others. Everyone has been created unique by God with their own set ofskills talents. On the contrary, you should focus on refining and sharpeningtheir own tools. So what are you “Games”? Num. Date Books To Be Read In The Coming Days Progress 1 Saturday, March 01, 2014 Economix: How Our Economy Works (and Doesn't Work), in Words and Pictures Paperback by Michael Goodwin Currently reading it 2 Sunday, March 02, 2014 The Cartoon Guide to Calculus (Cartoon Guides) by Larry Gonick 3 Monday, March 03, 2014 The Cartoon Guide to Statistics by Larry Gonick 4 Tuesday, March 04, 2014 The Cartoon Guide to Physics by Larry Gonick 5 Wednesday, March 05, 2014 A Conversation, Book 1: English in Everyday Life, 4th Edition by Tina Kasloff Carver 6 Thursday, March 06, 2014 A Conversation Book 2: English in Everyday Life (Full Student Book) (Third Edition) by Tina Kasloff Carver 7 Friday, March 07, 2014 The Elements of Style, Fourth Edition by William Strunk Jr. (Author), E. B. White (Author), Roger Angell 8 Saturday, March 08, 2014 Writing Tools: 50 Essential Strategies for Every Writer by Roy Peter Clark 9 Sunday, March 09, 2014 The ONE Thing: The Surprisingly Simple Truth Behind Extraordinary Results Hardcover by Gary Keller 10 Monday, March 10, 2014 Talk Like TED: The 9 Public-Speaking Secrets of the World's Top Minds Carmine Gall 11 Tuesday, March 11, 2014 The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change Paperback – Deluxe Edition 12 Wednesday, March 12, 2014 How to Win Friends Influence People Paperback by Dale Carnegie
Minority Game 和 EI Farol 酒吧模型告诉我们在资讯均等的情况下，不存在着可以稳定胜出的纯策略。它的逆反定理是：只有不平衡信息才有可能。股市中能够胜出的，不是任何成功的技术和策略，功夫要下在如何去获得大多数人还没有的信息上。这给总想胜人一筹的炒股人指出努力的方向。你多聪明，多辛勤，知识多丰富，学了多少炒股秘籍，掌握多少公共信息，通通都不是关键。你必须在瞬息万变茫茫股海之中，及早发现众人还未知的信息才行。这不是有一份耕耘就能多一份收获的事，而是下到竞技场，搏击时你的速度、眼界、心智能否胜人的问题。 当我把这个博弈理论的结果告诉朋友们时，一位同学告诉我，这不是你原创的发现。 Fisher 早已知道这个道理，他挣得盆满钵溢，还写了一本书。 我赶紧到 Amazon 买书看， KennethFisher 的书名“ The Only Three Questions That Count: Investing by Knowing WhatOthers Don't ”。在 2007 年出版，被纽约时报列为最畅销书。他在前言中提出这个观点：“不论你觉得自己多富有智慧。假如认为更聪明，得到更好训练就能凭着公开的消息和资讯胜过他人，你就是个傻瓜！唯一能够在股市中胜出的根本是：知道他人所不知的东西。” 这观点与我的相近，他书的副标题就是：投资于独到之处。 与我从博弈论的角度论证不同，他是从经济学的市场有效性理论出发。他简单地说：所有的信息都已经反映在股价上。经济形势，财经消息，历史曲线，成千上万的人都在研究这些公共的知识推测将来。你能想到的，有效的市场早就把它折现在股价上了，轮不到你来捡便宜。 Fisher 是个出生投资世家的牛人，父亲纵横股市一甲子声名显赫。他自小在家得其亲灸，成年后创建著名的 Fisher Investments 任总裁， CEO ，为世界 16000 多位富豪管理超过 300 亿资产投资。