赵凤光 我当时的回答： 记得不是很清楚了，十几年前曾看过这么一个说法，哲学就是形而上学，或者反过来说，形而上学就是哲学，这是中国古代对哲学（老子还是孔子？）的一种叫法，本义哲学就是超越具体的形的学问。但在马克思的共产主义和唯物主义翻译到中文来时，形而上学被用来专指唯心主义作为唯物主义的对立面。这个词所代表的意义已经与中国传统的含义不同。 才发现当时的人家问的是行而上学。有趣。 对“行而上学”的解释 发布日期：2003/8/5来源： 作者： 浏览： 评论： 字体： 大 中 小 作者：冰城丫头 行而上学这是怎样的概念呢？ 看书或是杂志或是网上的文章，很多人用，发觉意思不是一样的， 这是怎么回事？ 还是有些人像我一样也不明白！ 请教啦！ 作者：leeleel 一小孩，他妈要他去上学，其实他不愿意，又不敢不从，就每天早上背着书包出去，但是不去学校，跑到别的地方玩儿去了－－看起来好像去上学了，其实没有，就叫形而上学。 作者：iamphd 这是国内教科书的定义 形而上学：形而上学是与辩证法相对立的世界观和方法论。其特点是用孤立的、片面的、静止的观点去看世界，把世界上一切事物都看成是永远彼此孤立和永远不变化的；如果说有变化，也只是数量的增减和场所的变更，而这种增减和变更的原因，不在事物的内部而在事物的外部，即由于外力的推动。“形而上学”一词最初是古希腊哲学家亚里士多德(公元前384年一公元前322年)一部著作的中译名，其原意为“在物理学之后”。“形而上学”作为哲学名词有两种涵义：(1)从黑格尔开始，把它当作反辩证法的同义词来使用，但真正揭露其本质的是马克思主义哲学。(2)指一种研究感官不可达到的东西即超经验的东西的哲学。这一用法在马克思主义以前的哲学著作中即已出现，至今仍流行于西方哲学家之间。近代唯心主义者(如马赫主义者)常用“形而上学”一词来攻击唯物主义，污蔑唯物主义的物质观是超感觉、超经验的虚构。在哲学史上，由于历史条件不同，形而上学有时同唯物主义结合在一起，有时同唯心主义结合在一起。但从本质来说，形而上学同唯心主义有着密切关系。 作者：iamphd 呵呵，批评的是。下面是网上的一个解释，希望能够有所补益。 http://websyte.com/alan/metamul.htm METAPHYSICS: MULTIPLE MEANINGS Presented by AWPNT This site was selected as one of the "Best 1,001 Web Sites" by PCComputing (December 1996). ACADEMIC METAPHYSICS The term metaphysics originally referred to the writings of Aristotle that came after his writings on physics, in the arrangement made by Andronicus of Rhodes about three centuries after Aristotle''s death. Traditionally, metaphysics refers to the branch of philosophy that attempts to understand the fundamental nature of all reality, whether visible or invisible. It seeks a description so basic, so essentially simple, so all-inclusive that it applies to everything, whether divine or human or anything else. It attempts to tell what anything must be like in order to be at all. To call one a metaphysician in this traditional, philosophical sense indicates nothing more than his or her interest in attempting to discover what underlies everything. Old materialists, who said that there is nothing but matter in motion, and current naturalists, who say that everything is made of lifeless, non-experiencing energy, are just as much to be classified as metaphysicians as are idealists, who maintain that there is nothing but ideas, or mind, or spirit. Perhaps the best definition of materialism is that of Charles Hartshorne (Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers, p. 17): "the denial that the most pervasive processes of nature involve any such psychical functions as sensing, feeling, remembering, desiring, or thinking." Idealists assert what materialists here deny. Dualists say that mind and matter are equally real, while neutral monists claim that there is a neutral reality that can appear as either mind or matter. Philosophers generally are content to divide reality into two halves, mind and matter (extended and unextended reality) and do not emphasize such distinctions within the mind half as spirit and soul. POPULAR METAPHYSICS A commonly employed, secondary, popular, usage of metaphysics includes a wide range of controversial phenomena believed by many people to exist beyond the physical. Popular metaphysics relates to two traditionally contrasted, if not completely separable, areas, (1) mysticism, referring to experiences of unity with the ultimate, commonly interpreted as the God who is love, and (2) occultism, referring to the extension of knowing (extrasensory perception, including telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, retrocognition, and mediumship) and doing (psychokinesis) beyond the usually recognized fields of human activity. The academic study of the occult (literally hidden) has been known as psychical research and, more recently, parapsychology. Both New Age and New Thought emphasize mysticism and its practical, pragmatic application in daily living, but New Thought discourages involvement in occultism. The terms metaphysics and metaphysical in a popular sense have been used in connection with New Thought, Christian Science, Theosophy, and Spiritualism, as in J. Stillson Judah, The History and Philosophy of the Metaphysical Movements in America (The Westminster Press, 1967), as well the New Age movement, and in the name of the Society for the Study of Metaphysical Religion (see below). Some of the varying understandings of metaphysics held by some founders of New Thought and Christian Science are given in the opening pages of Contrasting Strains of Metaphysical Idealism Contributing to New Thought. PURE AND APPLIED METAPHYSICS Cutting across the division of the academic and the popular, there is another way of dividing metaphysics: theoretical and applied. This distinction is like the division between science and technology; one describes; the other applies the description to practical problems, putting knowledge to work. Gathering knowledge (or alleged knowledge, critics of metaphysics would say) in metaphysics traditionally is by rational thought; in a more popular understanding, knowledge gathering may be either mystical or occult; in either case the pure (?) knowledge is to be distinguished from the practical application of it. 作者：windlight 记得不是很清楚了，十几年前曾看过这么一个说法，哲学就是形而上学，或者反过来说，形而上学就是哲学，这是中国古代对哲学（老子还是孔子？）的一种叫法，本义哲学就是超越具体的形的学问。但在马克思的共产主义和唯物主义翻译到中文来时，形而上学被用来专指唯心主义作为唯物主义的对立面。这个词所代表的意义已经与中国传统的含义不同。 