On the Relation between Philosophy and Science from the Perspective of Formal Expression Zou Xiaohui, Zou Shunpeng China University of Geosciences (Beijing) Institute of Ideological and Political Education Higher Education Research Institute,100083 China University of Geosciences (Beijing) and University of California (Berkeley) Searle Research Center Bilingual Information Processing Research 【Abstract】 This paper discusses the relationship between philosophy and science from the perspective of the formal expression, isessentially to study the intrinsic relation between the value of information, semantic, knowledge and wisdom ability and its effects. The method is: first, man-machine can understand the language of arithmetic to construct a virtual formal matrix, its characteristic is that the relation between position and order is only conserved, in turn, to adopt Chinese all can understand Numbers and Chinese-words, to construct the function relation of symmetric matrix, whose character is synonymous with corresponding conversion, after that, in the human brain and computer that each is processing information, semantic and knowledge on the characteristics of seeking a third complement each other. The result: raises a series of new philosophical problems, such as: outside of the biology of the brain and the physical computer really is that one can realize man-machine highly collaborative optimization reasonable division of complementary advantages and interaction of the third brain? If it exists, then, how does it exist? If it does not exist, then, how to explain the language, knowledge, software differs from the human brain and computer can be in any natural person having a wisdom ability shuttling back and forth between the subject and agent and has the characteristics of the function? Its significance is: from the ancient to modern, and across the point of view of rational reflection of Chinese and western philosophy, clearly put forward the third brain behind the question of whether or not to there is the third wisdom? In other words, is for the love of wisdom philosopher, under the help of computer is the second brain, whether could go beyond the first brain and even the second brain and the wisdom of both sum capacity? How to do that? 【Keywords】 Information; Semantic; Knowledge; Wisdom-Ability; Function-Value 从形式化表述角度论哲学和科学的关系 中国地质大学（北京）和美国加州大学（伯克利）中美塞尔研究中心双语信息处理课题组 【摘要】本文旨在从形式化表述角度论述哲学和科学的关系，实质上就是探讨信息、语义、知识和智慧能力及其作用价值的内在联系。其方法是：首先，采用人机均可理解的算术语言来构造一个虚拟的形式化矩阵，其特征在于其序位关系唯一守恒，进而，再采用中国人均可理解的数字和文字，构造一个满足函数关系的对称矩阵，其特征在于同义并列对应转换，这之后，在人脑和电脑各自处理信息、语义、知识的特点上寻求一种相互补充的“第三脑”。其结果是：引出了一系列的新的哲学问题，如：在生物的人脑和物理的电脑之外真的会存在一个可实现人机合理分工优势互补、高度协作优化互动的“第三脑”吗？如果它存在，那么，它是如何存在的呢？如果它不存在，那么，又如何解释“语言、知识、软件”区别于人脑和电脑而可在具有智慧能力的自然人主体和计算机代理之间来回穿梭而游刃有余的特点呢？其意义是：从纵贯古今和横跨中西的哲学理性反思的角度，明确提出“第三脑”背后是否还存在“第三智”的问题？换一句话说，就是“爱智慧”的哲人，在电脑即“第二脑”的帮助之下，是否真有可能超越“第一脑”乃至“第二脑”及两者简单相加的智慧能力？如何实现？ 【关键词】信息、语义、知识、智慧能力、作用价值 在线出版日期： 2014年11月25日 http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/Conference_8311189.aspx 首届国际信息哲学研讨会论文集——目录 时间：2013-10-28 11:47:32 来源：ICPI http://icpi.xjtu.edu.cn/xueshujiaoliu/huiyi/2013-10-28/29.html
LOVE'S PHILOSOPHY 爱情哲学 Percy Bysshe Shelley (雪莱) 翻译 潘学峰 山泉与河流绞葛 同样海也喜纳百川 天堂之风永远是那样 使人感到甜蜜 世界上并没有孤单 所有的事情必依天律 如果一切都如此 为什么你我就特殊？ 看吧，群山亲吻高空， 海浪相互拥抱 如果她并不以为哥哥值得爱 那妹妹的娇艳又有何意？ 阳光拥抱着土地 月光亲吻着大海--- 如果你爱的并不是我 这亲蜜的一切能值几文？ The fountains mingle with the river, And the rivers with the ocean; The winds of heaven mix forever With a sweet emotion; Nothing in the world is single; All things by a law divine In another's being mingle-- Why not I with thine? See, the mountains kiss high heaven, And the waves clasp one another; No sister flower could be forgiven If it disdained its brother; And the sunlight clasps the earth, And the moonbeams kiss the sea;-- What are all these kissings worth, If thou kiss not me? 潘学峰 翻译 附注：四节四行，16行诗，ABAB, CDCD,EFEF, GHGH押韵，很规范的押韵。翻译时更加重视了意译，改变了原诗歌的格式。来自群组: 现代欧美
Professor of Natural Philosophy INFORMATON ON UK SIDE: Sedleian Professor of Natural Philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sedleian_Professor_of_Natural_Philosophy The Sedleian professor of natural philosophy is the name of a chair at the Mathematical Institute of the University of Oxford. The Sedleian Chair was founded bySir William Sedley who, by his will dated 20 October 1618, left the sum of ₤2,000 to the University of Oxfordfor purchase of lands for its endowment. Sedley's bequest took effect in 1621with the purchase of an estate at Waddesdon in Buckinghamshire to produce the necessary income. It is regarded as the oldest of the scientific chairs. Holders include: Edward Lapworth , 1621–1638 John Edwards , 1638–1648 Joshua Crosse , 1648–1660 Thomas Willis , 1660–1675 Thomas Millington , 1675–1704 James Fayrer , 1704–1719 Hon Charles Bertie , 1719–1741 Joseph Browne , 1741–1767 Benjamin Wheeler , 1767–1782 Thomas Hornsby , 1782–1810 George Leigh Cooke , 1810–1853 Bartholomew Price , 1853–1898 Augustus Love , 1899–1940 vacant 1940–1946 Sydney Chapman , 1946–1953 George Frederick James Temple , 1953–1968 Albert E. Green , 1968–1977 Thomas Brooke Benjamin , 1979–1995 John Macleod Ball , 1996– ============================ Professor of Natural Philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor_of_Natural_Philosophy The Chair of NaturalPhilosophy is a professorship at the University of Glasgow , in Scotland, which was established in 1727 The Nova Erectio of King James VI of Scotland shared the teaching of moral philosophy, logic and natural philosophy among the regents. In 1727 separate chairs were instituted. Professors of natural philosophy Robert Dick, Snr MA MD (1727) Robert Dick, Jnr MA MD (1751) John Anderson MA (1757) James Brown MA MD (1796) William Meikleham MA LLD (1803) William Thomson, 1st Baron Kelvin of Largs GCVO MA DCL LLD FRS (1846) Andrew Gray MA LLD FRS (1899) Harold Albert Wilson MA DSc FRS (1924) Edward Taylor Jones DSc LLD (1926) Philip Ivor Dee CBE MA FRS Robert Patton Ferrier BSc MA PhD FRSE (1973) ========================= Jacksonian Professor of Natural Philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacksonian_Professor_of_Natural_Philosophy The Jacksonian Professorship of Natural Philosophy is one of the senior chairs in Natural and Experimental philosophy at Cambridge University , and was founded in1782 by a bequest from the Reverend Richard Jackson. In 1782 the Reverend Richard Jackson of Tarrington , Herefordshire, and a former fellow of Trinity College died, leaving a fifth of the income from his estate to the head gardener of the university's physic garden and the remainder to found the Professorship of Natural and Experimental Philosophy that now bears his name. His will specified the details of the professor with much precision, including that preference should be given to candidates from Trinity and men from Staffordshire , Warwickshire , Derbyshire and Cheshire , and that any holder must search for a cure for gout! The will also stated that his lectures should promote real and useful knowledge by showingor doing something in the way of experiment upon the subject undertaken to be treated, and its early holders consequently tended towards the experimental end of the field, such as chemists and engineers . More recently, it has been decided that the professorship should permanently be associated with physics . The first holder of the position was the mathematician and chemist Isaac Milner , elected to the post in 1783. One result of the bequest was that a building was erected to allow public lectures for the professor, as well as the professor of botany. It was the University's first building to be specifically designed for the teaching of science. Jacksonian Professors Isaac Milner (1783-1792) Francis Wollaston (1792-1813) William Farish (1813-1837) Robert Willis (1837-1874) James Dewar (1875-1923) Charles Wilson (1925-1935) Edward Appleton (1936-1939) John Cockcroft (1939-1946) Otto Frisch (1947-1972) Alan Cook (1972-1990) Malcolm Longair (1991-2008) James Stirling (2008-2013 ---------------------------- Professor of Natural Philosophy David MacKay http://www.phy.cam.ac.uk/directory/mackayd Department of Physics CavendishLaboratory http://www.phy.cam.ac.uk/ ============================ INFORMATION ON AMERICAN SIDE: Hollis Chair of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy The Hollis Chair of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy is an endowed professorship established at Harvard College in 1727 by Thomas Hollis . The incumbents have been: Isaac Greenwood (1727–1737) John Winthrop (1737–1779) Samuel Williams (1779–1789) Samuel Webber (1789–1806) John Farrar (1807–1838) Joseph Lovering (1838–1888) Benjamin Osgood Peirce (1888–1914) Wallace Clement Sabine (1914–1919) (1919–1921) Theodore Lyman (1921–1926) Percy Williams Bridgman (1926–1950) John Hasbrouck Van Vleck (1951–1969) Andrew Gleason (1969–1992) Bertrand Halperin (1992-) John Winthrop http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Winthrop_(educator) John Winthrop (December 19, 1714 – May 3, 1779) was the 2nd Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in HarvardCollege . He was a distinguished mathematician , physicist and astronomer , born in Boston , Mass. His great-great-grand father, also named JohnWinthrop , was founder of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. He graduated in 1732 from Harvard , where, from 1738 until his death he served as professor of mathematics and natural philosophy. Professor Winthrop was one of the foremost men of science in America during the 18th century, and his impact on its early advance in New England was particularly significant. Both Benjamin Franklin and Benjamin Thompson (Count Rumford) probably owed much of their early interest in scientific research to his influence. He also had a decisive influence in the early philosophical education of John Adams ,during the latter's time at Harvard. He corresponded regularly with the Royal Society in London—as such, one of the first American intellectuals of his time to be taken seriously in Europe. He was noted for attempting to explain the great Lisbon earthquake of 1755 as ascientific—rather than religious—phenomenon, and his application of mathematical computations to earthquake activity following the great quake has formed the basis of the claim made on his behalf as the founder of the scienceof seismology . Additionally, he observed the transits of Mercury in 1740 and 1761 and journeyed to New found land to observe a transit of Venus . He traveled in a ship provided by the Province of Massachusetts - probably the first scientific expedition ever sent out by any incipient American state. He served as acting president of Harvard in 1769 and again in 1773; but both times declined the offer of the full presidency on the grounds of old age. During the nine months in 1775-1776 when Harvard moved to Concord, Massachusetts , Winthrop occupied the house which was later to become famous as The Way side , home to Louisa May Alcott and Nathaniel Hawthorne . Additionally, he was actively interested in public affairs, was for several years a judge of probate in Middlesex County, was a member of the Governor's Council in 1773-74, and subsequently offered the weight of his influence to the patriotic cause in the Revolution . -------------------- Philosophy - Departmental History http://philosophy.sas.upenn.edu/department-history EARLY YEARS Philosophy has been taught continuously in the University of Pennsylvania and its predecessors since 1755, when the bachelor of arts degree was first offered. The first teacher of philosophy was William Smith,first Provost of the newly founded Academy of Philadelphia. The various branches of philosophy, which included logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy,and natural philosophy, formed the core of the College curriculum. A professor of Ethics was named in 1755, a joint appointment in Classics and Metaphysics was made in 1756, and the first professor of Natural Philosophy was named in 1762. Throughout the nineteenth century there was a professor of Moral Philosophy, who was typically a clergyman and often the Provost (chief academic officer) of the University. The professor of Natural Philosophy was a chemist or physicist. The arts faculty in general was known as the faculty in philosophy. ……..
Natural philosophy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_philosophy This article is about the philosophical study of nature. For the current in the 19th-century German idealism, see Naturphilosophie . Natural philosophy or the philosophy of nature (from Latin philosophianaturalis ) was the philosophical study of nature and the physical universe that was dominant before the development of modern science . It is considered to be the precursor of natural sciences such as physics . Natural science historically developed out of philosophy or, more specifically, natural philosophy. At older universities ,long-established Chairs of Natural Philosophy are nowadays occupied mainly by physics professors .Modern meanings of the terms science and scientists date only tothe 19th century. The naturalist-theologian WilliamWhewell was the one who coined the term scientist .The Oxford English Dictionary dates the origin of the word to 1834.Before then, the word science meant any kind of well-established knowledge and the label of scientist did not exist. Some examples of the application of the term natural philosophy to what we today would call natural science are IsaacNewton 's 1687 scientific treatise, which is known as The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and Lord Kelvin and Peter Guthrie Tait's 1867 treatise called Treatise on Natural Philosophy which helped define much of modern physics. Origin and evolution of the term The term natural philosophy preceded our current natural science (from the Latin, scientia ,meaning knowledge) when the subject of that knowledge or study isthe workings of nature. Natural philosophy pertains to the work of analysis and synthesis of common experience and argumentation to explain or describe nature—while, in the 16th century and earlier, science is used exclusively as a synonym for knowledge or study. The term science ,as in natural science , gained its modern meaning when acquiring knowledge through experiments (special experiences) under the scientific method became its own specialized branch of study apart from natural philosophy. In the 16th century, Jacopo Zabarella was the first person appointed as a professor of Natural Philosophy -- at the University of Padua in 1577. In the 14th and 15th centuries, natural philosophy referred to what is now physical science . From the mid-19th century, when it became increasingly unusual for scientists to contribute to both physics and chemistry , it just meant physics , and is still used in that sense in degree titles at the University of Oxford . Natural philosophy was distinguished from the other precursor of modern science, natural history , in that the former involved reasoning and explanations about nature (and after Galileo , quantitative reasoning), whereas the latter was essentially qualitative and descriptive. Scope of natural philosophy In Plato's earliest known dialogue, Charmides distinguishes between science or bodies of knowledge that produce a physical result, and those that do not.Natural philosophy has been categorized as a theoretical rather than a practical branch of philosophy (like ethics). Sciences that guide arts and draw on the philosophical knowledge of nature may produce practical results, but these subsidiary sciences (e.g., architecture or medicine) go beyond natural philosophy. The study of natural philosophy seeks to explore the cosmos by any means necessary to understand the universe.Some ideas presupposes that change is a reality. Although this may seem obvious, there have been some philosophers who have denied the concept of metamorphosis, such as Plato's predecessor Parmenides and later Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus , and perhaps some Eastern philosophers. George Santayana , in his Scepticism and Animal Faith, attempted to show that the reality of change cannot be proven. If his reasoning is sound, it follows that to be a physicist, one must restrain one's skepticism enough to trust one's senses, or else rely on anti-realism . René Descartes ' metaphysical system of Cartesian Dualism describes two kinds of substance: matter and mind. According to this system, everything that is matter is deterministic and natural—and so belongs to natural philosophy—and everything that ismind is volitional and non-natural, and falls outside the domain of philosophy of nature. Branches and subject matter of natural philosophy Major branches of natural philosophy include astronomy and cosmology ,the study of nature on the grand scale; etiology , the study of (intrinsic and sometimes extrinsic) causes ; the study of chance , probability and randomness; the study of elements ; the study of the infinite and the unlimited (virtual or actual); the study of matter ; mechanics ,the study of translation of motion and change; the study of nature or the various sources of actions; the study of natural qualities ; the study of physical quantities ; the study of relations between physical entities; and the philosophy of space and time . (Adler,1993) History of natural philosophy See History of physics , History of chemistry and History of astronomy for the history of natural philosophy prior to the 17th century. Man's mental engagement with nature certainly predates civilization and the record of history.Philosophical, specifically non-religious thought about the natural world goes back to ancient Greece. These lines of thought began before Socrates, who turned from his philosophical studies from speculations about nature to a consideration of man, viz., political philosophy. The thought of early philosophers such Parmenides , Heraclitus ,and Democritus centered on the natural world. Plato followed Socrates in concentrating on man.It was Plato's student, Aristotle, who, in basing his thought on the natural world, returned empiricism to its primary place, while leaving room in the world for man. Martin Heidegger observes that Aristotle was the originator of conception of nature that prevailed in the Middle Ages into the modern era: The Physics is a lecture in which he seeks to determine beings that arise on their own, τὰ φύσει ὄντα , with regard to their being .Aristotelian physics is different from what we mean today by this word,not only to the extent that it belongs to antiquity whereas the modern physical sciences belong to modernity , rather above all it is different by virtue of the fact that Aristotle's physics is philosophy,whereas modern physics is a positive science that presupposes a philosophy .... This book determines the warp and woof of the whole of Western thinking, even at that place where it, as modern thinking, appears to think at odds with ancient thinking. But oppositionis invariably comprised of a decisive, and often even perilous, dependence.Without Aristotle's Physics there would have been no Galileo. Aristotle surveyed the thought of his predecessors and conceived of nature in a way that charted a middle course between their excesses. Plato's world of eternal and unchanging Forms ,imperfectly represented in matter by a divine Artisan ,contrasts sharply with the various mechanistic Weltanschauungen ,of which atomism was, by the fourth century at least, the most prominent… This debate was to persist throughout the ancient world. Atomistic mechanism got a shot in the arm from Epicurus …while the Stoics adopted a divine teleology … The choice seems simple:either show how a structured, regular world could arise out of undirected processes, or inject intelligence into the system. This was how Aristotle… when still a young acolyte of Plato, saw matters. Cicero … preserves Aristotle's own cave-image : if troglodytes were brought on a sudden into the upper world, they would immediately supposeit to have been intelligently arranged. But Aristotle grew to abandon this view; although he believes in a divine being, the Prime Mover is not the efficient cause of action in the Universe, and plays no part in constructing or arranging it... But, although he rejects the divine Artificer, Aristotle does not resort to a pure mechanism of random forces. Instead he seeks to find a middle way between the two positions, one which relies heavily on the notion of Nature, or phusis . Aristotle recommended four causes as appropriate for the business of the natural philosopher, or physicist, “and if he refers his problems back to all of them, he will assign the ‘why’ in the way proper to his science—the matter, the form, the mover, ‘that for the sake of which’”. While the vagrancies of the material cause are subject to circumstance, the formal, efficient and final cause often coincide because in natural kinds, the mature form and final cause are one and the same. The capacity to mature into a specimen of one's kind is directly acquired from “the primary source of motion”, i.e., from one's father, whose seed ( sperma ) conveys the essential nature (commonto the species), as a hypothetical ratio . Science has always been asystematic knowledge of causes. From the late Middle Ages and into the modern era, the tendency has been to narrow science to the consideration of efficient or agent causes, and those of a particular kind: The action of an efficient cause may sometimes, but not always, be described in terms of quantitative force. The action of an artist on a block of clay, for instance, can be described in terms of how many pounds of pressure per square inch is exerted on it. The efficient causality of the teacher in directing the activity of the artist, however,cannot be so described… The final cause acts on the agent to influence or induce her to act. If the artist works to make money, making money is in some way the cause of her action. But we cannot describe this influence in terms of quantitative force. The final cause acts,but it acts according to the mode of final causality, as an end or good that induces the efficient cause to act. The mode of causality proper to the final cause cannot itself be reduced to efficient causality, much less to the mode of efficient causality we call force. Figures in natural philosophy The scientific method has ancient precedents and Galileo exemplifies a mathematical understanding of nature which is the hallmark of modern natural scientists. The 19th-century distinction of a scientific enterprise apart from traditional natural philosophy has its roots in prior centuries. Proposals for a more inquisitive and practical approach to the study of nature are notable in Francis Bacon , whose ardent convictions did much to popularize his insightful Baconian method . The late 17th-century natural philosopher Robert Boyle wrote a seminal work on the distinction between physics and metaphysics called, A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature , aswell as The Skeptical Chymist , after which the modern science of chemistry is named, (as distinct from proto-scientific studies of alchemy ). These works of natural philosophy are representative of a departure from the medieval scholasticism taught in European universities , and anticipate in many ways, the developments which would lead to science as practiced in the modernsense. As Bacon would say, vexing nature to reveal hersecrets, ( scientific experimentation ), rather than amere reliance on largely historical, even anecdotal , observations of empirical phenomena ,would come to be regarded as a defining characteristic of modern science , if not the very key to its success. Boyle's biographers, in their emphasis that he laid the foundations of modern chemistry, neglect how steadily he clung to the scholastic sciences in theory, practice and doctrine. However, he meticulously recorded observational detail on practical research, and subsequently advocated not only this practice, but its publication, both for successful and unsuccessful experiments, so as to validate individual claims by replication. For sometimes we use the word nature for that Author of nature whom the schoolmen ,harshly enough, call natura naturans , as when it is said that nature tha t made man partly corporeal and partlyimmaterial . Sometimes we mean by the nature of a thing the essence , or that which the schoolmen scruple not to call the quiddity of a thing, namely, the attribute or attributes on whose score it is what it is, whether the thing be corporeal or not,as when we attempt to define the nature of an angel , or of a triangle ,or of a fluid body, as such. Sometimes we take nature for an internal principle of motion ,as when we say that a stone let fall in the air is by nature carried towards the centre of the earth , and, on the contrary, that fire or flame does naturally move upwards toward heaven . Sometimes we understand by nature theestablished course of things, as when we say that nature makes the night succeed the day , nature hath made respiration necessary to the life of men. Sometimes we take nature for an aggregate of powers belonging to a body, especially aliving one, as when physicians say that nature is strong or weak orspent, or that in such or such diseases nature left to herself will dothe cure . Sometimes we take nature for the universe , or system of the corporeal works of God , as when it is said of a phoenix , or a chimera , that there is no such thing in nature ,i.e. in the world. And sometimes too, and that most commonly, we would expressby nature a semi-deity or other strange kind of being, such as this discourse examines the notion of. — RobertBoyle , A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature The modern emphasis is less on abroad empiricism (one that includes passive observation of nature's activity),but on a narrow conception of the empirical concentrating on the control exercised through experimental (active) observation for the sake of control of nature. Nature is reduced to a passive recipient of human activity. Current work in natural philosophy In the middle of the 20thcentury, ErnstMayr 's discussions on the teleology of nature brought up issues that were dealt with previously by Aristotle (regarding finalcause ) and Kant (regarding reflective judgment ). Especially since themid-20th-century European crisis, some thinkers argued the importance of looking at nature from a broad philosophical perspective, rather than what they considered a narrowly positivist approach relying implicitly on a hidden,unexamined philosophy. One line of thought grows from the Aristotelian tradition, especially as developed by ThomasAquinas . Another line springs from Edmund Husserl , especially as expressed in The Crisis of European Sciences .Students of his such as Jacob Klein and Hans Jonas more fully developed his themes. Among living scholars, Brian David Ellis , Nancy Cartwright , David Oderberg , and John Dupré are some of the more prominent thinkers who can arguably be classed as generally adopting a more open approach to the natural world. Ellis (2002) observes the rise of a New Essentialism. David Oderberg (2007) takes issue with other philosophers, including Ellis to a degree, who claim to be essentialists.He revives and defends the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition from modern attempts to flatten nature to the limp subject of the experimental method. References 1. Jump up ^ Michael J.Crowe, Mechanics from Aristotle to Einstein (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2007), 11. 