在 Forbes 写了 22 年 Portfolio Strategy 专栏，在 Bloomberg Money 写了 7 年专栏，出版了 4 本投资方面的书，在学术界和财经界都声名昭著，他本人就在福布斯 400 个最富有的美国人之中。 Fisher 的 480 页全书正是基于这个观点，教你如何知人所不知。他提了三个问题：“哪些信以为真的东西，其实未必是对的？哪些鬼神莫测的东西，实际上是有章可循的？到底是什么，造成了思想的盲区？” 这些都属于开拓眼界思想方法的教导，书中罗列出许多传统股市技术教条作为反例一一驳倒。 Fisher 的观点来自市场的有效性，从宏观的角度看到市场稳定后的表现。他统管着几百亿的钱，规模巨大，稍有动作举世皆知，玩不得投机取巧的事，也握有许多资源，所以只能从“想人所不能想”之处入手。 我的结论来自微观的博弈角度，从新消息来临开始，在辩驳思考之中可以看到过渡的过程。虽然大的结论一样，但你认真思考了就能明白为什么形成这个结论，这就给散户指出了投机取巧的空间。还是用例子来说明吧。想像一下连续的随时可以进出的 EI Farol 酒吧问题，你类比地把在酒吧中享受当作股市中赢钱。宏观来看，不可预测性和无必胜纯策略的结论仍然成立。 Fisher 和我的观点的出发点都在这儿。 Fisher 的建议是从大家的误区入手，比如说大家相信周末酒吧一定挤，他经过调查发现没这回事，周末就招呼自己一班朋友去。既然是思想误区，大多数人一时半会改不了。 Fisher 的朋友们就可以一直按此办理爽下去。这是他的赢钱策略。 我的建议是除此之外，还可以利用散户轻快的特点，在市场走向稳定的过渡过程中，发现可以利用新的信息，来捡市场走向均衡时的赚钱机会。比如说你可以盯着 Fisher 的行踪，及时跟上。又如你发现酒吧是按顾客人数请女招待，就盯着她，发现在家，便可断定酒吧不挤。这类招数可以一直用到了多数人都知道了才不灵。与人分享有效的炒股新招，只要这群散户不足以影响股票的走向，这新招就可以一直玩下去。由此可知书上经典技术过去可能很强，现在弄得大家都知道就很难用了，反而少人得知的新招比较有戏。 散户及时地捕捉信息，在这过渡过程的短时间内占有不平衡资讯的优势。从新资讯到系统消化折现到股价都要有一段时间，时机转瞬就消失，靠得就是一个“快”字和准确的判断。你知道多少信息这不是关键，所有的信息无论是直接转播还是从技术分析来的，经过一段时间都会变为公共信息被反映在股价上，信息的优势在于你获取它并付诸于行动时，它还没被大多数人使用，还没折现在股价中。 在这个角度下，可以看出 Fisher 书中有些批判的偏颇之处，其实许多流行的招数和新招对散户都有可行之处，关键在于及时准确判断出这个信息在股价上折现程度的市场感觉上。 这个结论的反面：捕捉信息的后知后觉者要被先进者掏了口袋。你学了两本炒股大全下海搏杀，所有从传播和技术分析得来的信息正好已过头地反映在股价上了，兴冲冲地按图杀进，刚好垫了底。炒股的招数知道的人越多，你的反应的空间就越小，你就越可能是垫底的。全民炒股时钱好赚，是因为有许多比你还差的傻冒刚入场，一大群人都傻呼呼地往吹大的泡沫里扔钱。 最后，如果你掌握有一些别人所不具备额外的中长期信息，你就能够修改追踪市场平均的分散布局，或者选取合适类别的共同基金。由于占有了信息的优势，你可以较低的风险取得比市场要高的回报。精确的计算，散户玩不动也不必要，但着眼于信息优势来选股，选类股，选时机，进而修正分散的布局，却是人人可以玩或已经在玩的战略。 Minority Game 的研究还证明，如果系统的信息越丰富，系统的波动就越小。这也说明了欧美成熟市场比新兴国家股市波动小的原因。成熟的投资者知道，自己有把握控制的只是在冒险和保守倾向中取舍。 知道了这些，是不是真要面对投资博弈的苦恼，那就见仁见智了。喜欢掌控自己命运的人认为理财是终身的本领，只要还有点钱，就需要面对。即使交给专职管理，你也必须心中明白，不然碰到麦道夫，李曼兄弟那才叫做冤。我太太有个闺蜜连股票与债劵的区别都弄不清，也懒得弄清，极端信任她的理财咨询师，因此省了不少脑筋。能够这么放得下，真是她的幸福。看到卢万达躲进教堂最后遭遇屠杀的难民和灾难片里高声祈祷的信徒了吗？他们只因为心中有所依赖，就比我们少了许多恐惧。他们始终是幸福的，直至最后的一刹那。 知道股市的秘密，只能防止你犯傻，不意味着就能做好。致胜的关键在于信息优势，除此之外再无他法。信息优势要靠大量的时间和精力来换取，无时不刻悬心警惕。一旦卷入，人在不确定之中患得患失，心中的安宁便随之而去。这就是希望掌控自己命运所要付出的代价。 （涨停板） 【参考资料】 Wikipedia, Minority Game and EIFarol Bar Problem , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Farol_Bar_problem W. Brian Arthur, InductiveReasoning and Bounded Rationality (The El Farol Problem), American EconomicReview, 84,406-411, 1994, http://www.iwp.jku.at/born/mpwfst/03/0306BA_InductiveReasoning_p.pdf Challet, D. and Yi-Cheng Zhang,1998, On the minority game: analytical and numerical studies ， Physica A,256, 514-532. http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/9805084 Ken Fisher ， The OnlyThree Questions That Count: Investing by Knowing What Others Don't ， 2008 http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0470292679/ref=ord_cart_shr?_encoding=UTF8m=ATVPDKIKX0DERv=glance