作者：iamphd What is Metaphysic An attempt at arriving at a New Answer to and Old Question (I) The purpose of this paper is to combine in thought the intellectual development of man, particularly with respect to philosophy and religion, with the findings of the theory of evolution. In doing so, the idea that man’s capability of reason is, from a functional viewpoint, a result of evolution, will be taken seriously, and the particular stages of this development will be made apparent. The proposal is: metaphysic arises out of an enhanced selection on neural basis in the transition from understanding to reason. If metaphysic is a product of reason, then what has to be clarified first is what reason is and how it arrives at bringing forth something like metaphysic. Therefore, a model of the human mind has to be established that will show the connection between the activities of the human brain on neural basis and the history of cultural development. When we consider life from an evolutionary and from a phylogenetic viewpoint, we will, above all, discover quality-enhancing major brain mutations that we can observe with respect to the brain’s transfer capacity in the ‘chain’ of instinct, emotion, understanding and reason, and, in a more externally visible chain such as that of the categories of insects, reptiles, mammals and man. The essence of all of these quality-enhancing major brain mutations lies in the possibility of - by means of each respective newly developed capability and its mode of interpretation - entering into a qualitatively new way of communicating with the world. All possibility of communication and interpretation is only possible due to the fact that, first of all, differences exist, and that that which is identical repeats itself in that which is different. If all that exists would only consist of identical concepts, then that which is alike would not be repeated in that which is different; there would never have existed any development. And thus even still our own human capabilities such as feeling, ‘plain understanding/common sense’ and reason are based on this fact of the repetition of that which is alike in that which is different. In this development in the quality enhancement of the human (brain) capabilities, the comparative processes become increasingly abstract and synthetic. ‘Plain understanding/common sense’ is a means of blocking ‘emotion’, just as ‘emotion’ is a means of blocking instinct; in this transition, human feelings develop in the form of ‘emotion’ that is transformed into ‘plain understanding/common sense’. What is new in understanding is its method of storing (of information or data): while the ‘emotional memory’ works by conditioning itself on the basis of the sensory data of one sense and a genetically and individually conditioned set of values, understanding/ combines the ‘pictographic’ structure of sensory data of various sensory organs (or: means of sensory perception) and connects them with a language/audio component. It only stores a value on the basis of this combination of ‘manifold pictogram’ and sound, and thus ‘things’ become apparent to consciousness. Thus, understanding is developed in the independent vertical conditioning of various sensory/sensual representation(s) together with a language representation, as an independent development of the brain: out of it arises ‘the concept’. Language, grammar and understanding are formed as an inseparable entity, for, as understanding, grammar is the ‘conquering of the world’ by means of language. With this, for humans, the world is separated into the understanding subject and the understood object. Reason uses the old methods, just one step more synthetically, for it, in turn, takes note for itself of that which is alike in that which is different. However, its original or raw material is the data of ‘plain understanding/common sense’, just as ‘plain understanding/common sense’ developed out of the ‘data of emotion’. By immediately combining sensory data, understanding can always only see the individual thing; it finds its satisfaction in the quantitative use on the basis or the moral of the own group (the ‘will to have’). Reason is different: it conditions for itself the pictogram of understanding by separating it from the sensory/sensual differences as essence under one concept, guided by its unique and own evaluation that is qualitatively different from understanding’s evaluation, namely as ethics, with a view to all of humanity (the ‘will to be/to exist’) - and precisely at this point, metaphysic emerges. This rather accidentally or incidentally established term from the text arrangement of Aristotle’s work proves itself, however, surprisingly fitting, for, when reason deals with the data of understanding it actually works ‘after’, ‘besides’ and ‘above’ the ‘physically real’, in essence, it does not exist in nature, rather, it makes use of the pictogram which is based on the recognition capacity of understanding. The pre-Socratean thinkers applied this process of ‘searching for essence’ to nature and thus traced existence back to one basic principle each, such as, for example, water, fire, earth or air. The sophistic thinkers drew conclusions from the view of the essence of human society and, based on each pre-supposed point-of-departure, they arrived at entirely diverging views. Socrates, in taking the ‘Delphic oracle’, ‘gnoti se auton’, seriously, took the next step with which he sent man on his way to becoming ‘civilized western man’. This meant nothing less than that he asked for the essence of man. In order to really understand what I know and that I want, I first have to learn to understand what and how I can know and want. On this basis, Socrates was still justified in saying that realization equals virtue and that knowledge equals ‘wanting’. However, Socrates’ dialectics are not yet able to take this step directly; rather, he was regulated purely negatively in a searching/tentative manner by