2. Jump up ^ Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason , trans. Reginald Lilly, (Indiana University Press, 1991), 62- 63 . 3. Jump up ^ See especially Physics , books I II. 4. Jump up ^ Hankinson, R. J.(1997). Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought . Oxford University Press.p. 125. ISBN 978-0-19-924656-4 . 5. Jump up ^ Aristotle, Physics II.7. 6. Jump up ^ Michael J. Dodds, Science, Causality and Divine Action: Classical Principles for Contemporary Challenges, CTNS Bulletin 21:1 . 7. Jump up ^ Dodds 2001, p.5. 8. Jump up ^ More, LouisTrenchard (January 1941). Boyle as Alchemist. Journal of the History of Ideas (University of Pennsylvania Press) 2 (1): 61–76. doi : 10.2307/2707281 . JSTOR 2707281 . 9. Jump up ^ Boyle, Robert;Stewart, M.A. (1991). SelectedPhilosophical Papers of Robert Boyle . HPC Classics Series. Hackett.pp. 176–177. ISBN 978-0-87220-122-4 . LCCN 91025480 . 10. Jump up ^ Teleologyand Randomness in the Development of Natural Science Research: Systems,Ontology and Evolution Interthesis, v. 8, n. 2, p. 316-334, jul/dec.2011 11. Jump up ^ E.A. Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company,1954), 227-230. 12. Jump up ^ See his The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism 2002. ISBN0-7735-2474-6 13. Jump up ^ David S.Oderberg, Real Essentialism (Routledge, 2007). ISBN0415323649 Further reading Adler, Mortimer J. (1993). The Four Dimensions of Philosophy: Metaphysical, Moral, Objective, Categorical . Macmillan. ISBN 0-02-500574-X . E.A. Burtt , Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1954). Philip Kitcher , Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. LCCN:2001036144 ISBN 0-19-514583-6 Bertrand Russell , A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (1945) Simon Schuster, 1972. Santayana, George (1923). Scepticism and Animal Faith . Dover Publications . pp. 27–41. ISBN 0-486-20236-4 . David Snoke , Natural Philosophy: A Survey of Physics and Western Thought. Access Research Network, 2003. ISBN 1-931796-25-4 . Nancy R. Pearcey and Charles B. Thaxton , The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural Philosophy (Crossway Books, 1994, ISBN 0891077669 ). External links Aristotle's Natural Philosophy , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Institute for the Study of Nature A Bigger Physics , a talk at MIT by Michael Augros Other articles
Freedom from Fear by Aung Sang Suu Kyi, 1990 It is not power that corrupts but fear. Fear of losingpower corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge 打击 ofpower corrupts those who are subject to it. Most Burmese are familiar with thefour a-gati 恶 , the four kinds of corruption.Chanda-gati, corruption induced by desire, is deviation from the right path inpursuit of bribes or for the sake of those one loves. Dosa-gati is taking thewrong path to spite 欺辱 those against whom one bears ill will,and moga-gati is aberration 错误 due to ignorance. But perhaps the worstof the four is bhaya-gati, for not only does bhaya, fear, stifle 压制 andslowly destroy all sense of right and wrong, it so often lies at the root ofthe other three kinds of corruption. Just as chanda-gati 欲望 ,when not the result of sheer avarice 贪婪 , can be causedby fear of want 贫困 or fear of losing the goodwill 好感 ofthose one loves, so fear of being surpassed, humiliated 屈辱 orinjured in some way can provide the impetus for ill will. And it would be difficult to dispel ignorance unless there is freedom to pursue the truthunfettered 束缚 by fear. With so close a relationship between fear and corruption it is little wonder that in any society where fearis rife 流行 corruption in all forms becomes deeplyentrenched. Freedom from Fear speech by Aung Sang Suu Kyi, 1990 It is not power that corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge 打击 ofpower corrupts those who are subject to it. Most Burmese are familiar with the four a-gati 恶 , the four kinds of corruption.Chanda-gati, corruption induced by desire, is deviation from the right path in pursuit of bribes or for the sake of those one loves. Dosa-gati is taking the wrong path to spite 欺辱 those against whom one bears ill will,and moga-gati is aberration 错误 due to ignorance. But perhaps the worst of the four is bhaya-gati, for not only does bhaya, fear, stifle 压制 and slowly destroy all sense of right and wrong, it so often lies at the root of the other three kinds of corruption. Just as chanda-gati 欲望 ,when not the result of sheer avarice 贪婪 , can be causedby fear of want 贫困 or fear of losing the goodwill 好感 ofthose one loves, so fear of being surpassed, humiliated 屈辱 or injured in some way can provide the impetus for ill will. And it would be difficult to dispel ignorance unless there is freedom to pursue the truth unfettered 束缚 by fear. With so close a relationship between fear and corruption it is little wonder that in any society where fear is rife 流行 corruption in all forms becomes deeply entrenched壕沟围绕. Public dissatisfaction with economic hardships has beenseen as the chief cause of the movement for democracy in Burma, sparked off bythe student demonstrations 1988. It is true that years of incoherent policies,inept 不聪明 official measures, burgeoning 发芽 inflation and falling real income had turned the country into an economicshambles 困顿 . But it was more than the difficultiesof eking 勉强 out a barely acceptable standard ofliving that had eroded the patience of a traditionally good-natured, quiescentpeople - it was also the humiliation of a way of life disfigured by corruptionand fear. The students were protesting not just against the death oftheir comrades but against the denial of their right to life by a totalitarianregime which deprived the present of meaningfulness and held out no hope forthe future. And because the students' protests articulated the frustrations ofthe people at large, the demonstrations quickly grew into a nationwidemovement. Some of its keenest supporters were businessmen who had developed theskills and the contacts necessary not only to survive but to prosper within thesystem. But their affluence offered them no genuine sense of security orfulfilment, and they could not but 不得不 seethat if they and their fellow citizens, regardless of economic status, were toachieve a worthwhile existence, an accountable administration was at least anecessary if not a sufficient condition. The people of Burma had wearied of aprecarious 危险 state of passive apprehension wherethey were 'as water in the cupped hands' of the powers that be. Emerald 翡翠 cool we may be_As water in cuppedhands_But oh that we might be_As splinters 碎片 of glass_Incupped hands. Glass splinters 碎片 , the smallestwith its sharp, glinting 闪烁 power to defend itself against handsthat try to crush, could be seen as a vivid symbol of the spark of courage thatis an essential attribute of those who would free themselves from the grip ofoppression. Bogyoke Aung San regarded himself as a revolutionary and searchedtirelessly for answers to the problems that beset 困 Burma duringher times of trial 苦 . He exhorted 劝 thepeople to develop courage: 'Don't just depend on the courage and intrepidity 勇 ofothers. Each and every one of you must make sacrifices to become a heropossessed of courage and intrepidity. Then only shall we all be able to enjoytrue freedom.' The effort necessary to remain uncorrupted in an environment where fear is an integral part of everyday existence is not immediately apparent to those fortunate enough to live in states governed by the rule of law. Just laws do not merely prevent corruption by meting out impartial punishment to offenders. They also help to create a society in which people can fulfil the basic requirements necessary for the preservation of human dignity without recourse to corrupt practices. Where there are no suchlaws, the burden of upholding the principles of justice and common decencyfalls on the ordinary people. It is the cumulative 积累 effect on their sustained effort and steady endurance which will change anation where reason and conscience are warped 扭曲 by fear in to one where legal rules exist to promote man's desire for harmony and justicewhile restraining the less desirable destructive traits in his nature. In an age when immense technological advances have createdlethal 致命 weapons which could be, and are, usedby the powefful and the unprincipled to dominate the weak and the helpless,there is a compelling need for a closer relationship between politics andethics at both the national and international levels. The Universal Declarationof Human Rights of the United Nations proclaims that 'every individual and every organ of society' should strive to promote the basic rights and freedomsto which all human beings regardless of race, nationality or religion are entitled. But as long as there are governments whose authority is founded oncoercion 强迫 rather than on the mandate 任命 ofthe people, and interest groups which place short-term profits above long-termpeace and prosperity, concerted international action to protect and promotehuman rights will remain at best a partially realized struggle. There will continueto be arenas of struggle where victims of oppression have to draw on their owninner resources to defend their inalienable rights as members of the humanfamily. The quintessential 真正 revolution isthat of the spirit, born of an intellectual conviction of the need for changein those mental attitudes and values which shape the course of a nation'sdevelopment. A revolution which aims merely at changing official policies andinstitutions with a view to an improvement in material conditions has little chance of genuine success. Without a revolution of the spirit, the forces which produced the iniquities of the old order would continue to be operative, posing a constant threat to the process of reform and regeneration. It is not enough merely to call for freedom, democracy and human rights. There has to be a united determination to persevere 坚持 in thestruggle, to make sacrifices in the name of enduring truths, to resist the corrupting influences of desire, ill will, ignorance and fear. Saints, it has been said, are the sinners who go on trying.So free men are the oppressed who go on trying and who in the process makethemselves fit to bear the responsibilities and to uphold the disciplines whichwill maintain a free society. Among the basic freedoms to which men aspire thattheir lives might be full and uncramped 限制 夹子 ,freedom from fear stands out as both a means and an end. A people who wouldbuild a nation in which strong, democratic institutions are firmly establishedas a guarantee against state-induced power must first learn to liberate theirown minds from apathy and fear. Always one to practise what he preached, Aung San himself constantly demonstrated courage - not just the physical sort but the kind thatenabled him to speak the truth, to stand by his word, to accept criticism, to admit his faults, to correct his mistakes, to respect the opposition, to parley谈判 with the enemy and to let people be the judge of his worthiness as a leader. It is for such moral courage that he will always be loved and respected in Burma -not merely as a warrior hero but as the inspiration and conscience of the nation. The words used by Jawaharlal Nehru to describe Mahatma 大圣 Gandhi could well be applied to Aung San: 'The essence of his teaching was fearlessness and truth,and action allied to these, always keeping the welfare of the masses in view.' Gandhi, that great apostle of non-violence, and Aung San,the founder of a national army, were very different personalities, but as there is an inevitable sameness about the challenges of authoritarian rule anywhere at any time, so there is a similarity in the intrinsic qualities of those who rise up to meet the challenge. Nehru, who considered the instillation of courage in the people of India one of Gandhi's greatest achievements, was a political modernist, but as he assessed the needs for a twentieth-century movement for independence, he found himself looking back to the philosophy of ancient India: 'The greatest gift for an individual or a nation . was abhaya, fearlessness,not merely bodily courage but absence of fear from the mind.' Fearlessness may be a gift but perhaps more precious is the courage acquired through endeavour, courage that comes from cultivating the habit of refusing to let fear dictate one's actions, courage that could be described as 'grace under pressure' - grace which is renewed repeatedly in the face of harsh, unremitting 不懈 pressure. Within a system which denies the existence of basic humanrights, fear tends to be the order of the day. Fear of imprisonment, fear oftorture, fear of death, fear of losing friends, family, property or means oflivelihood, fear of poverty, fear of isolation, fear of failure. A mostinsidious form of fear is that which masquerades as common sense or even wisdom,condemning as foolish, reckless, insignificant or futile the small, daily actsof courage which help to preserve man's self-respect and inherent humandignity. It is not easy for a people conditioned by fear under the iron rule ofthe principle that might is right to free themselves from the enervating 衰弱 miasma 瘴 of fear. Yet even under the mostcrushing state machinery courage rises up again and again, for fear is not thenatural state of civilized man. The wellspring of courage and endurance in the face of unbridled power is generally a firm belief in the sanctity of ethical principles combined with a historical sense that despite all setbacks thecondition of man is set on an ultimate course for both spiritual and material advancement. It is his capacity for self-improvement and self-redemption which most distinguishes man from the mere brute. At the root of human responsibility is the concept of perfection, the urge to achieve it, the intelligence to find a path towards it, and the will to follow that path if not to the end at least the distance needed to rise above individual limitations and environmental impediments. It is man's vision of a world fit for rational, civilized humanity which leads him to dare and to suffer to build societies free from want and fear. Concepts such as truth, justice and compassion cannot be dismissed as trite陈腐 when these are often the only bulwarks堡垒 which stand against ruthless power.
Lab Philosophy How to be a good scientist is a question I keep asking myself. Here are a few random thoughts based my own experience and my observation of colleagues and trainees. I see this as my work philosophy and I hope it could be helpful to people in my group. 1. Follow passion. Follow nothing but your passion. If you are not motivated by your projects, do yourself a favor and seek immediate change. 2. Fly high. Everybody loves low-hanging fruit. Fly as high as possible so that you can see fruits others don't see, or fruits that are low to you but high to others. 3. Think differently. You may find a high-hanging fruit reachable from a different angle. 4. Say no. Say no to a hundred opportunities to ensure the success of one. 5. Have backup. Productive people work on several projects simultaneously and employ multiple approaches in the same project in parallel, not in serial. 6. Embrace failure. You may get a quick paper if everything go as planned, but you can grow faster by learning from failure. 7. Keep records. Prepare monkey-proof documentation so that others can easily follow and appreciate your work. 8. Be nice. Volunteer work is an easy way to win friends and build collaborations. From: Dr. Bing Zhang's lab ( http://bioinfo.vanderbilt.edu/zhanglab/?q=node/413 )
Thought experiments are devices of the imagination used to investigate the nature of things. Thought experimenting often takes place when the method of variation is employed in entertaining imaginative suppositions. They are used for diverse reasons in a variety of areas, including economics, history, mathematics, philosophy, and physics. Most often thought experiments are communicated in narrative form, sometimes through media like a diagram. Thought experiments should be distinguished from thinking about experiments, from merely imagining any experiments to be conducted outside the imagination, and from psychological experiments with thoughts. They should also be distinguished from counterfactual reasoning in general, as they seem to require an experimental element. The primary philosophical challenge of thought experiments is simple: How can we learn about reality (if we can at all), just by thinking? More precisely, are there thought experiments that enable us to acquire new knowledge about the intended realm of investigation without new data? If so, where does the new information come from if not from direct contact with the realm of investigation under consideration? Finally, how can we distinguish good from bad instances of such thought experiments? These questions seem urgent with respect to scientific thought experiments because most philosophers and historians of science “recognize them as an occasionally potent tool for increasing man's understanding of nature. Historically their role is very close to the double one played by actual laboratory experiments and observations. First, thought experiments can disclose nature's failure to conform to a previously held set of expectations. In addition, they can suggest particular ways in which both expectation and theory must henceforth be revised.” (Kuhn, 1977, p. 241 and 261) The questions are urgent regarding philosophical thought experiments because they play an important role in philosophical discourse. Philosophy without thought experiments seems unthinkable (see e.g., Myers, 1968). There is widespread agreement that thought experiments play a central role both in philosophy and in the natural sciences and general acceptance of the importance and enormous influence and value of some of the well-known thought experiments in the natural sciences, like Maxwell's demon, Einstein's elevator or Schrödinger's cat. The 17th century saw some of its most brilliant practitioners in Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz. And in our own time, the creation of quantum mechanics and relativity are almost unthinkable without the crucial role played by thought experiments. Much of ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind is based firmly on the results of thought experiments as well, including Searle's Chinese room or Putnam's twin earth. Philosophy, even more than the sciences, would be severely impoverished without thought experiments, which suggests that a unified theory of thought experiments is desirable to account for them in both the sciences and the humanities (see Cooper, 2005, pp. 329–330; Gähde, 2000). There have been attempts to define “thought experiment”, but likely (contrary to Haggqvist, 2009) it will be better to leave the term loosely characterized, so as not to prejudice the investigation. Many of the most important concepts we deal with are like this, e.g., religion or democracy. A few more examples will circumscribe our subject matter well enough: Newton's bucket, Heisenberg's gamma-ray microscope, Parfit's people who split like an amoeba, Mary the colour scientist, and Thomson's violinist. Everyone is probably familiar with some of these. Less familiar thought experiments include “the dome”, a relatively young thought experiment and probably the simplest example of indeterminism in Newtonian physics. Imagine a mass sitting on a radially symmetric surface in a gravitational field. Guided by Newton's laws of motion one comes to realize that the mass can either remain at rest for all times or spontaneously move in an arbitrary direction. (see Norton, 2008) This thought experiment triggers a number of very interesting questions concerning the nature of Newtonian theory (see Norton, 2008, pp. 791–792), the meaning of “physical” (see Norton, 2008, pp. 792–794), the role of idealizations in physics (see Norton, 2008), pp. 794–796), and also with respect to free will (see Fehige, 2005b). In the following we will first highlight some of the most common features of thought experiments. A proposal follows for classifying thought experiments, before reviewing the state of the debate on thought experimenting. We conclude by highlighting some of the recent developments surrounding the “laboratory of the mind,” as some have called it. 1. Common Features of Thought Experiments 2. Types of Thought Experiments: A Taxonomy 3. The Debate Over Thought Experiments 3.1 Some Historical Background 3.2 Systematic Exploration 4. Recent Developments Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries 1. Common Features of Thought Experiments Thought experiments are conducted for diverse reasons in a variety of areas, be it in the moral, mathematical, or natural realm (see De Mey, 2006). We leave aside those that simply entertain. Some thought experiments fulfil a specific function within a theory (see e.g., Boorsboom et al., 2002). Others are executed because it is impossible to run the experimental scenario in the real world (see Sorensen, 1992, pp. 200–202). Sometimes thought experiments help to illustrate and clarify very abstract states of affairs, thereby accelerating the process of understanding (see Behmel, 2001). Again others serve as examples in conceptual analysis (see Cohnitz, 2006). Most attention is received by those that are taken to provide evidence in favour of or against a theory, putting them on a par with real-world experiments (see Gendler, 2004). The different ways to use thought experiments are, of course, not exclusive to each other. Theorizing about thought experiments usually turns on the details or the patterns of specific cases. Familiarity with a wide range of examples is crucial for commentators. One of the most beautiful early examples of thought experimenting (in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1.951–987; see Bailey, 1950, pp. 58–59) attempts to show that space is infinite: If there is a purported boundary to the universe, we can toss a spear at it. If the spear flies through, it isn't a boundary after all; if the spear bounces back, then there must be something beyond the supposed edge of space, a cosmic wall that stopped the spear, a wall that is itself in space. Either way, there is no edge of the universe; space is infinite. This example nicely illustrates many of the most common features of thought experimenting: We visualize some situation; we carry out an operation; we see what happens, and we draw a conclusion. It also illustrates their fallibility. Since the time of Lucretius, we've learned how to conceptualize space so that it is both finite and unbounded. Imagine a circle, which is a one dimensional space. As we move around, there is no edge, but it is nevertheless finite. The universe might be a many-dimensional version of it. Figure 1. “Welcome to the edge of the Universe” Often a real experiment that is the analogue of a thought experiment is impossible for physical, technological, ethical, or financial reasons (see e.g., Sorensen, 1992, pp. 200–202); but this needn't be a defining condition of thought experiments. The main point is that we seem able to get a grip on nature just by thinking, and therein lies the great interest for philosophy. How is it possible to learn apparently new things about nature without new empirical data? One possible answer is to claim that we possess a great store of “instinctive knowledge” picked up from experience. This is the solution that Ernst Mach offered (see Mach, 1897 and 1905, for a most instructive assessment of his views see Kühne, 2006, pp. 165–202; Sorensen, 1992, pp. 51–75). One of Mach's favourite examples of thought experimenting is due to Simon Stevin (see Mach, 1883, pp. 48–58). When a chain is draped over a double frictionless plane, as in Fig. 2a, how will it move? Add some links as in Fig. 2b. Now it is obvious. The initial setup must have been in static equilibrium. Otherwise, we would have a perpetual motion machine; and according to our experience-based “instinctive knowledge”, says Mach, this is impossible. We do not have to perform the experiment in the real world. The outcome seems compelling. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) “How will it move?” Judith Thomson provided one of the most striking and effective thought experiments in the moral realm (see Thomson, 1971). Her example is aimed at a popular anti-abortion argument that goes something like this: The foetus is an innocent person with a right to life. Abortion results in the death of a foetus. Therefore, abortion is morally wrong. In her thought experiment we are asked to imagine a famous violinist falling into a coma. The society of music lovers determines from medical records that you and you alone can save the violinist's life by being hooked up to him for nine months. The music lovers break into your home while you are asleep and hook the unconscious (and unknowing, hence innocent) violinist to you. You may want to unhook him, but you are then faced with this argument put forward by the music lovers: The violinist is an innocent person with a right to life. Unhooking him will result in his death. Therefore, unhooking him is morally wrong. However, the argument, even though it has the same structure as the anti-abortion argument, does not seem convincing in this case. You would be very generous to remain attached and in bed for nine months, but you are not morally obliged to do so. The parallel with the abortion case is evident. Thomson's thought experiment is effective in distinguishing two concepts that had previously been run together: “right to life” and “right to what is needed to sustain life.” The foetus and the violinist may each have the former, but it is not evident that either has the latter. The upshot is that even if the foetus has a right to life (which Thomson does not believe but allows for the sake of the argument), it may still be morally permissible to abort. Those opposed to Thomson's view can either dismiss her thought experiment as useless fiction or provide a different version of the same scenario to challenge the conclusion. It is a very intriguing feature of thought experiments that they can be “rethought” (Bokulich, 2001). Thought experiments can evolve and undergo modifications over time. This raises the interesting question of what it is that preserves the identity of a thought experiment (see e.g., Bishop, 1999). That thought experiments can be rethought coheres with another feature of thought experiments, namely that they have “evidential significance only historically and locally, i.e., when and where premises that attribute evidential significance to it are endorsed” (McAllister, 1996, p. 248). 2. Types of Thought Experiments: A Taxonomy The simplest taxonomy for thought experiments is to classify them according to their use. But, of course, there are many other ways of classifying thought experiments: science vs philosophy, normative (moral or epistemic) vs factual, and so on. Karl Popper's taxonomy has gained some popularity. Popper (1959) distinguishes between heuristic (to illustrate a theory), critical (against a theory) and apologetic (in favour of a theory) thought experiments. His case in favour of a critical and against an apologetic use of thought experiments is very limited. He focuses exclusively on quantum physics and doesn't really say much to address the primary epistemological challenge presented by the success of critical thought experiments. We will present a preliminary taxonomy (see Brown, 1986, pp. 4–11) that has not remained unchallenged (see Norton, 1993b). It is less rough than Popper's and only limited in that it focuses on the class of those thought experiments that are taken to function in theory choice. The main division is constructive vs destructive and resembles Popper's distinction between apologetic and critical thought experiments. Each of these is subject to further divisions. As for the type of destructive thought experiments, the following subtypes could be identified: The simplest of these is to draw out a contradiction in a theory, thereby refuting it. The first part of Galileo's famous falling bodies example does this, as it shows that in Aristotle's account, a composite body (cannon ball and musket ball attached) would have to fall both faster and slower than the cannon ball alone. A second subtype is constituted by those thought experiments that aim to show that the theory in question is in conflict with other beliefs that we hold. Schrödinger's well-known cat paradox, for instance, does not show that quantum theory (as interpreted by Bohr) is internally inconsistent (see Schrödinger 1935, p. 812; translation: Trimmer, 1980, 328): “A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following diabolical device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of one hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system to itself for an hour, one would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The first atomic decay would have poisoned it. The q-function of the entire system would express this by having in it the living and the dead cat (pardon the expression) mixed or smeared out in equal parts.” This thought experiment shows that quantum theory (as interpreted by Bohr) is in conflict with some very powerful common sense beliefs we have about macro-sized objects such as cats -- they cannot be both dead and alive in any sense whatsoever. The bizarreness of superpositions in the atomic world is worrisome enough, says Schrödinger, but when it implies that same bizarreness at an everyday level, it is intolerable. There is a third subtype of negative thought experiments, namely when, in effect, a central assumption or premiss of the thought experiment itself is undermined. For example, as we have seen above, Thomson showed with her thought experiment that “right to life” and “right to what is needed to sustain life” had been run together. When distinguished, the argument against abortion is negatively affected. A fourth sub-type of negative thought experiments are “counter thought experiments” (Brown, 2007a) or “thought-experiment/anti-thought-experiment pairs” (Norton, 2004, pp. 45–49). Above, we have already encountered this subtype in our discussion of Lucretius' spear-thought experiment. Here we would like to add two more examples (Brown, 2007, pp. 162–169): Mach produced a counter thought experiment against Isaac Newton, and Daniel C. Dennett produced another against Frank Jackson. In his Principia Mathematica Newton offered a pair of thought experiments as evidence for absolute space. One was the bucket with water climbing the wall, the other was a pair of spheres joined by a cord that maintained its tension in otherwise empty space. The explanation for these phenomena, said Newton, is absolute space: the bucket and the joined spheres are rotating with respect to space itself. In response, Mach claimed that, contra Newton, the two spheres would move toward one another thanks to the tension in the cord, and if we rotated a very thick, massive ring around a stationary bucket, we would see the water climb the bucket wall (see for further discussion of Mach's counter thought experiment to Newton: Kühne, 2006, pp. 191–202). In short, he described the phenomena of the thought experiments' scenarios differently, that is, he declared that different things would happen. Mach's counter thought experiment undermines our confidence in Newton's. Absolute space explained the phenomena in Newton's thought experiments, but now we're not so sure of the phenomena itself (at least, this is Mach's intent). Figure 3. Stages in the bucket experiment Figure 4. Two spheres held by a cord in otherwise empty space Frank Jackson created a much discussed thought experiment that aimed to show that physicalism is false. This is the doctrine that all facts are physical facts. In the thought experiment, Mary is a brilliant scientist who, from birth, is confined to a laboratory with only black and white experiences. She learns all the physical facts about perception there. One day, she leaves the laboratory and experiences colours for the first time; she learns what it's like to experience red. Clearly, says Jackson, she learns something new. Since she already knew all the physical facts, she must have learned something non-physical when she experienced colour. Thus, physicalism must be wrong. Dennett replied to this thought experiment with one of his own. It begins like Jackson's, but when Mary has her first experiences outside the lab, she says “Ah, colour perception is just as I thought it would be.” Like Mach, Dennett denies the phenomenon of the original thought experiment, that Mary would be learning something new. And like Mach, his counter thought experiment is effective in undermining Jackson's in so far as it seems similarly plausible. To be effective, counter thought experiments needn't be very plausible at all. In a court of law, the jury will convict provided guilt is established “beyond a reasonable doubt.” A common defence strategy is to provide an alternative account of the evidence that has just enough plausibility to put the prosecution's case into some measure of doubt. That is sufficient to undermine it. A good counter thought experiment need only do that much to be effective. As for the second type of thought experiments, there are many ways they could provide positive support for a theory. One of these is to provide a kind of illustration that makes a theory's claims clear and evident. In such cases thought experiments serve as a kind of heuristic aid. A result may already be well established, but the thought experiment can lead to a very satisfying sense of understanding. In his Principia Mathematica Newton provided a wonderful example showing how the moon is kept in its orbit in just the same way as an object falls to the earth (see Ducheyne, 2006, pp. 435–437). He illustrated this by means of a cannon shooting a cannon ball further and further. In the limit, the earth curves away as fast as the ball falls, with the eventual result being that the cannon ball will return to the spot where it was fired, and, if not impeded, will go around again and again. This is what the moon is doing. We could arrive at the same conclusion through calculation. But Newton's thought experiment provides that illusive understanding. It's a wonderful example of the “aha effect.” Figure 5. “The shot heard around the world” Thomson's violinist showed that abortion could be morally permissible even when the foetus has a right to life. Similarly, Einstein's elevator showed that light will bend in a gravitational field: According to the principle of equivalence, there is no difference between frames of reference; whether they are inertial or not, the laws of physics are the same in all. Suppose then, an observer is inside an elevator sealed off from the outside so that the observer cannot tell whether he is in a gravitational field or accelerating. If it were accelerating, and if a light beam were to enter one side, then, due to the elevator's motion, the beam would appear to drop or curve down as it crossed the elevator. Consequently, it would have to do the same thing if the elevator was not accelerating, but was in a gravitational field. Therefore, gravity ‘bends’ light. Maxwell's demon showed that entropy could be decreased: The second law of thermodynamics implies that heat won't pass from a cold body to a hot one. In classical thermodynamics this law is quite strict; but in Maxwell's kinetic theory of heat there is a probability, though extremely small, of such an event happening. Some thought this a reductio ad absurdum of Maxwell's theory. To show how it is logically possible to violate the second law Maxwell imagined a tiny creature who controls a door between two chambers. Fast molecules from the cold box are let into the hot box, and slow molecules from the hot are allowed into the cold. Thus, there will be an increase in the average speed in the hot box and a decrease in the average speed of molecules in the cold. Since, on Maxwell's theory, heat is just average speed of the molecules, there has been a flow of heat from a cold body to a hot one. Parfit's splitting persons showed that survival is a more important notion than identity when considering personhood (for a critical discussion see Gendler, 2002). We say they “showed” such and such, but, “purport to show” might be better, since some of these thought experiments are quite contentious. What they have in common is that they aim to establish something positive. Unlike destructive thought experiments, they are not trying to demolish an existing theory, though they may do that in passing. In principle: Given the fact that thought experiments can be rethought (Bokulich, 2001), and that the evidential significance is dependent on historical and local accomplishments (McAllister, 1996), it cannot be irrelevant to identify the intention of the thought experimenter, if one wants to determine the type of a thought experiment: “An imaginary experiment should be judged on its specific purpose.” (Krimsky, 1973, p. 331) 3. The Debate Over Thought Experiments 3.1 Some Historical Background Arguably since the time of the Pre-Socratics thought experimenting has been practiced. They “ invented thought experimentation as a cognitive procedure and practiced it with great dedication and versatility.” (Rescher, 2005, p. 2; see also Diamond, 2002, pp. 229–232; Glas, 1999, Ierodiakonou, 2005; Irvine, 1991; Rescher, 1991 and 2005, pp. 61–72). It seems that medieval science relied rather on thought experiments than real-world experiments (King, 1991). The 17th century saw some of its most brilliant practitioners in Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz (see Brown, 1986; Ducheyne, 2006; Gendler, 1998; Koyré, 1968; Kuhn, 1964, 246–252; McAllister, 1996 and 2005; McMullin, 1985; Palmieri, 2003 and 2005; Prudovsky, 1989). And in our own time, the creation of quantum mechanics (see Kühne, 2005, pp. 280–317; Popper, 1959; Stöltzner, 2003; Van Dyck, 2003; Yourgrau, 1967) and relativistic physics (see Brown, 1987; Kassung, 2004; Kühne, 2005, pp. 227–279; Norton, 1991 and 1993) are almost unthinkable without the crucial function of thought experiments. It is still common to place Mach at the beginning of the history of the term “thought experiment”. “This view is incorrect, however! it can be substantiated that it was used already in 1811.” (Witt-Hansen, 1976, p. 48; see also Buzzoni, 2008, pp. 14–15; 61–65; Cohnitz, 2008; Kühne, 2005, pp. 92–224; Moue et al., 2006, p. 63). This is to say that the term “thought experiment” derived from the Danish “Tankeexperiment.” And before thought experimentation was introduced by word, we find already in the work of the German philosopher-scientist Georg Lichtenberg (1742–1799) a tacit theory of “experiments with thoughts and ideas.” These experiments help to overcome habits of thought that can inhibit scientific progress, and make possible an enlightened philosophy. (See Schildknecht, 1990, pp. 21; 123–169; Schöne, 1982). Lichtenberg's “aphoristic experiments” (see Stern, 1963, pp. 112–126) reflect “that Lichtenberg's scientific preoccupations are the formal and thematic prolegomena to his work as a literary artist.” (Stern, 1963, p. 126) Lichtenberg's reflections on thought experimentation resemble those of Popper and Kuhn. The history of the philosophical investigation into thought experiments can be divided into four stages: In the 18th and 19th century the awareness of the importance of thought experiments in philosophy and science emerges. Special mention should be made of Georg Lichtenberg, Novalis (see Daiber, 2001), and Hans-Christian Ørsted. The topic reemerges in a more systematic manner at the beginning of the 20th century with little relation to the attempts made at the first stage. The stakeholders of the second stage were Pierre Duhem, Mach, and Alexius Meinong. (see Duhem, 1913, pp. 304–311; Mach, 1883, pp. 48–58, 1897 and 1905; Meinong, 1907). A third stage, probably due to the rediscovery of the importance of scientific practice for a proper understanding of science, followed in the first part of the second half of the 20th century. Again, the contributions of this stage bear little relation to the two previous stages. While the third period has seen a number of noteworthy contributions (Cole, 1983; Dancy, 1985; Dennett, 1985; Fodor, 1964; Helm; Gilbert, 1985; Helm et al., 1985; Krimsky, 1973; McMullin, 1985; Myers, 1986; Poser, 1984; Prudovsky, 1989; Rehder, 1980a,b; Yourgrau, 1962 and 1967), the protagonists of this period were Alexandre Koyré, Thomas S. Kuhn and Karl Popper. The ongoing philosophical exploration of thought experiments began in the 1980s, and marks the fourth stage. Arguably, it has been the most prolific one of all four stages. With some very important sign-postings (Horowitz; Massey (eds.), 1991; Sorensen, 1992a, b, c; Wilkes, 1988) the ongoing discussion took off after 1991. James R. Brown and John D. Norton (see for a concise statement of each position Brown, 2004a; Norton, 2004) have carried on a debate that others find useful, especially to contrast with their own alternative accounts. “The views of Brown and Norton represent the extremes of platonic rationalism and classic empiricism, respectively.” (Moue et al., 2006, p. 69) They will be described below. 3.2 Systematic Exploration Not all of the rapidly growing contributions address what we deem to be the primal philosophical challenge of thought experimenting. Still, an astonishing array of different types of views in response to this challenge has already become manifest. We cannot discuss here all the authors who are representative for each type of view which we have identified: the skeptical objection, the intuition based account, the argument view, conceptual constructivism, experimentalism, and the mental model account. We begin with the skeptical objection. Of course, particular thought experiments have been contested. But for the most part, thought experimenting in the sciences has been cheerfully accepted. Duhem, the great historian of physics, is almost alone in what has been understood as an outright condemnation of scientific thought experiments (see Duhem, 1913, pp. 304–311). A thought experiment is no substitute for a real experiment, he claimed, and should be forbidden in science, including science education. However, in view of the important role of actual thought experiments in the history of physics — from Galileo's falling bodies, to Newton's bucket, to Einstein's elevator — it is unlikely that anyone will feel or should feel much sympathy for Duhem's strictures. Philosophers can be as critical as Duhem when it comes to thought experimenting in their own field (see Peijnenburg; Atkinson, 2003). Few are outright skeptics, however. Many take a rather ambiguous stance. Soren Haggqvist, for example, has developed a model for philosophical thought experiments (Haggqvist, 1996 and 2009). Surprisingly, he does not identify a single successful example of the commonly accepted philosophical thought experiments that satisfies his model. And the process of identification is only the first step in addressing what we consider to be the primal philosophical challenge of thought experiments. It gets much more messy once the worry is addressed — how reliable are they? There is some justice in worrying about the reliability of philosophical thought experiments (see. e.g., Klee, 2008). This seems true for ethics (see Dancy, 1985, Jackson, 1992), conceptual analysis (see Fodor, 1964), or philosophy of mind: “A popular strategy in philosophy is to construct a certain sort of thought experiment I call intuition pump. intuition pumps are often abused, though seldom deliberately.” (Dennett, 1985, p. 12) Frequently discussed is the skeptical challenge by Kathleen Wilkes. Wilkes, 1988, expresses a deep suspicion about scenarios like Derek Parfit's people splitting like an amoeba (see Parfit, 1987, Gendler 2002). She wants philosophy “to use science fact rather than science fiction or fantasy” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 1), and therefore to refrain from using thought experiments because they are “both problematic and positively misleading” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 2). She claims that thought experiments about personal identity in particular often fail to provide the background conditions against which the experiment is set (cf. Wilkes, 1988, p. 7). We do agree with Wilkes that underdetermination can be a problem. But instead of dismissing thought experiments in philosophy we should consider it a crucial factor in assessing the quality of a thought experiment. (see Rescher, 2005, pp. 9–14) The more detailed the imaginary scenario in the relevant aspects, the better the thought experiment (Brendel, 2004, 97–99; Haggqvist, 1996, p. 28). We agree that the inferences drawn in thought experimenting are highly problematic if the hypothetical scenario “is inadequately described” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 8). But Wilkes seems to think that the lack of description is unavoidable, which supposedly amounts to a reason against philosophical thought experimenting on personal identity because persons are not natural kinds. This makes it impossible to fill in necessary information to make the thought experiment work given its unavoidable underdetermination. Wilkes thinks that “whenever we are examining the ranges of concepts that do not pick on natural kinds, the problem of deciding what is or what is not ‘relevant’ to the success of the thought experiment is yet more problematic than the same question as it arises in science; and, unlike the scientific problem, it may not even have an answer in principle.” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 15) She adds that scientific laws — especially those describing biological kinds like human beings — “are not disjoint and independent, detachable from one another . They are interrelated, to varying degrees of course” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 29) in many ways. This implies, for example, that “a full psychophysiological account of the processes of human perception must at some stage link up with part at least of linguistic ability; for we very typically see things under a certain description, and that description may be a very sophisticated one.” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 29) These considerations have her rule out experiments that challenge the human monopoly of personhood. No thought experiment, claims Wilkes, is well conceived if it involves non-human animals or computers as persons. But also those thought experiments can be ruled out which involve the “fission or fusion of humans” because it is not theoretically possible. “The total impact of the sum of laws that group us together as human beings (a natural kind category) precludes our splitting into two or fusing with someone else” (Wilkes, 1988, p. 36). One can ascertain here all too well the inherent difficulties in thinking about personal identity and the limited benefit some thought experiments might have for what is deemed the proper metaphysics of personal identity. Nevertheless, good reasons have been given in favour of the use of thought experiments about personal identity (Beck, 2006; Kolak, 1993; Hershenov, 2008). We feel that the problems about thought experiments on personal identity reveal more about the intricate nature of the subject than about the usefulness of philosophical thought experiments. And, disregarding other shortcomings in Wilkes' skepticism (for further discussion of Wilkes' views see Beck, 1992; Brooks, 1994; Focquaert, 2003; Haggqvist, 1996, pp. 27–34), her suggestion that thought experimental scenarios would have to satisfy current scientific knowledge about the relevant entities featured in a thought experiment is highly implausible. We learn a great deal about the world and our theories when we wonder, for instance, what would have happened after the big bang, if the law of gravity had been an inverse cube law instead of an inverse square. Would stars have failed to form? Reasoning about such a scenario is perfectly coherent and very instructive, even though it violates a law of nature. To some extent we should share Wilkes's concern that thought experimenting seems to be constrained only by relevant logical impossibilities and what seems intuitively acceptable. This is indeed problematic because intuitions can be highly misleading and relevant logical impossibilities fairly ungrounded if they cannot be supplemented by relevant theoretical impossibilities based on current science in order to avoid the irrational jump into fantasies. But in order to dismiss thought experimenting as a useful philosophical tool one has to show that intuition cannot be a source of knowledge and that an epistemic tool should be useless because there is a serious chance it can fail. Timothy Williamson has argued that we should forget about intuition as a cushion in the philosophical armchair. (Williamson, 2004a,b, 2008, pp. 179–207, and 2009). The importance of intuitions in philosophy has been neglected in the past (see Williamson, 2004b, p. 109–110), and only recently intuition received some of the attention it deserves (see e.g., DePaul; Ramsey (eds.), 1998). Besides the traditional divide between empiricists, rationalists and skeptics, it is not only a very non-uniform use of the word “intuition” that makes it difficult to assess the progress of the last years of philosophical inquiry about intuitions. The situation has been complicated by the contributions of experimental philosophy on intuitions, adding to questioning of their reliability. Generally speaking, the reliability of intuitions has been challenged on two grounds. One stems from an evolutionary explanation of the capacity to intuit; another emerged due to experiments which supposedly show the cultural relativity of intuitions. The current discussion of intuitions has barely made an impact on philosophical reflections about thought experiments. As far as philosophical thought experiments are concerned, this is as it should be, according to Williamson. In this respect George Bealer can be cited in support of Williamson, because for Bealer the talk about philosophical thought experiments reveals a conceptual confusion. Philosophy, he claims, is about “rational intuitions” and thought experiments can be only about “physical intuitions” (see Bealer, 1998, pp. 207–208, and 2002, p. 74). To many, this is as implausible as are some other elements of his “phenomenology of intuitions”, like the strict separation of “rational intuitions” from “physical intuitions”, or the immutability of “rational intuitions”. There are good reasons to believe that thought experiments appeal to intuitions in order to give us new insights about different realms of investigation, including philosophy. This kind of positive connection is what Williamson has in mind when addressing the role of intuitions in philosophical thought experiments like the famous Gettier cases, which overnight found acceptance by the philosophical community in their aim to refute the view that knowledge is justified true belief. While Williamson expects “armchair methods to play legitimately a more dominant role in future philosophy” (Williamson, 2009, p. 126), he thinks that “we should stop talking about intuition.” (Williamson, 2004b, p. 152). This does not impress proponents of what we call an intuition-based account of thought experiments, and probably for good reasons (see Ichikawa; Jarvis, 2009). The intuition-based account of thought experimenting comes in a naturalistic version (Brendel, 2004; Gendler, 2007; Fehige 2009 and forthcoming), and in the form of Brown's Platonism (Brown, 1986, 1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1993, 2004a,b, 2005, 2007a,b,c). Brown holds that in a few special cases we do go well beyond the old data to acquire a priori knowledge of nature (see also Koyré, 1968). Galileo showed that all bodies fall at the same speed with a brilliant thought experiment that started by destroying the then reigning Aristotelian account. The latter holds that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones ( H L ). But consider (Figure 6), in which a heavy cannon ball ( H ) and light musket ball ( L ) are attached together to form a compound object ( H + L ); the latter must fall faster than the cannon ball alone. Yet the compound object must also fall slower, since the light part will act as a drag on the heavy part. Now we have a contradiction. ( H + L H and H H + L ) That's the end of Aristotle's theory. But there is a bonus, since the right account is now obvious: they all fall at the same speed ( H = L = H + L ). Figure 6. Galileo: “I don't even have to look” This could be said to be a priori (though still fallible) knowledge of nature, since there are no new data involved, nor is the conclusion derived from old data, nor is it some sort of logical truth. This account of thought experiments can be further developed by linking the a priori epistemology to recent accounts of laws of nature that hold that laws are relations among objectively existing abstract entities. It is thus a rather Platonic view, not unlike Platonic accounts of mathematics such as that urged by Kurt Gödel. The two most often repeated arguments against Brown's Platonism are: it does not identify criteria to tell apart good and bad thought experiments, and violates the principle of ontological parsimony. These are poor objections, and most probably find widespread acceptance because Platonism seems to be unfathomable these days, given the general popularity of various forms of naturalism. If intuitions really do the job in a thought experiment, the first objection is weak because neither rationalists nor empiricists have a theory about the reliability of intuitions. So the objection should be that intuitions probably just do not matter in human cognition. However, there are good reasons to reject the argument (see Myers, 2004). As for the second objection, the appeal to Occam's razor is in general problematic when it is employed to rule out a theory. Whatever we eliminate by employing the principle of parsimony we can easily reintroduce by an inference to the best explanation (see Meixner, 2000). And this is exactly what a Platonist contends his or her Platonism about thought experimenting to be, while conceding that the Platonic intuition appears miraculous. But are they really more miraculous than sense perception, which seems similar in many respects to Platonic intuition? One might want to say yes, because supposedly we have no clue at all how Platonic intuition works but we do have some idea about the nature of sense perception. We know that if an object is far away it appears smaller in vision, and under certain light conditions the same object can look very differently. We wonder if it is really true that it is impossible to state similar rules to capture the nature of Platonic intuition? If you are drunk or lack attention you most probably will not be very successful in intuiting anything that makes sense. A review of the relevant psychological literature will reveal further criteria that could be employed to identify good and bad conditions for Platonic intuition while thought experimenting. Yet, proponents of the naturalistic version of the intuition based account wonder how necessary Platonism is once this move is entertained in defence of the reliability of intuitions (see Miščević, 2004). Norton can be cited in support of Williamson as he thinks that his approach offers sufficient reason to dismiss not only Platonism but any intuition based account altogether (Norton, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2004a,b, 2008). Norton is the most important defender of what we call the argument view about thought experiments. Surprisingly, Norton has not many more followers than Brown, even though the argument view seems to be the natural option for a debate that has many empiricists among its participants. Most empiricists find Norton's argument view too strong, only few still too weak (e.g., Bunzl, 1996). Norton claims that any thought experiment is really a (possibly disguised) argument; it starts with premises grounded in experience and follows deductive or inductive rules of inference in arriving at its conclusion. The picturesque features of any thought experiment which give it an experimental flavour might be psychologically helpful, but are strictly redundant. Thus, says Norton, we never go beyond the empirical premises in a way to which any empiricist would object. There are three objections that might be offered against Norton. First, his notion of argument is too vague. However, this is not a good objection: arguments can be deductive (which are perfectly clear) or inductive. If the latter are unclear, the fault is with induction, not with Norton's argument view. Second, it is argued that Norton simply begs the question: every real world experiment can be rephrased as an argument, but nobody would say that they are dispensable. The account does not address the question: Where do the premises come from? A thought experiment might be an essential step in making the Norton-style reconstruction. Third, a thought experiment that is presented in argument form loses its typical force. The soft-point in Brown's Platonism is linked to the strength of Norton's account because he claims that any other view implies a commitment to “asking the oracle.” “Imagine an oracle that claims mysterious powers but never delivers predictions that could not be learned by simple inferences from ordinary experience. We would not believe that the oracle had any mysterious powers. I propose the same verdict for thought experiments in science.” (Norton, 1996, pp. 1142–1143) Defenders of empiricist alternatives deny this dispensability thesis. Among these empiricist alternatives is what we could call conceptual constructivism, taken up recently by Van Dyck (2003), to account for Heisenberg's ɣ-ray microscope, and by Gendler (1998, pp. 415–420), in navigating middle ground between the views of Norton and Brown. The view was first proposed by Kuhn (1964). He employs many of the concepts (but not the terminology) of his well-known structure of scientific revolutions. On his view a well-conceived thought experiment can bring on a crisis or at least create an anomaly in the reigning theory and so contribute to paradigm change. Thought experiments can teach us something new about the world, even though we have no new empirical data, by helping us to re-conceptualize the world in a better way. Next we have what we might term experimentalism, encompassing a wide range of different approaches which all assume that thought experiments are a “limiting case” of ordinary experiments. Experimentalism was proposed first by Mach, 1897 and 1905. He defines experimenting in terms of its basic method of variation and its capacity to destroy prejudices about nature. According to Mach, experimenting is innate to higher animals, including humans. The thought experiment just happens on a higher intellectual level but is basically still an experiment. At the centre of thought experimenting is a “Gedankenerfahrung”, an experience in thought. Such an experience is possible because in thought experimenting we draw from “unwillkürliche Abbildung von Tatsachen”, uncontrollable images of facts — acquired in past experiences with the world. Thought experiments help to prepare real world experiments. Some of them are so convincing in their results that an execution seems unnecessary; others could be conducted in a real-world experiment, which is the most natural trajectory of a scientific thought experiment. In any case thought experiments can result in a revision of belief, thereby demonstrating their significance for scientific progress. Mach also appreciates the didactic value of thought experiments: they help us to realize what can be accomplished in thinking and what can not. In the spirit of Mach, Roy A. Sorensen has offered a very aspiring version of experimentalism that accounts for thought experiments in science and philosophy, and tackles many of the central issues of the topic. Sorensen, 1992, claims thought experiments to be “a subset of unexecuted experiments” (p. 213). By their logical nature they are paradoxes that aim to test modal consequences of propositions. The origin of thought experimenting is explained in terms of Darwinian evolution (like in Genz, 1999, pp. 25–29), though the explanation has been criticized to be only “little more than a ‘just so story’ that fails on a posteriori grounds to epistemically underwrite the capacity” for thought experimenting (see Maffie, 1997). Experimentalism does not have to take a naturalistic turn as it does in Sorensen's case. In a number of contributions (Buzzoni, 2004, 2007, 2008) Marco Buzzoni has defended a form of experimentalism that still struggles with its Kantian underpinnings (Buzzoni forthcoming). Buzzoni (2008) argues for the dialectical unity of thought experiments and real-world experiments. Thought experiments and real-world experiments are claimed to be identical on the “technological-operational” level and unproductive for scientific purposes without each other: without thought experiments there wouldn't be real-world experiments because we would not know how to put questions to nature; without real-world experiments there wouldn't be answers to these questions. Given the many scientific thought experiments that cannot be realized in the real-world, Buzzoni might be conflating thought experiments with imagined experiments to be carried out in the real-world. This brings us to the mental model account of thought experimenting (Andreas, forthcoming; Bishop, 1998; Cooper, 2005; Gendler, 2004; Palmieri, 2003; Nersessian, 1992, 1993, 2007; McMullin, 1985; Miščević, 1992, 2007). In thought experimenting, according to champions of this view, we manipulate a mental model instead of a physical model. As the model is non-propositional, it is most often communicated by means of a polished narrative which functions as a kind of user-manual for building the model. This approach could become the most prolific because it does not seem to be much of a stretch to draw connections to the intuition based account and to relate to the bodily component of experimenting (Gooding, 1993). Furthermore, first attempts have been made to place “literary fiction on the level of thought experiments” (Swirski, 2007, p. 6; see also Davies, 2007; Macho; Wunschel (eds.), 2004). The issue here “is not whether but how the arts function cognitively.” (Elgin, 1993, p. 14) This kind of analysis helps “to observe how the narrative aspect of thought experiments have implications for the process whereby one version of a thought experiment can spawn another” (Souder, 2003, pp. 208–209). The narrative of a thought experiment is not the thought experiment but seems to be more than just the indispensable medium of communication. The missing link could be mental modelling because “more than one instantiation or realization of a situation described in the narrative is possible. The constructed model need only be of the same kind with respect to salient dimensions of target phenomena” (Nersessian, 2007, p. 148). 4. Recent Developments Noteworthy contributions have been made exploring the importance of thought experiments in disciplines other than mathematics, philosophy, or physics. They include history (Tetlock et al . (eds.), 2009, pp. 14–44; Rescher, 2003, pp. 238–238, and 2005, pp. 36–46; Reiss, 2009; Weber; De Mey, 2003), the social sciences (Belkin; Tetlock (eds.), 1996; Roberts, 1993; Ylikoski, 2003), and revealed theology (Fehige, 2009 and 2011b). Tentative steps have been undertaken to relate more general epistemological topics to the primal challenge of thought experiments. As we have seen this is true for intuitions. To name another example: Conceivability and Possibility (edited by T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Oxford: Oxford University Press) includes a number of contributions that note the relevance of the discussed topic to thought experiments. According to Bealer, thought experiments seem to involve a conceivability that is too weak to provide reliable possibilities because they only exploit “physical intuitions” (p. 74). David Chalmers thinks that good thought experiments can be a guide to possibilities if the entailments of conceivability and possibility that he defends are sound (p. 153). Alan Sidelle's discussion of the metaphysical contingency of the laws of nature explicitly refers to the “importance of traditional imagining, conceiving, and thought experiment to modal inquiry” (p. 310), and can be read as a challenge to any claim that thought experiments would reveal anything more than a “necessity based in analyticity” (p. 329). There is also an interesting, but relatively unexplored issue concerning the relative importance of thought experiments in different disciplines. Physics and philosophy use them extensively. Chemistry, by contrast, has none of note at all. Why is this the case? Perhaps it is merely an historical accident that chemists never developed a culture of doing thought experiments. Perhaps it is tied to some deep feature of the discipline itself (see Snooks, 2006). Economics and history use thought experiments, but apparently not anthropology. A good explanation would likely tell us a lot about the structure of the discipline itself. Finally, since the interest in simulation is growing among philosophers of science, the relationship between computer simulation and thought experiments has started to attract attention: Behmel, 2001, pp. 98–108; Di Paolo et al ., 2000; Lenhard 2011; Stäudner, 1998. The issue here is whether computer simulations are thought experiments. This is rather unlikely because thought experiments and computer simulations seem to involve different kinds of simulation and have different aims. Still, their relationship is certainly of interest to anyone working on thought experiments, especially if it is true that computer simulations are the new way of doing science that is on a par with science by classical real world experiments (see Morrison, 2009). Bibliography The number of papers, anthologies, and monographs has been growing immensely since the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, it might be useful to highlight that in existing literature Kühne, 2006, is the most substantial study on the exploration of thought experiments since Kant; Sorensen, 1992, is the most extensive philosophical study of thought experiments. More than other monographs (see Behmel, 2001; Buschlinger, 1993; Brown, 1991a; Buzzoni, 2008; Cohnitz, 2006; Haggqvist, 1996; Rescher, 2005; Swirski, 2007), both studies well exceed the author's own systematic contribution to what we consider to be the primal philosophical challenge of thought experimentation. Also, this bibliography does not include the many (we count about eight) popular books on thought experiments (like Wittgenstein's Beetle and Other Classical Thought Experiments by Martin Cohen); nor do we list fiction that is related to the subject (like “The End of Mr. Y” by Scarlett Thomas). Further, for undergraduate teaching purposes one might want to consider Doing Philosophy: An Introduction Through Thought Experiments (edited by Theodore Schick, Jr. and Lewis Vaughn, fourth edition, 2010, Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education). Finally, it is noteworthy that a number of philosophical journals have dedicated part or all of an issue to the topic of thought experiments, including the Croatian Journal of Philosophy (19/VII), Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1/59), Informal Logic (3/17), and Philosophica (1/72). Andreas, Holger, 2011, “Zur Wissenschaftslogik von Gedankenexperimenten”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie , 59: 75–91. Arthur, Richard, 1999, “On Thought Experiments as A Priori Science”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 13: 215–229. Bailey, Cyril, 1950, Lucretius on the Nature of Things, (translation of De Rerum Naturae ), ninth reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Batens, Diderik, 2008, “On Possibilities and Thought Experiments”, in R. 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'ontology' has a very different sense in philosophy and in information science. Representation of conceptual domains. This is the information science use, and is due to Tom Gruber, who was generally influenced by Husserlian formal ontology. In analytic philosophy, an ontology is determined by an *interpretation* , which is - loosely speaking - a function that projects an element of a language onto an element of the world, however widely-set or limited the world might be. In more formal semantics, an interpretation determines a model by assigning values to the variables of a theory; if the theory is of first or higher order, then its domain will be those individuals over which the quantifiers range and the properties and relations which obtain between and among them. So, in analytic metaphysics , an ontology is usually determined by an interpretation of a first-order theory; and a first-order theory is (evidently) expressed in first-order logic. This, I think, provides a unified language standard that is sufficient to anyone's requirement ;-) //提供统一的标准符合每个人的需求 Of course, this is entirely irrelevant to your particular practical interrogations . But I surmise that your puzzlement is due to the divergence between: 1.*extensional ontology*, which is the ontology of first-order theories, and is derived from the Frege-Russell school through Carnap, the Polish logicians, and Quine. Such ontologies are concerned with the *extension* of concepts //本体外延 2. *formal ontology*, which is derived from Brentano and Husserl; Barry Smith is a typical theorist in this field and any top-level ontology (BFO, DOLCE, GFO...) gives an example. Such ontologies are concerned with *concepts* and the relations between concepts //形式化的本体，关注概念和概念与概念间的关系 3. *applied ontologies*, which derive from formal ontologies through Tom Gruber s use of the term, are representations of a certain domain of knowledge. Vanrullen and Hirst (forthcoming) will show that ontology is, in fact, a misnomer here: as such ontologies concern concepts and the representation of knowledge, they range over *semantic * and *epistemic * domains, rather than *ontic* domains in sense (1) above; they would perhaps be better described as applied epistemologies . //应用本体，对某领域知识的表述， Applied ontologies in sense (3) range over domain-specific concepts and the relations obtaining between such concepts: thus, the objects of such ontologies are not regions of the world, but concepts. The ontologies I describe (in sense (1)) range over the *extensions* of concepts - that is, things in the world that supposedly correspond to, exemplify, or satisfy concepts. As far as social systems are concerned: // 关注社会系统 Generally, the relation between a concept and the range or sequence of things in the world that might satisfy that concept is a matter of *determination* - of how well the concept picks out one specific thing or class of things in the world. Where an applied ontology models a well-defined taxonomy (as in ontologies applied to biological sciences) or a domain having a prescribed or semi-formalised language (as in air traffic control), the concepts which figure in the ontology have a clear, well-defined extension. Practical tools based on such ontologies (decision-making tools, diagnostic tools) function efficiently because theres not much room for concept-based indetermination. However, when the ontology ranges over concepts with a less well-defined extension (as in most social interactions), the content of the concepts is not fixed and objectively-determinable in every situation, but is normative and context-sensitive. In everyday interaction, the precise sense of a concept depends on a context-sensitive and speaker-sensitive *interpretation* - and here, theres a strong risk of underdetermination of any concept with respect to the range of things and situations in the world to which it might apply. Such indetermination can touch terms with an apparently technical definition and here we can take the different understandings of the term ontology as an example. It follows that indetermination is common where terms have social and cultural connotations that will be understood differently by different actors (this is a common problem in employer-employee relations, where notions of the nature and finalities of collective action can be understood very differently by operational agents, management, and direction); such distinctions are often determined by the sociolect of the interlocutors. The possibilities of indetermination are already large in exchanges between sociolects in one language and within a common general culture; theyre evidently far greater in exchanges between interlocutors having different native languages and no shared general culture. All this being the case (and this rejoins Gustavos interrogations), any tools which might apply to social situations (sociometric tools, tools for managing and planning the disposition of human resources, tools for skills management, training tools etc.) need to integrate norm-based rather than rule-based conceptual domains (domains in which a term takes a range of possible values or sets of values that are further determined by context, rather than domains in which a concept takes one, fixed value or set of values). A particular problem in the use of such devices as is to decision or consulting is that the user (and, for that matter, the technician) can confuse concepts with the putative extension of concepts for example, that he or she can take for granted not only that everyone knows what a family is, but also that everyone knows that a family is a system. The first is perhaps pragmatically the case for all competent speakers of English, but the second depends on the speaker having a reasonably sophisticated understanding of what a system is... that is, on the speaker possessing a theory of systems系统理论. Indeed, this is precisely the weakness of most systems thinking systems theory originated with biologists, and biological entities (living organisms, organs, cells...) are probably the most self-evident class of systems in the natural world. 系统理论起源生物学，生物实体 However, while it might be evident to a biologist that something is a system, this is a product of the biologists particular epistemic context it doesnt follow that it is *universally* evident that that thing is a system. The biological systems theorist is confusing混淆 a concept organism, organ with the extension of that concept: a liver is a system *with respect to a system of theories* - but with respect to the man on the Clapham omnibus, its a piece of offal that hes going to fry with onions for his tea. This material came from talking with David Hirst ..