绕远了，现在转回来。 说玩股票凭运气，咱们搞科学的不能说，尤其是学数学玩系统的人更不能这么说。你当教授的，在台上端了个架子，教那些满头雾水一脸迷糊的学生建立模型，优化控制。你总不能说股市这个系统鬼神莫测，不能建模寻优。这不科学呀！做研究教书的，就是动手不灵挣不来钱，告声惭愧认个输，也要落个明白不是？ 查了文献，发现十几年前有一篇“ Minority Game ”的论文，说是一群人进行二择一的选举，规则是：少数的胜。这个模型可以用来描写人们竞争有限资源策略问题。在股市上，多的钱是掏别人的口袋，没有大家都挣大钱的道理，审时度势在大众行动潮前，先买进的和先抛出的才是大赢家，而这些人往往是少数。“ Minority Game ”脱胎于“ EI Farol 酒吧问题”，这酒吧问题更有直观性，详述如下。 1994 年斯坦福及圣塔菲学院教授 W. Brian Arthur 提出这个问题。说在圣塔菲小镇，没什么夜生活。每个周四居民常聚在一个叫 EI Farol 酒吧听音乐。因为酒吧的空间有限，如果少于 60% 的居民到哪里，去酒吧就比呆在家里快活。反之则太挤了，还不如不去。每个人独立自主，他们所了解只是过去的行情。 这显然是个决策优化问题。但明显不存在着一个能正确预测行情的模型，这不仅因为参与者人心莫测，还因为若是有了可以预测行情的模型，就有一个决定去否的确定性策略。大家都可能采用这个相同的纯策略，它成了大多数人的策略后，原来预测酒吧不挤的也变挤了，挤就变不挤了。这个矛盾证明了对这类问题，不可能有稳定的 正确预测行情的方法。 Brian 提出这个问题在于说明：有时候在经济学上演绎推理并不可行，反而依照自己的经验归纳出各自高招更为实在。玩味这个问题，你就能明白为什么股市上会有这么多互相矛盾的推测和各自风行的策略。你用了航天的技术煞费心思整出来的决策，并不一定比隔壁二傻拍着屁股作出决定来的高明。决定成败的并非单由你的决策，而还在于参与这大赌局中众人的选择。这样还真是鬼神莫测了！ 你也许疑惑：既然这是博弈，那个得诺贝尔奖的，“ Beautiful mind ”的纳什不是证明了这博弈都存在最优策略，有所谓纳什（ Nash ）均衡点吗？对，这里确实有最优策略，而且是个唯一的纳什均衡。但这是一个混合策略，这个最好的策略就是以 60% 的概率随机选择去酒吧。就是说让你特制一个卜爻，往地上一扔有 60% 机会面朝上，你每次行前，假模假式地求神拜佛一番，扔下卜爻，面朝上就去，朝下时在家呆着。这样虽然不能保证你每次都很爽，但次数多了你的运气肯定不比其他人平均的差。 以前看报道统计的结果，说用飞镖随意选中的股票并不比基金经理的成绩差，以为是调侃基金的笑话，原来还真是有理论根据！ 有人说：既然什么策略都各有道理，我就一根筋走到底，买了一个基金就是它，看云舒云卷，潮起潮落。这好比不管人多人少，我天天都去 EI Farol 酒吧的策略。 理论上这真不比许多用了复杂数学的策略差。你若有条坚强的神经，那就恭喜您了！熊市掉个百分二三十很常见， 2008 年很多基金都丢了百分五六十，个股更多。这里如果只是你的少量财产，或者你还有着长长的挣钱未来，那是可以八风吹不动，胜故欣然败亦喜，反正股市还会回来的。基金和股票，按统计平均也是这样，但你买的那个基金或股票是回不来的那个万一呢？ 股市是由人们贪婪和恐惧所推动，你也是其中的一员。股市回报的期望是经济的增长，各种策略都有其合理性，理智的切入都能取得回报。但越高的风险有着越高的回报。这诱使人们不自觉地超越了心理底线。高估了自己的智慧和心理承受能力而沦为博弈中的傻瓜。华尔街有个前辈，呼风唤雨赚了个盆满钵溢，将零头两百万交给老婆说：“这是我们以后过日子的钱，无论我怎么说都不要再给我。” 老婆不解道：“你这么明白为何还要交代我。” 他说：“我如果向你要钱时就已经失去了理智，到时千万别听我的！” 最终在一次大崩盘中，他还急需一笔钱板本，向老婆发誓赌咒哄骗保证之后又将这最后的老本投入，全部化为乌有。 知识，技术，信息都不难。读几本书，能下功夫，肯花时间就可以了。难的是能克服情绪干扰始终保持冷静的心态，这不是人人任何时候都能做到的，而这又是最重要的。所有的股场教战都叮呤你要懂得止损， IBD 卖出规则第一条： Cut losses at no more than 7% to 8%, no questions asked ！其目的是在天不从人愿时不至于伤筋动骨。不管多不甘心，愿赌服输，有资本才能接着玩不是？ 都说情场失意赌场得意，富孀玩股票最好，是因为这时候手里有本钱，又全没了患得患失之心，大不了不过了。前些天看故事，说于凤至是理财天才在华尔街如何如何。其实那时候她正患乳腺癌在美治疗，张学良归了赵四小姐，正是心如止水，万念俱灰，最佳的投资心境。人到了这份上钱多钱少一个样，那是不能学也学不来的。 ( 待续）
