SOME FINAL THOUGHTS When Eastern and Western economists got together during a conference held by the Centre for Economic Policy Performance at the London School of Economics in 1990,enthusiastically discussing the on-going radical changes in CPEs,I called for emergency policies for financial control possibly through a banking system. At the Annual Conference of the Chinese Economic Association (UK) in 199l I argued that liberalisation of the banking system should not be attempted as long as the industrial system is not subject to proper financial discipline. Given that the production system of a CPE is decentralized, the banking system should be correspondingly controlled in terms of banking regulation, credit control and investment assessment. Indeed, without proper control of banks, banking control and a well-designed corporate governance structure, the economic and social costs of reform, such as inflation and/or financial disorder, will be increased. This study was completed when the Chinese government was deciding on a radical financial reform programme. No matter what form it eventually takes, I must again stress the essential control function of the banking system. It is to be hoped that the new programme will be designed carefully and implemented steadily. To sum up, in a planned economy people are “forced” (or more accurately planned) to be free, while in a market economy people are free to be forced (or to be put under market discipline). In either of these situations certain control mechanisms are necessary, simply because there always exists a relationship of contradictory unification between principals and agents. Tragically many people in RCPEs dream that once planning is abandoned, free markets can easily bring about a higher level of welfare than hitherto. This idea has led to many real tragedies. Although it was wrong for the central planners to ignore the importance of market mechanisms, it is also wrong to ignore the importance of state roles. Money talks, but money can also introduce evils. The gradual reform strategy adopted by the Chinese government has generally been effective. I supported this approach even in 1989, when China experienced turmoil and faced Western sanctions. My paper China Steps Forward (1989) argued that the Eastern Lion had awakened and was stepping forward successfully and irrevocably. No newspapers or magazines cared to publish it at the time. An American banker in Hong Kong had a similar experience, but recently published a book entitled China: China: The Next Economic Superpower (0verholt, 1993). The centre of world development has changed from time to time and has never been permanently associated with any particular area. China too was once a centre of development and if the Chinese people become more disciplined and continue to work hard there is nothing to prevent it from recapturing that position. It is necessary to learn from the lessons of the former Soviet Union in its decline from superpower status. Although