Many of the great achievements of the world were accomplished by tired and discouraged men who kept on working Three things in life that, once gone, never come back:Time, Words Opportunity Three things in life that may never be lost:Peace, Hope Honesty. Three things in life that are most valuable:Love, Faith Prayer Three things in life that are never certain:Dreams, Success Fortune Three things that make a man;Hard work,Sincerity Commitment\ Three things in life that can destroy a man;Lust, Pride Anger 世界上许多伟大的成就都是由 疲惫 又沮丧的人经过不懈努力地工作所取得的。 生命中失去就永不再来的三样东西：时间、说过的话、机遇！ 生命中从不可能丢失的三样东西：平和、希望、诚实！ 生命中最珍贵的三样东西：爱、信念、祈祷！ 生命中永不确定的三样东西：梦想、成功、幸运！ 造就一个人的三样东西：努力工作、真诚、奉献！ 毁灭一个人的三样东西：欲望、傲慢、愤怒！
Projected Table of Contents A Abd al-Jabbar abduction (Igor Douven) Abelard , Peter (Peter King) Abhidharma (Noa Ronkin) abilities (John Maier) Abner of Burgos (Charles Manekin) abortion (Margaret Little) Abrabanel, Judah (Aaron Hughes) abstract objects (Gideon Rosen) Academy, Plato's (Wolfgang Mann) accidental properties see essential vs. accidental properties Achillini, Alessandro action (George Wilson) joint see agency: shared logic of see logic: action action, divine action at a distance see quantum mechanics: action at a distance in actualism (Christopher Menzel) adaptation and adaptationism (Steven Orzack and Patrick Forber) Addams, Jane (Maurice Hamington) Adorno, Theodor aesthetics see aesthetics: Adorno and the Frankfurt School Adorno, Theodor W. (Lambert Zuidervaart) advance directives (Agnieszka Jaworska) Aegidius Romanus see Giles of Rome Aenesidemus see skepticism: ancient aesthetic, concept of the (James Shelley) aesthetics 19th Century Romantic Adorno and the Frankfurt School aesthetic judgment (Nick Zangwill) Africana see African Philosophy: Africana aesthetics Beardsley see Beardsley, Monroe C.: aesthetics British, in the 18th century (James Shelley) and cognitive science (Dustin Stokes and Amy Coplan) Collingwood see Collingwood, Robin George: aesthetics Croce see Croce, Benedetto: aesthetics Dewey see Dewey, John: aesthetics environmental (Allen Carlson) existentialist (Jean-Philippe Deranty) feminist see feminist (interventions): aesthetics French, in the 18th century (Jacques Morizot) Gadamer see Gadamer, Hans-Georg: aesthetics German, in the 18th century (Paul Guyer) Goodman see Goodman, Nelson: aesthetics Hegel see Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: aesthetics Heidegger see Heidegger, Martin: aesthetics Hume see Hume, David: aesthetics Husserl and phenomenology Japanese see Japanese Philosophy: aesthetics late ancient and medieval Nietzsche see Nietzsche, Friedrich: aesthetics and the philosophy of art Plato see Plato: aesthetics Schopenhauer see Schopenhauer, Arthur: aesthetics Wittgenstein see Wittgenstein, Ludwig: aesthetics affirmative action (Robert Fullinwider) Africana Philosophy (Lucius Outlaw) African Philosophy Africana aesthetics communal basis of African art (Ifeanyi Menkiti) ethics (Kwame Gyekye) ethnophilosophy in Anglophone Africa in Francophone Africa meta-philosophy philosophy of religion sage philosophy (Dismas Masolo) Afro-Caribbean Philosophy afterlife (William Hasker) agency shared (Abraham Sesshu Roth) agent-relative vs. agent-neutral reasons see reasons for action: agent-neutral vs. agent-relative agnosticism see atheism and agnosticism Agricola, Rudolf Agrippa see skepticism: ancient Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius (Charles Nauert) Akan Philosophy ethics and political philosophy of the person (Ajume Wingo) akrasia see weakness of will Al-Biruni Al-Farabi (Therese-Anne Druart) Al-Ghazali (Frank Griffel) Al-Kindi (Peter Adamson) Al-Razi Alan of Lille Alberti, Leon Battista Albert of Saxony (Jol Biard) Albert the Great (Markus Fhrer) Albo, Joseph (Dror Ehrlich) Alcinous Alcmaeon (Carl Huffman) Alcuin Alemanno, Yohanan Alexander, Samuel Alexander of Aphrodisias (Dorothea Frede) algebra (Vaughan Pratt) algebraizations of logics with semantics see logic: algebraizations of logics with semantics Boolean see Boolean algebra algebra of logic tradition (Stanley Burris) Alhacen see Ibn al-Haytham alienation Althusser, Louis (William Lewis) altruism (David Phillips) biological (Samir Okasha) Alyngton, Robert (Alessandro Conti) ambiguity (Adam Sennet) Ammonius (David Blank) Ammonius Saccas see Plotinus analogy medieval theories of (E. Jennifer Ashworth) analogy and analogical reasoning (Paul Bartha) analysis (Michael Beaney) analytic/synthetic distinction (Georges Rey) anaphora (Jeffrey C. King) anarchism (Rob Sparrow) Anaxagoras (Patricia Curd) Anaxarchus see Pyrrho Anaximander Anaximenes Anderson, John Andronicus of Rhodes see Aristotle, commentators on animal consciousness see consciousness: animal animalism (Stephan Blatti) animal research, ethics of see ethics, biomedical: research on animals animals, moral status of (Lori Gruen) anomalous monism (Steven Yalowitz) Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (Julia Driver) Anselm, Saint (Thomas Williams) Anthony, Susan B. anti-realism anti-realism, moral see moral anti-realism Antiochus of Ascalon (James Allen) Antiphon Antisthenes a posteriori knowledge see a priori justification and knowledge appearance vs. reality epistemological problems of perception see perception: epistemological problems of skepticism see skepticism a priori justification and knowledge (Bruce Russell) Aquinas, Saint Thomas (Ralph McInerny and John O'Callaghan) moral, political, and legal philosophy (John Finnis) Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in epistemology and philosophy of science ethics and action theory metaphysics (Amos Bertolacci) natural philosophy and natural science (Jon McGinnis) philosophy of language and logic (Tony Street) philosophy of religion political philosophy psychology and philosophy of mind (Alfred Ivry) Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in Arabic and Islamic Theological Philosophy (Kalam) Greek sources (Cristina D'Ancona) influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on Judaic thought (Mauro Zonta) influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West (Dag Nikolaus Hasse) interpretations of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, special topics in causation and occasionalism essence and existence (Allan Bck) eternity and time (Taneli Kukkonen) Ibn Kammuna see Ibn Kammuna Ikhwan al-Safa (Carmela Baffioni) illuminationism intentions and intentionality (Deborah Black) medical philosophy, Greek and Syriac sources medicine and medical philosophy mysticism (Mehdi Aminrazavi) prophecy Arcesilaus (Charles Brittain) architecture, philosophy and (Michael Levine and Bill Taylor) Archytas (Carl Huffman) Arendt, Hannah (Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves) arete see ethics: ancient argument Argyropoulos, John Aristippus see Cyrenaics Ariston of Chios Aristotelianism commentators on Aristotle see Aristotle, commentators on in the Renaissance (Heinrich Kuhn) Aristotle (Christopher Shields) Aristotle, commentators on (Andrea Falcon) Alexander of Aphrosias see Alexander of Aphrodisias Ammonius see Ammonius David see David Elias see Elias Olympiodorus see Olympiodorus Philoponus see Philoponus Simplicius see Simplicius Themistius see Themistius Aristotle, General Topics biology (James Lennox) categories (Paul Studtmann) ethics (Richard Kraut) logic (Robin Smith) metaphysics (S. Marc Cohen) poetics (Pierre Destre) political theory (Fred Miller) psychology (Christopher Shields) rhetoric (Christof Rapp) Aristotle, Special Topics causality (Andrea Falcon) mathematics (Henry Mendell) natural philosophy (Istvan Bodnar) on non-contradiction (Paula Gottlieb) textual transmission of Aristotelian corpus Arnauld, Antoine (Elmar Kremer) Arouet, Franois-Marie see Voltaire art, conceptual (Elisabeth Schellekens) art, definition of (Thomas Adajian) art, philosophy of see aesthetics: and the philosophy of art artifact (Risto Hilpinen) artificial intelligence (Selmer Bringsjord) automated reasoning see reasoning: automated belief representation see belief, formal representations of Chinese room argument see Chinese room argument connectionism see connectionism defeasible reasoning see reasoning: defeasible ethical issues in (James Moor) frame problem see frame problem logic and (Richmond Thomason) Turing test see Turing test Asa?ga aspect see tense and aspect assertion (Peter Pagin) Astell, Mary (Alice Sowaal) atheism and agnosticism (J. J. C. Smart) atomism 17th to 20th century (Alan Chalmers) ancient (Sylvia Berryman) atonement (Thomas D. Senor) attention (Christopher Mole) attributes see properties auditory perception see perception: auditory Augustine, Saint (Michael Mendelson) relation to Greek philosophy (Charles Brittain) Auriol , Peter (Russell L. Friedman) Austin, John (Brian Bix) Austin, John Langshaw (Mark Kaplan) authority (Tom Christiano) legal see legal obligation and authority automated reasoning see reasoning: automated autonomy and informed consent see informed consent in moral and political philosophy (John Christman) personal (Sarah Buss) political see self-determination, collective Averroes see Ibn Rushd Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol) (Sarah Pessin) Avicenna (Robert Wisnovsky) awareness, bodily see bodily awareness Ayer, Alfred Jules (Graham Macdonald) B Bacon, Francis (Juergen Klein) Bacon, Roger (Jeremiah Hackett) Bain, Alexander see Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century Barbaro, Ermolao Barr, Franois Poullain de la basing relation, epistemic (Keith Allen Korcz) Baudrillard, Jean (Douglas Kellner) Bauer, Bruno (Douglas Moggach) Bayes' Theorem (James Joyce) Bayle, Pierre (Thomas M. Lennon and Michael Hickson) Beardsley, Monroe C. aesthetics (Michael Wreen) Beattie, James see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century beauty Beauvoir, Simone de (Debra Bergoffen) Beecher, Catharine Ward behaviorism (George Graham) being see existence being and becoming see time in modern physics see space and time: being and becoming in modern physics belief (Eric Schwitzgebel) belief, ethics of (Andrew Chignell) belief, formal representations of (Franz Huber) belief merging and judgment aggregation (Gabriella Pigozzi) Bell's Theorem (Abner Shimony) beneficence, principle of (Tom Beauchamp) Beneke, Friedrich Eduard Benjamin, Walter (Peter Osborne and Matthew Charles) Bentham, Jeremy political philosophy Bergmann, Gustav Bergson, Henri (Leonard Lawlor and Valentine Moulard) Berkeley, George (Lisa Downing) Berlin, Isaiah (Joshua Cherniss and Henry Hardy) Bessarion, Basil (John Monfasani) Bhart?hari Biel, Gabriel binarium famosissimum (Paul Vincent Spade) biocomplexity biodiversity see ecology: biodiversity biological information see information: biological biology conservation see conservation biology developmental see developmental biology experiment in (Marcel Weber) molecular see molecular biology notion of individual (Robert A. Wilson) notion of self see self: the biological notion of philosophy of (Paul Griffiths) reduction in see reduction, scientific: in biology teleological notions in see teleology: teleological notions in biology biology, philosophy of feminist see feminist (interventions): philosophy of biology Black identity and race see race: and Black identity Blackwell, Antoinette Brown Blair, Hugh see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Bloch, Ernst Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich bodily awareness (Fr餩rique de Vignemont) Bodin, Jean (Mario Turchetti) body see substance Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus (John Marenbon) Bohr, Niels correspondence principle (Alisa Bokulich) Boltzmann, Ludwig Bolzano, Bernard (Edgar Morscher) logic (Jan Sebestik) Bonaventure, Saint (Tim Noone and R. E. Houser) Book of Causes Book of Six Principles Boole, George (Stanley Burris) Boolean algebra the mathematics of (J. Donald Monk) Bosanquet, Bernard (William Sweet) boundary (Achille Varzi) Boyle, Robert (J. J. MacIntosh and Peter Anstey) Bradley, Francis Herbert (Stewart Candlish and Pierfrancesco Basile) moral and political philosophy (David Crossley) Bradwardine, Thomas brain death see death: definition of brains in a vat (Tony Brueckner) Brentano, Franz (Wolfgang Huemer) theory of judgement (Johannes Brandl) Broad, Charlie Dunbar (Kent Gustavsson) Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan (Mark van Atten) Brown, Thomas see Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century Bruni, Leonardo Bruno, Giordano (Dilwyn Knox) Buber, Martin (Michael Zank) Buddha (Mark Siderits) Buddhism Chinese Zen see Japanese Philosophy: Zen Buddhism Bchner, Ludwig bundle theory see substance Buridan, John (Jack Zupko) Burke, Edmund (Ian Harris) Burley , Walter (Alessandro Conti) Burnet, James see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Butler, Joseph moral philosophy (Aaron Garrett) Byzantine philosophy (Katerina Ierodiakonou and Brje Bydn) C Cabanis, Pierre Jean George Caird, Edward see Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century Calcidius Callicles see Plato: Callicles and Thrasymachus Cambridge Platonists (Sarah Hutton) Campanella, Tommaso (Germana Ernst) Campbell, George see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Camus, Albert (Ron Aronson) Cantor, Georg capability approach (Ingrid Robeyns) Cardano, Girolamo Carmichael, Gershom see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Carnap, Rudolf (Hannes Leitgeb) Carneades (James Allen) Case, John Cassirer, Ernst (Michael Friedman) Castellio, Sebastian Castiglione, Baldassare casuistry see reasoning: moral categories (Amie Thomasson) ancient medieval theories of (Jorge Gracia and Lloyd Newton) category theory (Jean-Pierre Marquis) causation backward (Jan Faye) causal processes (Phil Dowe) counterfactual theories of (Peter Menzies) in the law (Antony Honor) and manipulability (James Woodward) medieval theories of (Graham White) mental see mental causation the metaphysics of (Jonathan Schaffer) probabilistic (Christopher Hitchcock) regularity theories of Cavendish, Margaret Lucas (David Cunning) Celsus censorship see pornography: and censorship certainty (Baron Reed) Cesalpino, Andrea ceteris paribus laws see laws of nature: ceteris paribus Chaldaean Oracles chance versus randomness (Antony Eagle) change (Chris Mortensen) chaos (Robert Bishop) Chapone, Hester character, moral (Marcia Homiak) character/trait Chartres, school of Chtalet, milie du (Karen Detlefsen) Chatton, Walter (Rondo Keele) chemistry, philosophy of (Michael Weisberg, Paul Needham, and Robin Hendry) childhood, the philosophy of (Gareth Matthews) children, philosophy for (Michael Pritchard) chimeras, human/non-human see ethics, biomedical: chimeras, human/non-human Chinese ethics see ethics: Chinese Chinese Philosophy legalism Chinese room argument (David Cole) Chisholm, Roderick (Richard Feldman and Fred Feldman) choice, axiom of (John L. Bell) choice, dynamic (Chrisoula Andreou) choice, social see social choice theory Christian theology, philosophy and (Michael Murray and Michael Rea) Christine de Pizan Chrysippus Church, Alonzo (Harry Deutsch) logic, contributions to (C. Anthony Anderson) Church-Turing Thesis (B. Jack Copeland) Church's Thesis see Church-Turing Thesis Cicero (Charles Brittain) Cieszkowski, August citizenship (Dominique Leydet) Civic education (Jack Crittenden) civic humanism (Athanasios Moulakis) civil disobedience (Kimberley Brownlee) civil rights (Andrew Altman) civil society Clarke, Samuel (Ezio Vailati and Timothy Yenter) Classical Indian Philosophy concept of emotion (Joerg Tuske) epistemology language and testimony (Madhav Deshpande) logic (Brendan Gillon) mental causation and consciousness (Sthaneshwar Timalsina) naturalism (Amita Chatterjee) perceptual experience and concepts (Monima Chadha) personhood self-knowledge (Manidipa Sen) Cleanthes Clement of Alexandria see doxography of ancient philosophy Clifford, William Kingdon climate justice see justice: climate clinical research, ethics of see ethics, biomedical: clinical research cloning (Katrien Devolder) Cockburn, Catharine Trotter (Patricia Sheridan) coercion (Scott Anderson) cognition embodied (Robert A. Wilson and Lucia Foglia) motor-based theories of see motor-based theories of perception and cognition cognition, animal (Kristin Andrews) cognitive disability see disability: cognitive cognitive science (Paul Thagard) cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, moral (Mark van Roojen) Cohen, Hermann (Scott Edgar) Coignet, Clarisse Coimbra University of Collingwood, Robin George (Giuseppina D'Oro) aesthetics (Gary Kemp) Collins, Anthony (William Uzgalis) colonialism (Margaret Kohn) color (Barry Maund) common good common knowledge (Peter Vanderschraaf and Giacomo Sillari) communitarianism (Daniel Bell) comparative philosophy Chinese and Western (David Wong) compatibilism (Michael McKenna) competence, in biomedical decision-making see decision-making capacity complexity biocomplexity see biocomplexity computatbility and see computability and complexity and information theory composition, the vagueness of see many, problem of compositionality (Zoltn Gendler Szab) computability historical development of (Jean Mosconi and Jacques Dubucs) computability and complexity (Neil Immerman) computation in physical systems (Gualtiero Piccinini) computational linguistics see linguistics: computational computational theory of mind see mind: computational theory of computer and information ethics (Terrell Bynum) computer science, philosophy of (Raymond Turner and Amnon Eden) computing modern history of (B. Jack Copeland) and moral responsibility (Kari Gwen Coleman) Comte, Auguste (Michel Bourdeau) concepts (Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence) conceptualism condemnation of 1277 (Hans Thijssen) Condillac, tienne Bonnot de (Lorne Falkenstein) conditionals (Dorothy Edgington) counterfactual (Kai von Fintel) logic of see logic: conditionals Condorcet, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de in the history of feminism (Joan Landes) confirmation (Branden Fitelson) Confucianism Neo-Confucianism see Neo-Confucianism Confucius (Jeffrey Riegel) connectionism (James Garson) connectives sentence connectives in formal logic (Lloyd Humberstone) conscience medieval theories of (Douglas Langston) consciousness (Robert Van Gulick) 17th century theories of (Larry Jorgensen) animal (Colin Allen) higher-order theories (Peter Carruthers) and intentionality (Charles Siewert) neuroscience of (Ned Block) representational theories of (William Lycan) self-, empirical approaches to see self-consciousness: empirical approaches to temporal (Barry Dainton) unity of (Andrew Brook and Paul Raymont) consensus consent see political obligation consequentialism (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) rule (Brad Hooker) conservation biology (Sahotra Sarkar) conservatism constitutionalism (Wil Waluchow) constructive empiricism (Bradley Monton and Chad Mohler) constructive type theory see type theory: constructive constructivism in metaethics (Carla Bagnoli) in political philosophy (Andrew Williams) content see mental content contextualism, epistemic (Patrick Rysiew) Continental Rationalism (Thomas M. Lennon and Shannon Dea) contingent truth see truth: necessary vs. contingent continuant see change continuity and infinitesimals (John L. Bell) continuum hypothesis (Peter Koellner) contractarianism (Ann Cudd) contracts, theories of contractualism (Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan) contradiction (Laurence R. Horn) convention (Michael Rescorla) Conway, Lady Anne (Sarah Hutton) Cooper, Anna Julia (Kathryn T. Gines) Copernicus, Nicolaus (Sheila Rabin) Cordemoy, Geraud de (Fred Ablondi) corruption (Seumas Miller) cosmological argument (Bruce Reichenbach) cosmology ancient methodological debates in the 1930s and 1940s (George Gale) and theology cosmopolitanism (Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown) counterfactuals see conditionals: counterfactual counterpart theory see possible objects Cousin, Victor Crathorn, William (Aurlien Robert) Cratylus creation and conservation (Jonathan Kvanvig) creationism (Michael Ruse) Cremonini, Cesare Crescas, Hasdai (James T. Robinson) criminal law, theories of (Antony Duff) critical theory (James Bohman) Croce, Benedetto aesthetics (Gary Kemp) Crummell, Alexander (Stephen Thompson) Cudworth, Ralph see Cambridge Platonists cultural evolution see evolution: cultural culture and cognitive science (Jesse Prinz) Culverwell, Nathaniel see Cambridge Platonists Curry's paradox (JC Beall) Cusanus, Nicolaus (Clyde Lee Miller) Cynics, ancient Cyrenaics Czolbe, Heinrich D Damascius Damian, Peter (Toivo J. Holopainen) Dante Alighieri (Winthrop Wetherbee) Daoism see Taoism Neo-Daoism see Neo-Taoism Darwin, Charles Darwinism (James Lennox) Dasein see Heidegger, Martin Daud, Abraham Ibn see Ibn Daud, Abraham David (Christian Wildberg) Davidson, Donald (Jeff Malpas) death (Steven Luper) definition of (David DeGrazia) de Beauvoir, Simone see Beauvoir, Simone de deception definition of see lying and deception: definition of self see self-deception decision-making capacity (Louis Charland) decision theory causal (Paul Weirich) deconstruction Dedekind, Richard contributions to the foundations of mathematics (Erich Reck) defaults in semantics and pragmatics (K. M. Jaszczolt) definitions (Anil Gupta) deism in the 18th century Deleuze, Gilles (Daniel Smith and John Protevi) Del Medigo, Elia Delmedigo, Elijah (Jacob Ross) delusion (Lisa Bortolotti) De Maistre, Joseph demarcation of science see science and pseudo-science democracy (Tom Christiano) Democritus (Sylvia Berryman) demonstration Aristotle's theory of see Aristotle, General Topics: logic medieval theories of (John Longeway) demonstratives see indexicals De Morgan, Augustus denotation see reference deontological ethics see ethics: deontological dependence, ontological (E. Jonathan Lowe) Derrida, Jacques (Leonard Lawlor) Derveni papyrus Descartes, Ren (Gary Hatfield) epistemology (Lex Newman) ethics (Donald Rutherford) life and works (Kurt Smith) mathematics (Mary Domski) modal metaphysics (David Cunning) ontological argument (Lawrence Nolan) physics (Edward Slowik) and the pineal gland (Gert-Jan Lokhorst) theory of emotion see emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of theory of ideas (Andrew Pessin) descriptions (Peter Ludlow) desert (Owen McLeod) Desgabets, Robert (Patricia Easton) design, argument from see teleology: teleological arguments for God's existence desire (Tim Schroeder) Destutt de Tracy, Antoine Louis Claude determinates vs. determinables (David H. Sanford) determinism ancient theories of see freedom: ancient theories of causal (Carl Hoefer) developmental biology (Lenny Moss and Paul Griffiths) epigenesis and preformationism (Jane Maienschein) evolution and development (Jason Scott Robert) Dewey, John aesthetics (Tom Leddy) moral philosophy (Elizabeth Anderson) political philosophy (Matthew Festenstein) Dharmakīrti (Tom Tillemans) diagrams (Sun-Joo Shin and Oliver Lemon) dialectic Dialectical School (Susanne Bobzien) dialetheism (Graham Priest and Francesco Berto) Diderot, Denis (JB Shank) Dietrich of Freiberg (Markus Fhrer) Dilthey, Wilhelm (Rudolf Makkreel) Diodorus Cronus (David Sedley) Diogenes Laertius see doxography of ancient philosophy Diogenes of Apollonia Diogenes of Oenoanda Diogenes of Sinope Dionysius the Areopagite see Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite dirty hands, the problem of (C.A.J. (Tony) Coady) disability (David Wasserman, Adrienne Asch, and Jeffrey Blustein) cognitive (David Wasserman, Adrienne Asch, Jeffrey Blustein, and Daniel Putnam) feminist perspectives on see feminist (topics): perspectives on disability and health care rationing (Jerome Bickenbach) discourse representation theory (Bart Geurts and David I. Beaver) discrimination (Andrew Altman) disease see health disjunction (Ray Jennings and Andrew Hartline) disposition dispositions (Michael Fara) Dissoi Logoi see Sophists, The distributive justice see justice: distributive diversity religious see religious diversity divine action see action, divine command theory see voluntarism, theological concepts of the see God: concepts of foreknowledge and free will see free will: divine foreknowledge and freedom see freedom: divine hiddenness see hiddenness of God illumination (Robert Pasnau) providence see providence, divine revelation see revelation, divine simplicity see simplicity: divine doctor-patient relationship see ethics, biomedical: provider-patient relationship doing vs. allowing harm (Frances Howard-Snyder) domestic partnership and marriage see marriage and domestic partnership domination donation and sale of human organs (Steve Wilkinson) double consciousness (John P. Pittman) double effect, doctrine of (Alison McIntyre) Douglass, Frederick (Ronald Sundstrom) doxography of ancient philosophy (Jaap Mansfeld) Drake, Judith Droysen, Johann Gustav dualism (Howard Robinson) Du Bosc, Jacques Duhem, Pierre (Roger Ariew) Dunbar, James see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Duns Scotus, John (Thomas Williams) Dutch book arguments (Susan Vineberg) dynamic epistemic logic see logic: dynamic epistemic E Early Modern India, analytic philosophy in (Jonardon Ganeri) Ebreo, Leone Eckhart, Meister see Meister Eckhart ecology (Sahotra Sarkar) biodiversity (Daniel P. Faith) conservation biology see conservation biology economics, philosophy of (Daniel M. Hausman) economics and economic justice (Marc Fleurbaey) education, philosophy of (D.C. Phillips) Edwards, Jonathan (William Wainwright) egalitarianism (Richard Arneson) egoism (Robert Shaver) Ehrenfels, Christian von (Robin Rollinger) Einstein, Albert Einstein-Bohr debates the hole argument see space and time: the hole argument philosophy of science (Don A. Howard) Elias (Christian Wildberg) Elizabeth of Bohemia emergent