Date: November 20, 2006 Perhaps due to lack of sleep, as soon as she was waken up, Tanya started complaining non-stop for no reasons and criticized us of making things crappy. So I said, As if you were a parent to parent parents! She instantly replied, I can parent parents if I am Grand-parent Tanya always enjoys this type of word games. Yes, but you are not. Well, I MAY parent parents if I pretend to be Grand-parent. That's called pseudo-parenting What is pseudo-parenting? Pseudo-parenting is parenting when you fake a parent. You got me, Dad. she smiled. As a result, she stopped parenting.
Game Theory by Michael Maschler , Eilon Solan and Shmuel Zamir (Apr 30, 2013) Hardcover: 920 pages Publisher: Cambridge University Press (April 30, 2013) Language: English ISBN-10: 1107005485 学习博弈论，这本书很好。 有人这样评论: 'This is the book for which the world has been waiting for decades: a definitive, comprehensive account of the mathematical theory of games, by three of the world's biggest experts on the subject. Rigorous yet eminently readable, deep yet comprehensible, replete with a large variety of important real-world applications, it will remain the standard reference in game theory for a very long time.' http://www.amazon.com/Game-Theory-Michael-Maschler/dp/1107005485/ref=sr_1_6?s=booksie=UTF8qid=1362886059sr=1-6keywords=Game+Theory#
After a big football against South Carolina on Saturday (October 20), Florida quarterback Jeff Driskel was highly praised because of his performance with the quote "He's had games in which he's been more of a game manager than a playmaker..." (Michael DiRocco, Driskel, Gators march on, October 20, 2012). As it is well-known, the quarterback on an American football team is the leader who is coordinating all plays. It is critical for the leader not to rely on his/her playmaking to succeed, rather it is critical to stimulate all potential of the team members and make sure that the team goal, to win, is always the highest priority! Individual statistics is a lesser concern and the overall team performance is!A great researcher should realize that as his/her career development, he/she should become not only a great researcher, but also a great leader and nurture the group he/she is leading. A game manager is not a personal playmaker, rather it is the leader who makes the team playmaking to win!
