在中美电子支付服务争端中,中方于2011年7月5日要求WTO专家组对美国成立专家组的请求与WTO争端解决机制(DSU)第6.2条不一致作出裁决。2011年9月30日,WTO专家组发布了裁决报告,拒绝中方要求。中方先失一局。 我看了此报告,将核心信息摘录在下方。 我的看法是: 一、好的方面: 1、我们对“成立专家组的请求”(R equest for the establishment of the Panel )这一程序环节已开始重视。 2、中方两项质疑(电子支付服务如何同中国的具体承诺相联系;美方未明确与市场准入和国民待遇有关的服务提供方式)是有道理的。但在专家组看来,这两项质疑(要求)提出的时间太早,不应要求美国在提交的“成立专家组的请求”中即阐释这二个问题。 二、不足的方面:我感觉仍没有掌控好专家组“标准职权范围”(standard terms of reference)与“特定职权范围”(specific terms of reference)问题。注意下面所附的第6.2条原文有两句。这第二句被专家组删除了!事实上中方可以操作的余地是在这第二句(In case the appllicant requests the establishment of a panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the proposed text of special terms of reference)。这也是我在前期博客中写的一个问题:在争端中中美磋商的问题要加上我方关注的问题(如我国有关产业状况与相应的市场保护政策适用的合理性与必要性);在中美磋商中只“研究”美方关注的问题于我无益。所以在中方被诉案中中方对专家组职权应争取少用“标准职权范围”而更多适用“特定职权范围”。 以上只代表个人意见。 On 5 July 2011, China submitted to the Panel a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the consistency of the United States' request for the establishment of the Panel (WT/DS413/2) with Article6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. On 7September2011, the Panel issued the enclosed preliminary ruling to the parties and third parties. The preliminary ruling will be incorporated as an integral part of the Panel's final report. China submits that the UnitedStates' panel request fails to explain, "even concisely", how the definition of "electronic payment services" relates to China's specific commitments in any of the three subsectors identified in the panel request, and further, that the panel request fails to indicate which mode or modes of supply the United States considers to be at issue. Article6.2 of the DSU provides as follows: The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. The Appellate Body has explained that Article6.2 of the DSU imposes four requirements, namely, a panel request must (i) be in writing; (ii) indicate whether consultations were held; (iii)identify the specific measures at issue; and (iv) provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. We recall that a panel request needs to set out only the complaining party's claims, not the arguments in support of those claims. We consider that requiring the United States to explain in its panel request how or why the challenged measures are inconsistent with China's commitments under the relevant modes of supply would, on the facts of this case, amount to requiring the United States to provide precise arguments in support of its claims. A complaining party is not required to include in its panel request arguments and evidence to demonstrate that the responding party's measures infringe upon the identified WTO provisions. Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 141. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para. 120.
据有关信息,在中美轮胎争端上诉败诉后,我国可能采取这样的贸易报复措施:对原产于美国的2.5升以上的小轿车和越野车征收反倾销税和反补贴税(此双反调查在中美轮胎争端上诉审结果公布之前已经完成)。问:中方可以采取这样的贸易报复措施吗? 答:中方可以采取这样的措施,但若将这种措施称为WTO机制下的“贸易报复措施”只是一种“想当然”;换言之,在任何争端中,WTO争端解决机构不会授权实施这种形式的贸易报复。 原因: 1、从概念上说,这样的贸易报复是“似是而非”的。这种贸易报复不是WTO争端解决机制下的“贸易报复”。在WTO机制下,贸易报复要经过争端解决机构授权并以“金额”的形式实施(DSU,Art.22.2);被授权的贸易报复只能是“补偿”(金额补偿)和“中止减让或其他义务”(suspension of concessions or other obligations)(包括协定内中止和跨协定中止。请注意在WTO争端解决机制中并没有retaliation(报复)这一词)。而且,如果被报复方不同意报复水平(报复额),可向原专家组(Panel)申请仲裁。 2、如果中方对原产于美国的2.5升以上的小轿车和越野车征收反倾销税和反补贴税,这是中方的权利。若美方又将中方的这种双反调查诉诸WTO争端解决机构,这只能成为一起新的贸易争端,专家组或上诉机构在审理时以规则为导向,不会在逻辑上将此新争端与中美轮胎争端联系在一起,而是根据美方的指控,利用WTO反倾销、反补贴等规则来裁决。 所以,中方以“对原产于美国的2.5升以上的小轿车和越野车征收反倾销税和反补贴税”的方式实施贸易报复,这是中方的一种“情绪化”表述,事实上是以不讲“理”的形式威胁或反击美方。当然,这种报复会让美国人很无奈,会“表示遗憾”。但这种“报复”在法理上是讲不通的。 哈哈,在此提醒在WTO前线奋勇战斗的李司长及同事和各位WTO后方专家注意了。顺祝全体同仁仲秋快乐!
