In violent conflicts, weapons matter, and this is precisely the case in conflicts between the child and the parent of major parental investment. For all the weapons the child can manage to grip, perhaps the only deadly one is death, since he himself is a vital tool, which means the gene carrier of the germ line, of the other side and his death means everything. In reality, there are occasional happenings of this kind. He hangs himself, and, nearly, kills his opponent. Evidently the other side possesses more lethal weapons, one of which is the womb. Yes, the womb, the very shelter in which he is the only inhabitant. Apart from utter frustration and complete defeat, how else could he retort to the proclamation like “I’d not have given birth to you if…”? Similar weapons work as well. Everything from foods, clothes to school things is not earned by himself, and when it comes to a bargaining with his opponent, his odds to win is exasperatedly compromised if he is shown with every detail of how much he consumes, in terms of, say, rmb, from birth to the very minute the row is going on. In confrontations of similar sort, the lethal weapons turn out to be only a few nasty sharp words. Is it not an evolutionary wonder compared to other tangible or visible weapons? Sure enough, there are some inventions of unique human weapons that really kill. Thanks to facial expressions and human languages, in the realm of human aggressiveness, unlike that of animals other than modern Homo, aggressiveness can be expressed in a bunch of delicate ways one even might not be aware of.
2月16日《纽约时报》英、中版同时发表了曾任美国国家安全顾问、地位显要的地缘战略家兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基的一篇短稿，题为“中美两强不会为争霸开 战”（注）。文中，布老试图调整美国舆论界“恐中、贬美”的态度，着重强调美国具有继续承担“国际冲突调人”的计划与能力。 就“调人”所起的“排难解纷”作用而言，本人以为首先有必要对第二次世界大战结束后的国际政治状态做一简单勾画。“以夷制夷”其实并非中国所专美，西方近五百年的扩 张史也丝毫不逊色，甚至将该策略反复运用得淋漓尽致。只不过，处于20世纪，当西方丧失许多殖民地、又难以割舍部分经济利益之时，“拉一方打一方” （play off one power against another）或者“以夷制夷”（play one barbarian state against another ）都不允许挂在嘴边，因此便产生了以“低强度冲突/战争”（ low intensity conflict/war）出现的“双关语”（doublespeak），以代替难听的“以夷制夷”。 低强度冲突的手段繁多，包括培训 对手的对手，向反对派提供军事装备、情报、财力支援，进行反颠覆、情报战，挑拨民族、宗教纠纷，支恐又反恐等等不一而足。对台湾而言，五十年代由美国埋下 “台湾地位未定”的伏笔，借钓鱼岛挑拨中台日关系，甚至在有限度冲突范围内削弱三方实力、提高军售，均属同一战略部署。鉴于此，所谓“调节中日冲突”也必 须在“维持低强度”的上下文范围加以审视。布热辛斯基是“低强度冲突”的教父，80年代甚至是培训巴基斯坦、阿富汗恐怖主义组织以打击苏军的总设计师。奥 巴马上台后，立即一改小布什的单干、蛮干作风，实施“以夷制夷”的“多边主义”政策（也是双关语），便是听从了布老的建议。 如今，当美国的一系列反华部署（从南海、西太平洋到整个非洲大陆，从妖魔化有毒玩具到反倾销）引起舆论界的反华情绪高涨时，他抛出这些文字意图掩盖美国的责任，同时 又把罪责推诿到“无一盟友”的中国身上。其实，中国无盟友，也正是因为美国利用特殊地位与能量，把那些周边国家玩弄得团团转…这方面只消观察印度、越南与缅甸近年的动态便一目了然。 地缘政治领域，有个“神秘三角关系”，也可说是“三角铁规律”，即最强方永远、自然地与最弱方一道夹击次强方。美日对中，苏印对中，中巴对印……除了极少数分裂国家外，我们几乎找不到任何例外。此铁规律背后的铁规律则是，这种“合纵连横”的主动权永远掌握在最 强方手上；至于次强方与最弱方，则一向是被动地接受摆布。过去，冷战时期有两霸在幕后操纵。后冷战时期，美国则是唯一大玩家！ 布老口口声声美国“无意统治亚洲”，却隐瞒了美国趁东欧阵营瓦解的机会，执意巩固全球的领导地位（双关语）。除此之外，他还指出“中美之间不存在意识形态的冲 突”。这点，本人绝对赞同，因为地缘政治本来就是以国家、集团利益为依归，根本就不受意识形态的影响。因此，无论对手的意识形态如何改变，该围堵的对象还 是该围堵，该削弱的敌人还是该削弱，该占有的资源也必须快马加鞭；中国人的政府，不论是在北京还是台北，都不准为了钓鱼台的主权回收问题，“打乱美国的全 球战略部署”或“给美国添乱”；更是不准对美国的“扶日抑中”政策提出调整的要求。 （注）英文原标题为Giants, but Not Hegemons，译为“中美两强不会为争霸开战”显然不妥，应改译为“中国、美国，巨而不霸”。 中美两强不会为争霸开战兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基 2013年02月16日 华盛顿——如今很多人担心，中美两强局面的出现，必然会导致冲突。但我认为，在目前的后霸权时代，发生争取全球支配地位战争的可能性不大。 诚然，这方面的历史很令人沮丧。自从200年前全球政治出现以来，为占据欧洲霸主地位，进行过四次长期战争（包括冷战），每次都可能导致一个唯一的超级大国掌握全球霸权。 相关文章 不要遏制中国，要和它合作 中国如何打败美国 中美合作比互信更重要 然而，近年来的一些进展改变了世界的格局。核武器使争取霸权的战争破坏性太大，使赢得战争也变得毫无意义。在全球经济越来越相互交织的情况下，一个国家单边的经济成功，不可能不给其他国家诱发灾难性的后果。此外，世界各国的人民已经在政治上觉醒，不再那么容易被强权制服，即使是最大的强权。最后，最重要的是，无论美国还是中国，都不是由敌对的意识形态所支配。 而且，尽管我们有着极为不同的政治体系，我们这两个国家的社会都是开放的，虽然开放的形式不同。这也能消解各自社会内部的趋向仇恨和敌对的压力。超过10万中国学生在美国大学读书，成千上万年轻的美国人在中国学习和工作、或参与某种专门研究或旅游项目。与前苏联不同，数百万的中国人经常出国旅行。还有好几百万的中国年轻人通过互联网每天接触着外边的世界。 所有这些与在19世纪和20世纪争夺全球霸权的国家的社会自我封闭形成鲜明对比。自我封闭加深了仇恨，增强了敌意，彼此相互妖魔化也更容易。 尽管如此，我们不能完全忽略这样一个事实：近年来对中美之间友好关系满怀希望的期待，最近受到越来越敌对性的论战的考验，尤其是在两国的大众媒体上。对美国不可避免的衰落的推测，以及关于中国势不可挡的迅速崛起的期待，在一定程度上助长了这场论战。 