It just sounds natural that a bunch of somatic cells in a multi-cellular body can be viewed as a population while evolutionary/ecological theories can be used to look into the population dynamics of these cells, and it sounds tempting that theoretical works my find their application in cancer research and possibly better treatment strategies. The first conceivable scenario is that we can measure the fitness of each individual (cancerous or peripheral) cell, given its life-history strategy is well defined, and then trace how this fitness may change when the micro-environment is changed due to cancer progression and/or effects of adopted therapy. Once it is understood how to selectively suppress the fitness of the most malignant cells and avoid relapse of evil survivors, better strategies of treatment will be designed accordingly (Robert Gatenby). Actually people have already gone beyond the above scenario, asking deeper questions, e.g. how cancer have evolved and been avoided in the history of metazoan life forms? Now it isn't a novel idea that cancer cells are just betrayers in a cooperative multi-cellular body, seeking their own opportunities to maximize offspring cells, rather than contributing to the whole metazoan individual and waiting for itself to be replicated in the next generation of the whole body. Cancer cells can be viewed as an atavistic phenomenon in an evolutionary perspective based on the knowledge that multiple cellular organisms originated from single-cellular organisms. But the tricky question is, how multi-cellular organisms could emerge successfully in the first place? This refers to the question that how a multiple cellular body win battles against betrayers who always emerge from inside to seek a “free life”. So the question is transformed into a classical economic/ecologic question, where the focus is the maintenance of cooperation in a competitive population or community. To be cautious, we may not say a “body”, or a population of cells, as one part of the players of this battle. One alternative subject may be the germ-line cells as the monopolist betrayer, in contrast to other cell lineages who all become its slaves (Paul Rainey). Or from the genetic (selfish gene, refer to Richard Dawkins) viewpoint, the genome is the sole bearer of strategies in the battle between its different carriers. One apparent observation is that multi-cellular organisms like human have never 'evolved' a perfect mechanism to prevent cancer through the whole life span. Logically, they don't have to achieve this goal, as long as it can keep its integrity until successful (or optimal times of) reproduction. My guess is that both cooperation and betrayal are locally optimal/stable strategies for a cell. Figure 1. A diagram of cooperation and betrayal as locally stable strategies. A conceptual barrier exists to help prevent betrayers from emerging within a multi-cellular body. On one hand, it is easy to understand that being cancerous or malignant is locally stable, as they always have more offspring within a time interval than their neighbor competitors. This is the major concern in using population dynamics models to help design better protocols of chemotherapy. On the other hand, being cooperative should also be a locally stable strategy for any single somatic cells. Its only my guess and I haven't read this from other researchers so far. If being cooperative is not locally stable, then it is hard to imagine how multi-cellular organisms can emerge and thrive in the first place, unless we accept it possible to teach a hen to swim by throwing it into water a million times. So it is understandable that we can draw a diagram as in Figure 1, where there are two locally stable strategies for a cell and there is a barrier between them, which help multi-cellular bodies maintain their integrity and resist emergence of betrayers to some extent. The message given by the barrier is, "if you are not a really evil betrayer, you'd better be a cooperator." It is noted that here we are considering fitness only at the inter-cellular level, where the fitness at the whole body/population level is not explicitly involved, but implicitly considered. So one interesting question is if there is indeed such a barrier, and if so, how it is embodied in terms of biochemistry and molecular cellular biology (possibly also in genetics and epigenetics). If we find where this barrier is, then we will know how to utilize this barrier to help reduce the betrayer cells in the patient. My future work is based on this simple hypothesis, but my scheme framework is a bit more complex, as conflict between mitochondrial and nuclear genomes is also considered in order to comprehensively understand life-history traits of a cell. This was already introduced in an earlier post, and I will keep it updated in future posts. p.s. Some similarity is seen between game theory models and dynamical systems models, as they are essentially the same thing but with different emphases. Normally game theory works with game players at the same level, or usually it doesn't clarify if players are at the same or different levels (with different sets of candidate strategies). Specifically the ESS theory works with a population of symmetric players based on replicate dynamics. On the contrary, the dynamical systems theory works with all players (nodes) at different levels, each with a distinct set of candidate strategies to interact with one another ( via connections), while there is usually only one individual player at each level (each node includes a single player ). Both theories work you out "stable states" or more broadly "attractors" including cyclic and strange attractors, which provide the groundwork from where you can explore more complex dynamics. I wish these will finally help us harness the behavior of cell systems and tumour tissues.