the voice of reason, which meant that this voice always advised him n o t to proceed rather than to proceed. The reason for this is that, as one can see in his ‘Aporias’, the transition of the brain’s transfer capacity from understanding to reason has not yet been successfully implemented, from an evolutionary-neural point-of-view; this path was only opened by Plato and Aristotle. ‘Phylogenetically speaking’, reason’s brain transfer capacity was established with Plato - in his words: Philosophers shall be Kings. From this ‘punctum saliens’ on, he turned dialectics into ‘Dihairese’ (1): The indvidiual (concept) has to be arrived at/determined in a view of the essence of the general (concept), the ‘idea of the good, beautiful and true’ appeared as the ‘summum bonum’ of reason, out of which then emerged ethics, actual philsophy, and, finally, the highest forms of religion (2). In Aristotle’s words, "everywhere where there is something better, there is also something that is the most perfect. Since amongst that which exists, one is better than the other, there must, consequently, be something that is the most perfect and this is the divine (3). It was also Aristotle who, as ‘form’, transferred or transposed the platonic ‘idea’ from transcendence into immanence, "If we imagine for ourselves a human being or a pedestrian, we imagine for ourselves a ‘concept of being’ and not an individual (representative of that ‘concept of being’). For, even if individual things (representatives of concepts) die/go asunder, the concept of them remains. Thus it is clear that, next to sensually perceptible individual ‘things’ there exists something that we imagine, irregardless of whether those things exist or not; for, in imagining those concepts, were are not imagining something that does not exist: that is the form and the idea" (4). Here, Aristotle described the abstraction of the capacity of reason ‘in nuce’, which separates the ‘forms’ that are provided by understanding and its individual perception and merely takes notice for itself of those pictograms as to their essence and which then exclusively deals with the ‘essence’ - and with this, metaphysic begins. However, the term ‘essence’ is today and thus also here, as opposed to Plato’s and Aristotle’s ‘ousia’, not used as a term that is burdened with meaning as an ontological term, but rather as a ‘functional’ term. (II) When we, at the turn of the year 2000, speak of an ‘end of metaphysic’, then, in retrospective, the path from its beginning with the pre-Socratean thinkers to us, can be considered the arc of metaphysic. This arc was filled, in the reception and reflection of reason, by the teachings of philosophy, for ‘ratio’, and, by the highest forms of religion, for existentiality. Its zenith and that what we, today, term as the ‘turning point of time’ had, naturally, arrived for metaphysic, at the moment of transition of the brain’s transfer capacity to reason, thus with the truly event-shaping ‘Greek troika’ and with the highest forms of religion such as Buddhism and Christianity. With this, reason’s view of the essence of the world became historically effective, and the viewpoints of understanding were turned upside down: in the self-active transition of the brain transfer capacity to reason which now ‘takes over’, the ‘summum bonum’ takes on its own life. What is, then, metaphysic? Metaphysic is when reason, in its reception and reflection, transfers ‘essence’ into existence, thus ‘ideas’ and ‘eternal forms’, which it, through the perception of understanding’s recognition of isolated patterns, elevates to the open level of reason, as ‘essence’. Therefore, truth in the ancient Greek language is called ‘a-letheir’ - in this word formation, it is significant to observe that the ancient Greeks did not experience the ‘essential truth’ of reason as a ‘reflecting abstraction’, but rather as a ‘receiving/receptive abolition of the concealment of true existence’, identical with Plato’s ‘re-remembering’ and to the stepping-stones of realization in the so-called ‘cave parable’ (5) and in the ‘Symposium’ (6). Reason conditions the thus gained understanding of ‘essence’ for itself under its own terms and, with this, enhances the sensory-bound existence that is perceptive to understanding, in its elevation to the ‘essence of being’ in reason, ethically, ideally and in new religiosity, with its own intensity. This enhancement has to be separated into: 1. correct, qualitative enhancements of inter-relations by reason in the communication of existence, in referring back to the data of understanding and in thus uncovering ‘essential terms’; 2. fantastic idealizations, be it with respect to religion, be it with respect to ‘mind’, when reason, without any basis, loses itself in unsupported speculations in the data of understanding. Since the transition of reception to the reflection of reason through the ‘triumvirate’ of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the value of existence is being/existence as partaking in the ‘summum bonum’. values are no longer identical with the purposes of understanding that have been idolized in the myths; rather, they are elevated above these as ideals. In myths, man has idolized himself and the world as it appeared to him from the viewpoint of his understanding; in the metaphysic of reason, man idolizes his own ‘ideal image’ of himself and ‘the essence of the world’, as it is shown in reason. The first expression of this movement was classical Greek art, in which humanity and the ideal ‘appear’ to be unified. The second step was the sole reliance