对美国未来的悲观看法，往往低估了美国自我更新的能力。而对中国崛起持过分乐观态度的人，低估了中国与美国之间仍然存在的巨大差距，不论是人均GDP，还是各自的技术能力。 看似矛盾的是，中国着实令人钦佩的经济成功，正在强化一种对复杂的社会和政治调整的整体性需求，即，在崛起的中产阶级要求更多权利的情况下，一个自称共产主义的政府官僚体系，如何、并且在多大程度上能够继续驾驭一个国家资本主义的体制。 对潜在的中国对美国军事威胁的过分简单化的焦虑，忽略了美国的优势，这种优势来自美国两面濒临大洋的非常有利的地缘战略位置，在任何一边，都有隔海相望的盟友。 相比之下，中国在地理上被并不总是被友好的国家包围着，而且几乎没有盟友。有时，一些中国的邻国受这种情形诱惑，希望在他们与中国的具体领土主张之争或利益冲突中拉上美国，支持自己。幸运的是，有迹象表明，一种共识正在形成，即这类威胁不应该以单方面或军事手段解决，而应该通过谈判解决。 美国媒体用“转向(pivot)”来形容奥巴马政府把重点向亚洲做相对调整的做法，对问题没有帮助，奥巴马本人从来没用过“转向”这个有军事内涵的说法。实际上，美国既是一个大西洋大国、也是一个太平洋大国，这个事实从未改变，新政策只是建设性地重申了这一事实。 考虑到所有这些因素，对稳定的中美关系的真正威胁，不是来自两国内部任何的敌对意图，而是来自亚洲，复兴的亚洲可能会滑向一种民族主义狂热，为了争夺资源、领土和霸权，引发类似20世纪欧洲那样的冲突。这种可能性令人深感不安。 有很多潜在的爆发点：朝鲜与韩国，中国与日本，中国与印度，或者印度与巴基斯坦。一旦政府煽动或允许民族主义狂热，把它作为一个社会压力安全阀，局面就有可能失控。 在这样一种潜在爆炸性环境下，美国在亚洲政治上和经济上的参与，可能就是一个不可或缺的稳定因素。的确，美国目前在亚洲所起的作用，应该与英国在19世纪的欧洲起的作用类似，提供一种“海外”平衡影响，不卷入亚洲的区域对抗的纠缠，不试图在该地区获得统治地位。 美国参与亚洲事务，不能仅仅依靠固有的盟国日本和韩国，还应建立在中美合作制度化的基础上，这样的参与才会有效，是建设性和具有战略敏感度的。 相应地，美国和中国应该有意识地避免两国的经济竞争变成政治敌对。需要的是双边和多边的相互密切接触，而不是相互排斥。比如，美国不应该寻求不包括中国的“跨太平洋伙伴关系”，中国也不应该寻求不包括美国的区域全面经济伙伴关系。 历史可以避免重演20世纪的灾难性战争，如果美国能以稳定器的形式、而不是以地区警察的姿态出现在亚洲，如果中国能成为该地区卓越，但不专横跋扈的大国。 2011年11月，奥巴马总统和目前即将离任的中国国家主席胡锦涛会面，发布了联合声明，大胆地规划了两国联合行动，提出建立历史上从未有过的中美伙伴关系。随着奥巴马第二个任期的开始，以及习近平准备在3月接任国家主席，两国领导人应该会面，重新确认和重新振奋美中关系。两国关系是充满活力、强健稳固，还是脆弱、充满猜忌，这将影响整个世界。 兹比格涅夫·布热津斯曾任吉米·卡特总统的国家安全顾问。他最近的新书是《大棋局:美国的首要地位及其地缘战略》。 翻译：Cindy Hao Giants, but Not HegemonsBy ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI Published: February 13, 2013 Facebook Twitter Google+ Save E-mail Share Print Single Page Reprints WASHINGTON — Today, many fear that the emerging American-Chinese duopoly must inevitably lead to conflict. But I do not believe that wars for global domination are a serious prospect in what is now the Post-Hegemonic Age. Connect With Us on Twitter For Op-Ed, follow @nytopinion and to hear from the editorial page editor, Andrew Rosenthal, follow @andyrNYT . Admittedly, the historical record is dismal. Since the onset of global politics 200 years ago, four long wars (including the Cold War) were fought over the domination of Europe, each of which could have resulted in global hegemony by a sole superpower. Yet several developments over recent years have changed the equation. Nuclear weapons make hegemonic wars too destructive, and thus victory meaningless. One-sided national economic triumphs cannot be achieved in the increasingly interwoven global economy without precipitating calamitous consequences for everyone. Further, the populations of the world have awakened politically and are not so easily subdued, even by the most powerful. Last but not least, neither the United States nor China is driven by hostile ideologies. Moreover, despite our very different political systems, both our societies are, in different ways, open. That, too, offsets pressure from within each respective society toward animus and hostility. More than 100,000 Chinese are students at American universities, and thousands of young Americans study and work in China or participate in special study or travel programs. Unlike in the former Soviet Union, millions of Chinese regularly travel abroad. And millions of young Chinese are in daily touch with the world through the Internet. All this contrasts greatly with the societal self-isolation of the 19th- and 20th-century contestants for global power, which intensified grievances, escalated hostility and made it easier to demonize the one another. Nonetheless, we cannot entirely ignore the fact that the hopeful expectation in recent years of an amicable American-Chinese relationship has lately been tested by ever more antagonistic polemics, especially in the mass media of both sides. This has been fueled in part by speculation about America’s allegedly inevitable decline and about China’s relentless, rapid rise. Pessimism about America’ future tends to underestimate its capacity for