I call for control Of the banking system and an active role for government, I am mindful of the problems of bureaucracy and corruption. Supervisory functions, which could be assumed by more actively organised trade unions and a more independent judiciary, need to be strengthened in order to improve the authorities’ management efficiency and prevent corruption. However these issues are beyond the parameters of this study. Finally, it is my honour to conclude by quoting the final 1words of a reappraisal of the planning literature by the late S. Chakravarty (1991, P.19), former chairman of the State Planning Commission of India: The leap from a “command” system to a market-based economic regime cannot be equated with the leap from the “realm of necessity” into the “realm of freedom”. A deeper understanding of the interface between market and planning may prove to be of strategic significance in ensuring a humane existence for vast masses of people, whether they are living in the so called “third world” or in what used to be called the “second world”. It is important to note, however, that failures are due as much to political factors as to the inability of the planners to adapt to changing circumstances. What the present conjuncture strongly suggests is the need to introduce an evolutionary perspective on the planning process itself and make corresponding changes rather than to seek salvation in the market system, whose self-regulating properties were questioned very effectively by Keynes more than half a century ago. Notes: 1. This is the final section of the final chapter of the book entitled Banking and Financial Control of the Reforming Planned Economies (Haiqun Yang, 1995), published by Macmillan Press in England. 2. CPEs is an abstract of the centrally planned economies. 3. RCPEs is an abstract of the reforming centrally planned economies. Notice: The above final words were published ina book entitled Banking Financial Control in Reforming Planned Economies by Macmillan Press in England in 1995,which was based on my Ph.D. thesis entitled Costs and Benefits in Decentralizing a Banking System in Transition completed in Birkbeck College of the University of Londonin 1994. 中文说明: 以上英文是杨海群1995年在英国麦克米兰出版公司出版的专著 Banking Financial Control in Reforming Planned Economies 即《改革的计划经济的银行与金融控制》 一书的结束语,该书基于本人在伦敦大学BIRKBECK学院完成的博士论文“银行系统分权化管理的成本效益分析”。
旧上海的金圆券 爷爷是解放前的老银行,是旧上海的小职员、老白领。小时候,他给我讲了很多老银行的故事,可惜,由于对银行没有任何概念,那些故事在我的记忆中都是零散、片段的,只记得他提到业务前台受理,业务单子用轮子滑到后台结账,觉得很好玩。但更深印象的故事是,老蒋逃跑前,是怎么发金圆券骗老百姓的钱的。那时,旧政府发公报,用金圆券换黄金、外币,私藏的黄金,一律没收!然后是一次又一次通缉,下最后期限,追加惩罚等等,把老百姓手中最后一点点黄金、外币逼出来。等最后期限一过,金圆券便大幅贬值,前后使用不到一年,贬值超过数万倍,最后类同垃圾券。这在货币史上也难见其右。这等于旧政府白白抢走老百姓手中的真金白银,后来运到了台湾。爷爷也就是这样被榨干了他的积蓄。爷爷每每谈到这件事都心痛不已。 (金圆券,图片摘自 http://baike.baidu.com/view/80870.htm ) 人民银行异地存储 年少时,银行的概念是存钱,我还一直纳闷,存钱不是应该给保管费吗,为什么倒付利息呢?当时全国只有一家银行:中国人民银行。我们下放到农村去,妈妈带了一个南京的存折,上面有50元钱,因为没有到期,舍不得取出。到期后在农村,走了十几里路,到了镇上的一家人民银行下属的信用社,想把钱取出来,却遭到拒绝,因为他们没有底账。后几经周折,50元钱还是呆在本子上,我妈怎么也不明白,人民银行不是一家吗?直到若干年后回南京才解决了这笔陈年旧帐。