on the ‘introspective’, caused by the movement and inner experience of the transition of the brain transfer capacity to reason; this finds its expression, from a phylogenetic viewpoint, as an entirely new and different outlook as opposed to the outlook of understanding. Did not Socrates and Jesus appear like madmen to their contemporaries? Based on the absolute concept of the ‘view of essence’ that has been brought about by the transition to the brain transfer capacity to reason, through Plato, the ‘Stoa’, Christianity and ‘Neo-Plantonism’, reason (as capacity) boughs down before the ‘summum bonum’ in the highest forms of religion: the viewed absolute concept of ‘God’ and the real salvation are ‘beyond’ this world, ‘sanctity’ is spiritualized from the more outer common religious rituals for the Gods of understanding to the individual standing before and the spiritualized relationship to One God. Classical Greek thinking still goes out from the assumption of a participation in the absolute in the ‘here and now’, be it as assimilation in the participation in the idea (Plato), be it as realization of the ‘form’ as ‘entelechia’ (Aristotle) - in ‘levels of participation’, man rises to the level of divine contemplation. With the break-through of the spiritualization as the process of reaon’s becoming ‘self-conscious’, these ‘levels’ of ‘worldly assimilation’ are transformed into an unbridgeable gap between the ‘other-worldly’ ‘summum bonum’ and man. Psychologically, this can be explained from the fact that man cannot attribute this break-through of the ‘self-consciousness of reason’ to himself - thus even Plato already spoke of the ‘burning of a divine spark’; also here belong the descriptions of the mystics with respect to ‘unio mystica’ (7). The individual break-through of the transition to the brain transfer capacity of reason in the ‘experiencing’ individual ‘appears’ to be caused by a ‘superior’ ‘outer-worldly’ force, which also Aristotle describes explicitly as the ‘divine’. The ‘here and now’ of this world is, from such a viewpoint that was already established in Sophism and with Plato, de-valued as a limitation of the existing that is wanting in existence, as baseless illusion. With Buddha, Jesus and with Neo-Platonism, this view becomes the ruling spiritual view. For the world that has thus been deprived of its ‘value’, there remains only ‘compassion’, because, from this viewpoint, all existence finds itself in the same baseless, undignified situation. The ‘true value’ of life, as it refers to this world, is transferred to a ‘beyond’. Therefore, this presented theory is uncovering the fantastic-unreal contents of metaphysic and its origin to, on the other hand, add to the phylogenetic process of development, its results, as far as they stem from a legitimate application of reason. Reason, brings in the values it notes for itself on the basis of the data of understanding into existence and into its tradition, and with this ‘being brought in’, these values receive just as much reality as the utilitarian emotional values of understanding once received. Even today, the latter are still, a priori, experienced as ‘true’ and ‘alive’, that the emotional prejudices of understanding all-too-often outweigh judgment based on reason. As an important proof of this categorical perception and differentiation between understanding should be mentioned the appearance of ‘conscience’. Demokrit’s ‘syneidesis’, thus the ‘combined awareness’, delineates the presence of two different ‘voices’, which, in light of a certain set of facts, come to two different forms of judgement: it is reason in its view of the ‘essence’ which ‘reports in’ as the newer and higher capacity, and which thus overshadows the desires of ‘emotion’ for lust respective the desires of understanding for power and use and which subjugates these to its own set of values, thus to ethics or to the requirements of the highest forms of religion. In this, the ethical values are to be considered ‘steadfast’ and ‘irremovable’, for they are values of reason that have been derived from the ‘equal’ ‘essence’ of all human beings, as much as our ‘emotional values’ are to be considered ‘steadfast’, which are values of understanding. The ‘good’ is that which, in reason, on the basis of this ‘equal’ ‘essence’ appears as ‘right. (III) Above all, a ‘theory of metaphysic’ has to show what metaphysic represents in the system of the human mind, and that it is a necessary activity of this mind: it is the arc, how, in each state of reception and reflection of reason the ‘condition of being/existence’ as a whole and the open questions that arise out of man’s unawareness of reason, becomes apparent, and it is thus a parallel to the myths of understanding. Myths have the same function for understanding as metaphysic for reason: searchingly and-projecting, to close the open arc. The receptive opening-up of the new (brain) capability makes this arc apparent with nature philosophy and dialectics and fills it up. In the transition of the brain transfer capability to reason which can be historically and functionally addressed as ‘dihairese’ with Plato and Aristotle as well as existentially with the highest forms of religion and the ‘turn of our times’, metaphysic of reason experiences itself as independent center, which subsequently unloaded itself in the reflective philosophy since Descartes in the reflection on its capability (cogito, ergu sum). In this process, reason gives birth, as a counter-movement to this ‘unloading, emptying out of existential spirituality’ and in its relying on itself