self-renewal. Exuberant optimists about China’s inevitable pre-eminence underestimate the gap that still separates China from America — whether in G.D.P. per capita terms or in respective technological capabilities. Paradoxically, China’s truly admirable economic success is now intensifying the systemic need for complex social and political adjustments in how and to what extent a ruling bureaucracy that defines itself as communist can continue to direct a system of state capitalism with a rising middle class seeking more rights. Simplistic agitation regarding the potential Chinese military threat to America ignores the benefits that the U.S. also derives from its very favorable geostrategic location on the open shores of two great oceans as well as from its trans-oceanic allies on all sides. In contrast, China is geographically encircled by not always friendly states and has very few, if any, allies. On occasion, some of China’s neighbors are tempted by this circumstance to draw the U.S. into support of their specific claims or conflicts of interest against China. Fortunately, there are signs that a consensus is emerging that such threats should not be resolved unilaterally or militarily, but through negotiation. Matters have been not helped by the American media’s characterization of the Obama administration’s relative rebalancing of focus toward Asia as a “pivot” (a word never used by the president) with military connotations. In fact, the new effort was only meant to be a constructive reaffirmation of the unchanged reality that the U.S. is both a Pacific and Atlantic power. Taking all this into account, the real threat to a stable U.S.-China relationship does not arise from any hostile intentions on the part of either country, but from the disturbing possibility that a revitalized Asia may slide into the kind of nationalistic fervor that precipitated conflicts in 20th-century Europe over resources, territory or power. There are plenty of potential flash points: North Korea vs. South Korea, China vs. Japan, China vs. India, or India vs. Pakistan. The danger is that if governments incite or allow nationalistic fervor as a kind of safety valve it can spin out of control. Connect With Us on Twitter For Op-Ed, follow @nytopinion and to hear from the editorial page editor, Andrew Rosenthal, follow @andyrNYT . In such a potentially explosive context, U.S. political and economic involvement in Asia can be a crucially needed stabilizing factor. Indeed, America’s current role in Asia should be analogous to Britain’s role in 19th-century Europe as an “off-shore” balancing influence with no entanglements in the region’s rivalries and no attempt to attain domination over the region. To be effective, constructive and strategically sensitive U.S. engagement in Asia must not be based solely on existing alliances with Japan and South Korea. Engagement must also mean institutionalizing U.S.- Chinese cooperation. Accordingly, America and China should deliberatively not let their economic competition turn into political hostility. Mutual engagement bilaterally and multilaterally — and not reciprocal exclusion — is what is needed. For example, the U.S. ought not seek a “trans-Pacific partnership” without China, and China should not seek a Regional Comprehensive Economic Pact without the U.S. History can avoid repeating the calamitous conflicts of the 20th century if America is present in Asia as stabilizer — not a would-be policeman — and if China becomes the preeminent, but not domineering, power in the region. In January 2011, President Obama and now-departing Chinese President Hu Jintao met and issued a communiqué boldly detailing joint undertakings and proposing to build a historically unprecedented partnership between America and China. With Obama reelected and Xi Jinping preparing to take over China’s presidency in March, the two leaders should meet to revalidate and re-energize the U.S.-China relationship. Whether this relationship is vital and robust, or weak and full of suspicion, will affect the whole world. Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. His most recent book is “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.”