properties (Timothy O'Connor and Hong Yu Wong) Emerson, Ralph Waldo (Russell Goodman) emotion (Ronald de Sousa) 17th and 18th century theories of (Amy M. Schmitter) in the Christian tradition (Robert Roberts) medieval theories of (Martin Pickav) empathy (Karsten Stueber) Empedocles (Richard Parry) empiricism see rationalism vs. empiricism constructive see constructive empiricism logical (Richard Creath) end of life, medicine and (Margaret Battin) Engels, Friedrich Enlightenment (William Bristow) entailment see logical consequence entropy and information processing see information processing: and thermodynamic entropy environmentalism (Alan Carter) envy (Justin D'Arms) Epictetus (Margaret Graver) Epicureanism Epicurus (David Konstan) epiphenomenalism (William Robinson) episteme and techne (Richard Parry) epistemic basing relation see basing relation, epistemic epistemic closure principle (Steven Luper) epistemic logic medieval epistemic paradoxes (Roy Sorensen) epistemology (Matthias Steup) Bayesian (William Talbott) contextualism in see contextualism, epistemic and ethics evolutionary (Michael Bradie and William Harms) feminist see feminist (interventions): epistemology and philosophy of science moral see moral epistemology moral, a priorism in see moral epistemology: a priorism in naturalized (Richard Feldman) reliabilism see reliabilism social (Alvin Goldman) social feminist see feminist (interventions): social epistemology virtue (John Greco and John Turri) epsilon calculus (Jeremy Avigad and Richard Zach) equality (Stefan Gosepath) of opportunity (Richard Arneson) equivalence of mass and energy (Francisco Flores) Erasmus, Desiderius (Charles Nauert) Erdmann, Johannes ergodic hierarchy (Roman Frigg, Joseph Berkovitz, and Fred Kronz) Eriugena, John Scottus (Dermot Moran) Erxleben, Dorothea Christiana Leporin essence medieval theories of essentialism see essential vs. accidental properties essential vs. accidental properties (Teresa Robertson) eternity (Paul Helm) medieval discussions of ethics ancient (Richard Parry) of belief see belief, ethics of business (Alexei Marcoux) Chinese (David Wong) computer and information see computer and information ethics deontological (Larry Alexander and Michael Moore) environmental (Andrew Brennan and Yeuk-Sze Lo) feminist see feminist (interventions): ethics in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Charles Goodman) natural law tradition (Mark Murphy) and personal identity see personal identity: and ethics utilitarian see consequentialism virtue (Rosalind Hursthouse) ethics, African see African Philosophy: ethics ethics, applied phenomenological approaches to ethics and information technology see information technology: phenomenological approaches to ethics and ethics, biomedical abortion see abortion advance directives and substitute decision-making see advance directives chimeras, human/non-human (Robert Streiffer) clinical research (David Wendler) cloning see cloning decision-making capacity see decision-making capacity disability see disability disease and health, concepts of see health donation and sale of human organs see donation and sale of human organs genetic engineering see genetic engineering human enhancement see human enhancement informed consent see informed consent international public health see public health: international justice, inequality, and health (Gopal Sreenivasan) justice and access to health care (Norman Daniels) justice and allocation of scarce resources pregnancy, birth, and medicine see pregnancy, birth, and medicine privacy and medicine (Anita Allen) provider-patient relationship public health ethics see public health: ethics race and health (Patricia King) reproductive technologies and arrangements see reproductive technologies research on animals stem cell research (Andrew Siegel) theory (John Arras) ethics, morality and practical reason see morality and practical reason eudaimonia see ethics: ancient Eudoxus (Henry Mendell) eugenics (Sara Goering) euthanasia voluntary (Robert Young) Evans, Gareth events (Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi) evidence (Thomas Kelly) the legal concept of (Dirdre Dwyer) scientific see confirmation evil, problem of (Michael Tooley) evolution (Phillip Sloan) cultural (Tim Lewens) evolutionary ethics see morality: and evolutionary biology evolutionary game theory see game theory: evolutionary evolutionary psychology see psychology: evolutionary existence (Barry Miller) medieval theories of existentialism (Steven Crowell) aesthetics see aesthetics: existentialist experimental moral philosophy (Don Loeb) experimentation in biology see biology: experiment in in physics see physics: experiment in explanation in mathematics see mathematics: explanation in scientific see scientific explanation exploitation (Alan Wertheimer) extrinsic see intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties Ezra, Abraham Ibn see Ibn Ezra, Abraham F Fackenheim, Emil facts (Kevin Mulligan and Fabrice Correia) faith (John Bishop) Falaquera, Shem Tov Ibn (Steve Harvey) fallacies see logic: informal medieval theories of false consciousness see self-deception: collective Fanon, Frantz (Robert Birt) fatalism (Hugh Rice) Fechner, Gustav Theodor (Michael Heidelberger) federalism (Andreas Fllesdal) Feigl, Herbert (Michael Heidelberger and Matthias Neuber) feminism, approaches to (Nancy Tuana) analytic philosophy (Ann Garry) continental philosophy (Ann J. Cahill) intersections between analytic and continental philosophy (Georgia Warnke) intersections between pragmatist and continental philosophy (Shannon Sullivan) pragmatism (Judy Whipps) psychoanalytic philosophy (Emily Zakin) feminism, history of English Renaissance feminist pamphlet writers French Renaissance contributions to querelle des femmes (debate over women) French Revolutionary feminist pamphlet writers Italian Renaissance feminist writers literature on the equality or superiority of women feminist (interventions) aesthetics (Carolyn Korsmeyer) bioethics (Anne Donchin) environmental philosophy (Karen Warren) epistemology and philosophy of science (Elizabeth Anderson) ethics (Rosemarie Tong and Nancy Williams) history of philosophy (Charlotte Witt) liberal feminism (Amy R. Baehr) metaphysics (Sally Haslanger) moral psychology (Anita Superson) philosophy of biology (Carla Fehr) philosophy of language (Jennifer Saul) philosophy of law (Patricia Smith) philosophy of mind (Julie Yoo) philosophy of religion (Nancy Frankenberry) political philosophy (Nolle McAfee) radical feminism (Christine Cuomo) social epistemology (Heidi Grasswick) feminist (topics) (Sally Haslanger and Nancy Tuana) perspectives on autonomy (Natalie Stoljar) perspectives on class and work (Ann Ferguson) perspectives on disability (Anita Silvers) perspectives on globalization (Shelley Wilcox and Alison Jaggar) perspectives on human rights perspectives on masculinity perspectives on objectification (Evangelia (Lina) Papadaki) perspectives on power (Amy Allen) perspectives on race and racism perspectives on rape (Rebecca Whisnant) perspectives on reproduction and the family (Debra Satz) perspectives on science (Alison Wylie, Elizabeth Potter, and Wenda K. Bauchspies) perspectives on sex and gender (Mari Mikkola) perspectives on sex markets (Laurie Shrage) perspectives on sexuality perspectives on the body (Kathleen Lennon) perspectives on the self (Diana Meyers) perspectives on trans issues (Talia Bettcher) Ferguson, Adam see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Ferrier, James see Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas (Van A. Harvey) Feyerabend, Paul (John Preston) Fichte, Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (Dan Breazeale) Ficino, Marsilio (Christopher Celenza) fiction (Fred Kroon and Alberto Voltolini) fictionalism (Matti Eklund) in the philosophy of mathematics see mathematics, philosophy of: fictionalism modal (Daniel Nolan) fideism (Richard Amesbury) Filelfo, Francesco film, philosophy of (Thomas Wartenberg) fine tuning (Roger White and Daniel Greco) finitism (Shaughan Lavine) Fischer, Kuno Fitch's paradox of knowability (Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno) fitness (Alexander Rosenberg and Frederic Bouchard) fitting attitude theories of value (Daniel Jacobson) folk psychology as mental simulation (Robert M. Gordon) as a theory (Ian Ravenscroft) Fonseca, Petrus foreknowledge, divine see free will: divine foreknowledge and forgiveness (Paul M. Hughes) formalism in the philosophy of mathematics see mathematics, philosophy of: formalism formal representations of belief see belief, formal representations of Forms see Plato: middle period metaphysics and epistemology form vs. matter Forster, Georg Foucault, Michel (Gary Gutting) four dimensionalism see temporal parts Fox, Margaret Fell frame problem (Murray Shanahan) Francis of Marchia (Christopher Schabel) Frankfurt School aesthetics see aesthetics: Adorno and the Frankfurt School free choice medieval theories of freedom see liberty ancient theories of (Susanne Bobzien) of association divine (William Rowe) positive and negative see liberty: positive and negative of speech (David van Mill) free rider problem (Russell Hardin) free will (Timothy O'Connor) (nondeterministic) theories of see incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free will divine foreknowledge and (Linda Zagzebski) Frege, Gottlob (Edward N. Zalta) controversy with Hilbert (Patricia Blanchette) logic, theorem, and foundations for arithmetic (Edward N. Zalta) puzzle and Moore's paradox of analysis (Andrew Cullison) Freud, Sigmund friendship (Bennett Helm) Fries, Johann Friedrich Fuller, Margaret function in biology see teleology: teleological notions in biology recursive (Piergiorgio Odifreddi) functionalism (Janet Levin) future contingents (Per Hasle and Peter hrstrm) medieval theories of (Simo Knuuttila) Fyodorov, Nikolai G Gadamer, Hans-Georg (Jeff Malpas) aesthetics (Nicholas Davey) Gage, Matilda Joslyn Galen Galenism in the Renaissance Galileo Galilei (Peter Machamer) games abstraction and completeness (Samson Abramsky) logic and see logic: and games logic for analyzing see logic: for analyzing games game theory (Don Ross) and ethics (Bruno Verbeek and Christopher Morris) evolutionary (J. McKenzie Alexander) interactive rationality and foundations of (Olivier Roy and Eric Pacuit) Ga?ge?a (Parimal Patil) Garlandus Compotista Gassendi, Pierre (Saul Fisher) Gaza, Theodore Gelukpa (Guy Newland) gene (Hans-Jrg Rheinberger and Staffan Mller-Wille) generalized quantifiers (Dag Westersthl) general relativity early philosophical interpretations of (Thomas A. Ryckman) general will generic statements (Sarah-Jane Leslie) genetic engineering genetics evolutionary (Michael Wade) and genomics (Ken Waters) genotype/phenotype distinction (Richard Lewontin) molecular (Ken Waters) population (Samir Okasha) geometry finitism in (Jean Paul Van Bendegem) in the 19th century (Roberto Torretti) non-Archimedean Gerard, Alexander see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century German Philosophy in the 18th century, prior to Kant (Brigitte Sassen) Gersonides (Tamar Rudavsky) Gilbert of Poitiers Giles of Rome (Roberto Lambertini) Giorgio, Francesco given, the see justification, epistemic: foundationalist theories of globalization (William Scheuerman) Gobinear, Joseph God concepts of (William Wainwright) and other necessary beings (Matthew Davidson) God, arguments for belief in pragmatic see pragmatic arguments and belief in God God, arguments for the existence of cosmological see cosmological argument Descartes' ontological see Descartes, Ren: ontological argument moral arguments (Peter Byrne) ontological see ontological arguments teleological see teleology: teleological arguments for God's existence Godfrey of Fontaines (John Wippel) Godwin, William (Mark Philp) Gdel, Kurt (Juliette Kennedy) completeness theorem contributions to relativity theory incompleteness theorem (Panu Raatikainen) Goes, Emanuel see Coimbra: University of Goodman, Nelson (Daniel Cohnitz and Marcus Rossberg) aesthetics (Alessandro Giovannelli) goodness, perfect (Thomas D. Senor and E.J. Coffman) Gorampa (Constance Kassor) Gorgias Gouges, Olympe de Gournay, Marie le Jars de grace early modern theories of grammar categorial see grammar: type logical type logical (Michael Moortgat) grammar, speculative medieval theories of Green, Thomas Hill (Colin Tyler) Gregory of Rimini (Christopher Schabel) Grice, Paul (Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner) Grimke, Angelina and Sarah Grosseteste, Robert (Neil Lewis) Grote, George Grotius, Hugo (Jon Miller) group rights see rights: group Gruppe, O. H. H Habermas, Jrgen (James Bohman and William Rehg) haecceity see substance medieval theories of (Richard Cross) Haeckel, Ernst Halevi, Judah (Barry Kogan) Haller, Karl Friedrich Hamann, Johann Georg (Gwen Griffith-Dickson) Hamilton, William see Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century Hanfeizi happiness (Dan Haybron) Hare, Richard Mervyn Hartley, David (Richard Allen) Hartmann, Eduard Hartmann, Nicolai Hartshorne, Charles (Dan Dombrowski) Hayek, Friedrich Hays, Mary health (Dominic Murphy) heaven and hell (Jonathan Kvanvig) hedonism (Andrew Moore) Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (Paul Redding) aesthetics (Stephen Houlgate) Hegelianism, Young Heidegger, Martin (Michael Wheeler) aesthetics (Iain Thomson) Heine, Heinrich hell see heaven and hell Hellenistic medical epistemology Hellenistic Philosophy Helmholtz, Hermann von (Lydia Patton) Hempel, Carl (James Fetzer) Henry of Ghent (Pasquale Porro) Heraclides of Pontus Heraclitus (Daniel W. Graham) Herbart, Johann Friedrich (Alan Kim) Herder, Johann Gottfried von (Michael Forster) Hricourt, Jenny Poinsard d' heritability (Stephen M. Downes) inheritance systems see inheritance systems hermeneutics (Bjrn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal) Hermes Trismegisthus see hermetism Hermetic writings hermetism Hertz, Heinrich Herzen, Alexander Hesiod Heytesbury, William (John Longeway) hiddenness of God (Daniel Howard-Snyder) Hierocles Hilbert, David controversy with Frege see Frege, Gottlob: controversy with Hilbert program in the foundations of mathematics (Richard Zach) Hippias see Sophists, The Hippocratic medicine Hirsch, Samson Raphael historiography in Latin American and Iberian philosophy history, philosophy of (Daniel Little) Hobbes, Thomas (Stewart Duncan) moral and political philosophy (Sharon A. Lloyd and Susanne Sreedhar) theory of emotion see emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of Hlderlin, Johann Christian Friedrich Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry (Baron) d' (Michael LeBuffe) holes (Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi) Holkot , Robert (Hester Gelber) Holst, Amalia Home, Henry see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Homer homology see character/trait homosexuality (Brent Pickett) Hook, Sidney (David Sidorsky) Hooker, Richard Horkheimer, Max (J.C. Berendzen) Hugh of St. Victor human enhancement (Eric Juengst) human genome project (Lisa Gannett) humanism civic see civic humanism in the Renaissance (Eckhard Keler) human rights see rights: human human test subjects see ethics, biomedical: clinical research Humboldt, Wilhelm von (Kurt Mueller-Vollmer) Hume, David (William Edward Morris) aesthetics (Ted Gracyk) and Kant on causality see Kant, Immanuel: and Hume on causality and Kant on morality see Kant, Immanuel: and Hume on morality moral philosophy (Rachel Cohon) Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism (Eric Schliesser) on free will (Paul Russell) on religion (Paul Russell) theory of emotion see emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of Husserl, Edmund (Christian Beyer) aesthetics see aesthetics: Husserl and phenomenology Hutcheson, Francis see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century theory of emotion see emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of Hutton, James see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Huxley, Thomas Henry hybrid logic see logic: hybrid Hypatia I Iamblichus Iberville, Pierre Le Moyne d' Ibn al-Haytham Ibn Arabi (William Chittick) Ibn Bajja (Josep Puig Montada) Ibn Daud, Abraham (Resianne Fontaine) Ibn Ezra, Abraham (Tzvi Langermann) Ibn Falaquera, Shem Tov see Falaquera, Shem Tov Ibn Ibn Hazm Ibn Kammuna (Tzvi Langermann) Ibn Khaldun Ibn Matta Ibn Nazzam Ibn Paquda, Bahya Ibn Rushd (Richard Taylor) Ibn Sina see Avicenna Ibn Taymiyya Ibn Tibbon, Samuel see Tibbon, Samuel Ibn Ibn Tufayl idealism British ideas identity (Harold Noonan) of indiscernibles (Peter Forrest) over time (Andre Gallois) personal see personal identity relative (Harry Deutsch) transworld (Penelope Mackie) identity politics (Cressida Heyes) identity theory of mind (J. J. C. Smart) ideology, law and see law: and ideology idiolects (Alex Barber) Ignatius of Loyola imagery, mental see mental imagery imagination (Tamar Gendler) imitation game see Turing test immigration (Kit Wellman) immortality see afterlife immunology, philosophy of see self: the biological notion of immutability (Brian Leftow) impartiality (Troy Jollimore) implicature (Wayne Davis) optimality theoretic and game theoretic approaches (Robert van Rooij) impossible worlds (Francesco Berto) incommensurability of scientific theories (Eric Oberheim and Paul Hoyningen-Huene) of values see value: incommensurable incomparable values see value: incommensurable incompatibilism (nondeterministic) theories of free will (Randolph Clarke) arguments for (Kadri Vihvelin) indeterminacy of translation indexicals (David Braun) individual, biological notion of see biology: notion of individual individualism, methodological (Joseph Heath) individuals individuation medieval theories of induction new problem of problem of (John Vickers) inductive logic see logic: inductive inequality see equality inertial systems see space and time: inertial frames inference to the best explanation see abduction infinitesimals see continuity and infinitesimals infinity informal logic see logic: informal information (Pieter Adriaans) biological (Peter Godfrey-Smith and Kim Sterelny) and logic see logic: and information quantum entanglement and see quantum theory: quantum entanglement and information semantic conceptions of (Luciano Floridi) information processing and thermodynamic entropy (Owen Maroney) information technology and moral values phenomenological approaches to ethics and (Lucas Introna) and privacy informed consent (Nir Eyal) Ingarden, Roman (Amie Thomasson) inherence see substance inheritance systems (Ehud Lamm) innate/acquired distinction (Paul Griffiths) innateness and contemporary theories of cognition (Jerry Samet) historical controversies (Jerry Samet) and language (Fiona Cowie) inscrutability of reference see indeterminacy of translation insolubles (Paul Vincent Spade and Stephen Read) instrumental rationality see rationality: instrumental integrity (Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael Levine) intelligent design, theory of see creationism intensional transitive verbs (Graeme Forbes) intention (Kieran Setiya) intentionality (Pierre Jacob) collective (David Schweikard and Hans Bernhard Schmid) consciousness and see consciousness: and intentionality in ancient philosophy (Victor Caston) medieval theories of internal vs. external reasons for action see reasons for action: internal vs. external intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties (Brian Weatherson) introspection (Eric Schwitzgebel) intuition (Joel Pust) intuitionism ethics in the philosophy of mathematics see mathematics, philosophy of: intuitionism intuitionistic logic see logic: intuitionistic development of see logic, history of: intuitionistic logic inverted qualia see qualia: inverted Isocrates Israeli, Isaac (Leonard Levin and R. David Walker) J Jabir Ibn Hayyan Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (George di Giovanni) James, William (Russell Goodman) James of Viterbo (Antoine Ct) Japanese Philosophy (Thomas Kasulis) aesthetics (Graham Parkes) Confucian (John Tucker) Kokugaku School (Susan Burns) Kkai (John Krummel) Kyoto School (Bret W. Davis) Nishida Kitarō see Nishida Kitarō Pure Land (Dennis Hirota) Watsuji Tetsur see Watsuji Tetsur Zen Buddhism (Shigenori Nagatomo) Jaspers, Karl (Chris Thornhill) Jayarā?i (Piotr Balcerowicz) Jevons, William Stanley (Bert Mosselmans) John of Salisbury (Kevin Guilfoy) Jonangpa and Kadampa Jones, Emily Elizabeth Constance (Gary Ostertag) Juana Ines de la Cruz, Sor Judah Halevi see Halevi, Judah judgment aesthetic see aesthetics: aesthetic judgment judgment aggregation and belief merging see belief merging and judgment aggregation justice climate (Axel Gosseries) distributive (Julian Lamont and Christi Favor) intergenerational (Lukas Meyer) international (Michael Blake) transitional (Nir Eisikovits) as a virtue (Michael Slote) justification, epistemic a priori see a priori justification and knowledge coherentist theories of (Jonathan Kvanvig) foundationalist theories of (Richard Fumerton) internalist vs. externalist conceptions of (George Pappas) reliabilism see reliabilism justification, political public (Fred D'Agostino) Justin Martyr K Kadampa see Jonangpa Kagypa Kalam see Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: Arabic and Islamic Theological Philosophy (Kalam) Kant, Immanuel (Michael Rohlf) account of reason (Garrath Williams) aesthetics and teleology (Hannah Ginsborg) critique of metaphysics (Michelle Grier) and Hume on causality (Graciela De Pierris and Michael Friedman) and Hume on morality (Lara Denis) and Leibniz (Catherine Wilson) moral philosophy (Robert Johnson) philosophical development (Martin Schnfeld) philosophy of mathematics (Lisa Shabel) philosophy of religion (Philip Rossi) philosophy of science (Eric Watkins) social and political philosophy (Frederick Rauscher) theory of judgment (Robert Hanna) transcendental arguments (Derk Pereboom) view of mind and consciousness of self (Andrew Brook) views on space and time (Andrew Janiak) Kaplan, Mordecai Kaspi, Joseph (Hannah Kasher) Keckermann, Bartholemew Kepler, Johannes (Daniel Di Liscia) Kierkegaard, Sren (William McDonald) killing vs. letting die see doing vs. allowing harm Kilvington, Richard (Elzbieta Jung) Kilwardby, Robert (Jos順ilipe Silva) knowledge analysis of (Matthias Steup) a priori see a priori justification and knowledge by acquaintance vs. description (Richard Fumerton) self- see self-knowledge knowledge, value of (Duncan Pritchard) Kochen-Specker theorem see quantum mechanics: Kochen-Specker theorem Kotarbiński, Tadeusz Krause, Karl Christian Friedrich Krochmal, Nachman Krug, Wilhelm Traugott Kuhn, Thomas (Alexander Bird) Kkai see Japanese Philosophy: Kkai Kumārila (Daniel Arnold) L Labriola, Antonio Lacan, Jacques (Charles Shepherdson) Laffitte, Pierre Lakatos, Imre (Alan Musgrave and Charles Pigden) lambda calculus, the Lambert, Juliette Lambert of Auxerre Lammenais, Abb de Landino, Cristoforo Lange, Friedrich Albert (Nadeem J. Z. Hussain) language of thought hypothesis (Murat Aydede) Laozi (Alan Chan) Laplace, Pierre Simon large cardinals and determinacy see set theory: large cardinals and determinacy Latin America and Iberian philosophy logic see logic: in Latin America and Iberia Latin American and Iberian philosophy social and political philosophy (Faviola Rivera) Latin Averroism law and ideology (Christine Sypnowich) and language (Timothy Endicott) limits of see limits of law nature of see nature of law: natural law theories rule of see rule of law and procedural fairness laws of nature (John W. Carroll) ceteris paribus (Alexander Reutlinger, Gerhard Schurz, and Andreas H?nn) learning theory, formal (Oliver Schulte) Lebensphilosophie Lefvre d'taples, Jacques legal obligation and authority (Leslie Green) legal philosophy (Leslie Green) economic analysis of law (Lewis Kornhauser) legal positivism see nature of law: legal positivism legal punishment see punishment, legal legal realisms see nature of law: legal realisms legal reasoning interpretation and coherence in (Julie Dickson) precedent and analogy in (Grant Lamond) legal rights (Kenneth Campbell) legitimacy (Fabienne Peter) Le Grand, Antoine (Patricia Easton) Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (Brandon C. Look) ethics (Andrew Youpa) influence on 19th century logic (Volker Peckhaus) modal metaphysics (Brandon C. Look) on causation (Marc Bobro) on the problem of evil (Michael Murray) philosophy of mind (Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin) philosophy of physics (Jeff Mcdonough) Leibowitz, Yeshayahu (Daniel Rynhold) Leonico Tomeo, Niccol Le?niewski, Stanis?aw (Peter Simons) Leucippus (Sylvia Berryman) Lvi-Strauss, Claude Levinas, Emmanuel (Bettina Bergo) Lewis, Clarence Irving (Bruce Hunter) Lewis, David (Brian Weatherson) metaphysics (Ned Hall) liar paradox (JC Beall and Michael Glanzberg) liberal feminism see feminist (interventions): liberal feminism liberalism (Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland) Liber de causis see Book of Causes Liber de sex principiis see Book of Six Principles libertarianism (Peter Vallentyne) liberty positive and negative (Ian Carter) liberty of conscience life (Bruce Weber) meaning of (Thaddeus Metz) lifeworld see Husserl, Edmund limits of law (John Stanton-Ife) linear logic see logic: linear linguistics computational (Lenhart Schubert) philosophy of (Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Geoff Pullum, and Barbara Scholz) Lipkin, Israel (Salanter) Lipsius, Justus (Jan Papy) literature, philosophy and (R. Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy) living wills see advance directives Locke, Alain LeRoy (Jacoby Carter) Locke, John (William Uzgalis) moral philosophy (Patricia Sheridan) philosophy of science (Hylarie Kochiras) political philosophy (Alex Tuckness) logic action (Krister Segerberg, John-Jules Meyer, and Marcus Kracht) algebraizations of logics with semantics (Hajnal Andreka and Istvan Nemeti) ancient (Susanne Bobzien) and artificial intelligence see artificial intelligence: logic and of belief revision (Sven Ove Hansson) classical (Stewart Shapiro) combinatory (Katalin Bimb) combining (Walter Carnielli and Marcelo Esteban Coniglio) conditionals (Horacio Arlo-Costa) connexive (Heinrich Wansing) deontic (Paul McNamara) dialogical (Laurent Keiff) dynamic epistemic (Alexandru Baltag) epistemic (Vincent Hendricks and John Symons) for analyzing games (C餲ic Dgremont and Wiebe van der Hoek) free (John Nolt) fuzzy (Petr Hajek) and games (Wilfrid Hodges) hybrid (Torben Braner) independence friendly (Tero Tulenheimo) inductive (James Hawthorne) infinitary (John L. Bell) informal (Leo Groarke) and information (Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson and Maricarmen Martinez) in Latin America and Iberia intensional (Melvin Fitting) in the 12th century intuitionistic (Joan Moschovakis) justification (Melvin Fitting and Sergei Artemov) linear (Roberto Di Cosmo and Dale Miller) many-valued (Siegfried Gottwald) of mass expressions see mass expressions: logic of modal (James Garson) multi-modal non-classical non-monotonic (G. Aldo Antonelli) paraconsistent (Graham Priest and Koji Tanaka) preference (Fenrong Liu and Leon van der Torre) probability (Barteld Kooi) propositional dynamic (Philippe Balbiani) provability (Rineke (L.C.) Verbrugge) of questions and rational agency relevance (Edwin Mares) Renaissance second-order and higher-order (Herbert B. Enderton) and social choice substructural (Greg Restall) temporal (Antony Galton) temporal agency logic, history of first-order logic (William Ewald) intuitionistic logic (Mark van Atten) modal logic (Roberta Ballarin) model theory see model theory: birth of proof theory see proof theory: development of set theory, axiomatic see set theory: development of axiomatic set theory, early see set theory: early development logical atomism Russell's (Kevin Klement) Wittgenstein's see Wittgenstein, Ludwig: logical atomism logical consequence (JC Beall and Greg Restall) propositional consequence relations and algebraic logic (Ramon Jansana) logical constants (John MacFarlane) logical constructions (Bernard Linsky) logical form (Paul Pietroski) logical positivism logical truth (Mario Gmez-Torrente) logic and ontology (Thomas Hofweber) logicism logos Longchenpa Lotze, Hermann (David Sullivan) love (Bennett Helm) loyalty (John Kleinig) luck justice and bad luck (Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen) moral (Dana K. Nelkin) Lucretius (David Sedley) Lukcs, Georg aesthetics (Juergen Pelzer) Luther, Martin Luzzatto, Samuel David Lvov-Warsaw School (Jan Woleński) lying and deception definition of (James Edwin Mahon) Lyotard, Jean Franois M Macaulay, Catharine Mach, Ernst (Paul Pojman) Machiavelli, Niccol (Cary Nederman) Mackie, John Leslie Madhyamaka (Richard Hayes) Maimon, Salomon (Peter Thielke and Yitzhak Melamed) Maimonides (Kenneth Seeskin) the influence of Islamic thought on (Sarah Pessin) Maine de Biran, P. F. Mair, Jean Makin, Bathsua Malebranche, Nicolas (Tad Schmaltz) theory of emotion see emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of theory of ideas and vision in God (Lawrence Nolan) Mally, Ernst (Alexander Hieke and Gerhard Zecha) deontic logic (Gert-Jan Lokhorst) Manicheism Mansel, Henry many, problem of (Brian Weatherson) Marburg School Marcel, Gabriel (-Honor) (Brian Treanor) Marcus Aurelius (Rachana Kamtekar) Marcuse, Herbert (Morton Schoolman) Marinella, Lucrezia Maritain, Jacques (William Sweet) marriage and domestic partnership (Elizabeth Brake) Marsilius of Inghen (Maarten Hoenen) Marsilius of Padua Martineau, Harriet Martineau, James Marty, Anton (Robin Rollinger) Marx, Karl (Jonathan Wolff) Marxism Masham, Lady Damaris (Sarah Hutton) mass/energy equivalence see equivalence of mass and energy mass expressions logic of (Greg Carlson) metaphysics of (Mark Steen) material constitution (Ryan Wasserman) materialism see physicalism eliminative (William Ramsey) mathematical style see style: in mathematics mathematics constructive (Douglas Bridges) explanation in (Paolo Mancosu) inconsistent (Chris Mortensen) non-deductive methods in (Alan Baker) mathematics, foundations of Dedekind's contributions to see Dedekind, Richard: contributions to the foundations of mathematics Hilbert's program see Hilbert, David: program in the foundations of mathematics mathematics, philosophy of (Leon Horsten) fictionalism (Mark Balaguer) formalism (Alan Weir) indispensability arguments in the (Mark Colyvan) intuitionism (Rosalie Iemhoff) Kant see Kant, Immanuel: philosophy of mathematics naturalism (Alexander Paseau) nominalism (Otvio Bueno) Platonism (ystein Linnebo) structuralism (Erich Reck) Wittgenstein see Wittgenstein, Ludwig: philosophy of mathematics Mauthner, Fritz McCosh, James McTaggart, John M. E. (Kris McDaniel) Mead, George Herbert (Mitchell Aboulafia) meaning normativity of (Kathrin Gler and sa Wikforss) meaning, theories of (Jeff Speaks) meaning holism measurement in quantum theory see quantum theory: measurement in medical theory, ancient Hellenistic medical epistemology see Hellenistic medical epistemology Hippocratic medicine see Hippocratic medicine medieval philosophy (Paul Vincent Spade) aesthetics see aesthetics: late ancient and medieval literary forms of (Eileen Sweeney) medieval theories analogy see analogy: medieval theories of categories see categories: medieval theories of causation see causation: medieval theories of conscience see conscience: medieval theories of of demonstration see demonstration: medieval theories of of emotion see emotion: medieval theories of essence see essence: medieval theories of existence see existence: medieval theories of fallacies see fallacies: medieval theories of free choice see free choice: medieval theories of future contingents see future contingents: medieval theories of haecceity see haecceity: medieval theories of individuation see individuation: medieval theories of intentionality see intentionality: medieval theories of of mental representation see mental representation: in medieval philosophy modality see modality: medieval theories of of obligationes see obligationes , medieval theories of practical reason see practical reason: medieval theories of properties of terms see terms, properties of: medieval theories of propositions see propositions: medieval theories of relations see relations: medieval theories of of singular terms see singular terms: medieval theories of speculative grammar see grammar, speculative: medieval theories of syllogism see syllogism: medieval theories of virtue see virtue: medieval theories of Megarian School Meinong, Alexius (Johann Marek) Meister Eckhart (Burkhard Mojsisch and Orrin F. Summerell) Melanchthon, Philip Melissus memory (John Sutton) epistemological problems of (Thomas D. Senor) Mencius (Kwong Loi Shun) Mendelssohn, Moses (Daniel Dahlstrom) mental causation (David Robb and John Heil) mental content causal theories of (Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa) externalism about (Joe Lau and Max Deutsch) narrow (Curtis Brown) nonconceptual (Jos Bermdez and Arnon Cahen) teleological theories of (Karen Neander) mental illness (Christian Perring) mental imagery (Nigel J.T. Thomas) mental representation (David Pitt) in medieval philosophy (Henrik Lagerlund) mereology (Achille Varzi) medieval (Andrew Arlig) Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (Bernard Flynn) Mersenne, Marin (Brian Baigrie) Mertonian calculators metaethics (Geoff Sayre-McCord) fittings attitude theories and sensibility theory see fitting attitude theories of value moral anti-realism see moral anti-realism moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism see cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism, moral moral epistemology see moral epistemology moral motivation see motivation: moral moral naturalism see naturalism: moral moral non-naturalism see non-naturalism, moral moral particularism see moral particularism moral realism see moral realism moral skepticism see skepticism: moral metalogic conceptions of, from Frege to Gdel (Jamie Tappenden) metaphilosophy metaphor (David Hills) metaphysics (Peter van Inwagen) metaphysics in the 16th century Francisco Surez see Surez, Francisco Petrus Fonseca see Fonseca, Petrus Michelet, Karl Ludwig Mill, Harriet Taylor (Dale E. Miller) Mill, James (Terence Ball) Mill, John Stuart (Fred Wilson) moral and political philosophy (David Brink) mind computational theory of (Steven Horst) identity theory of see identity theory of mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy (Christian Coseru) modularity of (Philip Robbins) philosophy of miracles (Michael Levine) modal epistemology see modality: epistemology of modality epistemology of (Anand Vaidya) medieval theories of (Simo Knuuttila) modal logic see logic: modal modern origins see logic, history of: modal logic models in science (Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann) model theory (Wilfrid Hodges) birth of first-order (Wilfrid Hodges) Mser, Justus Mohism (Chris Fraser) Mohist Canons (Chris Fraser) molecular biology (Lindley Darden and James Tabery) Moleschott, Jakob Molyneux's problem (Marjolein Degenaar and Gert-Jan Lokhorst) monism (Jonathan Schaffer) anomalous see anomalous monism monotheism (William Wainwright) Montaigne, Michel de (Marc Foglia) Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de (Hilary Bok) Moore, George Edward (Tom Baldwin) moral philosophy (Thomas Hurka) paradox of analysis see Frege, Gottlob: puzzle and Moore's paradox of analysis moral anti-realism (Richard Joyce) moral character see character, moral moral dilemmas (Terrance McConnell) moral epistemology (Richmond Campbell) a priorism in (Michael DePaul) moral intuitionism see intuitionism: ethics morality and evolutionary biology (William FitzPatrick) morality, definition of (Bernard Gert) morality and practical reason (Duncan MacIntosh) moral luck see luck: moral moral naturalism see naturalism: moral moral non-naturalism see non-naturalism, moral moral particularism (Jonathan Dancy) moral psychology empirical approaches (John Doris and Stephen Stich) moral realism (Geoff Sayre-McCord) moral reasoning see reasoning: moral moral relativism (Chris Gowans) moral responsibility (Andrew Eshleman) moral skepticism see skepticism: moral moral status of animals see animals, moral status of More, Hannah More, Henry (John Henry) More, Thomas (James D. Kinney) motivation moral (Connie S. Rosati) motor-based theories of perception and cognition (Rick Grush) Mller, Adam Muhammad Iqbal Mulla Sadra (Sajjad Rizvi) multiculturalism (Sarah Song) multiple realizability (John Bickle) Murdoch, Iris (Justin Broackes) Murray, Judith Sargent music, philosophy of (Andrew Kania) Musonius Rufus mysticism (Jerome Gellman) myths, Plato's see Plato: myths N Nāgārjuna (Jan Christoph Westerhoff) names (Sam Cumming) Narboni, Moses nationalism (Nenad Miscevic) Natorp, Paul (Alan Kim) naturalism (David Papineau) in epistemology see epistemology: naturalized in legal philosophy (Brian Leiter) in the philosophy of mathematics see mathematics, philosophy of: naturalism moral (James Lenman) natural kinds (Alexander Bird and Emma Tobin) natural law tradition in ethics see ethics: natural law tradition natural philosophy in the Renaissance natural selection (Robert Brandon) units and levels of (Elisabeth Lloyd) nature of law (Andrei Marmor) interpretivist theories (Nicos Stavropoulos) legal positivism (Leslie Green) legal realisms natural law theories (John Finnis) pure theory of law (Andrei Marmor) Naturphilosophie Navya-Nyāya see Early Modern India, analytic philosophy in necessary and sufficient conditions (Andrew Brennan) necessary beings and God see God: and other necessary beings necessary truth see truth: necessary vs. contingent negation (Laurence R. Horn) Ngritude (Souleymane Diagne) Nelson, Leonard (Jrg Schroth) Neo-Confucianism neo-Kantianism (Jeremy Heis) Neo-Pythagoreanism Neo-Taoism (Alan Chan) neologicism Neoplatonism (Christian Wildberg) in the Renaissance neostoicism Neurath, Otto (Jordi Cat) neuroscience, philosophy of (John Bickle, Peter Mandik, and Anthony Landreth) neutral monism (Leopold Stubenberg) Newman, John Henry Newton, Isaac (George Smith) Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (George Smith) philosophy (Andrew Janiak) views on space, time, and motion (Robert Rynasiewicz) Nicholas of Autrecourt (Hans Thijssen) Nicolas of Cusa see Cusanus, Nicolaus Nietzsche, Friedrich (Robert Wicks) aesthetics (Daniel Came) moral and political philosophy (Brian Leiter) Nishida Kitarō (John C. Maraldo) noema see Husserl, Edmund nominalism in metaphysics (Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra) in the philosophy of mathematics see mathematics, philosophy of: nominalism medieval versions of non-naturalism, moral (Michael Ridge) nonconceptual content see mental content: nonconceptual nonexistent objects (Maria Reicher) nonidentity problem (Melinda Roberts) norms of cooperation see social norms Norris, John (June Yang) nothingness (Roy Sorensen) Novalis (Kristin Gjesdal) Numenius (George Karamanolis) Nyingmapa O object (Henry Laycock) obligation legal see legal obligation and authority obligationes , medieval theories of (Paul Vincent Spade) obligations special (Diane Jeske) occasionalism (Sukjae Lee) Ockham , William (Paul Vincent Spade) Olivi, Peter John (Robert Pasnau) Olympiodorus (Christian Wildberg) omnipotence (Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz) omnipresence (Edward Wierenga) omniscience (Edward Wierenga) ontological arguments (Graham Oppy) ontological dependence see dependence, ontological ontology and information science ontology and ontological commitment (Phillip Bricker) operationalism (Hasok Chang) ordinary language Oresme, Nicole (Stefan Kirschner) Origen original position (Samuel Freeman) Orphism Ortega y Gasset, Jos (Oliver Holmes) other minds (Alec Hyslop) Otto, Rudolf P pacifism (Andrew Fiala) pain (Murat Aydede) Panaetius panentheism (John Culp) panpsychism (William Seager and Sean Allen-Hermanson) pantheism (Michael Levine) Paquda, Bayha Ibn see Ibn Paquda, Bahya paradox of analysis see Frege, Gottlob: puzzle and Moore's paradox of analysis Curry's see Curry's paradox Fitch's paradox of knowability see Fitch's paradox of knowability of the liar see liar paradox Russell's paradox see Russell's paradox Simpson's paradox see Simpson's paradox Skolem's (Timothy Bays) St. Petersburg paradox see St. Petersburg paradox of suspense see suspense, paradox of Zeno's paradoxes see Zeno of Elea: Zeno's paradoxes and contemporary logic (Andrea Cantini) epistemic see epistemic paradoxes parenthood and procreation (Tim Bayne and Avery Kolers) Parmenides (John Palmer) part/whole see mereology particulars see individuals Pascal, Blaise (Desmond Clarke) Pascal's wager (Alan Hjek) paternalism (Gerald Dworkin) patriotism (Igor Primoratz) Patristic Philosophy Patrizi, Francesco (Fred Purnell) Paul of Venice (Alessandro Conti) Peano, Giuseppe Pearson, Karl Peirce, Benjamin (Ivor Grattan-Guinness and Alison Walsh) Peirce, Charles Sanders (Robert Burch) logic (Eric Hammer) theory of signs (Albert Atkin) Penbygull, William (Alessandro Conti) perception auditory (Casey O'Callaghan) the contents of (Susanna Siegel) the disjunctive theory of (Matthew Soteriou) epistemological problems of (Laurence BonJour) motor-based theories of see motor-based theories of perception and cognition the problem of (Tim Crane) perfectionism, in moral and political philosophy (Steven Wall) Peripatetics persistence see temporal parts personal identity (Eric T. Olson) animalist theory of see animalism and ethics (David Shoemaker) personalism (Thomas D. Williams and Jan Olof Bengtsson) persons see personal identity Peter of Ailly see Pierre d'Ailly Peter of Spain (Joke Spruyt) Petrizi, Joane (Tengiz Iremadze) phenomenology (David Woodruff Smith) aesthetics see aesthetics: Husserl and phenomenology Philip the Chancellor (Colleen McCluskey) Philo Philodemus (David Blank) Philolaus (Carl Huffman) Philo of Alexandria Philo of Larissa (Charles Brittain) Philoponus (Christian Wildberg) philosophy of law see legal philosophy philosophy of mind feminist see feminist (interventions): philosophy of mind Philo the Dialectician see Dialectical School physicalism (Daniel Stoljar) physical theory, ancient physics experiment in (Allan Franklin) holism and nonseparability (Richard Healey) intertheory relations in (Robert Batterman) quantum field theory see quantum theory: quantum field theory Reichenbach's common cause principle (Frank Arntzenius) structuralism in (Heinz-Juergen Schmidt) symmetry and symmetry breaking (Katherine Brading and Elena Castellani) physis and nomos see Sophists, The Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni (Brian Copenhaver) Pierre d'Ailly pineal gland see Descartes, Ren: and the pineal gland Plato (Richard Kraut) aesthetics (Nickolas Pappas) Callicles and Thrasymachus (Rachel Barney) Cratylus (David Sedley) ethics (Dorothea Frede) ethics and politics in The Republic (Eric Brown) friendship and eros (C. D. C. Reeve) method and metaphysics in the Sophist and Statesman (Mary Louise Gill) middle period metaphysics and epistemology (Allan Silverman) myths (Catalin Partenie) on knowledge in the Theaetetus (Timothy Chappell) on utopia (Chris Bobonich) Parmenides (Samuel Rickless) rhetoric and poetry (Charles Griswold) shorter ethical works (Paul Woodruff) Timaeus (Donald Zeyl) Platonism in metaphysics (Mark Balaguer) in the philosophy of mathematics see mathematics, philosophy of: Platonism pleasure (Leonard D. Katz) Plekhanov, Georgy Plotinus (Lloyd Gerson) pluralism religious see religious diversity plurality of forms see binarium famosissimum plural quantification (ystein Linnebo) plurals in natural language Plutarch (George Karamanolis) Poggio Bracciolini, Gian Francesco Poincar, Henri Polgar, Isaac (Charles Manekin) political obligation (Richard Dagger) political philosophy ancient (Melissa Lane) history of medieval (John Kilcullen) political realism (W. J. Korab-Karpowicz) political theory and religion see religion and political theory Pomponazzi, Pietro (Stefano Perfetti) Popper, Karl (Stephen Thornton) population genetics see genetics: population pornography and censorship (Caroline West) Porphyry (Eyjlfur Emilsson) Porta, Giambattista della Posidonius positivism logical see logical positivism possible objects (Takashi Yagisawa) possible worlds (Christopher Menzel) postmodernism (Gary Aylesworth) poverty of the stimulus argument see innateness: and language practical reason (R. Jay Wallace) medieval theories of (Anthony Celano) morality and see morality and practical reason and the structure of actions (Elijah Millgram) pragmatic arguments and belief in God (Jeff Jordan) pragmatics (Kepa Korta and John Perry) defaults in see defaults in semantics and pragmatics pragmatism (Christopher Hookway) prayer petitionary (Thomas D. Senor and E.J. Coffman) predicate calculus see logic: classical predication preferences (Sven Ove Hansson and Till Grne-Yanoff) logic see logic: preference preformationism see developmental biology: epigenesis and preformationism pregnancy, birth, and medicine (Rebecca Kukla and Katherine Wayne) prenatal testing and screening see eugenics Presocratic Philosophy (Patricia Curd) presupposition (David I. Beaver and Bart Geurts) Price, Henry Habberley Prichard, Harold Arthur (Jonathan Dancy) Priestley, Joseph primary and secondary qualities (Justin Broackes) Principia Mathematica (A. D. Irvine) notation in (Bernard Linsky) principle of sufficient reason (Yitzhak Melamed and Martin Lin) Prior, Arthur (B. Jack Copeland) prisoner's dilemma (Steven Kuhn) privacy (Judith DeCew) and medicine see ethics, biomedical: privacy and medicine private language (Stewart Candlish and George Wrisley) probability, interpretations of (Alan Hjek) probability logic see logic: probability procedural fairness see rule of law and procedural fairness process philosophy (Nicholas Rescher) process theism see theism: process Proclus (Carlos Steel and Christoph Helmig) procreation see parenthood and procreation Prodicus see Sophists, The progress (Margaret Meek Lange) promises (Allen Habib) proof theory (Wilfried Sieg and Sol Feferman) development of (Jan von Plato) properties (Chris Swoyer) emergent see emergent properties essential vs. accidental see essential vs. accidental properties property (Jeremy Waldron) intellectual in information (Ken Himma and Adam Moore) prophecy (Scott Davison) propositional attitude reports (Thomas McKay and Michael Nelson) propositional consequence relations in algebraic logic see logical consequence: propositional consequence relations and algebraic logic propositional function (Edwin Mares) propositions (Matthew McGrath) medieval theories of singular (Greg Fitch and Michael Nelson) structured (Jeffrey C. King) Protagoras Proudhon, Pierre providence, divine (Hugh J. McCann) Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Kevin Corrigan and L. Michael Harrington) pseudo-science, science and see science and pseudo-science psyche see soul, ancient theories of psychiatry, philosophy of (Dominic Murphy) psychologism (Martin Kusch) psychology evolutionary (Stephen M. Downes) philosophy of public health ethics (Ruth Faden and Sirine Shebaya) international (Dan Wikler) publicity (Axel Gosseries) public reason (Charles Larmore) punishment (Hugo Adam Bedau and Erin Kelly) punishment, legal (Antony Duff) Pyrrho (Richard Bett) Pyrrhonism see skepticism: ancient Pythagoras (Carl Huffman) Pythagoreanism (Carl Huffman) Q qualia (Michael Tye) inverted (Alex Byrne) knowledge argument (Martine Nida-Rmelin) qualities qualiton see tropes quantifiers and quantification (Gabriel Uzquiano) quantum mechanics (Jenann Ismael) action at a distance in (Joseph Berkovitz) Bell's Theorem see Bell's Theorem Bohmian mechanics (Sheldon Goldstein) collapse theories (Giancarlo Ghirardi) Copenhagen interpretation of (Jan Faye) Everett's relative-state formulation of (Jeffrey Barrett) Kochen-Specker theorem (Carsten Held) many-worlds interpretation of (Lev Vaidman) modal interpretations of (Michael Dickson and Dennis Dieks) relational (Federico Laudisa and Carlo Rovelli) the role of decoherence in (Guido Bacciagaluppi) quantum theory and consciousness (Harald Atmanspacher) the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument in (Arthur Fine) identity and individuality in (Steven French) measurement in (Henry Krips) quantum computing (Amit Hagar) quantum entanglement and information (Jeffrey Bub) quantum field theory (Meinard Kuhlmann) quantum gravity (Steven Weinstein) quantum logic and probability theory (Alexander Wilce) uncertainty principle in see Uncertainty Principle von Neumann vs. Dirac (Fred Kronz) Quine, Willard van Orman (Peter Hylton) New Foundations (Thomas Forster) quotation (Herman Cappelen and Ernest LePore) R race (Michael James) and Black identity (Charles Mills) race theory, critical Radcliffe, Mary Ann radical feminism see feminist (interventions): radical feminism Ramsay, Allan see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Ramsey, Frank (Brad Armendt) Ramus, Petrus (Erland Sellberg) Rand, Ayn (Neera Badhwar and Roderick Long) randomness versus chance see chance: versus randomness Rashdall, Hastings rational agency logic and see logic: and rational agency rational choice, descriptive rational choice, normative expected utility rivals to expected utility rationalism vs. empiricism (Peter Markie) rationality Bayesian see epistemology: Bayesian bounded and the growth of scientific knowledge (John Worrall) historicist theories of (Carl Matheson) instrumental (Niko Kolodny) interactive and foundations of game theory see game theory: interactive rationality and foundations of Rawls, John (Leif Wenar) realism (Alexander Miller) moral see moral realism political see political realism scientific see scientific realism semantic challenges to (Drew Khlentzos) structural see structural realism reasoning automated (Frederic Portoraro) by analogy see analogy and analogical reasoning defeasible (Robert Koons) moral (Henry S. Richardson) reasons for action agent-neutral vs. agent-relative (Michael Ridge) internal vs. external (Stephen Finlay and Mark Schroeder) justification vs. explanation (James Lenman) recognition recursive function see function: recursive redistribution (Christian Barry) reduction, scientific in biology (Ingo Brigandt and Alan Love) in physics see physics: intertheory relations in reference (Marga Reimer) reflective equilibrium (Norman Daniels) Regius, Henricus (Desmond Clarke) Rehberg, August Wilhelm (Fred Beiser) Reichenbach, Hans (Clark Glymour and Frederick Eberhardt) Reid, Thomas (Gideon Yaffe and Ryan Nichols) ethics and aesthetics (Terence Cuneo) on memory and personal identity (Rebecca Copenhaver) Reinach, Adolf (James DuBois and Barry Smith) Reinhold, Karl Leonhard (Dan Breazeale) reism (Jan Woleński) relations see properties internal vs. external medieval theories of (Jeffrey Brower) relativism (Chris Swoyer) moral see moral relativism relaton see tropes reliabilism (Alvin Goldman) religion epistemology of (Peter Forrest) feminist philosophy of see feminist (interventions): philosophy of religion and morality (John Hare) philosophy of (Charles Taliaferro) and science (Alvin Plantinga) religion, phenomenology of (Mark Wynn) religion and political theory (Chris Eberle and Terence Cuneo) religious diversity (David Basinger) religious experience (Mark Webb) religious language Renouvier, Charles reparations, Black (Bernard Boxill) replication (David Hull and John S. Wilkins) representation, political (Suzanne Dovi) reproductive technologies republicanism (Frank Lovett) repugnant conclusion, the (Jesper Ryberg, Torbjrn Tnnsj, and Gustaf Arrhenius) respect (Robin S. Dillon) responsibility collective (Marion Smiley) restitution, legal principles of revelation, divine rhetoric Richard the Sophister (Paul Streveler) Rickert, Heinrich (R. Lanier Anderson) Ricoeur, Paul (Bernard Dauenhauer) Riehl, Alois rights (Leif Wenar) of children (David William Archard) civil see civil rights group (Peter Jones) human (James Nickel) legal see legal rights rigid designators (Joseph LaPorte) risk (Sven Ove Hansson) Robinson, Mary Darby role obligations see obligations: special Rorty, Richard (Bjrn Ramberg) Roscelin Rosenkranz, Karl Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen (Wayne Cristaudo) Rosenzweig, Franz (Benjamin Pollock) Rosmini, Antonio (Denis Cleary) Ross, William David (Anthony Skelton) Rousseau, Jean Jacques (Christopher Bertram) moral and political philosophy Royce, Josiah (Kelly A. Parker) Royer-Collard, Pierre Rufus, Richard see Richard the Sophister Ruge, Arnold rule consequentialism see consequentialism: rule rule of law and procedural fairness Russell, Bertrand (A. D. Irvine) logical atomism see logical atomism: Russell's moral philosophy (Charles Pigden) Russell's paradox (A. D. Irvine) Ryle, Gilbert (Julia Tanney) S Saadya (Sarah Pessin) ?