as ‘capacity of reason’ constantly new false forms of metaphysic, as, for example, German idealism and its equation of human mind and ‘reaon of the world’, the ‘superhuman’ of Nietzsche in the ‘eternal recurrence of the similar’, or the special relationship of the ‘German mind’ to ‘existence as such’ as with Fichte and Heidegger. Metaphyic as ‘uncovering of the essence’ is, above all, also an ‘establishment of the realm of reason’, as the ‘realm of understanding is that of utility and use. It (metaphysic) is thus particularly identical with the ‘mysterious realm’ (8) of eternal truth of objective nature, of truths that are not bound to a subject but are always in effect. The objective existence (of these truth) is based on the ‘similarity’ of pictographic abstraction, in which reason cleanses the ‘similar essence’ of the individualities of understanding and in which it conditions this essence for itself under its own terms: that which is right is that which is good. With questions as to ‘existence’ and as to ‘meaning’, however, it is different: the first question asks for the ‘real’ existence of being - what thus would be ‘essential existence’ of all that exists, including man, above and beyond the empirical view of understanding and above and beyond the ‘essential view’ of reason. The question as to ‘existence’ is asked with the awareness that ‘existence’ is more than our limited capabilities in the ‘normal communication of existence’ show. The ‘existence of capabilities’ is always an ‘equal existence’, the existence of living spirituality is always communication in the form of ‘release and dismissal’. Therefore, the first form of existence is always ‘predicative’, since every capability of existence consists of stating equality, similarity or inequality of perception and conditioning. The existence of living spirituality is the ex-sistence: the active and passive process of being released into the communication of the existing, which utilizes the predicative ‘equal existence’ of the capabilities (of existence). And thus the question as to the ‘meaning’ of existence points towards man and through his communication with the world also to all that exists: for what end it exists. Therefore, the questions as to the ‘meaning’ of existence will, ‘a priori’, always be a metaphysical question, because the ‘meaning’ of existence, for the limited capabilities of that which exists - and only in this form does that which exists exist - can never be finally evaluated. The answer to the question as to the ‘meaning’ of existence is always a hypothetical risk, an ‘existential’ reliance on it, thus, a ‘belief’. The question as to the ‘meaning’ of existence has to be separated into two areas: - For what purpose is that which is found in existence present, and how can that which is found in existence, according to the questioning capability, ‘best’ be arranged? Insofar, this deals with ethics in the communication of the various capabilities of being/existence. - For what purpose is that which exists in existence in the first place, what is the ‘reason for being’? ‘Reason’ is meant here in a double-meaning of ‘origin’ and ‘goal’, as ‘alpha’ and ‘omega’. Insofar, the questions as to the ‘meaning’ of existence belongs to the existential communication of man who refers to this ‘numinous basis’ of that which exists. The first questions as to meaning is thus directed towards immanence and ethics, the second towards transcendence and that, what used to be described as ‘the holy’, as ‘sanctity’. To transcend means to ‘step beyond’. ‘Stepping beyond’ is, physically speaking, a higher capability of transfer of function within immanence. What leads to this elevation will here, for the purpose of concrete explanation of the sphere of living spirituality, be called ‘elan vital (e.v.) (9), and the transcending transfer of the ‘transfer capability’ in the chain of predicative ‘capabilities’ also as e.v. migratio. Its latest product is, so far, metaphysic in all of its forms. Since, however, terms, all-too-easily, take on ‘a life of their own’, such as, for example, the term ‘soul’, and since one even searches for the ‘location’ of such materially misunderstood developments of ‘lives of their own’, here, elan vital and its migratio shall be presented by means of an image, since it can not be grasped just as the term ‘soul’ cannot be grasped. Rather is that, what is here called ‘elan vital’, always inseparably tied to ‘capabilities’. Each capability is a synthetic form of reaction and action of the ‘interior’ towards the ‘exterior’, whereby the ‘interior’ learns from the ‘exterior’, as the ‘exterior’ lends itself to the ‘interior’ for this learning process in its equal or similar repetition on the basis of these two factors. Since, however, the synthetic nature of communication increases from the ‘exterior’ towards the ‘interior’, and since the connection between the ‘exterior’ and the center of communication becomes ‘indirect’, the lively connection between the ‘exterior’ and the ‘interior’ has to be kept up. For this, a synthetic center on the basis of neuronal function is needed: the ‘one unit’ of being which is separated from other forms of being necessarily requires that the leading synthetic communication capability is ‘set inside’ with the ‘synthetic center’. The image of this being ‘set inside’ is the sphere or ball. What we, based on ‘scientific proof’, contend for galaxies, stars, planets and gravitation, that also holds true for ourselves: it is the nature of the sphere, to transmit into itself, within its environment, by means of its outer shell; its effect on its environment and the effects of its environment on it appear thus, ‘as if’ they come from the ‘inner center’ as the center of the sphere and ‘as if’ they have an effect on its center. Center and surface/outer shell are thus two components of the sphere, and yet, the sphere is one, one completely closed ‘unit’. Likewise, it is with the ‘capabilities of existence’ and with the ‘elan vital’. These layered capabilities, from instinct to reason, which connect each living being with the ‘exterior’ and which communicate with it, trans-mit to the center this ‘exterior’, in that these capabilities interpret the sensory data. The e.v.