这是本系列的第二篇 (首发于本人 英文博客 )，对上一篇提出的想法作了更细致一点的介绍，并引出后面的话题。下一篇才是最重要的，先在此预告一下～ 2012年4月23日追记：昆明动物所王瑞武老师基于榕小蜂的一系列研究，已经包含了这个思路。参见这两篇论文Wang et al. 2009 ( doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007802 )， Wang et al. 2011 ( doi: 10.1098/rsif.2011.0063 )。 看来我还得思考得再远一些，才能写出点东西。 At the first glance, the idea proposed in the last post may seem nothing new if we only consider the residents as the only players of the game. However, we are considering not only the residents but also the government as the opposite player. The overall game here can thus be classified as an Asymmetric Two-players' Game which is played Repeatedly. However, at least one of the two players is actually a population, in which each individual makes choices NOT based on the population benefit, but their own individual benefits. When a single government and its strategy is fixed, the scenario is exactly the same as the traditional multiple players' Prisoners' Dilemma or the Boxed Pigs' Game, where the Tragedy of the Commons is expected to be the outcome under certain assumptions. Now let's look at what happens if there are a plural of governments who are in competition with one another in accumulating their own wealth. The governments who choose the 'conscience' strategy may have a disadvantage at the beginning if only a small part of its residents would resist, because it will lose more money to its residents than other governments who choose to be 'selfish'. However, when generations of the residents passed under such a government, leaving only the obedient residents left because the resistant ones are eliminated naturally, the government will be paying nothing to the residents simply because nobody will claim their money back. In contrast, under a 'selfish' government, the obidient residents will be eliminated after a plural of generations with all the left residents becoming resistent, as the result the government will finally lose the money to its residents's pockets. Finally we see that the selfish governments lose the game and the non-selfish governments win. Notice here that the time span of a generation of the residents must be shorter than that of the governments, which is the prerequisite of the outcome here. This process was introduced briefly in my last post, and in this paragraph with more details. This government-resident model looks perfectly applicable to the interaction between cells and the mitochondia inside them. The mitochondria are the 'residents' living within a cell, the rest part of which is their 'government'. The money is embodied in ATPs, which are allocated between the mitochondria and the rest part (hereafter I will just use 'the cell' for the rest part of it). This allocation, which is actually through a biochemical mechanism, can be seen as the game being played between the mitochondrial genome and the nuclear genome during the macro-scale history of evolution. We know that indeed mitochondria replicate faster than the cell containing them get divided, which is the key prerequisite of the gaming process talked in the above paragraph. Also we know that mitochondria don't 'migrate' between cells in the natural world, which keeps the gaming process simpler than the realistic political issues. Bearing these in mind, we can then go on to talk about how nuclear and mitochondrial genomes (and/or 'epi-genomes') play games in ATPs allocation, and what outcomes are achieved under various conditions (healthy and pathological). To be continued.