这是本系列的第二篇 (首发于本人 英文博客 )，对上一篇提出的想法作了更细致一点的介绍，并引出后面的话题。下一篇才是最重要的，先在此预告一下～ 2012年4月23日追记：昆明动物所王瑞武老师基于榕小蜂的一系列研究，已经包含了这个思路。参见这两篇论文Wang et al. 2009 ( doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007802 )， Wang et al. 2011 ( doi: 10.1098/rsif.2011.0063 )。 看来我还得思考得再远一些，才能写出点东西。 At the first glance, the idea proposed in the last post may seem nothing new if we only consider the residents as the only players of the game. However, we are considering not only the residents but also the government as the opposite player. The overall game here can thus be classified as an Asymmetric Two-players' Game which is played Repeatedly. However, at least one of the two players is actually a population, in which each individual makes choices NOT based on the population benefit, but their own individual benefits. When a single government and its strategy is fixed, the scenario is exactly the same as the traditional multiple players' Prisoners' Dilemma or the Boxed Pigs' Game, where the Tragedy of the Commons is expected to be the outcome under certain assumptions. Now let's look at what happens if there are a plural of governments who are in competition with one another in accumulating their own wealth. The governments who choose the 'conscience' strategy may have a disadvantage at the beginning if only a small part of its residents would resist, because it will lose more money to its residents than other governments who choose to be 'selfish'. However, when generations of the residents passed under such a government, leaving only the obedient residents left because the resistant ones are eliminated naturally, the government will be paying nothing to the residents simply because nobody will claim their money back. In contrast, under a 'selfish' government, the obidient residents will be eliminated after a plural of generations with all the left residents becoming resistent, as the result the government will finally lose the money to its residents's pockets. Finally we see that the selfish governments lose the game and the non-selfish governments win. Notice here that the time span of a generation of the residents must be shorter than that of the governments, which is the prerequisite of the outcome here. This process was introduced briefly in my last post, and in this paragraph with more details. This government-resident model looks perfectly applicable to the interaction between cells and the mitochondia inside them. The mitochondria are the 'residents' living within a cell, the rest part of which is their 'government'. The money is embodied in ATPs, which are allocated between the mitochondria and the rest part (hereafter I will just use 'the cell' for the rest part of it). This allocation, which is actually through a biochemical mechanism, can be seen as the game being played between the mitochondrial genome and the nuclear genome during the macro-scale history of evolution. We know that indeed mitochondria replicate faster than the cell containing them get divided, which is the key prerequisite of the gaming process talked in the above paragraph. Also we know that mitochondria don't 'migrate' between cells in the natural world, which keeps the gaming process simpler than the realistic political issues. Bearing these in mind, we can then go on to talk about how nuclear and mitochondrial genomes (and/or 'epi-genomes') play games in ATPs allocation, and what outcomes are achieved under various conditions (healthy and pathological). To be continued.
After reading some papers about stochastic interactions, recently, I found that there may be exist a method for containing the process of evolutionary game theory(EGT) on complex networks. Arne Traulsen should be the first one talking about this stochastic interactions, which is in well-mixed finite population with PDG. His idea paves a new way of the research about EGT. Then, Chen applied it on lattice network with Von Neumman neighborhood. He found theoptimal interval of interaction probability p. But none have applied this idea in coevolution. Can I put them together and find out the coupling better results?
The second season of players in the game design is original, design for still is the original program life exists, also endowed with programs for players develop industry the development road of the ability. Fashion channel Moncler Doudoune launched the national life version of "magic day", it is to stress to the temperament of the metropolis and quality, and this attempt in the national TV was the first in. Fashionable element and the form of reality show, only at Moncler Men Jackets the Shanghai international metropolis will make good effect, also only in Shanghai to have so of fashion culture soil, and eastern TV "international, fashion, frontier" the individual personality of high ones, and to some extent have "not copy the sex Moncler Men ". In addition, more Chinese and foreign many fashion designers and authority of the stars, and to join the national TV channels for the players more will influence with the show has a professional clothing brand company and the Moncler Women idea in the industry, made a great opportunity to provide. Organizers said that on the screen is too much singing draft competition, like the homogeneity magic day of cutting such a professional reality show should be able to make more of the dislocation competition in the space. Graduates with job unspoken rule ? years passed, turn green in a hurry we have become graduates, in a year more than a year of deadly, we have to cover war will be full of Moncler Women Jackets air feels explosion head to straighten out, take off the canvas shoes, change babyish is full of metal sequins and small hole hole jeans, temporarily abandoned a small card wow Iraq t-shirts...... But what happened Moncler Kids next, we are looking for work: what is the dress? To graduate from girls and boys, couldn't help ten million times to ask. The senior entrust: do not "clothes over the world" best go ahead, in big 2 big three can pay attention to is the job in what the seniors do; Second in line with the practical and economical principles, pull on students go out together, not only can purchase application supplies reference, still can exchange each other, if the shape is little temperament, many things you can only chipped a, especially bag and some colour makeup cosmetics. -YuanQiuYan female graduate of this public interview, a head of a foot of grooming easy to ignore.