-center is nothing else but that center of activity of the sphere which, in man, we term as the ‘I/Ego’ of understanding, the ‘I/Ego’ of reason respectively, in double-reflection, ‘I/Ego- I/Ego’, to which the organism man, by means of his respectively operating capability, relates his experiences and actions. From the concentration of the ‘ego-center’ he gains his ‘strength’, and from it he works his deeds. This center is just as much an ‘as-if’, just as much function, as is the mass center of stars - and yet, both are, in their form, quite real: as centers of activity. All that is in this world, is, in a ‘transferred’ sense of such a shape of a ‘sphere’, and thus, of such ‘duality in unity’. This swaying between the two poles of the unit is, for example, already apparent in light, in that it behaves, on the one hand, as a wave (energy - elan vital), on the other hand, as corpuscle (mass-surface) - which, to this day, has not yet been reconciled in a ‘unified approach’ to it, but which can, thus far, only be understood in this ‘duality’. (IV) Every type of human being can be understood from the interplay of his capabilities and of the seat of the ‘sphere’ of his ‘interior’. The epigenetic development of the human mind brings forth, according to inclination, environment and its tradition, individually quite different ‘interior networks’ of ‘layers of capabilities’ between emotion, ‘plain understanding’ and reason. This leads necessarily to a diverging centering of the ‘Ego’ and thus, humans follow either their instincts, their emotions, their utilitarian needs, their ideals, sanctity, or, in chameleon-like fashion, each of this category at the same time. That the majority of humans are, even today, still conditioned by ‘plain understanding/common sense’ rather than by reason, can already be seen alone in the fact that superstition, thus mythical concepts of understanding are far more spread out than metaphysical concepts of reason. This is also evident in all higher forms of religion that are based on reason, which were forced, in order to gain a broad footing, to absorb in themselves all forms of understanding type of superstitions and which they still incorporate today. However, it is the task of the individual to free himself, by reflection, from fantasizing forms of metaphysic of reason as well as from superstition of understanding, but also from the dependence of instinct. In view of the overall intellectual development of mankind and its tradition, this has already happened, although the overwhelming majority can not even observe this, yet. The existential metaphysic of reason, be it in form of religion or philosophy, has been ‘emptied out/unloaded’ my means of reason’s self-reflection and is stranded at nihilism: "God is dead" (10), naked utilitarianism rages around the ‘golden calf’ as global capitalism. For with the false dogmas, one has also abandoned the central truth of the metaphysic of Christianity, the ‘double commandment’ (Matthew, 22). What does the commandment to ‘love God’ want to teach us other than to ‘keep sacred’ the goal of our existence as the transcendence of being, above and beyond ourselves? And what it the commandment ‘to love our neighbors as we love ourselves’ other than the consequent adherence and ‘putting into action’ of the realization of reason that all human beings are ‘equal’? The double commandment of the New Testament can thus be interpreted as the ‘reasonable’ realization of the functional principle of evolution: the "Yes" to the enhancement the can be seen in all that is living, thus the transcendence of being, by means of mutation and selection on the basis of the ‘balance’ of the forces of nature. And, also from a neuronal point of view, metaphysic and the highest forms of religion are a result of evolution - the result of what, after all? For the capability to view the essential can be derived from the phylogeny and from the epigenetic development of the human brain; epigenetic development is the continuation of evolution in the single life form by means or neuronal selection. This means that the, in man, principally constantly progressing, increasing ‘brain network creation’ follows along those neuronal networks of the human brain that have proven themselves as ‘functionally viable’, while those networks that have proven ‘functionally not viable’, are being discarded. The reception and reflection levels of ‘plain understanding/common sense’ and of reason can be derived from the constantly increasing epigenetic development of ‘brain networking’ and to the transition of brain transfer capabilities through these neuronal networks. The categorical enhancement of the capabilities of the human mind and the increase of the neuronal networking of his brain are interrelated and inter-dependent. This interrelationship and inter-dependence is complemented by our capability to transform our functional and evaluating ‘terms’ to