今天下午1：00是新学期CREDIT的第一次Seminar，我以为是CEDEX，虽然与我的专业不是很相关，但想起导师建议哪怕专业不相近也可以积极参与，一方面学习表达presentation skill ，一方面学习方法的应用，这是不分专业的。感觉收获很大，上星期Applied Microeconometrics的instrumental variables方法应用恰好得到了体现。这篇文章主要是希望研究冲突（conflict)与经济发展（economic development)之间的关系。使用的是Rwanda的数据，与以往使用宏观数据从convergence角度出发的文献不同的是，作者利用了微观数据来研究。可惜没有找到原文，可能尚属于working paper阶段，没有正式发表。作者的robustness检验相当丰富，值得学习。 How does conflict affect economic performance. Micro evidence from Rwanda Pieter Serneels, University of East Anglia and Marijke Verpoorten, K.University Leuven Abstract: Important gaps remain in the understanding of the economic consequences of civil war. Focusing on the conflict in Rwanda in the early 90s, and using micro data to carry out econometric analysis, this paper finds that households and localities that experienced more intense conflict are behind in terms of consumption six years after the conflict, a finding that is robust to taking into account the endogeneity of violence. Significantly different returns to land and labour are observed between zones that experienced low and high intensity conflict which is consistent with on-going recovery. Distinguishing between civil war and genocide, the findings also provide evidence that these returns, and by implication the process of recovery, depend on the form of violence. 另外一点收获发现这个seminar一直都是提供午餐的，倒是便宜了我。大家边听workshop，边品尝食物倒也显得自然。忽然之间明白了为什么在英国午餐会显得比较随意，而且大多是冷盘，只有drinks是热的。一方面可以节省时间，另一方向冷食不会散发出香味，不会影响周围的人。这也是为什么在图书馆的silent zone，热食是被禁止带入的。
国际医学期刊编辑委员会（International Committee of Medical Journal Editors,ICMJE）发布了统一格式的利益冲突（Conflict of Interest）信息披露(Disclosure)表。包括Lancet, New England Journal of Medicine, JAMA等所有ICMJE成员期刊都刊发了由多位主编联名的Editorial,介绍并鼓励生物医学的期刊和作者采用这一格式。 目前绝大多数的生物医学期刊都要求作者在投稿时披露相关的利益冲突（Conflict of Interest）信息，对于这种信息的披露格式和披露范围，不同的期刊之间可能会有些差异。同一个作者的利益冲突信息可能会以多种版本在不同的期刊上出现，对于作者来说，这增添了很多不必要的麻烦。对于读者来说，也可能会造成一些误解或混淆。故而ICMJE决定发布一个具有统一格式的信息披露表。 按照该表要求，作者需要披露四类信息：首先是与论文研究工作相关的直接或间接的财务支持，即论文作者是否接受了除工作单位之外的任何第三方提供的财务支持来进行这样研究工作；其次是在论文研究内容的直接领域或相关领域内，是否与任何商业机构有利益关系。换言之，只要有一点可能的利益关联，就应该予以披露；再次，任何涉及作者配偶和未成年子女的财务利益关系；最后，是可能与论文研究内容存在利益关系的非财务性关系（个人的、职业的、政治的、单位的、宗教的等等）。 这份表格所涵盖的内容比较完整，以可编辑的PDF格式供作者下载，使用起来也很方便，值得采用。 Editorial: http://www.icmje.org/format.pdf 信息披露表：http://www.icmje.org/coi_disclosure.pdf 信息披露表实例：http://www.icmje.org/sample_disclosure.pdf
标签: Conflict