那时的存折,简单的一个小本子,每次存储交易一笔,在折子上手写记下一笔,再各盖储户和银行的印章,就算成交了。要计算利息,业务员噼里啪啦一通算盘,再小本子上再记上一笔。 中国人民银行现在已升级成专门行使国家中央银行职能的央行,存储业务交给了其它银行。 里斯本的美元帐号 第一次出国,当时允许用人民币兑换200美金,汇率大概是1:7。我在北大攻博时的生活费好像只有三四十元一个月。我用尽了所有的积蓄又借了钱,几乎是我两年的收入,兑换了这200美金。这200美金当然对我来说是很大一笔钱。到了葡萄牙,当地那时还没有欧元,用的是埃斯库多,银行服务比当时的国内不知道先进多少。好在银行里用英语没有问题,我就这样经过了第一波现代银行基本知识扫盲。由于人民币不流通,在国内是可以存美元的,我舍不得把这200美金换成那弱势的埃斯库多,就说要存美元。不想里斯本大街上那些银行都说不开美元帐号。我到处打听哪里可以开美元帐号。终于有人告诉我,葡萄牙商业银行可以开美元帐号。我摸摸索索地找到了商业银行,一座富丽堂皇,古色古香的楼房。门口有个穿礼兵服的门卫,不同一般银行的凡响。我见到心里就开始打小鼓,但摸了摸口袋里的200美金,还是硬了头皮走了进去。不过门卫很客气地问我,有什么事?我说开美元账号。门卫立即打了一通电话,然后把我引进了一间布置典雅的会客室,让我等一会。我心想这次总算找对地方了。会客室里铺着地毯,维多利亚式的家具,书架上展放着精装古书,墙壁上挂着贵族的画像,完全是古典欧式布置。更让我吃惊的是,一个打扮精致的女孩给我端来了一杯南欧咖啡Espresso和一块小蛋糕,让我受宠若惊。我正不知所措地喝着咖啡,一会看看桌上的花,一会翻翻沙发上的杂志,一位穿着西装笔挺的绅士走了进来,轻声问我:你要存美元?我点点头,他说跟我来。我跟着他穿过两道长长的走廊,上下了两次电梯,然后来到了一个没有窗户,好像隔音的密间。看着密间里简单的办公家具,我忽然有了一种恐慌感,便更使劲捏了捏口袋里的200美金。绅士关上了门,示意我坐下,然后自己坐下,才问我第二句话:多少?我脱口而出:200 Dollar 。他顿了顿,还是一脸严肃,尊贵的小姐,非常感谢您信任并选择我们银行,我很荣幸能为您效劳。但我很遗憾现在不能帮您,因为我们这里开美元帐号至少需要200万美元。您是不是回去把差额补齐后再来开帐号?我保证你一定会得到我们最好的服务! (葡萄牙埃斯库多,现在已由欧元取代,退出了市场,进入历史 1$ 250 escudo 图片摘自 http://www.51766.com/xinwen/11000/1100052142.html ) 面试雷曼兄弟 回国前,我曾和著名投资银行雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)有过一次亲密接触。那是雷曼兄弟在伦敦的总部要找一个有数学背景的金融工程师,猎头公司把我的资料送给了他们,他们表示很有兴趣面试我。我接到通知时傻了眼,因为那时我已基本决定回国,并且已通知原来的公司要离职,进入了回国程序。想来想去,先看看再说,如雷漫耳的雷曼,有这样的面试机会也是一段难得的经历。 既然要去,就要好好准备。我做了如下几件事:1. 恶补雷曼兄弟的信息,上网搜了一遍。充分了解其历史,规模,业务范围等基本知识;2. 加强相关投资银行的知识;3. 尽量了解、分析和研究雷曼所增职位的信息;4.复习我的强项金融数学和相关计算机知识。 雷曼兄弟控股公司成立于1850年,总部设在纽约,在英国伦敦和日本东京还设有地区性总部。 雷曼兄弟控股公司通过它的分支机构 向全球企业、政府部门、市政当局、投资机构和高资产净值个人客户提供各种金融服务。公司主要业务分三大块:资本市场业务、投资银行业务和投资管理业务。资本市场部门为机构投资者的资本流动提供服务,包括二级市场交易、融资、抵押贷款发放和证券化、大宗经纪等业务,以及对固定收益和权益类产品的研究等。这些产品包括现金、衍生工具、有担保的融资、结构性工具和投资。它还提供如下权益类和固定收益类产品:美欧亚股票、政府及代理机构证券、资金市场产品、高级别公司证券、高收益率新兴市场证券、抵押和资产支持证券、优先股、市政证券、银行贷款、外汇、融资和衍生产品。另外这一部门还投资于房地产、私募股权和其他长期投资类别。投资银行部门主要向企业、机构和政府客户就合并、收购和其他金融事务提供建议和咨询。另外该部门还通过承销公开或非公开发行的负债及权益类工具帮助客户进行融资。投资管理部门又分为私人投资管理和资产管理两大块。私人投资管理主要向高资产值个人和中间市场机构客户提供投资与财富咨询和资本市场执行服务;资产管理部门主要向高资产净值个人客户、共同基金和其他中小型市场机构投资者提供个性化投资管理服务。 - 文字摘自 http://www.rmburl.com/richqy/200809/20080918144453.html 面试头天,我从爱丁堡赶到伦敦,住在一个朋友家里。朋友打开她的衣橱,帮我调整衣饰,研究每个细节。使我看起来更像金融城的分子。主要要给对方一个自己人的感觉和干练,亲和的印象。第二天,我来到了坐落在金融城里的雷曼兄弟那栋玻璃大楼。911后,这里戒备森严,经过检查后,我进入大厅,将面试通知交给接待台后的接待小姐。她打了一通电话,叫出面试负责人,一个典型的英格兰人。他用卡打开了通往电梯的栅栏,乘电梯领我上到高层,穿过一个被隔成一小间一小间电脑办公空间的大房间,走进了一间小会议室,给我倒了一杯速溶咖啡,让我坐下来等。过了一会,面试车轮战就开始了。一个个人进来,有男有女,有当地人,有印巴人,我已记不清到底有多少人,但肯定不下10人。每个人从不同的角度问我不同问题,有人出道数学题,有人让我编一段程序,有人考我Black-Sholes理论(金融数学的里程碑),有人试我应用软件、程序语言、数据库能力,有人要我谈对当时一些金融新闻事件的看法,有人问了我其它不着边际的问题。狂轰滥炸结束后,停了一段时间,那位领我上楼的英格兰人再次露面,告诉我回去等通知,可能继续去见他们的高层。又问我有什么问题。我反戈一击的时候到了。我详细向他了解所增职位,主要是职能、责任、要求、待遇、特点、培训、前景等方方面面。从这次谈话,我了解到,这个位子,偏重后台的IT,为前台的衍生品交易服务。较少机会接触到我所心仪的衍生品构造,计算方面的工作。 经过一番痛苦地抉择,分析了利弊,我觉得这个职位虽然收入很高,但如果为钱,我也不会从原来的公司辞职。这个机会应该不错,却不是非常理想,不足以让我中断我的回国进程。最后一刻,我决定放弃了进一步面试的尝试。 几年后,雷曼兄弟垮台,引发金融海啸。我后怕了半天,庆幸当时我做了一个多么正确的决定。不然的话,我今天岂不是在海啸口上首当其冲,冲进了英国的失业大军,在伦敦的金融城手持CV,到处漂泊,四下碰壁? (A worker carries a box out of the Lehman Brothers offices in London's Canary Wharf district on the day it filed for bankruptcy , 图片和解说摘自 2008年10月1日 Daily Mail Reporter )