中国的两项权利是: 一、贸易报复。问:中国的贸易报复权是否可以行使?特别是中方是否可以宣布对美直接实施贸易报复?若你的答案是不可以,则说明你已读懂了WTO争端解决规则。 二、要求仲裁。问:由谁来仲裁?WTO争端解决机制下的仲裁用以解决什么问题?如果你知道一般仲裁的事项在此争端中与中国不搭界,中方要求仲裁的权利在本案无法用,则说明你已将WTO争端解决机制搞得很清楚了。 WTO争端解决是规则导向的,讲其他问题无济于事。坦率地说,中国应该坦然授受失败。 (有机会请大家看我的书:《国际贸易摩擦与应对研究》,中国人民大学出版社,2011年5月版) 以下英文为此争端结论和裁决部分: WT/DS399/AB/R Page 122 VII. Findings and Conclusion 339. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body: (a) with respect to the USITC's analysis of whether imports from China are increasing rapidly within the meaning of Paragraph 16.4 of the Protocol, upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.110 of the Panel Report, that the USITC did not fail to properly evaluate whether imports from China met the specific threshold under Paragraph 16.4 of China's Accession Protocol of "increasing rapidly"; (b) with respect to whether rapidly increasing imports from China are "a significant cause" of material injury to the US domestic industry within the meaning of Paragraph 16.4 of China's Accession Protocol: (i) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.216 of the Panel Report, that the USITC did not err in its assessment of the conditions of competition in the US market; (ii) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.261 of the Panel Report, that the USITC's reliance on overall coincidence between an upward movement in subject imports and a downward movement in injury factors supports the USITC's finding that rapidly increasing imports from China are a significant cause of material injury to the domestic industry within the meaning of Paragraph 16.4 of China's Accession Protocol; (iii) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.378 of the Panel Report, that China has failed to establish that the USITC improperly attributed injury caused by other factors to subject imports; (iv) finds that the Panel did not act inconsistently with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU in its analysis of the USITC's determination that rapidly increasing imports from China were a significant cause of material injury to the domestic industry; and accordingly (v) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.379 of the Panel Report, that the USITC did not fail properly to establish that rapidly increasing imports from China were a significant cause of material injury to the domestic industry within the meaning of Paragraph 16.4 of China's Accession Protocol. WT/DS399/AB/R Page 123 340. Given that we have not found in this Report that the United States acted inconsistently with any of its WTO obligations, we make no recommendation to the DSB pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU. Signed in the original in Geneva this 12th day of August 2011 by: _________________________ Jennifer Hillman Presiding Member _________________________ _________________________ Shotaro Oshima Peter Van den Bossche Member Member
最近几天哥本哈根会议开得如火如荼,各国就碳排放问题吵个不可开交,中国也是个焦点。最近几年中国的碳排放剧增,总量上已经正式超过美国成为世界第一,但根据京都议定书,中国作为发展中国家,不承担减排义务。你想啊,要你是奥巴马,你乐意不?反正我是不乐意。不过咱中国政府还是负责任的,尽管不正式的承担减排义务,但是中国政府也制定了自己的减排指标,这也体现咱大国政府的责任心。 但是我倒是更好奇一些,想研究一下中国的碳排放都是哪儿来的,于是,就有了下面这张图。图中可以看出,建国以来我国的碳排放一直是在平稳增加的,但是从2001年期,我国碳排放的加速度剧增,我们不由得想问,这是为什么呢?这个时间段有什么事情影响了碳排放呢?想来想去,只能是世纪之交的那件大事:入世,加入WTO。 大家知道,加入WTO了,全球化了,外国产品进入中国的多了,外国人进入中国的也多了,咱们外资企业也越来越多了。哦,感情这些外企给咱的都是落后技术啊,碳排放剧增啊。有意思的是,控制碳排放的京都议定书的的签订,也在这个时间段,西方发达国家承担的减排义务,原来都是把排放指标转移到咱中国来了啊。。。 在我刚开始跟人讲这个观点的时候,有人不同意,说入世之后,中国私家车越来越多,你为啥不说是汽车保有量增加引起的碳排放增加呢?您别急,咱下面还有别的图。 下面这张图是单位GDP的能耗图。可以看出,这么多年来,中国单位GDP的能耗是在迅速下降的,没错,咱技术提高了嘛。我之前曾经在某个场合看到更完整的图,中国单位GDP的能耗,从1952年到2001年基本上是以同样的速度迅速下降的。但是大家从这里可以看到,2001年之后,他又反弹了。 为了进一步堵住某些人的口,咱们再来看一个跟私家车完全无关的指标:煤的消耗量。大家知道,煤的主要用途就是发电,而电呢,主要是工业用电。从煤的消耗量同样也可以看出,2001年之后,中国的耗量剧增。 三张图,在同一个时间点,发生了重要变化,让我们不得不认为,正是全球化,正是因为我们加入了地球村这个大家庭,才导致了我们今天的高能耗、高碳排放。正是由于京都议定书的签订,发达国家才会把高能耗、高碳排放的产业大量转移到中国。全球化了,我们的GDP是提高了,但是,付出的代价是我们的资源和环境。 另外,恐怕也是时候揭开GDP背后的故事了。我们的GDP是增加了,但是GNP呢?GNP现在在媒体提到的比较少,但是我小的时候,主要媒体报道经济指标的时候都用GNP,现在为什么不用了呢?大家自己想一想:)什么是GNP呢?我摘两句wiki上的话:GDP is product produced within a country's borders; GNP is product produced by enterprises owned by a country's citizens. To take the United States as an example, the U.S.'s GNP is the value of output produced by American-owned firms, regardless of where the firms are located.翻译成中文,就是说GDP是国内生产总值,GNP是国民生产总值。以美国为例,美国的GNP,就是所有美国公司(包括美国国有公司和美国民营公司)这一年的所有产值,而不考虑这些产值究竟是在美国还是在中国创造的。 我们再进一步的说,如果西方国家真的要求我们在碳排放方面承担什么义务的话,我们是否应该认真的算算,中国的GNP对应的碳排放到底有多少呢?中国大量的碳排放里头又有多少是给西方的GNP做贡献了呢?