adapt them to each category: If that which is pleasant to emotion, and it that which is ‘useful’ to ‘plain understanding/common sense’, then, in parallel, this holds true for reason: that which is right is good. When, at first, the capability of reason in its receptions, dialectically determines the ‘right’ as the ‘good’, so, in turn, subsequent to such transfer and in reflection, it is the new center of the "ego’ which makes the good to the basis of the right: That which is equal in nature deserves of that which is equal to it. This basic principle of all justice - and with it of the ‘good’ of reason, stands in diametrical opposition to the right of ‘plain understanding/common sense’ and its ‘utility. The year 1789 marks, for western tradition, the break-through of this ‘reflective’ principle of the essence of reason: Liberty, equality, brotherhood. Today, this principle has been terminated in the reality of a utilitarian ‘neo-liberalism’, and reason is abused for the purposes of ‘plain understanding/common sense’, without adhering to the values of reason: the unreasonable end of metaphysic. Annotations: By clicking on the colored footnotes, you can move back and forth between the text and the annotations. ( 1 ) ancient Greek: dihairein - to separate, to allocate, to interpret, to decide ( 2 ) To this subject, see also the work of the author in Aufklaerung Kritik 1/1996 "Was ist Dialektik?" with extensive Quotations from the antique authors. ( 3 ) Aristotle, Fragmentum 16 ( 4 ) Aristotle, Fragmentum 187 ( 5 ) Plato, Politeia 514 a (and following) ( 6 ) Plato, Symposium 209 e 6 (and following) ( 7 ) see, above all, Master Eckehart; as sample should be mentioned his "Sonnengleichnis" (Sun Parable) in Sermon 26. ( 8 ) Peter Singer, Praktische Ethic, 2nd ed., 1994, p. 23 ( 9 ) This term has been borrowed from Henri Bergson ("Die beiden Quellen der Moral und der Religion", Walter-Verlag, Olten 1980), does, however, as "Lebensschwung" (life force) not refer to anything mystical, but rather, in an evolutionary context, to the principle of life per se, which elevates itself in the various forms of existence of that which exists (from curds to life) and with the capabilities of living creatures. ( 10 ) Nietzsche, Die Froehliche Wissenschaft, 3rd volume, no. 125 作者：多看看 唯物主义很容易滑向超验的泥潭。如果不是在中国，形而上学和哲学这两个概念几乎就是同一的。形而上者谓之道，形而下者谓之器，这就是中国的翻译者使用形而上学这个名称的原因。 讨论见：( http://bbs.cenet.org.cn/dispbbs.asp?boardid=41143rootid=id=35391 )
我们现在有很多宪法学者都在研究美国宪法。可以说，过去十年是美国宪法学的"黄金十年"，其间出版了海量的美国宪法译著和专著，我们的翻译速度已经与美国学者的写作速度基本同步，甚至已经超越了中文读者的阅读速度。十年前，马伯里诉麦迪逊可能还是宪法学的知识前沿，可以出现在北大法学院研究生考试的试卷上，但现在，马伯里或许已经是法学院本科生的学前培训或者普法教育的内容了。 但在热闹的表象下，宪法学者并未自觉反思为什么的问题，即为什么要研究美国宪法。或者可以这样提问，为什么有这么多学者在研究美国宪法，而不是同样适用了美国原理的加拿大或以色列宪法，为什么现在没有什么人研究苏联宪法或非洲某个国家的宪法。 宪法学界更习惯于基于学科的逻辑讨论方法论，一个在我看来就是"怎么办"的问题，但真正的问题在于"为什么"，因为我们对为什么的回答决定了我们可以怎么办。也是因为我们的宪法学者在面对美国宪法时没有自己的问题意识，学习美国宪法就变成向美国学习宪法，反映在当下的美国宪法研究中，就是我们至今未能建立起中国宪法学的美国宪法叙事。 我自己的阅读经验或可说明这一点，我在做博士论文的时候，读了不少美国学者研究中国政治的著作。这些研究存在一个共同点，就是它们都有一个独立的问题意识，是美国人自己建立起来的一套认知中国政治的体系，有自己的概念、命题和语境，是根据中国在美国体系中的位置来建构中国的论述。 而我们的美国宪法研究却只是在进行美国宪法学的美国宪法叙事。我们看起来是在原汁原味地讲述美国宪法，但这种看起来走在前沿、追求同步的美国宪法研究实际上只能说是一种"鹦鹉学舌"，一种简单的拿来主义。我们自始至终都未曾反省为什么的问题，因此也没有自觉地思考如何建构起中国宪法学自己的美国宪法叙事。 更重要的或许在于，美国的法学教育是一个彻头彻尾的职业教育体系，是以培养本国律师为己任的。照搬美国法学院现有的职业主义叙事，将司法审查预设为美国宪政大厦的基石，实际上正遮蔽了美国宪政发展的真正经验。例如，美国建国时只有13个州，现在有50个州，这一大扩张在美国是一个宪法过程，但美国宪法学不谈这个，因为这个宪法过程在美国没有司法化，对做律师没有帮助。但美国在历史上如何处理这一问题，对我们就很有意义。美国宪政两百年可以带给当下中国相当多的教益，但美国法学院内的现有研究其实把美国宪法讲"薄"了，那些司法学说和技术与其说是美国宪政成功的奥秘，不如说是美国律师自我设置的职业进入门槛。 因此，中国宪法学者必须寻找新的参照系，在此基础上重现发现真正值得我们研究、掌握、并且借鉴学习的美国宪法。这个过程既要求我们带着自己的问题意识重建对美国宪法的理解，又要求我们可以将美国宪法作为一种方法，通过它来理解我们自己的宪法问题，因此是一个穿越在历史和现实、我者和他者之间的过程。劳伦斯·却伯在其新著《看不见的宪法》中引了惠特曼的一句诗：I am large, I contain multitudes（我辽阔博大；我包罗万象），这也许可以作为我们思考中美参照系的一个起点。 中国当下确实面临着自己的宪法问题，边疆治理、代际政治、一国两制，而美国实际上也有着同样或者在功能上等价的宪法问题，但这些问题在美国并没有 "政治问题司法化"，也无法参考美国现有的学说体系。如果我们天真地以为司法审查可以让中国宪法"活"起来--只要找到读过美国宪法解释ABC的人，由他们解释宪法，我们的宪法问题就可以迎刃而解，这其实是对美国宪政史的最大误读，这大概解决不了任何中国问题，它本身可能就是问题。 基辛格可以写出《论中国》，傅高义可以写出《邓小平与中国转型》，法国青年托克维尔在30岁写出了《论美国的民主》，为什么中国人的美国宪法研究不可能超越美国法学院现有的叙事，最终形成对美国的理论输出？ 美国宪法史的结构性特点 美国宪政史有两个结构性特点。 首先，美国是一个通过制宪建国的国家，美国本身就是一个宪法共同体，United States是通过宪法才united起来的。因为宪法在先，美国在后，美国宪法史就可以讲成一部美国史，理解美国宪法也就是在理解美国本身。中国不同，无论是作为传统意义上的文明秩序，还是现代意义上的民族国家，中国的政治根基都不是也不可能是成文宪法。中国宪法史不可能讲成"上下五千年"，最多只能是一部中国近现代史，不可能覆盖中国这个政治文化共同体的全部时空。 这一区别就在告诉我们，美国宪法不只是法院的司法化宪法，不只是法官用以化解政治冲突的司法学说和技艺，美国宪法的故事并不限于联邦最高法院所设定的剧场。 我的老师布鲁斯·阿克曼曾经说过，"我们的宪法叙事将我们构成了一个民族"。我们也可以说，美国之所以可能，就在于它的宪法，美国存在着一个 constitutional founding。不仅如此，如果看阿克曼所讲的美国宪法的三次大转型，建国、重建、新政，它们都不是司法决策的产物，而表现为国家宪法政体的结构性改造。回到英语原义，Founding，Reconstruction与New Deal，我们或许可以更好地把握其中结构性改造和国家建构的意义。美国是一个宪法共同体，这是美国宪政史的第一个特点。 其次，美国只有一部宪法，1787年的费城宪法至今仍是美国的高级法和根本法，而且两百年来只在文本上留下27条修正案。很多人因此讲美国宪法是超稳定的，但问题在于，美国宪法第五条所规定的修宪程序在进入20世纪后已经基本上走不通了，高级法政治的法治化轨道已经堵塞，即便是罗斯福新政都没有留下文本上的修正案，正是因此，美国的保守派在里根革命后攻击进步主义者放逐了自由放任的宪法秩序。阿克曼在《我们人民》中讲美国是"一部宪法、三种政体"，1787年宪法的框架容纳了建国、重建和新政三种宪法秩序，实际上是希望为罗斯福新政找到一种更坚实的宪法基础，证成新政是一次不成文的修宪。这样看来，超稳定或许不是一个准确的形容词。美国宪法经历过生与死的考验，最紧迫的当然是断而未裂的南北战争，如果不是林肯的决断，美国或许早就会南北分治了。此外还有大大小小的危机时刻。美国宪法学现在流行"看不见的宪法"、"隐藏的宪法"或"不成文宪法"的说法，这些学术修辞至少可以告诉我们，切勿从文本的稳定性推定宪政实践的稳定性。 但无论如何，美国只有一个政治纪元，也只有一种政治时间，无论其政治身份在危机时刻发生何种结构性的改造，还都是发生在1787年宪法设定的政治框架内，阿克曼有一句话说得很好："法国自1789年经历了五个共和，而我们只生活在一个共和国内。"我们现在说奥巴马是美国第44任总统，这是从华盛顿开始计算的，而不是林肯或罗斯福。如果对比中国或德国、法国，我们可以更清楚地看到美国宪政实践的连续性。 美国宪政实践的连续性给美国宪法的研究者提出了一个挑战，如何形成我们的总体史观，如何把握美国宪政实践的总体韵律。在法律意义上，我们甚至可以说美国只能有一部宪法史，这并不是理论设计的要求，而是美国宪政自身实践提出的命令。任何美国宪法理论，即便是那些仅处理宪法史的某一片段的理论，都必须具有总体性的视角。美国宪法史是裂而未断的，是由"一连串"的宪法实践所构成，美国宪法发展的关键时刻在解释时是环环相扣的--你如何理解1776年的《独立宣言》，可能就在很大程度上决定了如何理解1781年的《邦联条款》、1787年宪法，甚至如何理解美国内战。这是实践对理论建构提出的要求。 这就是美国宪政史的两个结构性特点：第一，美国史就是美国的宪法史；第二，美国只有一部宪法史。这两个判断听起来很绝对，但我认为从宪法学的意义上可以这么说。