āntarak?ita (James Blumenthal) Sakyapa Sakya Pandita (Jonathan C. Gold) Santayana, George (Herman Saatkamp) Sartre, Jean-Paul (Thomas Flynn) Saussure, Ferdinand scepticism see skepticism Scheler, Max (Zachary Davis and Anthony Steinbock) Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (Andrew Bowie) schema (John Corcoran) Schiller, Friedrich Schlegel, August Wilhelm von (Katia D. Hay) Schlegel, Friedrich (Allen Speight) Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (Michael Forster) Schlick, Moritz Schmitt, Carl (Lars Vinx) Scholem, Gershom (Shaul Magid) School of Names (Chris Fraser) Schopenhauer, Arthur (Robert Wicks) aesthetics (Alex Neill) Schulze, Gottlob Ernst Schurman, Anna Maria van Schutz, Alfred (Michael Barber) science theory and observation in (Jim Bogen) science, models in see models in science science, philosophy of science and pseudo-science (Sven Ove Hansson) scientific discovery scientific explanation (James Woodward) scientific instruments scientific knowledge social dimensions of (Helen Longino) scientific method scientific progress (Ilkka Niiniluoto) scientific realism (Richard Boyd) scientific revolutions (Thomas Nickles) scientific theories incommensurability of see incommensurability: of scientific theories structure of underdetermination of see underdetermination, of scientific theories scientific unity (Jordi Cat) Scottish Philosophy in the 18th Century (Alexander Broadie) in the 19th century (Gordon Graham) Scottus Eriugena , John see Eriugena, John Scottus Scotus, John Duns see Duns Scotus, John Scudry, Madeleine de search engines and ethics Sebond, Raymond see Montaigne, Michel de secession (Allen Buchanan) secondary qualities see primary and secondary qualities self the biological notion of (Alfred Tauber) feminist perspectives on the see feminist (topics): perspectives on the self knowledge see self-knowledge self-consciousness empirical approaches to phenomenological approaches to (Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi) self-deception (Ian Deweese-Boyd) collective self-determination, collective self-knowledge (Brie Gertler) self-reference (Thomas Bolander) self-respect see respect Sellars, Wilfrid (Jay Rosenberg) semantic holism see meaning holism semantics defaults in see defaults in semantics and pragmatics dynamic (Jan van Eijck and Albert Visser) formal Montague (Theo Janssen) proof-theoretic (Peter Schroeder-Heister) two-dimensional (Laura Schroeter) semiotics medieval (Stephan Meier-Oeser) Seneca (Katja Vogt) sense-data (Michael Huemer) sensibility theory see fitting attitude theories of value set theory (Thomas Jech) alternative axiomatic theories (M. Randall Holmes) constructive and Intuitionistic ZF (Laura Crosilla) continuum hypothesis see continuum hypothesis development of axiomatic (Michael Hallett) early development (Jos Ferreirs) independence and large cardinals (Peter Koellner) large cardinals and determinacy (Peter Koellner) non-wellfounded (Lawrence S. Moss) Sextus Empiricus (Benjamin Morison) sexuality feminist perspectives on see feminist (topics): perspectives on sexuality Shaftesbury, Lord (Michael B. Gill) theory of emotion see emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of Sharpe, Johannes (Alessandro Conti) Shestov, Lyov Sidgwick, Henry (Barton Schultz) Siger of Brabant Simon of Faversham (John Longeway) simplicity (Alan Baker) divine (William F. Vallicella) Simplicius (Christian Wildberg) Simpson's paradox (Gary Malinas and John Bigelow) sin singular terms medieval theories of (E. Jennifer Ashworth) situations in natural language semantics (Angelika Kratzer) skepticism (Peter Klein) ancient (Katja Vogt) brains in a vat see brains in a vat medieval (Charles Bolyard) moral (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) Skolem's paradox see paradox: Skolem's Smith, Adam see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century moral philosophy (Kate Abramson) Smith, John see Cambridge Platonists social choice theory (Christian List) social construction naturalistic approaches to (Ron Mallon) social contract see contractarianism contemporary approaches to (Fred D'Agostino and Gerald Gaus) social democracy social institutions (Seumas Miller) socialism (Andrew Chitty) social minimum (Stuart White) social norms (Cristina Bicchieri and Ryan Muldoon) social software (Jan van Eijck and Rineke (L.C.) Verbrugge) sociobiology (Harmon Holcomb and Jason Byron) Socrates (Debra Nails) Socratic Dialogues Socratic Schools Soloveitchik, Joseph Solovyov, Vladimir sophismata (Fabienne Pironet and Joke Spruyt) Sophists, The (C.C.W. Taylor) Sorites paradox (Dominic Hyde) sortals (Richard E. Grandy) soul, ancient theories of (Hendrik Lorenz) sounds (Roberto Casati and Jerome Dokic) sovereignty (Dan Philpott) space and time absolute and relational theories of space and motion (Nick Huggett and Carl Hoefer) being and becoming in modern physics (Steven Savitt) conventionality of simultaneity (Allen Janis) the hole argument (John D. Norton) inertial frames (Robert DiSalle) Malament-Hogarth spacetimes and the new computability singularities and black holes (Erik Curiel and Peter Bokulich) supertasks (Jon Prez Laraudogoitia) species (Marc Ereshefsky) speech acts (Mitchell Green) Spencer, Herbert (David Weinstein) Speusippus (Russell Dancy) Spinoza, Baruch (Steven Nadler) modal metaphysics (Samuel Newlands) physical theory (Richard Manning) political philosophy (Justin Steinberg) psychological theory (Michael LeBuffe) theory of attributes (Noa Shein) theory of emotion see emotion: 17th and 18th century theories of Spir, Afrikan square of opposition (Terence Parsons) ?rīhar?a ?rīhar?a (Parimal Patil) St. Petersburg paradox (Robert Martin) Stanton, Elizabeth Cady states of affairs (Thomas Wetzel) statistical physics Boltzmann's work in (Jos Uffink) philosophy of statistical mechanics (Lawrence Sklar) Stein, Edith stem cell research, ethics of see ethics, biomedical: stem cell research Sterry, Peter see Cambridge Platonists Stevenson, Charles Leslie (Dan Boisvert) Stewart, Dugald see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Stirner, Max (David Leopold) Stoicism (Dirk Baltzly) Strato of Lampsacus see Peripatetics Strauss, David Friedrich Strauss, Leo (Leora Batnitzky) Strawson, Peter Frederick (Paul Snowdon) structuralism in mathematics see mathematics, philosophy of: structuralism in physics see physics: structuralism in structural realism (James Ladyman) Stumpf, Carl (Denis Fisette) style in mathematics (Paolo Mancosu) Surez, Francisco substance (Howard Robinson) substructural logics see logic: substructural Suchon, Gabrielle Suhrawardi (Roxanne Marcotte) suicide (Michael Cholbi) supererogation (David Heyd) supervaluations supervenience (Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett) and value surrogate decision-making for incompetent individuals see advance directives suspense, paradox of (Aaron Smuts) syllogism medieval theories of (Henrik Lagerlund) symmetry and symmetry breaking see physics: symmetry and symmetry breaking syncategorematic words synthetic see analytic/synthetic distinction Syrianus (Christian Wildberg) T Taoism (Chad Hansen) Neo-Taoism see Neo-Taoism Tarabotti, Arcangela Tarski, Alfred (Mario Gmez-Torrente) truth definitions (Wilfrid Hodges) techne see episteme and techne technology, philosophy of (Maarten Franssen, Gert-Jan Lokhorst, and Ibo van de Poel) Teichmller, Gustav teleology teleological arguments for God's existence (Del Ratzsch) teleological notions in biology (Colin Allen) teleological theories of mental content see mental content: teleological theories of Telesio, Bernardino (Michaela Boenke) temporal consciousness see consciousness: temporal temporal parts (Katherine Hawley) Tennemann, Gottlieb tense and aspect (Mark Steedman) terms, properties of medieval theories of (Stephen Read) terrorism (Igor Primoratz) testimony epistemological problems of (Jonathan Adler) Thales theism process (Donald Viney) Themistius theology natural (Andrew Chignell) Theology of Aristotle (Peter Adamson) Theophrastus Thomas of Erfurt (Jack Zupko) Thoreau, Henry David (Rick Anthony Furtak) thought experiments (James Robert Brown) Thrasymachus see Plato: Callicles and Thrasymachus Thucydides Tibbon, Samuel Ibn (James T. Robinson) Tibetan epistemology and theory of Language (Pascale Hugon) Tibetan hermeneutics time (Ned Markosian) being and becoming in modern physics see space and time: being and becoming in modern physics the experience and perception of (Robin Le Poidevin) thermodynamic asymmetry in (Craig Callender) time machines (John Earman and Christian Wthrich) time travel (Peter Vranas) and modern physics (Frank Arntzenius and Tim Maudlin) Timon of Phlius (Richard Bett) toleration (Rainer Forst) tort law, theories of (Jules Coleman) torture (Seumas Miller) transcendental arguments (Robert Stern) Kant see Kant, Immanuel: transcendental arguments transcendentalism (Russell Goodman) transcendental philosophy transcendentals trans issues, feminist perspectives on see feminist (topics): perspectives on trans issues transworld identity see identity: transworld Trapezuntius, Georgius Trendelenburg, Adolf trinity (Dale Tuggy) tropes (John Bacon) trust (Carolyn McLeod) truth (Michael Glanzberg) axiomatic theories of (Volker Halbach) coherence theory of (James O. Young) correspondence theory of (Marian David) deflationary theory of (Daniel Stoljar and Nic Damnjanovic) identity theory of (Stewart Candlish) necessary vs. contingent pluralist theories of (Nikolaj Jang Pedersen and Cory Wright) revision theory of (Philip Kremer) Tarski's theory of truth see Tarski, Alfred: truth definitions truthlikeness (Graham Oddie) truthmakers (Fraser MacBride) truth values (Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing) Tsongkhapa (Gareth Sparham) Turing, Alan (Andrew Hodges) Turing machines (David Barker-Plummer) Turing test (Graham Oppy and David Dowe) Turnbull, George see Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century Twardowski, Kazimierz (Arianna Betti) two truths in India, theory of (Sonam Thakchoe) two truths in Tibet, theory of (Sonam Thakchoe) types and tokens (Linda Wetzel) type theory (Thierry Coquand) Church's type theory (Peter Andrews) constructive U berweg, Friedrich Umar Khayyam (Glen Van Brummelen and Mehdi Aminrazavi) Uncertainty Principle (Jan Hilgevoord and Jos Uffink) underdetermination, of scientific theories (Kyle Stanford) unity of science see scientific unity universal hylomorphism see binarium famosissimum universals see properties the medieval problem of (Gyula Klima) utilitarianism see consequentialism history of (Julia Driver) rule see consequentialism: rule utopia, utopianism V vagueness (Roy Sorensen) vagueness of composition see many, problem of Vaihinger, Hans (Juergen Klein) validity see logical truth Valla, Lorenzo (Lodi Nauta) value incommensurable (Nien-h Hsieh) intrinsic vs. extrinsic (Michael J. Zimmerman) of knowledge see knowledge, value of pluralism (Elinor Mason) value theory (Mark Schroeder) Vasubandhu (Jonathan C. Gold) veil of ignorance see original position verbs, intensional transitive see intensional transitive verbs verificationism verisimilitude see truthlikeness Vico, Giambattista (Timothy Costelloe) Vienna Circle (Thomas Uebel) virtue ancient theories of see ethics: ancient medieval theories of virtue ethics see ethics: virtue Viterbo, James of see James of Viterbo Vives, Juan Luis (Lorenzo Casini) volition see free will Voltaire (JB Shank) voluntarism, theological (Mark Murphy) von Pufendorf, Samuel Freiherr moral and political philosophy (Michael Seidler) voting (Gerry Mackie) methods (Eric Pacuit) W Wang Yangming war (Brian Orend) Ward, James (Pierfrancesco Basile) Watsuji Tetsur (Robert Carter) weakness of will (Sarah Stroud) Weber, Max (Sung Ho Kim) Weil, Simone well-being (Roger Crisp) Weyl, Hermann (John L. Bell) Wheeler, Anna Doyle Whewell, William (Laura J. Snyder) Whichcote, Benjamin see Cambridge Platonists Whitehead, Alfred North (A. D. Irvine) Wieland, Christoph Wilhelm William of Auvergne (Neil Lewis) William of Champeaux (Kevin Guilfoy) William of Ockham see Ockham, William William of Sherwood Williams, Bernard (Timothy Chappell) Williams, Donald Cary Wilson, John Cook (Mathieu Marion) Windelband, Wilhelm (R. Lanier Anderson) wisdom (Sharon Ryan) Wittgenstein, Ludwig (Anat Biletzki and Anat Matar) aesthetics (Garry Hagberg) logical atomism (Ian Proops) philosophy of mathematics (Victor Rodych) Wodeham, Adam Wolff, Christian (Matt Hettche) Wollstonecraft, Mary (Sylvana Tomaselli) Woodger, Joseph Henry world government (Catherine Lu) worlds impossible see impossible worlds possible see possible worlds Wright, Chauncey (Jean De Groot) Wright, Francis Wundt, Wilhelm Maximilian (Alan Kim) Wyclif, John (Alessandro Conti) political Philosophy (Stephen Lahey) X Xenocrates (Russell Dancy) Xenophanes (James Lesher) Xenophon Xunzi (Dan Robins) Y Yogācāra (Dan Lusthaus) Yorck von Wartenburg, Count Paul (Ingo Farin) Yoruba Philosophy epistemology ethics and aesthetics Yusuf Has Hajib Z Zabarella, Giacomo (Heikki Mikkeli) Zeller, Eduard Zeno of Citium Zeno of Elea (John Palmer) Zeno's paradoxes (Nick Huggett) Zhuangzi (Harold Roth) Zhu Xi zombies (Robert Kirk)
The First Call for Papers SOCREAL 2010 Second International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality 27 - 28 March 2010 Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan Under the Auspices of the Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy (CAEP) Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University In the past two decades, a number of logics and game theoretical analyses have been proposed and combined to model various aspects of social interaction among agents including individual agents, organizations, and individuals representing organizations. The aim of SOCREAL Workshop is to bring together researchers working on diverse aspects of such interaction in logic, philosophy, ethics, computer science, cognitive science and related fields in order to share issues, ideas, techniques, and results. The first SOCREAL Workshop was held in 9 - 10 March 2007 under the auspices of GPAE (Graduate Program in Applied Ethics, Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University) sponsored by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). Building upon the success of SOCREAL 2007, its second edition, SOCREAL 2010, will be held under the auspices of CAEP. SOCREAL 2010 will consist of lectures by invited speakers and presentations of submitted papers. Researchers from various fields, including logic, philosophy, ethics, computer science, cognitive science are hereby invited to submit an extended abstract (up to two thousand words) by 1 November 2009 to CAEP ( caep@let.hokudai.ac.jp ). The abstract should be written in English and sent as an attachment in pdf format. Each abstract should include a title, names and contact details of all the authors. It is requisite for at least one of the author(s) of each accepted paper to attend the workshop and present the paper. The time for presentation will be 55 minutes including discussion. The working language of SOCREAL Workshop is English. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to * language (or communication) as part of social reality, * speech acts (or communicative acts) as what shape social reality, * moral commitments (and conflicts) in social interaction, * logic and game theory as tools for studying social reality, * (organized) collective agency, * Norms and normative systems, * social institutional facts and their dynamics. INVITED SPEAKERS INCLUDE Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam and Stanford University) Fenrong Liu (Tsinghua University, China) PUBLICATION A printed booklet containing the abstracts of all the accepted papers will be available at the workshop. On-line proceedings containing the papers and the presentation slides presented at the workshop will be made available after the workshop. Selected papers from the workshop will also be published later in an issue of The Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy after an appropriate period for revision and another round of peer-review. GRANTS A limited number of grants of 20,000 to 50,000 yen will be available for postgraduate students and non-tenured scholars on a competitive basis. Priority is given to overseas students and scholars who present papers at the workshop. Anyone who wishes to apply for the grant should submit the completed Grant Application Form available at CAEP web-site at http://ethics.let.hokudai.ac.jp . IMPORTANT DATES Deadline for Submission of Abstracts: 1 November 2009 Notification of Acceptance: 15 December 2009 Workshop: 27-28 March 2010 WORKSHOP CO-CHAIRS Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam and Stanford University) Tomoyuki Yamada (Hokkaido University) PROGRAM COMMITTEE Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam and Stanford University) Jose Carmo (Universidade da Madeira, Portugal) Fenrong Liu (Tsinghua University, China) Jun Miyoshi (Kanto Gakuin University, Japan) Yuko Murakami (Tohoku University, Japan) Yasuo Nakayama (Osaka University, Japan) Manuel Rebuschi (Nancy University, France) Allard Tamminga (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands) Tomoyuki Yamada (Hokkaido University, Japan) Berislav Zarnic (University of Split, Croatia) LOCAL ORGANIZING COMMITTEE Nobuo Kurata (Hokkaido University) Koji Nakatogawa (Hokkaido University) Shunzo Majima (Hokkaido University) Yoshihiko Ono (Hokkaido University) Tomoyuki Yamada (Hokkaido University) CONTACT Shunzo Majima ( caep@let.hokudai.ac.jp ) Further information will be available at CAEP website: http://ethics.let.hokudai.ac.jp
Dov Gabbay , Paul Thagard , and John Woods . Volumes 1. Focal Issues Published 2. Physics Published 3. Biology Published 4. Mathematics In Production 5. Logic Published 6. Chemistry and Pharmacology 7. Statistics 8. Information Published 9. Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences 10. Philosophy of Complex Systems 11. Philosophy of Ecology 12. Psychology and Cognitive Science Published 13. Economics 14. Linguistics 15. Anthropology and Sociology Published 16. Medicine
Dr Luciano Floridi (弗洛里迪) Research Associate and Fellow in Information Policy Wolfson Building, Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD interests Philosophy of Information, Information and Computer Ethics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Logic and the History and Philosophy of Scepticism. biography Luciano Floridi (Laurea Rome La Sapienza, MPhil and PhD Warwick, MA Oxon. www.philosophyofinformation.net ) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire, where he holds the Research Chair in Philosophy of Information in the School of Humanities, and Fellow of St Cross College , Oxford University. He is the founder and director of the Information Ethics research Group at the University of Oxford , and of the research Group in Philosophy of Information at the University of Hertfordshire . He is best known for his pioneering work on two new areas of philosophical research, which he has contributed to establish: the philosophy of information and information ethics. His publications include over a hundred papers on epistemology and the philosophy of computing and information and several books, and have been translated into many languages. He is currently working on a new book entitled The Philosophy of Information for Oxford University Press, and editing the Handbook of Computer Ethics for Cambridge University Press. He is President of the International Association for Philosophy and Computing ( www.ia-cap.org ). info themes Foundations,LogicandStructures activities PhilosophyofInformation
来自: InfoSciPhi What is the Philosophy of Information (PI)? April 25th, 2006 Before I get much further along in discussions of the various topics and issues in this field, perhaps a short definition and some background information would be in order. I will try not to get too esoteric and technical with philosophical jargon in my writings on PI, since I want to keep you as readers. However, I have to do justice to the topic and to you as thinkers and educated, literate professionals by at least dealing with the basics of the discipline in the somewhat complex vernacular required. As early as the 1950s there was speculation about computers and intelligence as mathematician Alan Turing developed his Turing Test . He said, I propose to consider the question Can machines think? This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms machine and think. The advent of the computer has forced philosophers and computer scientists to consider new theoretical positions about the mind, cognition, consciousness, metaphysics , language, and much more. Until a few decades ago, professional philosophers have avoided the topics of PI and left them to other disciplines. The interdisciplinary nature of the issues in PI made it so that no particular specialty perceived these issues to be their own. Luciano Floridi , Associate Professor of Logic and Epistemology at Oxford , was incremental in defining the Philosophy of Information and has written extensively on various topics in the field. In his essay titled What is the Philosophy of Information he defines it thusly: Philosophy of information (PI) is the philosophical field concerned with a) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilization, and sciences, and b) the elaboration and application of information-theoretical and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. The dynamics of information could refer to such things as information life cycles (the various stages in form and functional activity through which information can pass), the constitution and modeling of information environments (one of which could be the library), or computation. Floridi says PI is prescriptive about what may count as information, and how information should be adequately created, processed, managed, and used. He goes on to state that that PI can be discussed through the perspectives of the ancient, classical, and modern authors such as Descartes , Plato , and Nietzsche , who wrote well before the current information age . I know that this is pretty dense subject matter, but I hope you can see why an informed discussion of PI is relevant to Library and Information Science. Floridi makes its importance clear as he concludes this essay with this paragraph: PI, understood as a foundational philosophy of information modeling and design, can explain and guide the purposeful construction of our intellectual environment, and provide the systematic treatment of the conceptual foundations of contemporary society. It enables humanity to make sense of the world and construct it responsibly, reaching a new stage in the semanticization of being. If what has been suggested here is correct, the current development of PI may be delayed but remains inevitable, and it will affect the overall way in which we address both new and old philosophical problems, bringing about a substantial innovation of the philosophical system. This will represent the information turn in philosophy. Clearly, PI promises to be one of the most exciting and fruitful areas of philosophical research of our time.
philosophy of computer science (PCS) is concerned with philosophical investigation at a level in which questions of knowledge (epistemology), existence (ontology), and value (ethics) are posed within the context of computer science, demanding expertise at least in computing as a specific field of inquiry. The PCS can be interpreted as a meta-discipline of computer science: It seeks to address philosophical problems that arise from within the discipline. By analogy, the PCS stands to computer science as does the philosophy of mathematics to mathematics and the philosophy of science to science. 信息来源
This book, published in 1978 by Harvester Press and Humanities Press, has been out of print for many years, and is now online. This online version was produced from a scanned in copy of the original, digitised by OCR software and made available in September 2001. Since then a number of notes and corrections have been added. 页面地址
标签: Philosophy