110221-文章LWLCW-PLA11.pdf www.elsevier.com/locate/pla Optimal convergence in naming game with geography-based negotiation on small-world networks Run-Ran Liu a,∗, Wen-Xu Wangb, Ying-Cheng Lai b,c, Guanrong Chen d, Bing-Hong Wang a,e a Department of Modern Physics and Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei Anhui 230026, China b School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA c Department of Physics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA d Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China e Research Center for Complex System Science, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science, Shanghai 200093, China a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: Received 15 September 2010 Received in revised form 21 November 2010 Accepted 5 December 2010 Available online 7 December 2010 Communicated by R. Wu Keywords: Naming game Convergence Small-world networks Geographical distance We propose a negotiation strategy to address the effect of geography on the dynamics of naming games over small-world networks. Communication and negotiation frequencies between two agents are determined by their geographical distance in terms of a parameter characterizing the correlation between interaction strength and the distance. A finding is that there exists an optimal parameter value leading to fastest convergence to global consensus on naming. Numerical computations and a theoretical analysis are provided to substantiate our findings. 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
一篇physica a的文章 k -Nearest-Neighbor interaction induced self-organized pedestrian counter flow Jian Ma, Weiguo Song, Jun Zhang, Siuming Lo, Guangxuana Liao http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL_udi=B6TVG-4Y5GXXN-8_user=10_coverDate=05%2F15%2F2010_rdoc=1_fmt=high_orig=search_sort=d_docanchor=view=c_searchStrId=1270927733_rerunOrigin=google_acct=C000050221_version=1_urlVersion=0_userid=10md5=68e4439550aedeccf3aeb86a8b05c749 已经接收的工作（doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.01.014 ）。受PNAS上对鸟群的野外观测研究影响，我们考虑对向行人流中固定个数的行人对目标行人方向选择的影响，结果表明这种相互作用的模式是对向行人流中自发产生行人带的诱因。 Abstract A recent field study confirmed that animal crowd behavior is dominated by the interaction from the k -Nearest-Neighbors rather than all the neighbors in a given metric distance. For the reason that systems with local interaction perform similar self-organized phenomena, we in this paper build two models, i.e.,a metric distance based model and a k -Nearest-Neighbor ( k NN) counterflow model, based on a simple discrete cellular automaton model entitled the basic model, to investigate the fundamental interaction ruling pedestrian counter flow. Pedestrians move in a long channel and as a result are divided into left moving pedestrians and right moving pedestrians. These pedestrians interact with each other in different forms in different models. In the metric distance based model, ones direction of chosen behavior is influenced by all those who are in a small metric distance and come from the opposite direction; while in the k NN counterflow model, ones direction of chosen behavior is influenced by the distribution of a fixed number of the k -Nearest neighbors coming from the opposite direction. The self-organized lane formation is captured and factors affecting the number of lanes formed in the channel are investigated. Results imply that with varying density, the lane formation pattern is almost the same in the k NN counterflow model while it is not in the case of metric distance based model. This means that the k NN interaction plays a more fundamental role in the emergence of collective pedestrian phenomena. Then the k NN counterflow model is further validated by comparing the lane formation pattern and the fundamental diagram with real pedestrian counter flow. Reasons for the lane formation and improvement of flow rate are discussed. The relations among mean velocity, occupancy and total entrance density of the model are also studied. The results indicate that the k NN interaction provides a more efficient traffic condition, and is able to quantify features such as segregation and phase transition at high density of pedestrian traffic. 全文下载： paper_full.zip
标签: game