法学学者当然可以对美国宪法史进行分期研究，只研究重建或者新政、马歇尔法院或者沃伦法院，但这些片段化或局部性的研究应当隐含合理的总体史观和叙事，否则，以学术规范化为借口沉浸于具体问题的技术化研究，那就不只是鹦鹉学舌，由此形成的研究成果很有可能是管中窥豹，甚至盲人摸象。或许可以说，在美国宪法研究中，既要看到树木，更要看到森林，在美国宪法史的解读上，不谋全局者，不足以谋一域。 从司法审查到宪法决策 我在2006年曾经翻译出版了哈佛法学院考克斯的《法院与宪法》。考克斯教授是在美国宪法史上留下过自己足印的人物，就是那位在水门事件中把尼克松拉下马的特别检察官，美国法治的英雄。这本书的名称其实就代表了美国法学院内的宪法叙事："法院与宪法"，法院在先，宪法在后，在这种叙事中，宪政就是司法审查，法官才是宪法的守护者，美国宪法就是讲述联邦最高法院的故事。 通常说来，故事会从1803年的马伯里诉麦迪逊开始讲起。如果我们看美国法学院内最常用的案例教科书，苏利文和冈瑟编撰的已经出到第17版的《宪法：案例与材料》，第一章就讲最高法院权力的来源与性质，第一个案例就是马伯里诉麦迪逊，相比之下，美国宪法文本的秩序首先是国会、其次总统，最后才是法院，《联邦党人文集》等到第78篇才论述司法问题。因此，这种叙事的材料其实是constitutional law，主要是法院的判例学说，而不是Constitution本身。由于我们对美国宪法的拿来主义，这种叙事其实也在塑造我们对美国宪法的想象，美国宪政在我们这里被误读为政治问题的司法化，也就是"大法官说了算"。 但事实并不如此，只要我们读过美国宪政史，我们就可以发现，美国历史上的伟大总统都有过"藐视法庭"的记录，从杰斐逊、杰克逊、林肯到罗斯福，无一例外，如果法官真的就是宪法的声音，那么这些总统都是反法治的。而且，政治学家斯科夫罗内克的研究已经证明，如果旧体制已摇摇欲坠，那么积极有为的新总统必定会和旧体制所培养的法官产生冲突，这是一种结构性的冲突。这就暴露了司法化宪法的一个断裂，一方面，我们都承认也必须承认他们是美国历史上最伟大的总统，是共和国的守护者，但另一方面，他们在美国这个法治国家内又不是守法主义者，怎么解决这个会让司法化论者感到尴尬的断裂？ 我们在这里要超越司法审查的概念禁锢，回到宪法决策（constitutional decision-making）这个一般性的概念。美国宪法的主语是We the People，而不是We the Court，其宾语是国会、总统、法院和各州，也不只限于法院。换言之，政府各个分支都必须基于宪法做出决策，在决策过程中有权解释它所理解的宪法，非民选的法官不能垄断宪法的解释权。 有关宪法决策，我经常举的例子就是1803年的路易斯安那购买，它与马伯里案同年发生，决策者其实就是马伯里案的实际被告，时任总统杰斐逊。路易斯安那购买由始至终都与法院没有关系，但它仅用一千万美元就让美国疆域扩展一倍，其宪政意义远大于马伯里。桑福德·列文森专门撰文说美国宪法课上不应讲马伯里，或许有矫枉过正之嫌。但我们确实应该打破马伯里迷思对宪法学探索的禁锢，重访路易斯安那购买或许可以是一个起点。 林肯在内战期间停止人身保护令状也是一个现成的例子。林肯对此有一个自己的辩解，"all the laws, but one, go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violate"。林肯的言下之意，我违反一部法律是为了防止国家的分崩离析，因此拯救了所有其他的法律，林肯的这句话也许会让我们想到施米特，但这确实是林肯的自我辩护。不过我们也要看到林肯的复杂性，因为根据这个逻辑，林肯完全可以拒绝参加1864年的总统竞选，因为参选就意味着可能落选，而林肯落选也就意味着南北分裂，但林肯没有继续主张他要拯救"all the laws, but one"，美国宪政的纪元得到延续。 我最近读到一个很有趣的历史细节。我们都知道，1953年的布朗案要求在公立学校内解除种族隔离，因此遭到美国南方的普遍抵制，包括地方民兵都动员起来阻止黑人白人合校。艾森豪威尔总统为了国家法制的统一，让中央军队进入南方执行最高法院的法令。对于美国南方白人来说，总统的行动会让他们回忆起内战失败后的屈辱军管史。但艾森豪威尔在他的决策中表现出了真正的宪法智慧，他派出的是二战时执行诺曼底登陆任务的空军部队，让民族英雄到南方去执法。总统的宪法决策既没有案例编号，也有缺少书面的意见书和司法说理或推理，但它往往体现了更可贵的宪法智慧。 我是在布雷耶大法官的新著《让民主运转起来》中读到这则小故事的，在耶鲁法学院读书时，我曾有幸聆听布雷耶的演讲，第一场的内容基本上围绕着马伯里诉麦迪逊。在讲座的问答环节，有听众提出了有关马伯里与早期共和国史的问题，布雷耶回答完毕后问坐在第一排的阿克曼："我讲对了吗？"阿克曼的回应是摇了摇头，这个小故事其实并没有什么微言大义，我之所以想起它，还是要借此检讨司法化叙事的正当性。在我看来，马伯里范式的司法审查既非四海皆准的宪政公式，也很难说是美国宪政发展的内在模式，它很大程度上来自职业叙事的建构和想象，或者如劳伦斯·却伯所言，"有关司法审查之正当性的论证最终都是超宪法的，相关思考在根本上是政治的、哲学的和历史的"，它是司法学说体系的第一块砖，把它抽出来，整个体系就会发生多米诺骨牌式的崩溃。但对我们而言，反思司法化宪法观却是重新理解美国宪政的第一步 三位一体的美国宪政形态 宪法是国家的根本大法，是共同体得以组成的根本结构方式，因此现代宪法学应当是一种statecraft，关于这一点，菲利普·波比特有过非常精彩的论述："国家是基于它的目的而存在的，其中包括生存下去和行动自由的动力，这是战略；权威和正当性的动力，这是法律；追求身份的动力，这就是历史。"有趣的是，这是波比特作为美国宪法学者在研究欧洲宪法史时提出的框架，我在此拿来重建我们对美国宪法的理解。一个国家的宪政形态是由历史、法律和战略所构成的，分别对应着宪法学内的宪法政体、国家能力和地缘政治，我在此以美国的建国宪法为例来实践这种新宪政的论证。 历史是关于政治身份的追求，美国作为一个宪法共同体，其政治身份就是美国的宪法政体，也就是United States的宪法结构。在早期共和国史中，United States并不是一个恒定的结构。我们可以从头看，《独立宣言》的文本中出现过united States，我们现在经常错误地翻译为"合众国"。但请注意，这时的united还是小写，只是前置的形容词，其性质正如它之前的thirteen，你总不能翻译成十三个合众国吧。因此，《独立宣言》并不是要建国，它只是十三个邦国"步调一致"宣布各自的独立，成为"free and independent States"。 United States作为一个法律名词首见于1781年的《邦联条款》，但这时的United States和我们现在的联合国（United Nations）没有实质区别，"The United States of American"只是"联合国在北美"，因为《邦联条款》第二条明确宣布"各邦国保留其主权、自由和独立"，第三条将邦联称之为"坚定的友爱同盟"（a firm league of friendship），因此，这时的United States还是一个国际法组织，而非主权国家。我们从它的运作也可以看出，各邦在邦联的代表并不是"议员"，而是"大使"，无论代表人数多少，都只能进行团体投票。只是在费城宪法生效后，United States才成为"合众国"，在此意义上，1787年才是美国真正的建国时刻，因为从这一刻起，它的权力基础不再是各个州，而是我们人民，甘阳教授将这一过程概括为"公民个体为本，统一宪政立国"。 而在这之后，United States还经历了一个由复数名词到单数名词的转变。1865年的第十三修正案还是在用their作为人称代词来指代the United States，合众国还是一个复数。转变出现在1868年的第十四修正案，制宪者开始用the来指代the United States。这种言词之间的区别其实标志着美国政治身份的大转型。也就是说，美国只有经历了一场内战，才浴火重生为一个不可分裂的民族国家，这在宪法文本上体现为合众国由复数名词向单数名词的转变，因为各州已经不可逆地失去了它们所主张的主权。 关于国家能力，宪法学有一个表述，宪法是"限制公权力以保护私人权利"，但至少美国的宪法发展是反其道而行之的，宪法转型在美国主要表现为国家建设的问题，也就是如何塑造国家能力的问题。麦迪逊在《联邦党人文集》第51篇说过一段耳熟能详的话："如果人都是天使，就不需要任何政府。如果是天使统治人，就不需要对政府有任何外部或内部控制。在创设一个人统治人的政府时，最大的困难就在于此：你必须首先使政府有能力控制被统治者；接下来再使政府有责任自我控制。"我们一定要看到麦迪逊的"首先"和"接下来"，原文分别为"first"和"in the next place"，逻辑是再清楚不过的了。 亨廷顿在《变动社会中的政治秩序》内开篇就讲道，"国家之间最重要的政治区别并不是它们的政府形式，而是政府的程度。"亨廷顿所说的"政府的程度" 其实就是国家能力的另一种表述，只是宪法学者现在更喜欢讨论"政府的形式"。也是在这本书中，亨廷顿阐发了麦迪逊的判断，"权力在能够被限制之前首先必须存在"，"人可以有秩序却无自由，但却不能有自由却无秩序"，因此，首要问题"并不是自由，而是创造一种正当的公共秩序"。 但亨廷顿认为，美国生来就具有一个政府，所以美国人只懂得如何限制政府，而不知道如何创造政府，这或许是一个有偏差的判断。有关美国政治发展的研究已经表明，美国人的政治智慧在于他们擅长建设"看不见"或者"尽可能不显眼"的政府，即便是19世纪，美国也不是一个自由放任的"弱国家"，只是我们用欧洲民族国家的经验理论是无法理解美国政治发展的。 在纪录片《大国崛起》中，阿克曼在讲述费城制宪时说，"在1787年宪法中，关于成立国家政府的一个基本观点是，如果我们不联合起来，就会被欧洲列强所摧毁，我们需要一个中央政府。"阿克曼的话其实连接了国家能力和地缘政治的问题。有关建国秩序的地缘政治宪法问题，我们可做两方面的解读。 首先，1776年至1787年间的北美大陆是一个列国体制。在战争结束，北美列国失去共同敌人后，它们在贸易和疆土上的冲突可能会让新大陆复制旧世界的命运，陷入一种"战国"状态，因此，制宪是"合众为一"，防止北美大陆重蹈欧洲的政治宿命，费城宪法在此意义上构成了北美诸邦的"和平协定"。制宪的实质是让原本inter-national的议题变为了inter-state的议题（而commerce这个词最初并不只是商务或贸易，而是指一般意义上的沟通），如果说前者要经过国际谈判才能解决，那么后者可直接由中央政治过程进行干预。直至林肯在论证美国不可分裂时，还在主张"和外人订条约能比朋友间订法律更容易吗？外人之间执行条约能比朋友之间遵守法律更容易吗？" 其次，但在实践中更重要的是，美国人只有联合起来，拧成一股绳，才可能在恶劣的国际环境中生存下去，这是一个基于国家安全的论证。我们现在读《联邦党人文集》通常会跳着读，从第10篇开始读，甚至是直接读有关司法审查的第78篇，但更重要的篇章其实出现在一开始，从第3篇到第8篇，军事家汉密尔顿和外交家杰伊都在进行地缘政治宪法的论证。事实上，即便是书生气最重的麦迪逊，也在第41篇中讲到，"美国若是联合起来，只要少数军队，甚至不需一兵一卒，对于外国野心来说，要比美国分裂而拥有十万名准备作战的精兵更能显示出一种令人生畏的姿态。" 为什么？原因在于美国有大西洋的天险，在当时的军事技术条件下，大西洋让美国不需要维持人数众多的陆军。仅有的2万名陆军大都驻在西部或北部与印第安人毗邻的边境地带，这也是我们"看不见"19世纪的美国政府的原因之一，但看不见并不意味着不存在。美国宪法第三修正案禁止士兵在和平时期驻扎民房，美国很少动用军队执行国内事务，正是地缘政治才能解释美国和欧洲大陆的"大分流"。阿基亚·阿玛说大西洋就是美国的"太平洋"，保卫美国人自由的不是《权利法案》，而是大西洋，这就是基于地缘政治的宪法论证。 在1862年的国会咨文中，林肯指出，美国的内地"从领土角度讲是共和国的主体，其余部分不过是它的边缘地区......蕴藏着最富饶的未开发资源"，但 "这个地区却没有海岸，没有一个地方接近海。作为国家的一部分，内地人民现在正而且将永远设法借道纽约到欧洲，借道新奥尔良到南美洲和非洲，借道旧金山到亚洲。但是，按照目前叛乱分子的设想把我们这个共同的国家分成两个国家，这样一来，广大内地的每一个人就都被切断了一个或更多的出口"，因此，美国作为一个民族"只能联合，不能分裂"。这是林肯基于地缘政治的宪法论证，它比任何其他形态的宪法论证都要厚重。 在结束时，我应当指出，我所提出的问题远远多于我所回答或者有能力问答的问题，但我希望，我在这里提出了一些正确的问题，并可以促发建设性的思考。 （作者系政治学博士，现任教于山东大学法学院 ） 原文见 http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php?3209/c11
标签: 超越
![[转载]新实验证实中微子未超光速 爱因斯坦相对论正确](http://image.sciencenet.cn/album/201203/19/102125vo98xob8ndccwlnx.jpg.thumb.jpg)
